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Note on transliteration 
As Hart (1981 vm) noted, the transliteration of vernacular terms and names, whether Arabic 
or Berber, "poses real pitfalls for the unwary" In this thesis, I have tried to be as consistent as 
possible to a simplified and standardized form of transliteration However, for the sake of 
understanding, official "French" spellings of established place names kept on from the French 
Protectorate Period are maintained instead of the official Berber or Arabic transcription (e g , 
Ouarzazate instead of Warzazat, Todgha instead of Tudgha or Todoght, Zaouia instead of 
Zawiya) The same goes for Arabic words that have found their way into the English 
language (e g , couscous) 
No diacritical marks for any vowels or (emphatic or non-emphatic) consonants are 
used in the text, save the 'am (a guttural sound produced by lengthening the glottal stop), 
designated by a comma ', to the left of the vowel which follows it The Arabic hamza has 
been omitted In the glossary, however, the ha, the "deep" h used in Tamazight Berber and 
Arabic, which is pronounced with a deep sigh and sounds like a loud whisper, has been 
indicated with a fe (e g , haratin) In the text, the simple h is used 
The g, typical of Tamazight Berber and Moroccan Arabic, is pronounced as the g in 
goodbye (e g , igurrameri) The kh is pronounced as ch in Bach In southern Morocco, the j is 
pronounced as the j in the French journal (e g, jellaba) The gh is pronounced as the 
"French" r in "Pans" (e g , Todgha, Tinghir) 
Todgha is pronounced as "Toe"-"dgha" with the "a" as in "ask" but then slightly 
elongated, and Tinghir as "Teen"-"gheer" with both "ee" pronounced as in "teen" 
But once we recognize 
that many ideas that are taken to be quintessentially Western 
have also flourished in other civilizations, 
we also see that these ideas are not 
as culture-specific as is sometimes claimed 
We need not begin with pessimism, at least on this ground, 
about the prospects of reasoned humanism in the world 
Amartya Sen, East and West The Reach of Reason 
The New York Review of Books, July 20, 2000 
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Introduction 
1.1. Anti-migrationism in a globalizing world 
Migration is an issue that raises high hopes and deep fears. In the West, and Europe in 
particular, the large-scale immigration of people coming from developing countries is 
increasingly perceived as a threat. This coincides with a common view that we live in a time 
of unprecedented migration. However, the popular idea that the late twentieth century is "the 
age of migration" (cf. Castles and Miller 1993), seems, from a global point of view, to be 
incorrect. Between 1965 and 1990, for example, the increase in the global international 
migration stock has almost kept equal pace with population growth. There were periods of 
equal if not more drastic international migration over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
(Zlotnik 1998:14). For instance, international migration during the second half of the 
twentieth century was at relatively modest levels compared to the international labor 
migration that occurred between 1870 and 1914, when more than 50 million people left 
Europe (Nayyar 2000). 
Also if we go further back in history, large-scale population movements (either 
refugees or labor migrants) over long distances have been common within and between non-
Westem and Western societies alike. There is also a tendency to overstate the general scale of 
current international migration. In fact, less than three percent of the world's population have 
lived outside their countries of origin for a year or more (IOM 2000:1). 
Views that recent international and internal migration are new or unprecedented 
phenomena should thus largely be rejected on empirical grounds. However, since the end of 
World War II there have been dramatic changes in the geographical orientation and direction 
of migration flows. Whereas in the nineteenth and early twentieth century the main global 
migration flows used to be predominantly North-North (mainly from Europe to North 
America), South-South (e.g., migration of Indian and Chinese indentured laborers to British, 
Dutch, French and German colonies), as well as North-South (from European countries to the 
colonies in the tropical world), South-North migration was very limited. However, this pattern 
has completely changed in the post-war period, with Western countries facing an 
unprecedented influx of non-Western migrants (see figure 1.1). 
In Western Europe, rapid post-war economic growth and an increasing shortage of 
semi- and unskilled laborers transformed countries from labor exporters to labor importers. 
Initially, in the 1950s and early 1960s, most labor migrants originated from southern 
European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece) or from former colonies. As 
of the mid-1960s, most migrant workers came from the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
countries, notably Turkey and Morocco. Since the 1980s, most southern European countries 
have become immigration countries themselves. For European societies, this large-scale 
influx of migrants from mainly non-Western countries was a completely new experience. For 
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countries like the United States and Canada, and also Australia and New Zealand, large-scale 
immigration was not a new phenomenon, but the increasing proportion of non-Western 
immigrants was. 
The global post-wwn international migration movements have increasingly become 
South-South and South-North. While acknowledging that most migration is among 
developing countries (CDR 2002), an increasing number of developing countries have become 
firmly integrated within migration systems that link them to rich countries (Schaeffer 
1993:43). It is not the relative number of international migrants, but the number of countries 
involved in international migration that has increased (Zlotnik 1998). Migration patterns also 
have the tendency to become increasingly diverse and complex: many countries have become 
both labor importers and exporters. Instead of being colonized, populations of developing 
countries have emigrated themselves to developed countries, and several non-Western 
countries, such as the Asian "tigers", Middle-East oil states, South-Africa, and Nigeria, have 
become labor importers in their own right. 
Figure 1.1. Annual number of migrants from "South" to "North" (1960-1989) 
D Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
• East and South-eastern Asia 
D Southern Asia 
• Northern Africa and Western 
Asia 
• Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: UNPD Population Information Network 
This reversal of global migration flows implying the settlement of large groups of non-
Western immigrants has literally brought "other worlds" to Western nations. This increasing 
visibility of migration and direct contact with other cultures may partly explain why, in the 
West, people at least perceive that migration has been on the rise in the late twentieth century 
and that this will remain so in the early twenty-first century. Large-scale migration from the 
developing to the developed world seems to raise deep fears in the West. Instead of being 
seen as a useful means towards development—as used to be predominantly the case until the 
early 1970s—migration is increasingly perceived as a problem and even as an outright threat. 
Since the mid-1970s, opposition to immigration in Europe and the US has increased. 
With the slowdown in economic growth and rising unemployment, migration has come to be 
perceived as a burden by most of the destination countries (Schiff 1996:2). Increasing 
numbers of migrants seem to be knocking on the rich world's doors, and are perceived as a 
threat not only to economic growth and to the welfare state, but also to general social, 
cultural, and political stability. In the post-9/11 era, popular perceptions that migrants form an 
internal threat to Western societies seem to have only further increased and the polarization 
between autochthonous and immigrant population seems to be increasing. 
In the late twentieth century, international migration was firmly placed at the top of 
national and international political agendas. Migration from the developing to the developed 
world is today a subject of increasing concern. Images of undocumented immigrants 
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desperately trying to cross the Rio Grande between Mexico and the United States or the Strait 
of Gibraltar between Morocco and Spain contribute to perceptions that migration is growing 
at an ever increasing rate. Especially in most European and East-Asian countries that lack a 
long history of immigration, politicians seem increasingly responsive to public fears of being 
"engulfed" by immigrants by reasserting the need to control or stem these flows. 
In political and academic circles, migration—perceived as "increasingly massive"—is 
typically seen as the outgrowth of all kinds of human misery, and future scenarios tend to be 
alarmist: 
population pressures, opportunity gradients and conditions of tyranny will have generated 
waves of migration towards the North and the West, which it will be impossible to contain. 
Our successors are likely to see mass migration on an unprecedented scale . . . . At the extreme 
it is not difficult to imagine innumerable immigrants landing on the Northern shores of the 
Mediterranean and consisting of the hungry and the desperate. Similarly, massive emigration 
from Latin Amenca to the United States is to be expected, while population pressure in China 
may seek relief by entering an empty Siberia . . . . the rising of the sea level as a result of the 
greenhouse effect could greatly increase migration pressures, for example, in Bangladesh and 
Egypt (King and Schneider 1991:62-3). 
In the developed world, such common views have led to an increasing public and also 
scholarly (Golini 1996:338) call to stop or at least decrease "undesirable" migration. The 
dominant narratives in most policy and some academic circles seem to be based not only on 
the assumption that migration is at an all-time high, but also that migration as a phenomenon 
is a threat to social and economic stability and development. South-North migration tends to 
be seen as a problematic phenomenon caused by a lack of development (which, it is believed, 
makes people move) in the countries and regions of origin and as a potential threat to both the 
sending (e.g., the "brain drain") and receiving societies. At its best, migration is perceived as 
a necessary evil to fill in shortages within particular sections of the labor market, and is much 
less frequently seen as contributing to development. Thus, migration and development are 
increasingly treated as contradictory phenomena. Rather than migration and development, it 
seems there can be only development or migration. 
Some scholars have argued that such negative perceptions cannot be dissociated from 
more fundamental "sedentarist" conservatism in Western discourse, in which migration tends 
to receive a generally negative press, and in which "population movements, whether 
haphazard or ordered, are regarded as a threat to stability and a challenge to established 
lifestyles" (McDowell and De Haan 1997:3, cf. Van der Post 1987:9). Concerns about 
migration seem to increase if majority groups perceive the settlement of new groups as a 
threat'. As such, this is not a new phenomenon. For instance, large-scale rural-to-urban 
migration has almost universally been perceived as a threat. Back in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, European citoyens and urban-based governments perceived rural 
1
 However, such womes mainly seem to apply to low-skilled and relalively poor immigrants. In Europe, for 
example, there is little resistance to highly-skilled migrant workers from Japan or Taiwan. In 2000, France 
invited Moroccan ITC experts and the Netherlands welcomed South African nurses Furthermore, migration by 
Europeans to the Americas has also not been perceived as an equally big threat. That the concomitant genocide 
of native populations was not perceived as a "threat to established lifestyles" reveals the strong ethnocentric 
component of contemporary thinking on migration It seems only now that the dominant global migration flows 
seem to have reversed, and that the settled populations of most developed countries are being confronted with 
permanent settlement of large groups of immigrants not sharing their culture and religion, that international 
migration has become a major issue of concern. 
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immigrants as a threat to their established lifestyles, in similar ways as urban-based elite 
groups in developing countnes perceive them nowadays (De Soto 2000) 
Sedentanst notions perceiving migration as potentially destabilizing seem to be partly 
behind the negativist bias against migration It is indeed striking that many scientific studies 
and the overwhelming majority of policy documents seem to aim either implicitly or 
explicitly at stopping or at least decreasing internal and international migration (Todaro and 
Maruszko 1987 111) Most policies are implicitly or explicitly negative on migration, and the 
control and limiting of migration remains a stated goal (McDowell and De Haan 1997) It is 
intriguing that such migration-decreasing aims are mostly formulated without explaining why 
this would actually be desirable This exemplifies that migration tends to be put a priori in a 
strongly negative light 
Within the developing world itself, there has been a great deal of concern about 
internal rural-to-urban migration The popular perception is that of increasing numbers of 
poor fleeing rural areas towards the "bright lights" of the city (Hams and Todaro 1970 126) 
Increasing poverty, population pressure, desertification (cf Schwartz and Notini 1994), war, 
and even "globalization" (cf Diatta and Mbow 1999) seem to have intensified the rural 
exodus Settling down in slums and often unemployed, rural-urban migrants seem to be 
destined to live in misery, forming a social volcano of discontent and a potential threat to 
political stability This rural exodus is also perceived as severely hampering development in 
the areas migrants leave behind As with international migration, the aim of policymakers and 
scholars alike seems to be to stem the migration flow (cf Epstein and Jezeph 2001) 
Large-scale rural-to-urban labor migration within or between developing countries (to 
the detriment of traditional, predominantly circular, seasonal, and rural-to-rural migration 
patterns) seems to be a largely late nineteenth century and twentieth century phenomenon 
However, while recognizing the historical uniqueness of each specific migration experience, 
the processes of economic development and "modernization" seem to be universally 
associated with the increasing concentration of economic and social activities in towns and 
cities In the nineteenth and twentieth centunes, Europe and North America also witnessed a 
massive transfer of economic agents from agriculture to urban-onented sectors In many 
ways, development seems to be conditional on rural-to-urban migration (De Soto 2000, 
McGee 1994 m, Skeldon 1997 196, Todaro 1969 139,) In this historical light, it is not 
surprising that the numerous attempts by governments to turn the tide, that is, to stop the rural 
exodus and to "fix" rural populations on their homesteads, typically fail (Bebbington 1999, 
De Haan et al 2000) Research seems to indicate that rural people mostly have good reasons 
to migrate to urban areas, where they have a higher chance to find employment and where 
they have better access to all kinds of public amenities 
Moreover, as with international migration, there has also been a tendency to overstate 
the magnitude of rural-to-urban migration in the developing world In general, the most 
important cause of rapid urban growth is natural population increase, not migration (Skeldon 
1997 8-9) Moreover, in most countries, rural populations have continued to grow and have 
not decreased as a whole Therefore, the metaphor exodus might not be a particularly accurate 
choice to indicate contemporary processes of rural-to-urban migration 
Within the developing world, the attitude towards international migration is rather 
ambiguous There is a rather positive inclination towards migration of lower-educated 
workers to industrial countnes (e g , migration of "guestworkers"), partly because of the hard 
currency remittances this generates However, there is a lot of concern surrounding the human 
capital flight of higher educated people or the "brain drain" (Adams 1969, Baldwin 1970), 
which is generally perceived as detnmental to national development—in spite of evidence 
that there might also be a "brain gain" alongside the "brain drain" (Stark et al 1997, cf 
Cohen 2003 9) In any case, this "brain dram" has proven to be notoriously difficult to curb as 
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long as economic and political conditions in the countries of origin do not show significant 
improvements. 
1.2. Turning the tide: aid and trade instead of migration? 
As far as European and East-Asian governments have been interested in the issue of 
migration and development, it has mainly been from the utilitarian perspective of stopping 
migration, reflecting a fundamental belief that migration and development are processes that 
are more or less negatively correlated. In the years following the 1973 Oil Crisis and the 
subsequent economic recession, European governments started to implement increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies. In addition, they started to experiment with specific measures 
to discourage family reunification and to encourage migrants to return to their home 
countries, such as departure bonuses, mother-tongue teaching for migrants' children, training 
programs before return, and investment programs for return migrants (Abadan-Unat et al. 
1976; Entzinger 1985; Obdeijn 1993; Pekin 1986; Penninx 1982). 
Such return policies typically failed, largely because of the lack of opportunities for 
economic reintegration in most countries of origin, which continued to suffer from high 
unemployment, political instability and repression, and unfavorable developmental conditions 
in general. Moreover, return migrants were generally not allowed to go back to the receiving 
countries if their investment project failed or if they failed to re-adapt. This made migrants 
decide to stay "to be on the safe side" (Entzinger 1985:263-275). Return policies did not lead 
to a significant increase in return migration. Instead, they sometimes had the adverse effect. 
When the former Federal Republic of Germany, for example, tried to discourage family 
reunification in the late 1970s, family migration increased, as many migrants feared that, 
eventually, family reunification might be forbidden entirely (Entzinger 1985:267). Such 
policies have not contributed to positive attitudes between migrants and residing populations, 
leading to a climate of suspicion towards Western governments among migrants as well. 
During the 1980s, policy makers in Europe started to acknowledge that many 
"guestworkers" would stay permanently. This led to a shift in policies, in which increasing 
attention was paid to development aid as a means to promote development and, hence, curb 
further immigration. The underlying belief was that by addressing the alleged "root causes" of 
migration (economic underdevelopment and poverty), migration could be reduced. In the 
same vein, policymakers, pressure groups, and scholars advocating trade liberalization vis-à-
vis developing countries typically assumed that this would boost development, and, hence, 
ultimately lower South-North migration. Trade policy has been considered by both the EU 
(e.g., partnerships with southern and eastern Mediterranean countries) and the US (e.g., 
NAFTA) as a means to reduce migration (Schiff 1996:4; Martin 2002:2). 
The anti-migrationist aim underpinning aid and trade policies is hardly hidden by 
policy makers. For instance, in 1994, the European Ministers for Development Cooperation 
requested the European Commission to investigate the possibility of using development aid to 
diminish migration pressures (DGIS 1996). In a policy document, the Dutch Ministry for 
Development Cooperation stated that well-coordinated development policies could, 
particularly in the longer term, contribute to reducing unwanted migration. The Ministry also 
pleaded for the establishment of "flexible" employment programs in the countries of origin, 
and asserted its support for a "general remigration program, aiming at the voluntary return of 
migrants to developing countries" (DGIS 1996:44). 
Similarly, at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference which was held in Barcelona in 
1995, the developing countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean and the EU countries 
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agreed to "strengthen cooperation in order to ease migration pressure" (DGIS 1996, for other 
examples see Ghosh 1992a 390) Another example of development programs with a strong 
anti-migrationist undertone are the French-Senegalese programs to promote the voluntary 
return of Senegalese, by providing assistance to migrant workers for reinsertion, in the forms 
of credit funds, training-for-retum programs, and so on These programs aim to 
reverse the exodus of the Senegalese explain to people the problems and hazards of 
emigration demonstrate to them [populations in areas with high emigration] that their 
temtory is full of gainful opportunities" which they can exploit m association with Senegalese 
living abroad (Diatta and Mbow 1999 251) 
In order to convince the Senegalese that it is for their own good not to go abroad, and to urge 
migrants to "return and invest", they advocate, amongst others, the "publication of a brochure 
on business opportunities" in Senegal (Diatta and Mbow 1999 253) 
Dominant Western perceptions of migration (and development) testify to an 
ethnocentric view (cf De Mas 1991) The bulk of the popular and scholarly literature on 
South-North migration is written from the perspective of the receiving countnes There is a 
very impressive body of literature on problems of economic, social, and cultural integration of 
migrants and ethnic minorities in the newly emerging multicultural societies of Western 
Europe, North Amenca and several Asian countnes (cf Castles and Miller 1993) In 
companson, there has been relatively little attention given to the issue of migration and 
development from the perspective of the migrant sending areas, the only notable exception 
being the ongoing and controversial "brain drain" debate (Adams 1969, Baldwin 1970, Beijer 
1970, Muir 1969, Golub 1996, Oommen 1989, Stark et al 1997) However, the actual 
developmental impact of migration on migrant sending areas has been relatively ignored over 
the past decades, in particular concerning migration to Europe 
The relative lack of interest in the developmental causes and impacts of migration 
from the perspective of migrant sending regions and countnes in the developing world has 
hampered a proper understanding of how the processes of migration and development are 
reciprocally related The one-sided focus on the receiving end has also hampered the design 
of more realistic migration policies, since the developmental roots of migration are largely 
ignored and therefore misunderstood 
For instance, policy makers and many academics often assume that poverty breeds 
labor migration, and that economic development would therefore lead to less migration 
However, as we will see in chapter 2, the paradox is that economic development initially 
tends to lead to more migration instead of less Development tends to stimulate migration in 
the short and medium term as it raises people's aspirations and actual ability to move abroad 
The idea that development leads to less migration is based on the notion that the poorest ("the 
hungry and the desperate"—cf King and Schneider 1991 62-3) have the highest tendency to 
migrate In reality, the poorest tend to migrate less than those who are slightly wealthier, as 
they are more restrained by the high opportunity costs and nsks which migration involves 
(Heanng and Van der Erf 2001) This seems particularly true for international migration 
Therefore, alarmist visions of migration and development stem from an erroneous 
analysis of the problem They typically ignore how both phenomena are intnnsically 
connected and how difficult or impossible it is to "tum the tide" Besides overestimating the 
ability of governments and aid agencies to promote development, the erratic point of 
departure of trade and foreign aid policies to reduce migration is that development will lead to 
significantly decreased migration Schiff (1994) convincingly demonstrated that in a labor-
abundant economy, trade liberalization, foreign aid, and remittances will increase income 
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from labor and improve workers' ability to cover the costs of migration Consequently, South-
North migration will increase (cf Martin and Taylor 1996) 
Development not only facilitates migration, but is also conditional on the transfer of 
rural labor to urban sectors within and across national boundanes In general, migration 
seems a constituent part of broader processes of development, which can only be stopped 
under totalitarian conditions (cf Skeldon 1997 202) Therefore, in an increasingly 
interdependent and globalizing world, the whole assumption that migration can be curbed to a 
significant extent seems unrealistic 
Moreover, through the establishment of transnational networks, migration movements 
tend to gain their own momentum over time, and have, therefore, become notoriously difficult 
for governments to control Network connections are a form of social capital which reduce the 
risks and opportunity costs of migration, and which people draw upon to gain access to 
foreign employment (Massey et al 1993 448-50, cf Klaver 1997, Waldorf 1998) Increasing 
legal restnctions on migration, partly driven by public pressure, are at odds with processes of 
"globalization", implying increasing flows of capital, goods, and information 
The combination of high and even increasing global income disparities and a lack of 
political freedom and instability in large parts of the developed world, as well as tight labor 
markets in specific economic sectors and the aging populations in the developed countries, is 
not likely to result in a decrease in future migration Rather, it is likely that undocumented 
labor migration and refugee movements will persist or increase, facilitated by extensive 
migration networks, whereas highly skilled laborers will continue to be welcomed (Salt 
1987) 
1.3. The age of remittances 
Western-centered perceptions of migration and development tend to ignore the fact that for 
numerous people living in the developing world, migration is not a threat, but the hope of a 
better future Equally, the governments of sending countries have high expectations of the 
labor they "export", expecting this to result in a flow back of remittance capital Moreover, 
they tend to expect that emigrants will invest considerable amounts of money in productive 
enterprises upon their return 
The fact that internal and international migration is greatly contributing to sustaining 
the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people in developing countnes is not fully 
appreciated by policy makers Whereas policy makers in developing and developed countries 
alike have been concentrating on designing rural development schemes and return migration 
programs, numerous labor migrants and their family members have been actively contributing 
to their home economies by sending remittances 
Migrant remittances have become increasingly important for most developing 
countnes More and more, people initially migrate individually, leaving their families behind, 
but sending considerable amounts of goods and money back to sustain them In the final 
decades of the twentieth century, the reduction of costs of transportation and communication 
and the global expansion of banking systems have facilitated the maintenance of intensive, 
intergenerational links between migrants and "stay-behinds" and the formation of so-called 
transnational communities This has facilitated increasing flows of information, goods, and 
money between migrant sending and receiving countries These processes have certainly 
played a major role in the enormous increase of international remittance flows in the past few 
decades 
8 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
Remittances sent back to migrant sending regions play a vital role in alleviating 
poverty and sustaining and improving livelihoods As Jones (1998a 4) argued, migrant 
remittances are a safety net for relatively poor areas, and remittances are freer from political 
barriers and controls than either product or other capital flows Remittances are usually 
destined for relatively "backward", rural regions that are most in need of development capital, 
and they more often help preserve rural livelihoods than lead to their demise However, it 
should be noted that, as with the process of migration itself, the benefits of remittances are 
selective, and do not tend to flow to the poorest members of communities (cf CDR 2002 2, 
Schiff 1994 15) 
If we are not living in the age of migration, we are certainly living in the age of 
remittances Total world remittance credits (the sum of worker remittances, compensation of 
employees, and migrant transfers) rose from US$ 2 billion in 1970 to US$ 28 billion in 1988 
In 2000, official estimates of the total value of migrant remittances were in the order of US$ 
100 billion annually, some 65 percent of which go to developing countries (Gammeltoft 
2002 1) Since this does not include transfers in cash and kind and remittances sent through 
informal channels, the actual amount of remittances is likely to be substantially higher 
As figure 1 2 shows, remittances to developing countries more than doubled between 
1991 and 1999 In contrast, official aid flows fell through most of the 1990s Accumulated 
over the 1990s, officially reported remittances to developing countnes have been 
approximately 20 percent higher than official development assistance (Gammeltoft 2002 2) 
This may put into a more realistic perspective the argument that development aid is a means 
to reduce migration pressures (Russell 1992 269) Migrant remittances seem a more effective 
instrument for income re-distribution than large, bureaucratic development programs or 
development aid An important characteristic of remittances is that they tend to flow directly 
back to the family members of the migrants, and do not have to be distributed through formal 
bureaucratic hierarchies or be "trickled down" through the economy 
Governments tend to focus on the importance of remittances as a source of foreign 
currency and their potential contribution to economic growth in modem sectors, such as 
industry and agnculture This view coincides with a neglect of the direct importance of 
remittances at the micro and meso level, that is, the way in which migrants can be agents 
themselves, who migrate to sustain or to improve their livelihoods, to fulfill their ambitions, 
to live in better secunty and health, and to increase the options they have in life 
Migrant remittances have been shown to "play an important role in poverty alleviation 
for migrant households and sub-national areas of out-migration [and] improve the ability 
of migrant families to educate and provide health care for their children " (Russell 1995) 
Keely and Tran (1989 514) argued that "it is difficult to imagine a mechanism for the transfer 
of so much capital to so many (and often poor) countnes and to the benefit of so many of their 
citizens" There is probably no other, more "bottom-up" way of redistributing and enhancing 
welfare among populations in developing countnes than these remittances (Jones 1998b) 
It is not the poorest, but typically the higher lower and lower middle income countries, 
especially those located relatively close to developed countnes or with particular colonial 
bonds, that have experienced the highest international migration rates (Skeldon 1997) 
Countnes such as Mexico, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and the Philippines have witnessed out-
migration on unprecedented scales, and remittances have become a crucial economic pillar at 
both the macro and micro level As a percentage of their GNP, the Middle East, North Africa, 
and the Caribbean receive the largest inflows of remittances However, for many low-income 
countnes in Sub-Saharan Africa and South-Asia, remittances are also becoming increasingly 
important and constitute a much higher share of total international capital flows to poor 
countries compared to middle-income countries (Gammeltoft 2002 2) 
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Figure 1.2. Official remittance and aid flows to developing countries (1991-1999) 
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It has often been predicted that the surge in remittances would be a temporary phenomenon. 
From this, remittances are seen as an unreliable source of revenue, which cannot contribute to 
sustained growth, and which could create a "dangerous" dependency. This argument was 
partly based on the prevailing assumption that, in the wake of the 1973 Oil Crisis, the era of 
massive South-North labor migration had largely ended. For instance, in Europe it was 
expected that most "temporary" Mediterranean guestworkers would return (Pekin 1986). 
However, this has generally not happened. South-North migration has been more persistent 
than was expected. 
In addition, there has been a tendency to underestimate the durability of transnational 
and transgenerational family linkages and, hence, remittance flows. Remittances have 
generally proven to be a much more stable and reliable source of income than more volatile 
sources of foreign exchange, such as FDI (foreign direct investment) and development aid 
(Gammeltoft 2002; Keely and Tran 1989). The assumption that migration movements as well 
as remittance flows will experience a rapid and steep decline in the near future can therefore 
be rejected (Keely and Tran 1989). 
1.4. The migration and development debate 
Few would deny the direct contribution of remittances to the livelihoods of families left 
behind. However, the question of whether migration and remittances can bring about 
sustained development and economic growth in migrant sending areas and countries has been 
the subject of heated debate over the past four decades, in which the more pessimistic views 
have tended to dominate (Hayes 1991; Keely and Tran 1989; Lewis 1986; Papademetriou 
1985; Taylor 1999). 
Developmentalist "migration optimists" tend to argue that migration leads to a North-
South transfer of investment capital and accelerates the exposure of traditional communities 
to liberal, rational and democratic ideas, modem knowledge, and education. Within this 
perspective, returned migrants in particular are perceived as important agents of change, 
innovators, and investors. 
On the other hand, structuralist "migration pessimists"—often inspired by dependency 
theory—have argued that migration and concomitant changes such as growing inequality and 
individualism lead to the withdrawal of human capital and the breakdown of traditional. 
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stable village communities and their economies, and the development of dependent, passive, 
non-productive communities, which become increasingly dependent on remittances 
Moreover, they argue that remittances are mainly spent on luxury goods and "consumptive" 
investments, and rarely invested in productive enterprises In this perspective, South-North 
migration is perceived as discouraging the autonomous economic growth of migrant sending 
countries (cf Durand et al 1996) 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the new economics of labor migration (NELM) emerged as a 
response to both developmentalist theory (the "migration optimists") and structuralist theory 
(the "migration pessimists") Both approaches seemed too rigid to deal with the complex 
realities of the migration and development issue NELM offered a much more subtle view on 
migration and development, in which both positive and negative development responses are 
possible Instead of separating determinants and impacts of migration—which has been 
common—NELM postulates that the factors determining migration decisions both at the 
sending and receiving end are also likely to shape remittance and investment behavior (Taylor 
1999 64-3) 
These improved theoretical insights into migration and development interactions were 
mainly due to the rise in sound empirical micro-studies, mainly conducted in Mexico NELM 
scholars criticized the weak methodological foundations, poor analytical quality, and 
empiricist character of most prior research, which typically failed to take into account the 
complex, often indirect, positive impacts of migration and remittances on migrant sending 
communities as a whole, including nonmigrant households (Taylor et al 1996a) 
The sparse amount of pertinent micro-level data has long constrained the fields of 
international migration research Although many social scientists have addressed migration in 
their work, most studies have been largely descriptive-inductive and were not designed to 
explicitly test hypotheses on migration and development interactions As a result of this 
theoretical void and the general lack of a common thread in the debate—or even the absence 
of a common theoretical debate—most empirical work remains isolated, scattered, and 
theoretically underexplored I would therefore advocate a stronger connection between theory 
and empiry, which can only be achieved if researchers try to design their studies in such a 
way that they are able to add to the theoretical debate The breakthrough that NELM has 
established over the past two decades proves the strong potential of theoretically embedded 
empirical research on migration and development 
There is now widespread consensus among migration researchers that empirical 
micro-level studies generally provide richer and more detailed and reliable data than those 
available from official sources (Fawcett and Arnold 1987 1523-1537, Sabagh 1997) More 
detailed field studies are essential in enabling us to evaluate existing theones and to offer 
insights that will lead to their improvement 
1.5. Migration and development research in Morocco 
The overwhelming majonty of theoretically embedded micro-studies which have recently 
been published in international, refereed journals are based on NELM-inspired research in 
Mexico done by (mostly US-based) researchers Other countries, such as Turkey (cf Day and 
Içduygu 1997, Içduygu et al 2001), the Philippines (cf Rahman 2000), India (cf Zachana 
2001), Egypt (cf Adams 1991, 1993), and some countries in sub-Saharan Africa (cf De Haan 
et al 2000, Lucas and Stark 1985, Lucas 1987) have received relatively limited attention over 
the past two decades With a few exceptions (cf Adams 1991, 1993, for Egypt) there is a near 
complete absence of empirical micro-studies done outside Latin Amenca that systematically 
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explore the developmental impact of migration at the local and/or the regional level This 
empincal vacuum hinders the evaluation of hypotheses generated by NELM-and other recent 
theoretical models for most countnes in South-America, Africa, and Asia 
This particularly applies to the Mediterranean region (Massey et al 1998 126) It is 
remarkable that the issue of migration and development in migrant sending areas in the 
Mediterranean received extensive attention in the 1970s, but has largely disappeared from the 
empirical research agenda since then Most recent studies (cf King 1996) examining this 
issue are either very general country-level studies based on secondary (macro-) data or 
literature reviews based on earlier studies from the 1970s or early 1980s, whereas the 
migration and development context of the Mediterranean as well as the theoretical debate 
have radically changed since then 
In the 1980s and 1990s, most European researchers seemed to turn their backs on the 
migrant sending countries in the Mediterranean The growing awareness that most 
guestworkers would not return probably explains why the focus shifted from the sending to 
the receiving countries The general focus of recent migration literature on the European-
Mediterranean region has been on the "integration" of migrants in the "receiving" countnes, 
the emergence of multicultural societies and transnational identities, and the role of networks 
in perpetuating the migration process 
Compared to the voluminous literature on integration and multicultural issues, the 
general lack of interest in the situation of the sending countries is striking, which apparently 
reflects an ethnocentric bias in migration research (De Mas 1991, Michalak 1997) The 
broader question of migration and development in the context of Mediterranean-European 
migration has hardly been addressed through systematic empirical research recently In the 
relatively few cases where large research projects have been funded that involve research in 
sending countnes, these mainly concern research on the "root causes" of migration and the 
role of migration networks (cf Hearing and Van der Erf 2001 ) The effects of migration on 
development in sending areas have received little attention 
Consequently, research emanating from the Mediterranean region has only played a 
minor role in the theoretical migration and development debate over the past two decades 
This especially applies to Morocco, which is surpnsing regarding its prominent position 
among the world's migrant sending countries Since the late 1960s, Morocco has been one of 
the main countnes of origin for immigrants to European countries like France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and, and more recently, Italy and Spain Currently over two 
million people of Moroccan descent live abroad, and remittances have become among the 
country's most important sources of foreign exchange 
In the 1970s, the REMPLOD (Re-Integration of Emigrant Manpower and Promotion of 
Local Opportunities for Development) project marked both the beginning and early climax of 
systematic research on migration and development in Morocco (Heinemeijer et al 1976, 
1977) The project was initiated and funded in 1974 by the Dutch Ministry of Development 
Cooperation in order to explore the ways in which international labor migration could 
contribute to development in the sending countnes (Van Dijk et al 1978) This was in a time 
when it was generally expected that labor migration from countries such as Morocco would 
be temporary, and, consequently, that most migrants would return Large-scale emigration to 
Europe, which gained full momentum in the late 1960s, was still very new 
The REMPLOD project entailed parallel research in Morocco, Turkey (Abadan-Unat et 
al 1976), and Tunisia (Koelstra and Tieleman 1976) In Morocco, a team of Moroccan and 
Dutch geographers, sociologists, and economists earned out the research The effects of rural 
out-migration to European countnes on two rural regions (the Rif and the southwestern Sous 
region) were compared through an extensive survey conducted in several villages that 
included both migrants and nonmigrant households 
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The findings of the REMPLOD project gave a thoughtful and comprehensive view of the 
impact of migration on regional development at a relatively early stage of massive migration 
from Morocco to Europe. The project revealed that, although migrants showed a relatively 
high propensity to invest in local enterprises, and did so more than nonmigrants, the 
investment opportunities for migrants m their regions of origin were very limited. Moreover, 
migrants were generally lowly qualified and did not tend to return. The conclusion was, 
therefore, that economic development in the regions of origin was a prerequisite for return 
migration and remittance investment rather than a consequence of migration (Heinemeijer et 
al. 1976). 
Unfortunately, interest in such elaborate and comparative studies on migration and 
development largely faded in the 1980s and 1990s. Although numerous regional studies have 
since been conducted, their empiricist nature and generally weak methodological design do 
not allow the testing of hypotheses on migration and development relationships. Bencherifa 
(1993:51) commented that, notwithstanding the relative abundance of studies examining 
Moroccan migration, the focus has been on the causes and morphology of migration and that 
the impact of migration on development in the areas of origin has rarely been at the center of 
attention, having mostly been mentioned "in passing". 
The relatively few studies that have paid more substantial attention to this issue have 
been rather pessimistic concerning the impact of migration, and seem largely to support the 
premises of structuralism in general and dependency theory in particular. In this perspective, 
migration is generally seen as a process that drams rural areas of their most valuable labor 
forces, causing agricultural decline and an increasing and potentially harmful dependency of 
these regions on remittances. Therefore, instead of contributing to development, migration 
rather reinforces under-development according to most of these studies (Ait Hamza 1988; 
Lazaar 1987;Lebon 1984). 
Nevertheless, the pessimistic tone of these studies seemed based more on deductive 
reasoning than on actual empirical findings able to sustain such conclusions. For instance, 
hardly any study systematically compares migrants and nonmigrants, although this seems 
essential in order to be able to assess migration impacts. This poor state-of-the-art seems to 
hold for Mediterranean migration and development research in general (Massey et al. 
1998:126). 
A general paralysis has unfortunately pervaded thinking on migration and 
development in the Mediterranean, in which the dominant "truth" that migration does not 
contribute to "genuine" development in sending areas (cf. King 1996) is not sufficiently 
challenged by fresh empirical evidence. This makes the debate somehow self-affirmative, 
leading researchers to repeat conclusions such as "it is a well-known fact that many migrant 
workers have been able to save considerable sums of money, but if these savings were 
transferred to their home country they were seldom invested in a productive manner" 
(Entzinger 1985:268). 
As from the late 1980s, however, some new Moroccan studies on the impact of 
migration and development in migrant sending areas, mainly conducted by geographers, have 
appeared which have questioned the unilaterally pessimistic conclusions of earlier research. 
Bencherifa (1991, 1993) injected new life into the debate on migration and development in 
Morocco by stressing the spatial heterogeneity of migration impacts and by calling for a more 
subtle view of this issue. 
Several mostly regional-geographical studies, which were conducted in the southern 
oasis of Figuig (Bencherifa and Popp 1990) and in the northern area around Nador 
(Bencherifa and Popp 2000) seemed to indicate that migration, under certain circumstances, 
has significantly contributed to processes of local and regional development. Although 
migrants indeed spend money on basic luxury items and the construction of modem houses, 
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remittances are also used for the purchase of agricultural land and equipment or the 
establishment of several enterprises for their families 
However, most research done in Morocco has remained strongly empiricist and seems 
largely disconnected from the broader theoretical debate on migration and development Most 
studies have not been targeted at testing premises of recent theoretical perspectives on 
migration and development at all Moreover, as these studies are rarely published in major 
international academic journals, valuable research results remain largely unknown to the 
larger academic community This is both surprising and unfortunate when we realize that 
Morocco is one of the major labor-exporting countries in the world Morocco is one of those 
typical "labor frontier countnes" (Skeldon 1997), where migration has affected everyday life 
of most families and where migration has transformed society 
It is a missed opportunity that the general theoretical debate on migration and 
development is not "fed" by empincal work conducted in one of the world's leading 
emigration countries Perhaps even more importantly, a better understanding of the 
developmental causes and impacts of migration from Morocco—located only 13 kilometers 
off Europe's south coast—can contribute to the formulation of more realistic policies towards 
migration and development It is time to go beyond naive ideas on "development or 
migration" and instead see migration as a constituent part of development processes 
Improving insights into actual migration-development interactions and possible obstacles to 
migrants' investments—seen from the perspective of the migrants themselves—will probably 
be more valuable for policy formulation than unrealistic legalist approaches aimed at "just 
stopping" migration 
Therefore, it seems desirable to create a better connection between the general 
theoretical debate on migration and development and the Moroccan expenence Embedding 
empincal research in a broader, NELM-based theoretical framework will—instead of 
reinventing the wheel—also provide us with a set of readily testable hypotheses that will 
guide and focus research 
1.6. Aims and structure of this study 
This study attempts to establish a connection between contemporary migration and 
development theory and the specific Moroccan migration and development experience This 
is done through detailed and extensive empirical research in the Todgha valley, a river oasis 
located in the Province of Ouarzazate and part of so-called "Presaharan" Morocco This 
region, predominantly a peasant economy until French colonization, has been characterized 
by intensive and increasing out-migration to various internal and international destinations 
over the twentieth century 
This study examines the linkages between labor migration and development, with a 
theoretical focus on the impact of internal and international labor migration on development 
processes in migrant sending areas in developing countries The main aim of this study is to 
contribute to the contemporary debate on migration and development, which is largely based 
on insights derived from empincal research conducted in other regions than the Maghreb The 
study has been designed to test and refine at least some of the prevailing hypotheses in this 
general debate, which will be presented in chapter 2 On the basis of data collected among 
507 households in six villages in the Todgha valley over the period September 1998-July 
2000, it will be explored to what extent current insights into migration and development hold 
for this study, and in what respects they might possibly need adaptation in the light of this 
particular Moroccan expenence 
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Acknowledging that a strict distinction between labor migration and other types of 
migration cannot always be made, this study will primarily focus on labor migration 
However, it will consider family migration—which is closely intertwined with labor 
migration and often functions as labor migration "in disguise"—and student migration, which 
is both a precursor to and a consequence of labor migration The study deals with both 
internal and international migration movements, assuming that both movements are 
intrinsically interrelated, and should therefore be considered simultaneously This study 
specifically examines the issue of migration and development from the perspective of the 
sending areas The migrants' position at the destination and the internal functioning of 
migrant networks do not form part of this study, since doing justice to these issues would 
require at least two additional studies 
Besides contributing to the theoretical debate with empirical evidence from a major 
labor-exporting country that has hardly played a role in this debate so far, this study also 
hopes to offer greater insight into the specific characteristics of migration-development 
interactions in Morocco, which have not before been studied within a NELM-based theoretical 
perspective The final aim of this study is to offer greater insight into the factors that explain 
the spatio-temporal differentiation in migration-development interactions This study not only 
aims to study the (positive or negative) impact of migration on development in the Todgha 
valley as a whole, but also the principles determining the heterogeneity of the interactions 
between migration and development As we will explain in chapter 2, this not only pertains to 
spatial heterogeneity, but also to the differentiated impact migration may have in the different 
fields of "development" (e g , education, material and social well-being, culture, agriculture, 
and other economic sectors), distributional issues (inequality), and temporal aspects 
The structure of this thesis is as follows In chapter 2, the theoretical debate on 
migration and development is extensively reviewed The aim will be to link theoretical 
perspectives on the causes of migration to theoretical perspectives on the impacts of migration 
at the sending end I will argue that it is possible to integrate insights denved from transitional 
migration theory, the new economics of labor migration, and so-called livelihood approaches 
into a "stmcturationahst" and "new regional geographical" view on migration and 
development, in which different development responses to migration are possible within a 
certain latitude set by structural, constraining conditions Narrow or vague concepts of 
"development" have severely hampered a transparent debate on migration and development I 
will therefore propose to apply the "capabilities approach" developed by Amartya Sen to the 
migration and development debate 
Chapter 3 presents the problem statement and research questions of the empirical 
study in the Todgha valley The chapter will equally justify, present, and evaluate the research 
methodologies used Chapter 4 examines the evolution of migration patterns within and from 
Morocco over the twentieth century, including the macro-economic interests migration 
represent for the country, government policies aimed at influencing migration patterns, and 
the investment behavior of migrants 
In the remainder of this thesis, the empirical results of the fieldwork will be presented 
Chapter 5 gives a general introduction to the Todgha valley Chapter 6 provides an overview 
of the character, evolution, selection and developmental causes of migration from, to, and 
within the Todgha Chapter 7 will analyze what role migration has played m changing oasis 
livelihoods, and how migration has affected the well-being and capabilities of oasis 
households Chapters 8 and 9 will provide an assessment of the way in which migration has 
affected investment patterns and the effects of migration on regional economic development 
in general Chapter 8 will examine the role of migration in transformations in the agricultural 
sector, chapter 9 will give attention to investments in non-agricultural domains of the regional 
economy, and will equally look at the impact of migration on the educational levels of 
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household members. Chapter 10 examines the role of migration in social, cultural, and 
institutional change, and how migration has affected oasis life in more general terms. Chapter 
11 will then summarize and integrate the analyses of the preceding chapters, and will assess 
to what extent the results of the study have confirmed, refuted, or modified the theoretical 
insights on the interaction between migration and development that will be presented in the 
second chapter. 

2 
Migration and development theory 
2.1. General migration theories 
Over the twentieth century, several theoretical perspectives on migration have been 
developed. However, they have generally evolved in isolation from one another, and show 
important differences in their level of analysis as well as paradigmatic and thematic 
orientation. One of the possible reasons for this lack of coherence is that migration has never 
been the exclusive domain of one of the social sciences, but has been studied by most of 
them. Differences in paradigmatic orientation and level of analysis have led to widespread 
controversy on the nature, causes, and consequences of migration. In their highly influential 
review article, Massey et al. (1993:432) stated that popular thinking on international 
migration 
remains mired in nineteenth-century concepts, models, and assumptions . . a full 
understanding of contemporary migration processes will not be achieved by relying on the 
tools of one discipline alone, or by focusing on a single level of analysis. Rather, their 
complex, multifaceted nature requires a sophisticated theory that incorporates a vanety of 
perspectives, levels, and assumptions 
Over the past decades, several migration researchers have bemoaned the absence of a 
comprehensive migration theory, and there have been numerous calls to develop just such a 
general migration theory (cf. Lee 1966; Massey et al. 1998; Zelinsky 1971). Among the main 
reasons explaining why it is so difficult to generalize about the causes and consequences of 
migration are the diversity and complexity of the phenomenon as well as the difficulty of 
separating migration from other socio-economic and political processes. Moreover, it is often 
difficult to combine macro- and micro-level theories of migration. This has led scholars to 
conclude that there will probably never be a general theory on migration (Salt 1987; Van 
Amersfoort 1998). 
Up to the early 1980s, the debate on migration tended to be polarized, with neo-
classical, functionalist views on the one hand and historical-structuralist views (neo-Marxist, 
dependency, world systems) on the other. Since then, however, under the influence of 
postmodernism and structuration theory, the debate has become less polarized and has been 
characterized by increasing synergy between migration theorists from different disciplines 
and paradigmatic backgrounds. Moreover, there has been increasing recognition of the 
(eclectic) possibility to combine and integrate different theoretical perspectives on migration, 
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Massey et al. 1993). Although it would be 
naïve to assume that an all-encompassing and all-explaining meta-theory on migration will 
ever arise, there is undoubtedly more room for theorizing on migration processes and how 
they connect with broader processes of development. 
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It seems particularly the above-mentioned fragmentation of migration studies and the 
related inability to put migration into a broader theoretical perspective of development, and, 
consequently, to connect both causes and consequences of migration, that has haunted 
migration studies so far This chapter will attempt to develop a theoretical framework, which 
puts migration in a developmental perspective, drawing on and combining concepts from 
different theoretical approaches In this, we will elaborate on the main theoretical perspectives 
that dominated the debate on migration and development over the twentieth century, with a 
particular emphasis on the impact of labor migration on development in migrant sending areas 
in the developing world 
Notwithstanding this focus on migration and development in sending areas, we will 
start this chapter by examining general theones of migration, which mainly focus on the 
causes of migration and the feedback mechanisms through which population movements are 
perpetuated This is a deliberate choice, since if we believe that the causes and consequences 
of migration are strongly interrelated, the specific circumstances that cause migration will 
equally affect the "recursive" effects of migration on development in sending areas (cf 
Taylor 1999) For instance, it matters whether labor migration is to be seen as a desperate 
"flight from misery" or a voluntary endeavor by young, ambitious people to acquire sufficient 
capital to invest in their own enterprise upon return Without a proper insight into the 
fundamental causes of migration, assessing its impacts risks becoming a fuzzy affair 
Moreover, general theoretical stances towards migration (e g, neo-classical and 
structuralist interpretations) will greatly influence the specific analysis of the localized 
developmental impacts and the interpretation of empirical results Only through considering 
the causes and consequences of migration within a single theoretical perspective—ι e , 
through incorporating them within a general perspective on migration and development—can 
we deepen our theoretical understanding of this phenomenon as an integral part of broader 
development processes 
Secondly, we will discuss specific theoretical perspectives on the impact of internal 
and international migration on development m migrant sending areas in the developing world, 
looking at opposing traditional "optimistic" and "pessimistic" views, and analyzing their 
intimate connections with functionalist and structuralist views on development Thirdly, we 
will present alternative, more pluralist and refined views on migration and development that 
have emerged more recently We will argue that the "new economics of labor migration" and 
household-onented "livelihood approaches", when put in a single perspective, offer a 
valuable theoretical framework which is better able to deal with the inherently heterogeneous 
nature of migration impacts 
Finally, the possible shortcomings of recent approaches will be discussed We will 
propose how to overcome some of these shortcomings by putting the debate on migration and 
development into a broader development perspective, thereby drawing on Sen's (1999) 
capabihties-onented perspective on development, the so-called new regional geography 
combined with insights from Giddens' (1984) structuration theory on the recursive 
relationship between agency and structure Altogether, this will provide us with an analytical 
framework, which will serve as a guideline for the remainder of the study 
2.1.1. The neo-classical equilibrium perspective 
The first scholarly contribution to migration consisted of two articles by the nineteenth 
century geographer Ravenstein (1885, 1889), in which he formulated his "laws of migration" 
He saw migration as an inseparable part of development, and he asserted that the major 
causes of migration were economic Migration patterns were further assumed to be influenced 
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by factors such as distance and population densities (Skeldon 1997:19). This perspective, in 
which people are expected to move from low income to high income areas, and from densely 
to sparsely populated areas, that is, the general notion that migration movements tend towards 
a certain spatial-economic equilibrium, has remained alive in the work of many 
demographers, geographers, and economists ever since (Castles and Miller 1993:20). 
Although the issue of migration has never attracted substantial attention within 
mainstream economic theory itself (cf. Bauer and Zimmermann 1998:95; Lee 1966:48; 
Passaris 1989:525-7), economic explanations have dominated popular and scholarly thinking 
on migration. At the macro-level, neo-classical economic theory explains migration by 
geographical differences in the supply and demand for labor. The resulting differentials in 
wages cause workers to move from low-wage, labor-surplus regions to high-wage, labor-
scarce regions. Migration will cause labor to become less scarce at the destination and scarcer 
at the sending end. Capital is expected to move in the opposite direction. In a perfectly neo-
classical world, this process of "factor price equalization" (the Heckscher-Ohlin model) will 
eventually result in growing convergence between wages at the sending and receiving end 
(Harris and Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954; Ranis and Fei 1961; Schiff 1994; Todaro and 
Maruszko 1987). In the long run, this process would remove the incentives for migrating. 
At the micro-level, neo-classical migration theory views migrants as individual, 
rational actors, who decide to move on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. Supposing free 
choice and full access to information, they are expected to go where they can be the most 
productive, that is, are able to earn the highest wages. This capacity obviously depends on the 
specific skills a person possesses and the specific structure of labor markets. 
Neo-classical migration theory sees rural-urban migration as an constituent part of the 
whole development process, by which surplus labor in the rural sector supplies the workforce 
for the urban industrial economy (Lewis 1954). By postulating that it "is a well-known fact of 
economic history that material progress usually has been associated with the gradual but 
continuous transfer of economic agents from rural based traditional agriculture to urban 
oriented modem industry" (Todaro 1969:139), neo-classical migration theory is firmly 
entrenched in "developmentalist" modernization theory (cf. Rostow 1960). 
Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) elaborated the basic two-sector model of 
rural-to-urban labor migration. This "Harris-Todaro model" was very influential and has 
remained the basis of neo-classical migration theory since then. The original model was 
developed in order to explain the apparently contradictory phenomenon of continuing rural-
to-urban migration in developing countries despite rising unemployment in cities. The model 
was bom out of discontent with vague and "amorphous explanations such as the "bright 
lights" of the city acting as a magnet to lure peasants into urban areas" (Harris and Todaro 
1970:126). Harris and Todaro argued that, in order to understand this phenomenon, it is 
necessary to modify and extend the simple wage differential approach by looking "not only at 
prevailing income differentials as such but rather at the rural-urban "expected" income 
differential, i.e., the income differential adjusted for the probability of finding an urban job" 
(Todaro 1969:138). 
The expected income in the destination area not only depends on the actual (or 
average) earnings at the destination, but also on the probability of employment. The 
assumption is that, as long as rural-urban income differences remain high enough to outweigh 
the risk of becoming unemployed, the "lure of relatively higher permanent incomes will 
continue to attract a steady stream of rural migrants" (Todaro 1969:147). This model diverged 
from the usual models as it assumed the existence of two separate rural and urban sectors and 
unemployment. However, in the light of mounting empirical evidence from developing 
countries, it is questionable to what extent it is indeed possible to separate the urban and rural 
sectors. Moreover, and perhaps even less realistically, the model assumed the existence of a 
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determined minimum urban wage at levels substantially higher than agricultural earnings 
(Hams and Todaro 1970 126) 
Later, the Hams-Todaro model was refined to make it more realistic (Bauer and 
Zimmermann 1998 97) Modifications pertained to the inclusion of other factors than 
unemployment that influence the expected income gains that can be achieved through 
migration The potential gains in the form of higher wages should be balanced with factors 
such as the opportunity costs of migration, that is, the costs of travel, temporary 
unemployment while moving and installation at the destination, and the psychological costs 
of migration In fact, as we will see, the opportunity costs and risks associated with migration, 
particularly international migration, explain why it is generally not the poorest who migrate— 
ι e , migration is a selective process—and why migrant networks are so essential to lowering 
the material and psychological thresholds to migration 
Although the Hams-Todaro model was initially developed for internal migration, it 
can, with some modifications, also be applied to international migration Borjas ( 1989, 1990) 
postulated the idea of an international immigration market, in which potential migrants base 
the choice of destination on individual, cost-benefit calculations Todaro and Maruszko 
(1987) developed a model for undocumented international migration, which takes the Hams-
Todaro model as basis, but adds to it the probability of being captured and deported as well as 
the "illegality tax" 
Further extension of the model is possible by interpreting it within a human capital 
framework, in which migration is seen as an investment decision In economic theory, human 
capital has increasingly been recognized as a crucial factor in the process of economic 
development in "modernizing" societies (Becker 1962, Sjaastad 1962) Human capital theory 
assumes that personal assets such as skills, education, and physical abilities are fundamental 
"capitals" that influence economic production Human capital theory enables us to 
theoretically explain the selectivity of migration beyond explanations focusing only on 
opportunity costs Migrants are typically not representative of the communities they come 
from Considering that individuals are different in terms of personal skills, knowledge, 
physical abilities, age, sex, and so on, there will also be differences in the extent to which 
people are expected to gain from migrating, that is, they can expect diverging returns on their 
"migration investment" 
Differences in expected "returns on investments" will partly explain diverging inter-
individual propensities to migrate Depending on the specific type of labor demand in migrant 
receiving areas, migrants will be selected depending on their specific skills and educational 
background This makes it possible to explain theoretically why the likelihood of migration 
decreases with age and that individuals with higher education often exhibit a higher migration 
probability (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998 99) The most important analytical and 
methodological implication of this is that researchers should not only pay attention to 
aggregate labor market variables like wage and employment differences, but should also take 
into account the relevance of individual "capitals" in the migration decision (Bauer and 
Zimmermann 1998 99) This is not only important in order to correctly assess the nature of 
the migration process, but also to understand the developmental impact of migration The 
notion of migration selectivity is of fundamental importance in determining migration impacts 
at the origin For instance, in order to study its consequences on income inequality, it is 
crucial to know whether migrants are from either relatively neh or poor sections of the 
population In order to assess selectivity and migration impacts, empirical studies should 
therefore take into consideration (i e , record) the socio-economic characteristics of migrants 
compared to nonmigrants 
Many of the later refinements of neo-classical migration theory relate to the selectivity 
of migration Without denying the importance of expected wage differentials, the likelihood 
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of particular groups emigrating is also supposed to depend both on the opportunity costs of 
migration and individual human capital characteristics This makes patterns of migration 
selectivity also dependent on the specific characteristics of labor markets determining chances 
to find employment as well as immigration policies The combination of such factors may 
explain the differentiation and dynamism that seem typical of migration patterns 
Neo-classical migration theory can be positioned within the functionalist paradigm of 
social theory, as the central argument of factor price equalization assumes that economic 
forces tend towards an equilibrium and also because it largely ignores the relevance of 
structural constraints One can wonder whether this is realistic, particularly in the context of 
developing countnes, and this partly explains why the neo-classical approach has been 
criticized on several grounds 
First of all, place utility and other micro-theones assume that migrants have perfect 
knowledge of the costs and benefits of migration, which is typically not the case (McDowell 
and De Haan 1997 9) As we will see, access to information has proven to be a crucial factor 
in determining actual migration patterns, as are social capital factors such as access to migrant 
networks 
A second criticism is that neo-classical migration theory is not able to deal with 
constraining factors such as government restrictions on migration However, this criticism can 
be contested to a certain extent, as such constraining factors can be included in neo-classical 
models as "migration market distortions," raising the opportunity costs and risks of migration 
(cf Todaro and Maruszko 1987) A third, more valid, criticism is that in most developing 
countnes, factor markets (capital, insurance) are typically far from perfect, making access to 
financial services and capital difficult or even impossible for marginalized groups This 
makes actual migration patterns difficult to explain within a neo-classical framework that 
mainly focuses on expected income 
Neo-classical migration economy has also been criticized for being a-histoncal and 
Euro- or Westem-centric, supposing that migration (i e , the transfer of labor from agricultural 
rural to industrial urban sectors) fulfills the same facilitating role in "modernization" as it did 
in nineteenth century Europe, thereby largely ignoring specific political, geographical, and 
socio-cultural factors that influence migration processes In fact, the structural conditions 
under which contemporary migration in and from developing countries takes place are rather 
different Migration typically does not take place in a social, cultural, political, and 
institutional void Approaches that try to deal with such issues will be at the center of the 
following section 
2.1.2. Historical-structural theory and asymmetric growth 
A radically different interpretation of migration was provided as of the 1960s by the 
historical-structural paradigm on development, which has its intellectual roots in Marxist 
political economy (Castles and Miller 1993 22-23) Contemporary historical-structural theory 
emerged in response to functionalist (neo-classical, developmentalist-modemizationist) 
approaches towards development Historical-structuralists postulate that economic and 
political power is unequally distributed among developed and underdeveloped countnes, that 
people have unequal access to resources, and that capitalist expansion has the tendency to 
reinforce inequalities Instead of modernizing and gradually progressing towards economic 
development, underdeveloped countnes are trapped by their disadvantaged position within 
the global geopolitical structure 
As in most fields of social science, histoncal-structurahsm has clearly dominated 
migration research in the 1970s and 1980s Histoncal structuralists have not developed a 
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migration theory as such, but perceive migration as a natural outgrowth of disruptions and 
dislocations that are intrinsic to the process of capitalist accumulation They interpret 
migration as one of the many manifestations of capitalist penetration and the increasingly 
unequal terms of trade between developed and underdeveloped countries (Massey et al 
1998 36) 
Andre Gunder Frank (1966, 1969) was the frontrunner of the "dependency" theory, 
which hypothesized that global capitalism (and migration as one of its manifestations) 
contributed to the "development of underdevelopment" The dependency school views 
migration not only as detrimental to the economies of underdeveloped countnes but also as 
one of the very causes of underdevelopment, rather than as a path towards development 
According to this theory, migration ruins stable peasant societies, undermines their economies 
and uproots their populations 
Another exponent of this historical-structural school of thought is Emmanuel 
Wallerstein (1974, 1980), whose world-systems theory classified countnes according to their 
degree of dependency, and distinguished between the capitalist "core" nations, followed by 
the "semi-penpheral", "peripheral", and isolated nations in the "external" area, which were 
not (yet) included in the capitalist system In this perspective, the incorporation of the 
peripheries into the capitalist economy is associated with putting a (migration) dram on them 
Historical structuralists have criticized neo-classical migration theory, stating that 
individuals do not have a free choice, since they are fundamentally constrained by structural 
forces Within this perspective, migration is not a matter of free choice, but people are forced 
to move because traditional economic structures have been undermined as a result of their 
incorporation into the global political-economic system Through these processes, rural 
populations become increasingly deprived of their traditional livelihoods, and these uprooted 
populations become part of the urban proletariat to the benefit of those core areas that rely on 
cheap (immigrant) labor 
Historical structuralists have been criticized for being too determinist and rigid in their 
thinking in viewing individuals as "pawns" that passively adapt to macro-forces, thereby 
largely ruling out individual agency Moreover, rigid historical structuralism may have been 
refuted by recent history, as various formerly developing and labor exporting countnes have 
achieved sustained economic growth in the past decades despite (or thanks to) their firm 
connection to global capitalism (Sen 1999) For most southern European countnes and some 
Asian Nies, the incorporation into global capitalism and, possibly, high labor migration have 
apparently worked out well, despite gloomy predictions some decades ago (Almeida 1973, 
Papademetnou 1985) 
There is increasing consensus that capitalism as such cannot be blamed for the 
problems of underdevelopment, but that the specific developmental effects of incorporation of 
a region or country into the global capitalist system seems to depend much more on the 
conditions under which this takes place, that is, how the incorporation is embedded into wider 
institutional structures as well as the internal socio-political cohesion and economic strength 
of countnes and regions Thus, depending on these circumstances, the incorporation into 
global capitalism can have both positive and negative effects in different areas of 
development and on different groups of people within society (Sen 1999, Stiglitz 2002) 
In the same vein, (labor) migration cannot automatically be interpreted as a "flight 
from misery", not only because it is seldom the poorest who migrate, but also because it may 
facilitate development in several ways through reverse flows of capital and knowledge 
Moreover, if migration were only to the benefit of the exploitative "core", how could we then 
explain why immigration is often perceived as a threat, and how could then we explain why 
employed people voluntarily leave their country (Castles and Miller 1993 23)9 
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2.1.3. The push-pull framework 
Both neo-classical and historical-structural theories of migration typically fail to explain why 
some people in a certain country or region migrate and others do not (Massey et al. 1993; 
Hemers 1999:680), and why people tend to migrate between particular places in a spatially 
clustered, concentrated, non-random fashion. It can therefore be useful to look at some of the 
spatial models developed by geographers and demographers over the past decades. 
In 1966, Lee bemoaned the fact that since Ravenstein developed his famous laws of 
migration almost eighty years earlier, no substantial theoretical insights had been added to the 
field of migration studies. In his attempt to contribute to the theoretical advance of migration 
studies, Lee revised Ravenstein's laws on migration and proposed a new analytical 
framework for migration. In his view, the decision to migrate is determined by the following 
factors: factors associated with the area of origin; factors associated with the area of 
destination; so-called intervening obstacles (such as distance, physical barriers, immigration 
laws, and so on); and personal factors. 
Lee (1966:54-55) argued that migration tends to take place within well-defined 
"streams", from specific places at the origin to specific places at the destination, not only 
because opportunities tend to be highly localized but also because the flow of knowledge 
back from destination facilitates the passage for later migrants. As we will see, the latter 
argument fits well into network and chain migration theories explaining the self-reinforcing 
tendencies and perpetuation of migration. 
Lee also stated that migration is selective with respect to the individual characteristics 
of migrants because people respond differently to plus and minus factors at origin and 
destinations and have different abilities to cope with the intervening variables (Reniers 
1999:681). Therefore, migrants are rarely representative of their community of origin. This is 
in line with neo-classical explanations of on migration selectivity explained by differences in 
human capital endowments and the discriminating aspects of opportunity costs. 
Although Lee did not apparently invent or employ the term himself1, his analytical 
framework is commonly referred to as the "push-pull" model (Passaris 1989). The push-pull 
model is basically an individual choice and equilibrium model, and is, therefore, largely 
analogous to neo-classical micro models. The push-pull model has gained enormous 
popularity in the migration literature over recent decades (cf. Hearing and Van der Erf 2001, 
Zachariah et al. 2001). Most researchers who have applied the push-pull framework have 
assumed that various environmental, demographic, and economic factors determine migration 
decisions. Two main forces are typically distinguished to create the pushes and pulls: rural 
population growth which caused a Malthusian pressure on natural and agricultural resources, 
which pushed people out from marginal rural areas, and economic conditions (higher wages) 
that lured people into cities and industrialized countries (Skeldon 1997:20; cf. King and 
Schneider 1991:62-3; Schwartz and Notini 1994). 
At first sight, the push-pull model seems attractive, as it is apparently able to 
incorporate all the factors that play a role in migration decision-making. It is frequently 
suggested that a general view of labor migration could best be achieved using a push-pull 
framework, because of its apparent ability to integrate other theoretical insights (Bauer and 
Zimmermann 1998:103). Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the push-pull framework is of 
1
 The push-pull polarity has commonly, but undeservedly, been attributed to Lee (1966) For instance, Petersen 
(1958) already used the push-pull terminology, without however specifying its ongins, which probably go back 
to the early twentieth century. 
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much analytical use, and whether it can be called a theory at all It is rather a purely 
descriptive model in which the different factors playing a role in migration decisions are 
enumerated in a relative arbitrary manner Its all-inclusive pretensions are also its main 
weakness Push-pull models often have the character of ad-hoc explanations forming a 
depository of factors that "might play a certain role" The model does not allow for assigning 
relative weights to the different factors affecting migration decisions, nor does it allow for 
empirical tests on the role and importance of factors that have been included or excluded 
Analyses concluding that "low wages", "high population pressure" or "environmental 
degradation" as opposed to better conditions at the destination "cause" migration tend to be so 
general as to be more or less stating the obvious 
A fundamental weakness of this model is that push and pull factors are generally 
mirrored in each other For example, if a researcher states that migrants are lured to the big 
city or to foreign countnes because of the "high wage pull", she or he always says this in 
relation to the "low wage push" at the sending end High urban or foreign wages alone will 
probably not lure peasants away if wages at home are equally high It then becomes arbitrary 
and open to subjective judgment to establish whether the push or the pull is dominant In fact, 
the differences in the relative scarcity of labor can be aptly expressed in one single variable, 
that is, wage differentials 
Push and pull factors then tum out to be two sides of the same coin together they 
provide the perception of difference between "here" and "there", and therefore have limited 
heuristic value (cf Wittmann 1975 23, cited in McDowell and De Haan 1997 9) Although 
the assumption that people tend to move from low to high wage areas might seem logical at 
first sight, this does not necessarily hold true at the individual level Whether migration 
occurs crucially depends on the skills and knowledge of migrants and conditions in the 
specific economic sectors where they can find employment both at the origin and destination 
Such sectoral differences may even explain migration from areas (or countnes) with high on 
average wages to poorer areas Moreover, as we will see later in our discussion on the 
mobility transition theory and the "migration hump", the effect of wage differentials on 
migration rates is by no means linear This all points to the limitations of equilibrium 
approaches 
Besides wage differentials, factors such as population pressure, demographic pressure, 
or environmental degradation have commonly been postulated as direct or indirect "causes" 
of migration (cf King and Schneider 1991 62-3, Schwartz and Notini 1994, Zachanah et al 
2001 71-9) For example, Farrag (1997 319), recently stated for sub-Saharan Africa that 
in addition to landlessness per se, emigration dynamics were clearly influenced by small farm 
size, marginal ecological conditions that render cash cropping unviable, depleted soil fertility 
caused by population pressure no limited land and low levels of farm income 
Nevertheless, such statements are too general and lack commitment Apart from the fact that 
population or migration pressure are relative, difficult-to-grasp and often weakly defined 
concepts, such factors alone cannot explain why people move People do not typically move 
from places "because" they expect to find a "better environment" or "less population 
pressure", but because they expect to be able to make a more satisfying living elsewhere In 
fact, most migrants tend to move from areas with relatively low population densities and 
relatively little environmental degradation to environmentally degraded areas with high 
population densities People tend to be increasingly concentrated in crowded places—cities, 
towns, and prosperous agricultural areas—that, however, offer better social and economic 
opportunities in terms of individual freedom, paid labor, and entrepreneurial activities This 
illustrates the limitations and triviality of "push-pull" explanations 
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The general problem with these kinds of more or less neo-Malthusian explanations is 
that they tend to single out environmental factors in relation to population pressure as 
"causes" of migration. Although environmental factors might indeed play an important role, 
they should be seen in relation to other political, economic, social, and cultural factors that 
eventually determine standards of living, the distribution of wealth, and unequal access to 
resources. Moreover, explanations focusing on natural endowments continue to implicitly 
perceive migrant sending areas as closed, self-sustaining regions characterized by subsistence 
agriculture. Even if this ever were true, this closed-regions image is increasingly far from 
reality in a globalizing world, in which even the most remote regions are becoming 
increasingly linked to the outside world through infrastructure, trade, and migration, and in 
which rural economies are also becoming increasingly diversified (cf. Bebbington 1999). 
Thus, so-called environmental "causes" should not be isolated from the social, political, and 
institutional factors that determine the access to and use of natural and other economic 
resources, and which, together, shape the local economic context in which people try to make 
a living. 
In the same vein, population growth, which has often been postulated as a "cause" of 
migration pressure, is clearly only one component of a complex chain of processes, and can 
only be applied if the ceteris paribus trick is made (Coleman 1999:486-7). Time and again, 
"population pressure" is (too) narrowly defined in terms of people per square kilometer of 
farmland, without taking into account potential productivity increases and the income earned 
in non-agricultural sectors. In fact, the whole gamut of economic conditions and access to 
various economic resources determines the extent to which different groups within society are 
able to make what they perceive as a satisfactory living. 
Moreover, the propensity to migrate crucially depends on the aspirations of people, an 
element which is typically ignored by push-pull models—in which needs are assumed to be 
constant—but is essential in explaining migration. After all, aspirations are typically not 
constant, and it is often the level of aspiration that determines perceived "overpopulation" in 
relation to local economic opportunities (cf. Petersen 1958:259). For instance, increased 
wealth in combination with better education, increased media exposure, and the (concomitant) 
confrontation with the wealth of other people may increase feelings of relative deprivation, 
and may give rise to higher aspiration levels and, therefore, increased migration. Moreover, a 
slight increase in wealth may enable people to bear the opportunity costs and risks of 
migrating. Therefore, decreased wage differentials may in fact lead to increased migration. In 
general, migration is not a survival strategy, that is, a last resort to escape from extreme 
conditions of poverty and unemployment. Most labor migrants do not flee, but move 
deliberately in the expectation of finding a better or more stable livelihood, and to improve 
their social and economic status (Appleyard 1995:295). 
Analogous to neo-classical economic models, push-pull models—at least in the way 
they are commonly interpreted—can be criticized for unrealistically viewing migration as a 
calculation by individuals, without paying attention to structural constraints, which imply that 
people typically have unequal access to resources. The model is a functionalist gravity-model 
which supposes a tendency towards equilibrium between push and pull factors, an assumption 
which has been contested by historical structuralists. The push-pull model assumes full and 
equal access to information and various resources or "capitals", and humans are portrayed as 
more or less atomistic individuals that operate in an institutional, social, and cultural void. 
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Furthermore, it does not take into account how migrants perceive their worlds and relate to 
their kin, friends, and community members (Cross et al. 1998)2. 
Last but not least, push-pull models are also not able to explain return migration and 
the simultaneous occurrence of emigration and immigration in many areas, nor do they pay 
attention to the impacts of migration, and the way it may alter the structural contexts both at 
the destination and origin. In other words, the push-pull model is a static model that is unable 
to link migration to broader processes of development, and therefore seems of little analytical 
use. By disassociating migration from development, and ignoring the question of how 
migration and development influence each other over time, it tries to artificially cut off 
migration from the general process of which it is a constituent part. 
Fortunately, there have been attempts by geographers and, more recently, economists 
which go beyond simplistic explanations supposing a linear, static link between migration and 
(expected) income differentials, but which instead try to model how development and 
migration—seen as a constituent component of development—are reciprocally related over 
time, and how the character and role of migration changes in the course of the development 
process. These dynamic or—as they will be referred to in this study—transitional models, 
will be at the center of the following section. 
2.2. Transitional models: The mobility transition and the migration 
hump 
There have been various attempts to link the demographic transition theory to population 
mobility. The most comprehensive "spatio-temporal" attempt was that by Zelinsky (1971), 
who postulated his hypothesis of the mobility transition, which was a fusion between the 
demographic transition theory, the notion of the spatial diffusion of innovations, the economic 
principle of least effort or economic optimization, and the hypotheses developed by Lee 
(1966). 
The fusion of the spatial with the temporal perspective would seem especially intriguing. 
Indeed, it is surprising how little effort has been made by geographers to treat the 
demographic transition as a process diffusing outward through space and time . . . . There are 
definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during 
recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization 
trend (Zelinsky 1971:220-2) 
Zelinsky argued that through the development of scientific knowledge, modem man had 
extended control over his own physiology in the form of death and birth control, resulting in 
the demographic transition. He preferred to use the term vital transition, in which he 
broadened the concept of demographic transition by linking it to processes of modernization, 
It is important to stress, however, that Lee (1966) himself explicitly stated that people take migration decisions 
on the basis of perceived differences between the origin and destination Nevertheless, researchers who worked 
with push-pull models did generally not elaborate on this point. Lee's writing is in fact subtler than later 
interpretations of his model. Reading Lee, one wonders how many "push-pull researchers" actually read his 
1966 article. Although the push-pull model—as it is commonly interpreted—seems of little use for our 
theoretical understanding of migration and development linkages, Lee's insights into the geographical clustering 
of migration streams through information flows back are still valuable 
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economic growth, and increasing mobility In many respects, this vital transition can be 
equated with what others would name development 
Zelmsky (1971 230-1) argued that there has not only been a general and spectacular 
expansion of individual mobility in modernizing societies, but also that the specific character 
of migration processes tends to change over the course of this vital transition He 
distinguished five phases in the vital transition (a) The pre-modem traditional society (high 
fertility and mortality, little natural increase if any), (b) The early transitional society (rapid 
decline in mortality, major population growth), (c) The late transitional society (major decline 
in fertility, significant but decelerating natural increase), (d) The advanced society (fertility 
and mortality stabilized at low levels, slight population increase if any), (e) A future 
"superadvanced" society (continuing low fertility and mortality) 
The core of his argument was that each of these phases were linked to distinct forms 
of migration and mobility, in a process that he designated the mobility transition Based on a 
review of empirical and theoretical migration literature, Zelmsky tried to integrate different 
kinds of labor mobility, both internal and international, long-term and circular movement, 
within one single analytical framework The different types of migration would peak at 
different points in the vital transition Premodem traditional societies (phase a) are mainly 
characterized by limited circular migration and little "genuine residential migration" In the 
early stages of the vital transition (phase b in particular), all forms of mobility (circular, rural 
colonization frontiers, internal rural-urban, international) increase In phase c, international 
migration decreases rapidly, rural-to-urban internal migration slackens but remains at high 
levels, and circular movements would further increase and grow in structural complexity At 
the end of phase c, the rural exodus significantly decreases, as the number of those employed 
in agricultural production approaches the minimum level associated with optimum economic 
return 
In phase d, rural-to-urban migration continues though at a reduced scale, residential 
mobility is important, urban-to-urban migration and circular movements increase 
significantly Moreover, in this phase countries transform themselves from being net labor-
exporting to labor-importing countries, as there is a significant net immigration of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers from developing countries next to limited out-migration and 
circulation of skilled and professional workers In phase e, most internal migration is urban-
urban, residential and circular mobility decreases due to better communication technology, 
and immigration of unskilled labor will continue 
Zelmsky's approach was innovative in the sense that it was the first model which saw 
migration in a spatio-temporal development perspective, and which does not assume a 
negative-linear relation between development and migration In fact, it acknowledges that 
migration tends to increase, in particular in the early phases of development, in which 
improvements in transport and communication, flows of knowledge, education, a perceived 
lack of local economic opportunity, and a minimum level of welfare increase both the urge 
and capability of people to migrate Only in the later stages of development, characterized by 
decreasing population growth and increased welfare, will classical forms or rural-to-urban 
(the rural exodus) and international migration by unskilled workers decrease, although these 
will be partly replaced by other forms of migration and immigration It is a diffusionist model 
by assuming that the propensity—as a function of inclinations and capabilities—to migrate 
was initiated in the most developed zones and then progressively spread to less developed 
zones 
Zelmsky's mobility transition is a universal model, as it assumes that all societies 
undergo the same kind of processes Thus, mobility transition theory is profoundly rooted in 
modernization theory (cf Rostow 1960), and that has also been the main subject of later 
criticism Its universahstic pretensions are not only its strength, but also its mam weakness 
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Like neo-classical and "developmentallst" migration theory, the model is a-histoncal in 
assuming that there is one single, unilinear path towards development, whereas in reality 
migration and development do not affect areas in the same way (Findlay et al 1998) For 
instance, in the Arab oil countnes we find mobility systems that are far removed from 
previous historical expenence and even the inevitability of the urban transition has been 
questioned—for example in parts of sub-Saharan Africa—by some researchers, although 
others claim that the urban transition is inevitable and universal (Skeldon 1997 40) 
Mobility transition theory has also been criticized for its assumption of largely 
immobile traditional societies, which has turned out to be erroneous Perceptions that 
migration is a new phenomenon are based on the "myth of the immobile peasant" (Skeldon 
1997 7-8), that is, the implicit assumption in much of (Western) popular and scholarly 
thinking that pre-modem societies consisted of relatively isolated, stable, static, homogeneous 
peasant communities, in which migration was fairly exceptional False notions of stable 
peasant societies can be associated with a more sedentanst conservatism rooted in Western, or 
at least European, thinking (cf McDowell and De Haan 1997 3) Back in the 1950s, Petersen 
(1958 258) argued that the familiar push-pull polarity implies a universal sedentary tendency, 
which has little empirical basis 
Skeldon (1997 32) argued that the idea that the Industrial Revolution uprooted 
peasants from their stable communities for the first time was in fact a romanticized elitist 
view of peasant life Historical research on Europe and Japan and in present-day rural 
developing societies has shown that peasant societies are, and have generally been, highly 
mobile (De Haan 1999, McDowell and De Haan 1997, Moch 1992, Rubenstein 1992 127) 
The magnitude and patterns of spatial mobility may have been highly variable across groups 
and over time, but "migration was very much an intrinsic characteristic of past and present 
rural societies" (Skeldon 1997 8) 
Although such criticism seems valid to a certain extent, this does not necessarily upset 
the entire mobility transition model Unfortunately, attempts to deconstruct the mobility 
transition models and other developmentalist approaches towards migration can easily 
degenerate into a relativist caricature Although it is true that migration as such is not new or 
a singular event—instead, it seems a universal feature of human mankind—its character has, 
however, fundamentally changed due to revolutionary technological and infrastructural 
developments and the incorporation of regions and countnes within international capitalism 
This process of global integration started with European mercantile and colonial expansion— 
some say even earlier—and further accelerated after the Industrial Revolution The major 
advances in transport and communication technology in the second half of the twentieth 
century have further facilitated this process of "globalization" The enormous reduction in 
costs of transportation and communication have facilitated the closer integration of the 
countries and peoples of the world, and the breaking down of bamers that have facilitated the 
increasing flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and—though to a lesser extent— 
people across borders (Stiglitz 2002 9) 
Beginning in the seventeenth century North Sea countries, and further extending 
throughout Europe m the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the spatial diffusion of 
development processes has resulted in massive rural-to-urban migration within Europe and 
North America (cf Moch 1992) Moreover, tens of millions of Europeans—over 50 million 
between 1870 and 1914 alone (Nayyar 2000)—migrated to the Americas, or other colonies 
around the world In most developing countnes, processes of large-scale rural-to-urban 
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migration and voluntary3 international labor migration over long distances have gained 
momentum in the late nineteenth and twentieth century, and can hardly be dissociated from 
the connected and overlapping processes of development, the progressive incorporation of 
peasant economies into the capitalist economy, and globalization. Although migration as such 
is not a new phenomenon, contemporary—why not say modem—patterns of migration are in 
a way unique and fundamentally different from those in pre-industrial societies both in 
geographical scope and in intensity. 
Although the historical conditions under which migration within and from the 
developing world currently occurs are different from those in the nineteenth century, there is 
very little that is unique about these processes, and it would therefore be unwise to reject 
"generalizing" transitional models out of hand (cf. Skeldon 1997:40). Notwithstanding the 
appropriate criticism of Zelinsky's assumption of stable peasant societies, it would, on 
empirical grounds, also be erroneous to suggest that the historical evolution of migration 
patterns in both the developed and developing world can be disconnected from broader 
development or modernization processes. 
Despite the current "taboo" on evolutionary developmentalist models, there seem to be 
some interesting historical parallels between migration patterns in different countries (e.g., the 
switch of southern European countries from labor exporters to importers) that fit surprisingly 
well into the mobility transition model, which seems rather accurate to describe and explain 
how the character of migration changes over the course of development processes. 
For instance, if we look at global migration patterns, it is striking that the countries 
with the lowest GNP and the highest population growth do not exhibit the highest rates of out-
migration. Instead, the world's main labor exporters are typically upper-lower to lower-
middle income countries (such as Mexico, North African countries, the Philippines, and 
Indonesia), which are generally located in a zone that Skeldon (1997:53,144-170) has 
conceptualized as the global "labor frontier". Such countries would currently be in phase (b) 
or early phase (c) of Zelinsky's model, experiencing high population growth, at least 
moderate economic growth, urbanization and partial de-agrarization, and high rates of both 
urban-to-rural and international labor migration. 
More recently, migration economists have—largely unintentionally—provided 
additional evidence for the Zelinsky-based transitional models by uncovering and 
theoretically explaining the anatomy of the so-called "migration hump" (Martin 1993; 2002; 
Martin and Taylor 1996). There is ample evidence that, in the early stages of development, an 
increase in wealth can initially lead to a rise in migration. This is partly linked to the notion of 
the selectivity of migration: a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to be able to assume the 
costs and risks of migrating. With increasing wealth and the establishment of migrant 
networks, an increasing proportion of the population is able to migrate, selectivity of 
migration tends to decrease, and this process of "development" initially tends to lead to an 
increasing diffusion of migration across communities. 
Only after a longer period of sustained economic growth and decreasing wage gaps 
with destination countries does labor migration tend to decrease (cf. Martin 1992:471 ; Martin 
3
 One notable exception was the slave trade, an extremely violent form of forced migration to be distinguished 
from contract laborers or other more-or-less volunlary labor migrants. It is believed thai more than 15 million 
people were taken from Africa to Europe, North America, and the Caribbean between the mid sixteenth and 
early nineteenth century (Nayyar 2000:2). This slave trade "was the largest, enforced, mass migration of labor in 
human history" (Nayyar 2000.2). Notwithstanding the massive scale of the trans-Atlantic slave trade set up by 
Europeans, African-European, African-African, and African-Arab slave trade as such is a much older 
phenomenon 
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and Taylor 1996; Rotte et al 1997) . This is what happened in the past few decades with 
southern European countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece, and, recently, Portugal and Ireland 
(Baganha 1998; Bodega et al. 1995; King 1996)—which used to be located on the "labor 
frontier", which has shifted south- and eastward since then—and several south-east Asian 
countries such as Malaysia and South-Korea. All these countries have transformed from labor 
exporters into net labor importers (Zelinsky's phases (d) and (e)). 
Therefore, economic development in combination with a parallel demographic 
transition and decreasing expected income differentials—trends which often occur 
simultaneously—tend to have a J-curve or inverted U-curve effect on emigration, steeply 
increasing in the initial phases of development and only later gradually decreasing (Martin 
1992). This "migration hump" (Martin 1993; Martin and Taylor 1996) roughly reflects global 
patterns of migration, and seems, indeed, to confirm Zelinsky's general model. This is a much 
more sophisticated approach than push-pull and other equilibrium and gravity approaches that 
seem to assume that migration rates are linearly dependent on factors such as population 
growth and income differentials. Figure 2.1 depicts how, according to transitional models, 
development (Zelinsky would speak of "vital transition") and different forms of migration are 
supposed to be generally related to each other. 
Figure 2.1. The effect of development on migration patterns according to transitional models 
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Source: Adapted from Zelinsky (1971:233), see also Martin (1993); Martin and Taylor (1996) 
Certainly, there is a danger in explaining migration by singling out factors such as 
demographic and economic development. Although Zelinsky's general suppositions seem to 
be valid, countries with roughly the same population growth rates and levels of development 
tend to show diverging migration characteristics. To what extent migration will occur, and 
where migrants will go, depends on the interplay between many other variables (cf. Russell 
1995), such as income, unemployment, education, political stability, immigration policies, 
environmental factors, access to information, social capital (network connections) distance, 
and so on. Jointly, they determine the general level and distribution of wealth, people's 
perceptions of "here" and "there", and, by that, the propensity and capability of people to 
Pnor research seems to have indicated that emigration tends to decrease significantly if the income differential 
between sending and receiving countnes reaches values between 1 3 and 1.4.5, provided that the emigration 
country is growing fast and offering hope and opportunity (Martin 1994, Fami and Venturini 1994; Olesen 
2002). 
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migrate Although countnes or regions resembling Zehnsky's categones b and c seem to have 
a higher propensity to expenence high international out-migration, the extent to which this 
occurs seems to vary greatly within a possibihstic range 
This seems enough to reject relativist claims that no general inferences whatsoever 
can be me made on the histoncal, spatio-temporal development of migration The attraction of 
the (adapted) mobility transition model, combined with the migration hump hypothesis, is its 
capacity to link diverse migration and other aspects of development (economic, demographic) 
into one spatial-temporal model, which offers a valuable insight into the complex 
interhnkages between migration and development, and tackles simplistic but omnipresent 
clichés such as "poverty breeds migration" Whereas this transitional model concentrates on 
the spatio-temporal "morphology" of migration and the way development influences 
migration patterns over time, it is essentially a macro-model, which treats migration as a 
result of development, thereby largely ignoring the recursive effects of migration on local and 
regional development both at the destination and ongin 
As has been argued, this very inability to connect both causes and recursive effects of 
migration within a broader theoretical perspective on development has haunted migration 
research so far As a constituent component of development, migration is in fact both a 
dependent and independent variable within the development process In the remainder of this 
chapter, we will examine the main general theoretical perspectives that have been developed 
on the vanous feedback mechanisms through which migration patterns are both modified and 
perpetuated over time, and the controversial issue of how migration affects development in 
sending areas Subsequently, we will attempt to integrate both sets of theories within one 
single theoretical perspective on migration and development 
2.3. Internal dynamics and feedbacks: networks and migration 
systems 
2.3.1. Social capital, network theory, and chain migration 
Labor migration may begin for a vanety of reasons Although the truism holds that economic 
forces—as expressed in expected wage differentials—almost always play an important role as 
one of the root causes of migration, and people tend to move to places where the standards of 
living are better, this alone cannot explain the actual shape of migration patterns (Salt 
1987 243, Schoorl 1998) There is increasing attention being paid to the role of nation states, 
institutions, personal networks, and cultural and historical factors in shaping migration 
patterns For instance, wage differentials alone cannot explain why many Moroccans 
particularly migrate to France or to the French-speaking Canadian Province of Quebec, and, 
for instance, much less to Germany Former colonial or other historical bonds, or a shared 
culture or language, tend to have a high influence on the geographical structuring of 
migration In some cases, direct labor recruitment has played an important role in initiating 
migration flows too, but initial migration movements may also (partly) originate in the more 
or less "spontaneous" settlement of an initial group of migrants Such factors might explain 
why the Netherlands has become an important migration destination for Moroccans, although 
Morocco and the Netherlands have neither colonial nor linguistic bonds Geographical 
proximity might also play a role in initial settlement patterns For instance, it seems no 
coincidence that most African migrants in Spain are Moroccans, that recent Tunisian migrants 
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tend to go to Italy, that Albanians migrate to Greece, and Mexicans move to the US Even in 
an age of globalization, distance has not lost its relevance 
Once a certain critical number of migrants have settled at the destination, however, 
other forces come into play The often coincidental choices made by pioneer migrants or 
labor-recruiting employers tend to have a great influence on subsequent migration patterns 
There is Lee's (1966 54-55) argument that migration facilitates the flow of information back 
from the place of destination to the origin, which facilitates the passage for later migrants But 
there is more to that, as there is evidence that the already settled migrants function as 
"beachheads" (Boeker 1994), reducing the risks as well as material and psychological costs of 
subsequent migration Through the assistance of friends and relatives, new migrants may 
more easily be able to obtain information and receive active assistance in finding employment 
and a place to live, in arranging residence papers, or in finding a mamage partner Therefore, 
the formation of an established migrant community at one particular destination will increase 
the likelihood of subsequent migration to that particular place (Appleyard 1992) 
In more recent studies, the term network migration has usually been used to desenbe 
this process of "chain migration" Networks can be defined as sets of interpersonal ties that 
connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through 
bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin (Massey et al 1993 448) These 
social bonds and the feeling of being part of one (transnational) community also explain why 
migrants tend to remit substantial amounts of money to "stay-behinds"—whereas neo-
classical approaches towards migration leave no room for remittances As the costs and risks 
of migration are lowered by social and informational networks, once established migration 
streams tend to gain their own momentum 
Massey (1989) argued that once the number of network connections in an origin area 
reaches a critical level, migration becomes self-perpetuating, because it creates the social 
structure to sustain the process (cf Appleyard 1992) Network effects explain the (often 
unintended) perpetuation of migration and its continuation irrespective of its original causes 
(Waldorf 1998) The facilitating role of such "family and friends networks" makes migration 
notonously difficult for governments to control In fact, the majonty of migrants from the 
southern and eastern Mediterranean living in Europe are not "primary labor migrants" but 
network migrants who came on the basis of their legal right to family reunification 
Network connections are a form of social capital that people draw upon to gain access 
to employment abroad (Massey et al 1993 448) In the previous sections, we examined the 
importance of material capital (financial, assets such as land) and human capital (education, 
skills, knowledge) in determining an individual's propensity and ability to migrate Social 
capital is a third, crucial resource in enabling migration Although network effects play an 
important role in both internal and international migration, they seem especially important in 
international migration, due to the generally higher financial and legal obstacles and risks 
involved in trans-boundary movements, which make migrants even more dependent on such 
networks 
Social capital in the form of migrated kin has a countervailing effect on legal, 
political, and financial obstacles to migration, and access to migrant networks tends to 
diminish the risks and opportunity costs related to migration At the sending end, the 
implication of falling costs and risks is that migration, ceteris paribus, tends to become less 
selective—with regards to access of migrants to human and material capital—over time That 
is, an increasing share of the population can afford to migrate (Taylor 1986) This is broadly 
in line with the transitional-diffiisionist models examined in the previous section As we will 
see, changes in selectivity are also likely to influence the developmental impact of migration 
at the sending end 
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2.3.2. Migration systems theory 
Network theory is affiliated to another approach known as migration systems theory The 
fundamental assumption of this theory is that migration alters the social, cultural, economic, 
and institutional conditions at both the sending and receiving ends—that is, the entire 
developmental space within which migration processes operate Whereas network theory 
mainly focuses on the vital role of personal relations between migrants and nonmigrants, and 
the way this social capital facilitates and perpetuates migration processes, migration systems 
theory goes beyond this point in stressing that migration not only affects the direct social 
environment of migrants, but restructures the entire societal context in which migration takes 
place, both at the receiving and sending end In this, migration systems theory links migration 
to broader processes of development, and therefore seems particularly relevant to our study 
The geographer Mabogunje (1970), the founder of migration systems theory, defined a 
migration system as a set of places linked by flows and counterflows of people, goods, 
services, and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, 
between the places Borrowing from general systems theory, he focused on the role of 
information flows and feedback mechanisms in shaping migration systems He stressed the 
importance of feedback mechanisms, through which information about the migrants' 
reception and progress at the destination is transmitted back to the place of origin Favorable 
information would then encourage further migration and lead to situations of 
almost organized migratory flows from particular villages to particular cities In other words, 
the existence of information in the system encourages greater deviation from the "most 
probable or random state" In many North-African cities, for instance, it is not uncommon 
for an entire district or craft occupation in a city to be dominated by permanent migrants from 
one or two villages [The] state of a system at any given time is not determined so much 
by its initial conditions as by the nature of the process, or the system parameters since 
open systems are basically independent of their initial conditions (Mabogunje 1970 13-4) 
Mabogunje focused his analysis on rural-urban migration within the African continent Portes 
and Borocz (1987) and Kritz et al (1992) extended this to international migration 
International migration systems consist of countnes—or rather places within different 
countnes—that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants, and are also characterized by 
feedback mechanisms that connect the movement of people between particular countries, 
areas, and even cities to the concomitant flows of goods, capital (remittances), ideas, and 
information (Fawcett 1989, Gurak and Caces 1992) The end result is "a set of relatively 
stable exchanges of people between certain nations yielding an identifiable geographic 
structure that persists across space and time" (Massey et al 1998 61) 
Migration systems link people, families, and communities over space m what we 
might call transnational communities This results in a rather neat geographical structuring 
and clustering of migration flows, which is far from a "random state" 
formal and informal subsystems operate to perpetuate and reinforce the systematic nature of 
international flows by encouraging migration along certain pathways, and discouraging it 
along others The end result is a set of relatively stable exchanges yielding an identifiable 
geographical structure that persists across space and time (Mabogunje 1970 12) 
Network theory can already explain why once a migration system has developed, it tends to 
operate relatively independently of government policy intervention, thus making migration 
notoriously difficult to "manage" Migration system theory adds to that, in line with Lee 
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(1966), by arguing that migration flows—and counterflows of goods, remittances, and 
information—tend to be geographically structured and take the shape of spatially clustered 
flows This clustered morphology of migration flows can typically not be explained by factors 
such as unemployment and income differentials In almost all emigration regions, we often 
see that particular regions, villages, or ethnic (sub) groups tend to specialize in migration to 
particular areas, cities, or even city quarters, either within the same country or abroad 
Mabogunje's example of North African cities can be extended to international 
migration For example, the vast majonty of the international migrants from Figuig, an 
isolated oasis in southern Morocco, live in particular quarters of Pans (Saa 1998) Many 
migrants from Laârache in northern Morocco happen to live in London—which is not a 
"typical" destination for Moroccan migrants at all—and certain villages in the northern Rif 
mountains are firmly linked to specific German or Dutch cities 
Besides the existence of very specialized migration systems at the micro-level, it is 
possible to identify several international migration systems at the macro-global level, in 
which particular regions in the developing world have specialized in migration to particular 
regions in the developed world For instance, most of the labor migrants in the EU member 
states tend to originate from the southern and eastern Mediterranean Through decades of 
migration, both sides of the Mediterranean—in spite of official policies aimed at "fencing 
off' Europe—have become tightly interlinked and interdependent through flows of people, 
goods, and remittances within what we might call the Mediterranean-European migration 
system 
Besides increasing trading links, migration plays a key role in strengthening ties 
between the geographically contiguous countries in Maritime Europe and the southern and 
eastern Mediterranean In what is analogous to the intensification of economic and political 
ties between the United States and Central America (Cohen 2003 26), trade and sustained and 
increasing migration and remittance flows have drawn large parts of the eastern and southern 
Mediterranean—and Turkey, Tunisia, and Morocco in particular—inextricably closer to the 
countries of the European Union 
Fawcett ( 1989) stressed the relevance of both national and transnational networks 
Such networks tend to be closely interwoven, blurring the distinction between internal and 
international migration (Martin 1992 458, McK.ee and Tisdell 1988 418) Via a process of so-
called leapfrogging, international migration is often preceded by internal migrant moves, and 
returning migrants may settle in other than their places of origin In a process called relay 
migration (Anzpe 1981), return migration may be followed by the migration of another 
family member Unfortunately, most studies only focus on either internal or international 
migration, whereas they are in fact part of the same process 
The fact that the initial circumstances at both the receiving and sending end are 
modified by the migration process implies that the causes and consequences of migration 
should not be studied separately, but as part of the same system and the same process 
Migration reshapes the development context at both the origin and destination, which in their 
turn, are supposed to influence subsequent migration patterns For example, remittances sent 
back to family members could alter the economic context in the areas of origin Levitt (1998) 
stressed the importance of so-called "social remittances", which she interprets as a local-level, 
migration-driven form of cultural diffusion This flow back consisting of ideas, behaviors, and 
identities plays an important role in promoting immigrant entrepreneurship, community, 
family formation, and political integration It also affects the perceptions and aspirations of 
people, which are also likely to affect subsequent migration patterns 
This insight into the recursive effects of migration on the entire development context 
emphasizes the importance of including those who have not emigrated in the^nalysis, as the 
effect of migration goes well beyond the people directly concerned The methodological 
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implication of this seems to be that the effects of migration cannot be properly understood by 
studying migrants alone, but also requires considering the wider development context in 
which migration takes place. As we will see, the very weakness of most migration impact 
studies is their tendency to study only migrants, whereas a proper understanding of the 
interlmkages and feedback mechanisms between migration and development necessitates 
studying entire migrant sending communities, including nonmigrants. Only such an approach 
will allow us to properly assess—through comparing migrants and nonmigrants—how 
migration affects the socio-economic behavior of migrants, to study migration selectivity, and 
to analyze the direct as well as indirect social, cultural, and economic effects of migration on 
entire migrant sending communities. 
2.3.3. Discussion 
The distinction between network and migration systems theories is not as clear-cut as 
sometimes is suggested and the two can easily be combined. They perceive that sending and 
receiving areas are increasingly linked through networks and feedback flows of people, 
information, ideas, goods, and capital, and point to the important role of social capital in 
facilitating subsequent migration. The study of migration networks has become increasingly 
popular in the last two decades, but there is a tendency to accept the arguments of network 
theories too uncritically. Their weak point is that they do not offer insight into the 
mechanisms that eventually lead to the weakening and crumbling of networks and migration 
systems. Following the circular logic of these theories, migration seems to go on ad infinitum 
(Massey et al. 1998:48). They do not indicate what are the external, structural factors as well 
as internal processes that counteract the tendencies that lead to increasing migration through 
networks (cf. Klaver 1997:45). 
As with the push-pull models, there is a tendency to empirically illustrate the 
important facilitating role of migrant networks without specifying its relative weight vis-à-vis 
other facilitating and constraining factors that affect migration. Firstly, labor migration 
movements tend to decrease or cease when the fundamental causes of migration disappear, for 
example if wage differentials between sending and receiving areas go below a certain level 
(Martin and Taylor 1996), or if labor demand falls away. Secondly, although migration is 
indeed difficult to control by government due to network effects, legal and physical barriers to 
migration do nevertheless have an important influence on the magnitude and nature of 
migration5. 
Finally, there may also be internal forces, which may weaken networks over time. 
Migrants are not necessarily only "bridgeheads" facilitating subsequent migration, but may 
also become restrictive "gatekeepers" (Böcker 1994), being hesitant or unwilling to assist 
prospective migrants. Links with kin and friends might weaken over time, and migrants—and 
their children in particular—might increasingly feel alienated from them. An important 
inference from network theory was that migration selectivity tends to decrease after the initial 
stages of pioneer migration, leading to a kind of diffusion of the migration experience over 
communities. However, the lesson here is that later on selectivity might increase again when 
migrant networks weaken. 
5
 For instance, increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe have led to a sharp decrease of legal labor 
migration from the southern and eastern Mediterranean, although this has been partly counterbalanced by a rise 
in family and undocumented migration Policies have thus been important in changing the face of migration 
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Network and migration systems theories primarily focus on the factors that cause, 
shape, and perpetuate migration. Migration systems theory points to the importance of 
feedback mechanisms transforming the developmental—social, cultural, political, economic, 
and spatial6—context at both the sending and receiving ends in which subsequent migration 
decisions are made. Migration systems theory seems useful in describing and modeling 
processes of spatial geographical structuring of migration streams, and, as a spatio-temporal 
model, it can be well integrated within the concepts of mobility transition and the migration 
hump. Taken together, they help us to understand how migration evolves over time—and 
changes in its nature, magnitude, destinations, and selectivity—and is reciprocally linked to 
the broader process of development. 
However, spatial and spatio-temporal approaches such as push-pull models, 
transitional migration theories, and network theories do not offer specific insights into the 
nature of migration impacts on development in sending areas, let alone the heterogeneity of 
such impacts. Nevertheless, these approaches have demonstrated their utility in increasing 
insights into the spatio-temporal dynamics of migration selectivity patterns—which are highly 
relevant to the study of migration impacts—and the close links between national and 
international migration systems. Moreover, in linking the causes and effects of migration at 
the origin and the destination, they have pointed to the importance of considering the broader 
cultural, social, economic, and political context m which migration and development 
interactions take place. 
2.4. Migration and development optimists vs. pessimists 
Over the last three decades of the twentieth century, the impact of migration on development 
in sending areas has been the subject of continuous and sometimes heated debate (Bauer and 
Zimmermann 1998; Russell 1992:267). In this debate, one can broadly distinguish two 
radically opposed approaches, that is, the "balanced growth" versus "asymmetric 
development" theories. Alternatively, one might call them "migration optimists" and 
"migration pessimists". 
The migration optimists are largely inspired by neo-classical migration economy, and 
developmentalist modernization theories, which are all affiliated to the functionalist paradigm 
in social theory. Notwithstanding differences between neo-classical and developmentalist 
views, they both believe that migration has generally had a positive impact on the 
development process in sending areas, as migration is believed to generate counterflows of 
capital (remittances) and knowledge, which are believed to then stimulate development. 
Through investments and their knowledge, (return) migrants are seen as active agents of 
economic growth. 
Most migration pessimists are affiliated to structuralist social theory, which 
encompasses neo-Marxist, dependency, world systems, and, to a certain extent, cumulative 
causation theory. In general, structuralist approaches towards migration and development tend 
to treat migration as a negative phenomenon contributing to the further underdevelopment of 
the economies of the sending countries and to the undermining of their socio-cultural integrity 
(Hayes 1991). 
6
 Note that these models use a broad conception of development, which goes beyond the income-focused 
neoclassical migration theory 
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With regards to migration impacts, we can basically distinguish between the impact on 
national development on the one hand (cf. Taylor et al. 1996b), and on local and regional 
development on the other (cf. Taylor et al. 1996a). The debate on the macro-economic impact 
of migration focuses on issues such as the loss of human capital (the "brain drain"—cf. 
Adams 1969) or instead gains (the "brain gain"—cf. Stark 1997) through migration and the 
contribution of migrant remittances to the foreign currency reserve and national economic 
development of labor-exporting countries. This study examines the impact of migration on 
development at the level of the local communities and regions migrants originate from. This 
debate has particularly focused on remittance use by migrants, and is also known as the 
"investments versus consumption" debate (Martin 1992). 
The migration pessimists have clearly dominated this debate over the past decades. 
Recently, however, the dominant theoretical perspectives have been challenged by the "new 
economics of labor migration" (NELM) and other pluralist approaches, which put the debate on 
migration impacts in a broader developmental perspective. In the following sections, we will 
further discuss these theoretical perspectives on local and regional migration-development 
interactions. 
2.4.1. The dawning of a new era: developmentalist views 
Neo-classical advocates of the theoretical model of balanced growth perceive migration as a 
form of optimal allocation of production factors to the benefit of all, that is, both sending and 
receiving areas (see section 2.1.1). In this perspective, the re-allocation of labor from rural, 
agricultural areas to urban, industrial sectors, is considered as an essential prerequisite for 
economic growth and, hence, as an integral component of the whole development process 
(Todaro 1969:139). The free movement of labor—in an unconstrained market environment— 
is eventually expected to lead to the increasing scarcity of labor, which will then lead to a 
higher marginal productivity of labor and increasing wage levels in migrant sending areas. 
Capital flows are expected to go in exactly the opposite direction as labor migration, that is, 
from the labor-scarce to the capital scarce migrant sending areas. 
Eventually, this process of factor price equalization will lead to migration ceasing 
once wage levels are equal at both the origin and destination. This equilibrium model can 
both be applied at the national and international level. It is important to note that neo-classical 
migration theory, strictly speaking, has no place for income remittances from migrants to the 
areas of origin (Taylor 1999:65). It tends to view migrants as atomistic, income maximizing 
individuals, and does not consider their belonging to socio-economic units such as households 
and their broader connections to kin and community members. If that were true, there would 
indeed be no reason to send remittances back7. In a strictly neo-classical world, the 
developmental role of migration is entirely realized through factor price equalization. 
Therefore, this rather abstract model gives little insight into the concrete and disparate 
development impact of migration on the sending areas. Nevertheless, those advocating 
migration as a means of development in sending areas have generally recognized the 
importance of remittances, to which they attribute an important role in stimulating local, 
regional, and national economic growth. In this "developmentalist" view, migrants, and in 
7
 As Djajic (1986) pointed out, earlier neo-classical approaches did rule out the possibility of a gain for 
nonmigrants, as they did not consider remittances in their models. Their only gain is that the scarcity—reflected 
in the price—of labor at the origin may theoretically increase as a result of migration. As we will see, historical-
structuralist models paid just as little attention to remittances as neo-classical models 
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particular return migrants, are seen as important agents of change and innovation, investing 
remittances in economic enterprises back home It was also hypothesized that migrants not 
only bring back money, but also new ideas, knowledge, and entrepreneurial attitudes that they 
have acquired as a result of migration In this way, migrants would contribute to the 
accelerated spatial diffusion of modernization in relatively "backward" areas, and play a 
mentally and financially positive role in development 
Such visions can be partly associated with the optimistic expectations surrounding the 
development of poor countnes that were prominent in the first 25 years of the post-wwn era 
Optimistic views on migration and development were generally rooted in nineteenth and early 
twentieth century studies on rural-to-urban migration within Europe and United States and on 
the historical experience with emigration from Europe to the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and so on Freshly decolomahzed countries, it was believed, would quickly follow the same 
path of modernization, industrialization, and rapid economic growth as other, mostly Western 
countnes had gone through or were—in the case of southern Europe—still going through 
Reflecting these expectations, such countnes were optimistically called "developing 
countnes" Capital constraints seemed the major problem developing countries were facing 
The optimistic developmentahst model postulated that through a policy of large-scale capital 
transfer (loans, development aid, and—indeed—remittances) and industrialization, poor 
countnes would be able to jump on the bandwagon of rapid economic development and 
modernization 
In the same post-war period, large-scale labor migration from developing to developed 
countnes started to gain momentum As Papademetnou (1985 212) argued, many labor 
surplus countnes became involved in the migration process amidst expectations of the 
"dawning of a new era" Governments of developing countnes started to actively encourage 
emigration, since they considered it one of the pnncipal instruments to promote development 
(Adler 1981, Penninx 1982) 
At the macro level, remittances were considered a vital source of hard currency At the 
meso and micro level, migration was supposed to lead to the economic improvement of 
migrants and greater freedom from local socio-economic bamers and constraints (Jones 
1998a) Remittances were seen as "an effective response to market forces, providing a 
transition to an otherwise unsustainable development They improve income distribution and 
quality of life beyond what other available development approaches could deliver" (Keely 
and Tran 1989 500) Moreover, it was expected that labor migrants, who were generally 
assumed to return after some years, would re-invest large sums of money in industrial 
enterpnses in the region or country of origin Expectations ran high As Beyer (1970 102) 
voiced this development optimism, migrant workers "can also represent a hope for the 
industnal development of their native land" In the same vein, Kindleberger (1965 253) 
argued that "large-scale emigration can contnbute to the best of both worlds rapid growth in 
the country of immigration and rapid growth in the country of origin" (cf De Mas and 
Vermeulen 1993) 
Although such development optimism has been tempered since the early 1970s, many 
politicians and other policy makers continue to see international migration as a major 
instrument of national economic development In the Asian and Pacific context, this has also 
been referred to as the "MIRAB" model (Bertram 1986) This can be seen as a national 
development model, in which a combination of "migration, remittances, aid, and 
(government) bureaucracy" is expected to contnbute to the economic take-off of developing 
countnes (Hayes 1991, McKee and Tisdell 1988 418) Many labor-exporting countries have 
developed specific policies to maximize the amounts of remittances sent back and to stimulate 
investments by migrants (cf Ghosh 1992b) 
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Developing world governments have generally been positive towards the emigration 
of their lower educated citizens, not only because of the hard currency remittances this 
generates, but also because it supposedly alleviates unemployment, "population pressure", 
and political tensions. The attitude towards the emigration of highly skilled people has, at 
least, been ambiguous. The "brain drain" has been commonly perceived as detrimental to 
development, as it is perceived to deprive poor countries of their valuable skilled and 
professional labor resources in which states have invested many years of education (Adams 
1969; Baldwin 1970)8. 
It is striking that visions of the contribution of international migration to development 
have generally been far more positive compared to internal migration, which has been mostly 
negatively evaluated. Rural-to-urban migration in particular has been perceived as a threat to 
economic and political stability, which partly explains the popularity of (unrealistic) policies 
that aim to curb the rural exodus. There seems to be an increasing bias towards international 
migration in the specialist theoretical literature on migration and development, but internal 
and international migration rarely seem to be studied in relation to each other. This role of 
internal migration in development processes is often not properly understood. This is 
unfortunate, as we have seen that internal and international migration systems are, in practice, 
closely intertwined. 
2.4.2. The migrant syndrome: cumulative causation and structuralist views 
As from the late 1960s, the optimistic views on migration and development in sending areas 
have been increasingly challenged under the combined influence of a paradigm shift in social 
sciences towards the historical-structuralist view and an increasing number of empirical 
studies that often did not support optimistic views on migration and development. In 
historical-structuralist views, migration clearly failed to resolve, or substantially ameliorate, 
the structural conditions that caused migration (Papademetriou 1985:211). In a historical-
structuralist perspective, migration is essentially interpreted as a negative "flight from 
misery" which contributes little to development. Worse, many migration researchers have 
argued that migration has even contributed to maintaining and aggravating problems of 
underdevelopment, and even further deprive the poor: 
the evolution into an uncontrolled depletion of their already meager supplies of skilled 
manpower - and the most healthy, dynamic, and productive members of their populations . . . 
[and] . . .the often marginal socio-economic gains from the skills and remittances of emigrants 
(Papademetriou 1985:111-2) 
B
 Although there is no room to elaborate on this issue, it is important to note that unilaterally negative visions of 
the "brain drain" have been increasingly contested in recent years by researchers who stress the beneficial 
effects such high-skilled migration may—under certain circumstances, and in the longer run—have on migrants 
themselves as well as sending areas and countries (Golub 1996, Oommen 1989; Stark 1997; Cohen 2003). 
9
 Although the sociological, anthropological, and geographical literature on rural societies in developing 
countries also pays substantial attention to internal (and international) migration, such studies are generally 
disconnected from the general theoretical debate on migration and development treated in this chapter. De Haan 
(1999) argued that, although labor migration is nowadays a central element in the livelihoods of households in 
large parts of the developing world, development studies have paid insufficient attention to migration, and 
subsequently tend to ignore migration as a potentially significant factor in development. 
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At the national level, the importance of remittances has been generally recognized, but there 
was increasing concern about the brain drain phenomenon. Whereas at the national level the 
feelings were mixed, the disappointment seemed particularly great concerning the effects of 
migration on development at the regional and local level. The dominant vision was that, 
although remittances were sent back, they were rarely invested in such a way that they could 
contribute to development in the regions and communities of origin. This coincided with the 
renaissance in Marxist thinking in social sciences. Historical structuralist and center-
periphery theories seemed applicable to the study of migration and did not bode well (De Mas 
and Vermeulen 1993). In fact, these approaches turned the argument of neo-classical and 
developmentalist approaches upside down: migration does not decrease, but increase spatial 
and inter-personal disparities in developmental levels. Also in a socio-cultural respect, the 
effects of migration were increasingly seen as detrimental. From the early 1970s, numerous 
academic publications seemed to support the hypothesis that migration contributes to the 
"development of underdevelopment" instead of the reverse (cf. Almeida 1973; Lipton 1980; 
Reichert 1981; Rhoades 1979; Rubenstein 1992). 
Such pessimistic findings seemed to fit into one particular theoretical perspective on 
migration impacts: cumulative causation theory, which was developed earlier by the Swedish 
economist Gunnar Myrdal (1957). Cumulative causation theory is analogous to migration 
systems theory in the sense that it links the process of migration to the dynamics in the 
broader development context in both the origin and destination. The main difference is that 
cumulative causation theory is more explicit on the developmental impact of migration on 
sending areas, and its verdict is clearly negative. 
Cumulative causation theory holds that capitalist development is inevitably marked by 
deepening spatial and personal income and welfare inequalities. By altering the context in 
which subsequent migration decisions are made, the establishment of migration streams 
creates de-developing feedback mechanisms—so-called "backwash effects"—in sending 
regions that make additional movements more likely. Cumulative causation theory suggests 
that migration sets in motion a vicious circle in which the backwash effects alter the system in 
such a way that productivity and wealth at the origin is further decreased. Migration, it says, 
undermines regional and local economies by depriving communities of their most valuable 
labor force, increasing dependence on the outside world, and stimulating subsequent out-
migration. In sum, migration is believed to intensify regional developmental disparities. 
Although cumulative causation theory was developed well before the revival of (historical) 
structuralist social theory, and is rather empirical in nature, it seems to fit well in a historical-
structural and dependency framework of "asymmetrical growth", and was taken up again with 
enthusiasm in the 1970s. 
While being a general perspective on development, cumulative causation has been 
frequently applied to the issue of migration and development. Cumulative causation theory 
argues that once differential growth had occurred, internal and external economies of scale 
will perpetuate and deepen the bipolar pattern characterized by the vicious cycle of poverty in 
the periphery and the accelerated growth of the core region. Although positive "spread 
effects" also occur—such as increased demand for agricultural products and raw materials 
trade from the periphery and, though not explicitly mentioned by Myrdal, remittances—these 
would in no way match the backwash effects. Myrdal argued that, without strong state policy, 
the capitalist system fosters increasing regional inequalities (cf. Potter et al. 1999:56). 
Structuralist and cumulative causation theories perceive migration as a process serving 
the interests of the receiving nations in need of cheap immigrant labor, and which only seems 
to worsen underdevelopment at the sending end. This "pauperization", they assume, 
encourages further out-migration. The latter thought reveals an a priori negative perception of 
migration. Increasing disparities in development are believed to further increase migration. In 
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this perspective, migrants have no genuine free choice, but are individuals that are 
involuntarily pushed out of their native regions by structural forces Thus, migration is 
perceived as a forced flight from inescapable misery rather than a voluntary choice 
contributing to development in sending areas 
Radically different from neo-classical and developmentalist theory, cumulative 
causation and historical structuralist theories do not see migration as a means to development 
On the contrary, they argue that migration deprives developing countnes of their valuable 
human and material capital resources, which are exploited for the benefit of industrialized 
countries (international migration) and urban-based capitalist elite groups within developing 
countnes (internal migration) The productive structures at the origin would be progressively 
undermined, contributing to "asymmetric growth"—as opposed to the neo-classical 
equilibrium model of factor price equalization—and the increasing underdevelopment and 
dependency of the underdeveloped on the "exploitative" developed core countries (cf 
Almeida 1973) 
From the early 1970s, an increasing number of empirical studies conducted in migrant 
sending areas suggested that Myrdal's rather grim predictions of cumulative causation 
appeared to be coming true (for review articles, see Lewis 1986, Lipton 1980) Dependency, 
instability, and developmental distortion were resulting in economic decline (Keely and Tran 
1989 501) Empirical work revealed various other negative effects of migration not yet 
mentioned by Myrdal—in particular in the socio-cultural domain Such negative perspectives 
on the role of migration were amalgamated into what might be called the "migrant 
syndrome"10 view In the following paragraphs, we will review the main mechanisms through 
which the migrant syndrome is presumed to have a negative impact on sending areas 
Historical-structuralist theones tend to see migration as a process draining developing 
countnes in general and backward rural areas in particular of their labor and human capital 
resources Although the brain drain has attracted most attention, perhaps more relevant in the 
context of "classical" labor migration from developing countnes would seem to be the "brawn 
drain" (Penninx 1982 793)—the massive departure of young, able-bodied men and women 
from rural areas (cf Lewis 1986) This lost labor effect is supposed to have a negative effect 
on local production Migration is typically blamed for causing a critical shortage of 
agncultural labor, depnving areas of their most valuable, able-bodied working force (Taylor 
1984) Therefore, the lost labor effect is blamed for the de-intensification of agriculture and 
the decline of land under cultivation (Rubenstein 1992 133) Moreover, migrants are typically 
young men that are often supposed to be the most significant agncultural innovators (Lipton 
1980 7+11) Likewise, other traditional economic sectors, such as craft industries, are 
supposed to suffer from this lost labor effect 
The second mechanism through which migration is believed to have a detrimental 
effect on development in migrant sending areas is increasing inequality at the community and 
regional level This is related to the selective nature of migration almost all empirical studies 
confirm that migrants are not representative of the communities from which they originate 
Labor migrants tend to be relatively young (15-35 years) and, in many cultural contexts, 
predominantly male In contrast to popular perceptions, it tends not to be the poorest and most 
miserable who leave since a certain threshold of wealth is required to overcome the 
opportunity costs and nsks involved in migrating However, to argue from "poor villages 
expel more migrants" to "poor villagers are likeliest to migrate" is to commit a classical 
"ecological fallacy", and in practice it is seldom the poorest who migrate, still less migrate 
successfully" (Lipton 1980 7) 
,0
 To be attnbuled to Reichert (1981, cf Taylor 1999 64) 
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Migrants are therefore expected to be from higher lower or middle-income classes. It 
has also been argued that migrants tend to be the already employed, more entrepreneurial, 
open-minded, and relatively better educated people within a community (Zachariah et al. 
2001). As it is already the better-off who tend to migrate, socio-economic inequalities within 
communities may increase, since the remittances and other benefits of migration thus go 
disproportionally to the better-off (Lipton 1980). Therefore, migration will not contribute to 
the alleviation of the poverty of the worst-off. Instead, the gradual undermining of traditional 
economies would even increase the deprivation of "stay-behinds". 
Perhaps the mostly commonly cited "truth" in the empirical research on migration and 
development is that migrants fritter their money away on "conspicuous consumption"" and 
invest their money in so-called non-productive enterprises such as housing (cf. Entzinger 
1985:268; Lewis 1986). In his wide-ranging and influential review of migration impact-
studies, Lipton (1980:12) concluded that recipients use remittances first to pay off debts 
incurred in financing migration or for education of their children. More than 90 percent of 
remittances are spent on everyday consumption. Most consumption behavior serves to 
reinforce status, such as high payments for bride prices and the construction of pompous, 
luxurious houses. Much "chain migration" depends on education financed by remittances 
from older siblings. Investments only come in the fourth place of remittance use. Moreover, 
these would mainly be so-called consumptive investments, mainly concerning a capital 
transfer more than capital creation, such as the purchase of land, or remittances were used to 
hire workers (e.g., for irrigation maintenance) where once family labor was used, or for labor-
replacing mechanization rather than the generation of extra output or the better use of scarce 
land inputs. 
Skepticism about the use of migrant remittances for productive investments has been 
the common thread of most evaluation of migration and development (King 1996; Lewis 
1986; Massey et al. 1998; Papademetriou and Martin 1991; Taylor and Watt 1996). Twelve 
years after Lipton, in his review article on migration, development, and remittances in 
Mexico, Rubenstein (1992) came to the similar conclusion that most remittance income was 
spent on day-to-day household subsistence. He also reported expenditure on religious rituals, 
feasts, marriages, gifts, funerals, and the education of children. A large part of the remittances 
of migrants would also be spent on the purchase of building lots, the construction, renovation, 
or enlargement of a house, and the upgrading of household facilities. Many studies mention a 
lack of creativity and innovation of most investors, which would result in an imitative "me-
too" effect, which would render the establishment of, for instance, grocery shops, small 
restaurants, and trucks, "second rank propositions in an overcrowded sector" (cf. Penninx 
1982:802-3). 
Such expenses tend to be evaluated as not contributing to development, weakening the 
local economy, and increasing dependency on the outside world. First, increased consumption 
and land purchase by migrants were reported to provoke inflatory pressures (cf. Russell 1992) 
and soaring land prices (Appleyard 1989; Rubenstein 1992), from which the already poorer 
nonmigrants would suffer the most—leading to more inequality. Second, most of the 
purchased items (e.g., TV sets, household appliances, refrigerators, stylish clothing and 
fabrics, building materials, ornaments, "modem" foodstuffs, fertilizers, etc.) would not be 
locally produced, but have to be imported from urban areas or from abroad. This is assumed 
to have the double effect of "crowding out" traditional, local production, and strengthening 
the economies of "core areas", thereby intensifying the process of "asymmetric growth" and 
" This term was coined by Veblen (1970) to describe the way that the nouveau riche consumed particular items 
in order to denote their new social status 
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increasing regional disparities between the core and periphery Third, the scarce productive 
investments would be mainly made in urban areas outside the village or region of origin 
(Lewis 1986, Lipton 1980) This leakage of remittance investments out of migrant sending 
areas is supposed to further exacerbate regional disparities in wealth 
Besides the negative impact of migration on local production, poverty, and inequality, 
many researchers have also negatively evaluated the socio-cultural effects of migration The 
exposure to the wealth of (return) migrants and the goods and ideas they bring with them, are 
often assumed to contribute to a change in rural tastes (Lipton 1980 12), which increases the 
demands for imported urban or foreign-produced goods and food, lowering the demand for 
locally produced goods and increasing the general costs of living for migrants and 
nonmigrants alike Migration is held responsible for the loss of "community solidarity", the 
"undermining of their sociocultural integrity" (Hayes 1991), and the breakdown of traditional 
institutions and organizations regulating village life and agriculture (cf De Haas 1998) The 
exposure of rural youth to the relative wealth and success of migrants, combined with 
changing "urban" tastes and material aspirations, is supposed to make the rural way of life 
less appealing, discourage local people from working in agricultural and other traditional 
sectors, and encourage even more out-migration, perpetuating the vicious circle of cumulative 
causation of the migrant syndrome 
So, migration is perceived as draining migrant sending areas of their productive 
forces, thereby hindering local economic development rather than stimulating it, and 
increasing their dependency on the "core" and increasing their marginahzation In figure 2 2, 
the main mechanisms through which the "migration syndrome" is supposed to maintain and 
deepen underdevelopment in migrant sending areas are summanzed in a conceptual 
framework It shows how "migration pessimists" believe that these negative feedback effects 
lead to continuing out-migration 
The main "positive" effect of migration would be the increase in family welfare for 
migrants themselves, which would, however, only be temporary and therefore "artificial" or 
"cosmetic" This one-sided dependency on migrant remittances is considered dangerous, as 
migration studies have commonly assumed that remittances will decrease in the near future 
On the whole, migration and remittances have a detrimental effect on local agricultural and 
other local productivity, increase intra-commumty and regional inequality, increase 
dependency on the outside world, contribute to economic and political instability, and lead to 
general economic decline (cf Keely and Tran 1989 500) In Neomarxist terms, migration 
reproduces and reinforces the capitalist system based on inequality 
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Figure 2.2. Conceptual framework of the "migrant syndrome" 
out-migration 
Increasing inequality/ 
relative deprivation 
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on remittances 
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imported goods 
"Lost labor " 
(physical, human 
capital) 
Urban tastes and 
preferences 
Increased poverty 
among nonmigrants 
Decreasing local production 
and employment 
Dependency/underdevelopment 
""*• = relation between variables ( *= system feedback) 
2.4.3. Towards a pluralist perspective 
The presented views on migration and development represent two extremes. Most empirical 
studies should be situated somewhere in between—as they see both positive and negative 
impacts—although most studies clearly tend towards the more pessimistic views (Taylor 
1999). The 1970s and 1980s were characterized by a rapid expansion in the number of 
empirical micro-studies in various labor exporting countnes, especially from around the 
Mediterranean Sea (notably on Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia) and Latin 
America (with an emphasis on Mexico). Most of such micro-studies were carried out by 
anthropologists, sociologists, or geographers, and tended to support historical-structural views 
to varying degrees (cf. Almeida 1973; Lipton 1980; Park 1992; Reichert 1981; Rhoades 1979; 
Rubenstein 1992). This is not to say that most studies are as straightforwardly neo-Marxist 
oriented as, for instance, Rubenstein (1992), but the number of publications more or less 
supporting the developmentalist view remained limited (cf. Baucic 1972; Komer 1987; Van 
Velsen 1959; Yasin 1987). However, even in the heyday of neo-Marxism, there have been 
empirical studies that stressed the non-uniform, differentiated impact of migration (Abadan-
Unat et al. 1976; Heinemeijer et al. 1976; Penninx 1982). Anthropologists seemed the most 
pessimistic, and geographers and economists tended towards a more moderate stance (De Mas 
and Vermeulen 1993). 
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However, the stream of plainly pessimistic publications seems to dry up towards the 
end of the 1980s Notwithstanding some later pessimist echoes (cf King 1996, Zachanah et 
al 2001, Rahman 2000), the tone of debate has become undoubtedly more moderate since 
then This timing seems not coincidental, as this has corresponded with a general paradigm 
shift in contemporary social theory, away from grand theories towards more pluralist, hybrid 
approaches Most studies from the late 1980s and 1990s seem to have departed from a 
structuralist stance, and see both positive and negative impacts of migration (cf Adams 1991, 
Ahlburg 1995, Cuffaro 1993, Golub 1996, Jones 1998a, Keely and Tran 1989, McKee and 
Tisdell 1988, Osaki 1999, Stahl 1988) 
Notwithstanding these later, subtler approaches, the overall tone of the debate has 
remained rather pessimistic To some, it might appear superfluous to extensively discuss 
structuralist theory, as it is considered obsolete However, the influence of structuralist 
thinking on migration and development theory is enormous, and many of its views still 
pervade empincal studies on migration impacts (cf Taylor 1999 63) Both explicitly and 
implicitly, many views derived from cumulative causation theory—which sees migration as a 
de-developing, destabilizing, and, hence, undesirable, product of poverty, as a problem which 
can and should be "solved" through closed border policies in combination with aid and 
development programs—still retain currency among academics, left and right wing 
politicians, and the media 
Nevertheless, there are good theoretical arguments to reject the propositions of the 
migrant syndrome view This criticism is not just based on another interpretation of empirical 
data due to a general paradigm shift in social theory away from structuralist thinking, but 
there are also a number of theoretical fallacies and internal logical inconsistencies in the 
pessimistic views on migration and development denved from cumulative causation theory 
The first objection is the deterministic and self-affirming nature of the model, which does not 
give room for heterogeneity in the specific, localized migration impacts For what reason 
would positive spread effects (e g , remittances) never match negative backwash effects under 
certain conditions9 
Second, like other "circular feedback" models—such as migration network theory— 
the vicious cycle of "pauperization" in the penphery and migration and growth at the core 
seems to go on ad infinitum This is suspect, since it seems unrealistic to assume that there are 
no counter-mechanisms which level-off or change the nature of this supposedly linear process 
over time How far can "under-development" go on without decreasing migration'' 
Cumulative causation and related models implicitly suppose a linear-negative association 
between development and migration However, as has been argued earlier, one cannot 
generally assume a linear-positive relationship between spatial disparities in income and 
welfare and the occurrence of migration As empincal evidence supporting transitional 
migration theones has convincingly demonstrated, the relationship between "development"— 
whether expressed in terms of the vital transition (Zelinsky 1971) or income dispanties—and 
migration is J- or inverted U-curve like rather than linear This means that, in cases of 
extreme pauperization, (international) labor migration is generally not likely to increase, 
rather to decrease—although in extreme cases increased refugee migration might occur 
Third, there is an inherent contradiction in the two central arguments that "migration 
pessimists" generally make On the one hand, they say, migration breeds inequality because 
migrants come from better-off groups within society On the other hand, it is argued that 
further impovenshment of the region of origin leads to more migration This is logically 
inconsistent, as the first argument correctly supposes that a certain threshold of wealth needs 
to precede migration and the second argument supposes a negative-linear relationship 
between wealth and migration Thus, the migration pessimists tend to make an imprecise 
analysis of the causes of labor migration through their ignorance of the inherently selective 
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character of migration Therefore, they suggest that increasing deprivation leads to increased 
labor migration per se However, this reflects an erroneous understanding of the role of 
migration in the development process, which is far more temporally and spatially 
heterogeneous than the migration pessimists suggest 
A fourth, empirical reason to question the one-sided negative perceptions on migration 
and development is the increasing body of empirical research that appeared in the 1980s and 
1990s indicating that, under certain circumstances, migration has in fact played a positive role 
in the development of regions and countnes of origin In south-European countries such as 
Spain, Italy, and Greece and East Asian countries such as Malaysia and South-Korea, 
remittances have played a significant role in their—successful—national economic 
development and, in reaction to sustained socio-economic development in their countries of 
origin, many international migrants have in fact returned to invest money in private 
enterprises 
Only after a long period of sustained development has out-migration leveled-off and 
decreased, and these formerly labor-exporting countries have now been transformed into net 
labor importers or are on the way to doing so (cf Skeldon 1997) This again provides 
evidence that transitional migration theories—despite all relativist cnticism on evolutionary 
models of development—seemed to be more realistic and have more explanatory power than 
the largely circular cumulative causation theory Apparently, the self-reinforcing cyclical 
mechanisms of asymmetrical, polarizing development cannot be taken as axiomatic 
So, looking back, does this all mean that the migration optimists were nghf The 
answer is no In fact, neither the structuralist pessimists nor the functionalists optimists were 
right, as the variation of migration-development interactions is too high to be able to fit them 
into deterministic theoretical schemes "predicting" the "development outcome" of migration 
Both theones seemed too rigid and general to be able to deal with the complexities and spatial 
diversity of factual migration-development interactions 
Papademetnou and Martin (1991) nghtfiilly stated that there is no automatic 
mechanism by which international migration and remittances result in development Few 
migration researchers would nowadays contest this general assertion (cf Russell 1992), but it 
gives an uncomfortable feeling to leave it simply at that The main problem surrounding 
research on migration and development seems to be the absence of an appropriate theoretical 
framework refined enough to deal with the apparently complex realities of the issue, that is 
able to deal with the diversity of migration and development interactions, but that does not 
restrict itself to empiricism and "all is local and singular" relativism 
Findings from different studies are clearly contradictory (Stahl 1988) In some cases, 
migration seems to have a positive effect on development, in other cases it seems to have no 
effect or even negative effects This not just pertains to differences in paradigmatic 
orientation and research methodology—leading to different interpretations—but also to real, 
existing differences There is a growing consensus that migration and development 
interactions are highly complex and that the nature of migration impacts is highly context-
sensitive "Black and white" theoretical approaches are therefore not appropriate to deal with 
this issue 
Empirical research has clearly indicated that the "spiraling down" mechanisms of 
cumulative causation do not always hold true, but also that the perfect neo-classical world 
does not exist in reality, especially in the developing world In other words, structural 
constraints such as highly unequal access to power, markets, education, and other social 
facilities do matter in the daily struggle of most people in the developing world, and do 
severely limit their capability to overcome their situation of poverty and general 
underdevelopment Hence, discarding the rigidity of the structuralist approaches is not to say 
that structural constraints do not matter 
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Neo-classical and developmentallst perspectives on migration and development tend 
to underestimate, while structuralist perspectives tend to overestimate the importance of 
structural constraints A new, more realistic theoretical perspective on migration and 
development has to be able to account for the role of structure—the constraining or enabling 
general political, institutional, economic social, and cultural context in which migration takes 
place—as well as agency—the (limited) capacity of individuals to overcome constraints and 
potentially reshape the structural context 
The second half of the 1980s marked in several ways the end of not only rigid 
historical-structuralism, but also of rigid theoretical thinking in general In this new era, 
social scientists, influenced by post-modernist thinking and particularly inspired by Giddens' 
(1984) structuration theory, sought to harmonize actor- and structure-oriented approaches 
Recognition of the interaction or recursive relationship between structure and agency seems 
essential for the migration and development debate, as this enables us to better deal with the 
heterogeneity of migration impacts In such a "pluralist" approach, the results of the 
structure-actor interactions allow for a greater variety of outcome than would have been 
allowed from either the single aggregation of individual decision making (Skeldon 1997 18) 
or from the unidirectional imperatives of structures 
The paradigm shift in social theory has also deeply affected the migration and 
development debate Over the 1980s and 1990s, the main contribution to thinking on 
migration and development came from the new economics of labor migration (NELM) theory, 
which recognizes the heterogeneous impacts of migration while making an explicit link 
between the developmental causes and consequences of migration Finally, there is 
increasing recognition that insights from different theoretical perspectives on migration and 
development are not contradictory per se, and might well be combined (Massey et al 1993, 
1998) 
The following sections sketch a theoretical framework for the analysis of migration-
development interactions This framework will place migration in a broader developmental 
context by combining the integrated insights from the earlier general migration theories, the 
new economics of labor migration, and so-called household livelihood approaches with the 
"capabilities" perspective on development introduced by Amartya Sen (1999) This, in its 
entirety, can be placed within a structuration perspective, which gives room for the recursive 
and heterogeneous relationship between migration and development 
2.5. Coining to grips with migration and development interactions 
2.5.1. New economics of labor migration (NELM) 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called new economics of labor migration (NELM) emerged as a 
critical response to, and improvement of, neo-classical migration theory (Massey et al 
1993 436) The new economics of labor migration theory rejects neo-classical models, which 
were evaluated as too individualistic and rigid to deal with the complex and diverse realities 
of the migration and development interactions This new approach has gradually turned out to 
be a viable alternative to not only neo-classical but also to structuralist approaches, gaining 
increasing acceptance throughout the 1990s It was Stark (1978, 1980) who revitalized 
thinking on migration from the developing world by placing the behavior of individual 
migrants in a wider societal context and by considenng not the individual, but the family or 
the household as the most appropriate decision-making unit This new approach allows for 
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integrating factors other than individual income maximization as influencing migration 
decision-making. In this respect. Stark and Levhari (1982:191-2) argued that 
During the last decade or so, the ruling economic explanation for rural-to-urban migration 
taking place in less developed countnes (LDCs) has been the response to intersectoral expected 
incomes differential This is somewhat surprising, especially since during the very same 
penod both risk and (especially) risk avoidance have assumed major significance in 
mainstream economics . . . the way variability in alternative rural earnings and in future urban 
earnings must figure in migrants' calculations is beyond the grasp of the expected-income 
hypothesis . . . . It is suggested that an optimizing, risk-averse small-farmer family confronted 
with a subjectively risk-increasing situation manages to control the nsk through diversification 
of its income portfolio via the placing of its best-suited member in the urban sector, which is 
independent from agricultural production. 
The new economics of labor migration models migration as risk-sharing behavior of families 
or households. Better than individuals, households seem able to diversify their resources, such 
as labor, in order to minimize income risks (Stark and Levhari 1982). The fundamental 
assumption is that people or households act not only to maximize income but also to 
minimize and spread risks. Internal and international migration is perceived as a household 
response to income risk, as migrant remittances provide income insurance for households of 
origin. This risk-spreading motive can even explain the occurrence of migration in the 
absence of (expected) wage differentials. The basic idea is that for the household as a whole 
"it may be a Pareto-superior strategy to have members migrate elsewhere, either as a means of 
risk sharing or as an investment in access to higher earnings streams" (Lucas and Stark 
1985:902). 
Migration is not only perceived as household risk spreading strategy in order to 
stabilize income, but also as a strategy to overcome various market constraints. The new 
economics of labor migration places the household in imperfect credit (capital) and risk 
(insurance) markets that prevail m most developing countries (Stark 1978; 1980; Stark and 
Bloom 1985; Stark and Levhari 1982; several other articles reprinted in Stark 1991; Taylor 
1986; Taylor and Watt 1996; Taylor 1999). Such markets are often weakly developed or 
difficult to access for non-elite groups. Through remittances, migration can be a household 
strategy to overcome such market constraints, and may potentially enable households to 
invest in productive activities and to improve their livelihoods (Stark 1980). While 
remittances do not play a role in neo-classical migration theory (cf. Taylor 1999), within 
NELM they are perceived as one of the most essential motives for migrating. 
Besides providing a radically different conceptualization of migration as a household 
strategy aiming at (a) diversifying the household's income portfolio; (b) increasing household 
income; and (c) overcoming constraints on economic activities and investments in the region 
of origin, the new economics of labor migration also criticized the very methodological 
design of most poor migration research. According to Taylor et al. (1996a: 1), 
prior work has been unduly pessimistic about the prospects for development as a result of 
international migration, largely because it has failed to take into account the complex, often 
indirect ways that migration and remittances influence the economic status of households and 
the communities that contain them 
This is related to criticism of the lack of analytical rigor, the prevalence of deductive 
reasoning over empirical testing, as well as the important methodological deficiencies of most 
studies. NELM scholars claim that most studies on migration impact in sending areas consist of 
simplified, non-comparative remittance-use studies and rather "impressionistic" assessments 
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about migration impacts, and are in their very methodological design often not able to capture 
the complex relationships between migration and development (Taylor 1999). 
Over the past two decades, an increasing number of NELM-inspired publications have 
appeared which seem to corroborate most hypotheses of the new economics of labor 
migration theory, and which further deepened insights into the complex interactions between 
migration and development in sending areas (for general overviews, see Taylor et al 1996a,b, 
Taylor 1999) Also outside the domain of NELM, recent empirical work has challenged most 
of the previous, predominantly pessimistic views (cf Conway and Cohen 1998, De Haan 
1999) In brief, the impact of migration seems to be far more on the positive side than has 
commonly been assumed Recent research showed that international migrant households 
generally exhibit a higher propensity to invest than nonmigrant households do, which seems 
in clear contrast to the gnm predictions of cumulative causation theory Moreover, the much-
despised consumption as well as investments in "non-productive" sectors such as housing 
turned out to play, under certain circumstances, a clearly positive role in local and regional 
economic development, for migrants and nonmigrants alike, and should therefore not be 
unduly discarded from analyses beforehand 
2.5.2. Migration as a household livelihood strategy 
The new economics of labor migration (NELM) can be well-integrated within the so-called 
livelihood approaches that have evolved as of the late 1970s among geographers, 
anthropologists, and sociologists conducting micro-research among poor people in developing 
countnes Growing awareness of the diversity of the ways in which poor people in poor 
countries organize their daily living in urban and rural environments, and the creativity they 
demonstrate there, points to the fundamental role of human agency This empirical variety 
clearly does not fit into the macro-structural schemes of neo-Marxist, world systems, and 
dependency theory Empirical work has contributed to a growing awareness that the poor 
cannot only be seen as passive victims of global capitalist forces—whose existence they 
generally did not deny by the way—but try to actively improve their livelihoods within the 
constraining conditions they live in (Lieten and Nieuwenhuys 1989) 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social 
resources), and activities required for a means of living (Carney 1998) It is important to note 
that a livelihood encompasses not only the income generating activities pursued by a 
household and its individuals, but also the social institutions, intra-household relations, and 
mechanisms of access to resources through the life cycle (Ellis 1998) For their livelihoods, 
people and households draw on five categories of assets (or capital)-natural, social, human, 
physical, and financial (Carney 1998) Ellis (2000) has placed particular emphasis on the 
access to assets and activities that is influenced by social relations (gender, class, kin, belief 
systems) and institutions (cf Cahn 2002), which explains that the relative access to assets and 
activities in unequally distributed within communities and households 
A livelihood strategy can then be defined as a strategic or deliberate choice of a 
combination of activities by households and their individual members to maintain, secure, and 
improve their livelihoods This particular choice is based on (selective) access to assets, 
perceptions of opportunities, as well as aspirations of actors Since these differ from 
household to household and from individual to individual, this explains why livelihood 
strategies tend to be so heterogeneous 
The emergence of the livelihood concept has meant a departure from rigid historical-
structuralist views towards a more empirical approach. It went along with the insight that 
people—generally, but all the more in the prevailing circumstances of economic, political and 
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environmental uncertainty and hardship—organize their livelihoods not individually but 
within wider social contexts, such as households, village communities, and ethnic groups. For 
most social settings, the household was recognized as the most relevant social group and 
hence the most appropriate unit of analysis, acknowledging that the "forms of households 
vary across time, space, and socio-economic groups" (McDowell and De Haan 1997:3). 
Concerning rural livelihoods, Bebbington (1999) stressed the need to broaden our 
understanding of rural livelihoods in the developing world, without automatically restricting 
the analysis to agriculture or natural resources. In almost all rural areas of the developing 
world, rural households are diversifying their livelihoods. Rural-based households tend to 
increasingly draw on multiple activities inside and outside agriculture, and gain additional 
income through migration. Many rural areas are "de-agrarizing", and rural livelihoods should 
therefore no longer be equated with agranan livelihoods. We should cease to "crunch rural 
livelihoods into the category of agricultural and natural resource-based strategies" 
(Bebbington 1999:2021). In this context, migration should be seen as one of the main 
elements of the livelihood strategies open to rural households, which is often combined with 
other strategies, such as agricultural intensification and local non-farm activities (McDowell 
and De Haan 1997:1-3; Ellis 2000; Scoones 1998). 
On a global scale, most rural areas are now incorporated into one or several internal or 
international migration systems, and migration has become a crucial element in the 
livelihoods of countless rural households in the developing world. Only a few regions have 
not been incorporated into migration systems, and increasing involvement in migration seems 
a worldwide trend12. It is increasingly recognized that labor migration is often more than a 
short-term survival or crisis coping strategy—a "flight from misery". Rather, it is often a 
deliberate decision to improve livelihoods, enable investments (Bebbington 1999:2027), and 
help to reduce fluctuations in the family income that has (often) been entirely dependent on 
climatic vagaries (De Haan et al. 2000:28; McDowell and De Haan 1997:18). Migration can 
generally be seen as a means to acquire a wider range of assets which insure against future 
shocks and stresses (De Haan et al. 2000:30). 
This comes very close to the premises of NELM, if we see migration as part of a 
broader household livelihood strategy to diversify income and overcome market constraints. 
What we see, in a way, is that livelihood approaches meant for sociologists and 
anthropologists in particular a departure from orthodox, rigid structuralism towards more 
pluralist approaches (McDowell and De Haan 1997). Neo-classical and developmentalist 
migration economists moved in exactly the opposite direction. The development of NELM as 
of the late 1970s—too!—meant a departure from individualistic neo-classical and actor-
oriented approaches towards a theoretical perspective that recognized the relevance of both 
agency and structural constraints to development, resulting in a more realistic, pluralist 
approach. 
Interestingly, NELM adopted a household-oriented approach that was already common 
in other fields of social science. In this respect, Lucas and Stark (1985:901) stated that 
economists have begun to address questions of household composition more traditionally 
posed by anthropologists and sociologists. Furthermore, Lucas and Stark (1985:915) proposed 
to 
12
 Therefore, most policies aimed at curbing migration flows are like swimming against the tide Bebbington 
(1999) argues that this explains why numerous projects aiming at stopping the rural exodus have failed. De 
Haan et al (2000) argued that, instead of designing such costly and potentially harmful anti-migrationist 
programs, policies should rather look into ways of enhancing the positive effects of migration 
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extend the recent intergenerational view of the household to a spatial dimension. . . . and 
dualistic theories of development must be revised: Instead of an urban sector and a rural 
sector, each with its own populace benefiting from the sectoral-specific speeds of 
development, the family straddles the two. Classes cease to be only peasants and workers, and 
a hybrid peasants-worker group emerges. This perception is not new to anthropologists but has 
not previously been integrated with the economics of the household. 
Research on rural livelihoods confirmed the latter argument, and demonstrated that internal 
and international migrants tend to maintain close links with their areas of origin over a much 
longer period than has previously been assumed (McDowell and De Haan 1997:1). It is not 
either migration or activities at the origin, but often both. The important methodological and 
analytical consequence of all this seems to be that the impact of a migration strategy cannot 
be evaluated outside its relationship with the other livelihood strategies, that is, the 
"portfolio" of household activities (Stark 1991). Research attempting to isolate migration and 
migrants from their wider social context, and other livelihood activities, is doomed to fail. 
Migration and employment at the origin should not be seen as mutually exclusive 
possibilities, but are in fact often combined. Without a household approach, such multiple 
strategies cannot be captured. This view, which is shared by both NELM and livelihoods 
approaches, better reflect the realities of daily life for millions of households in developing 
countries than neo-classical or structuralist approaches. 
The livelihood approach seems useful to model and gain insight into the way 
households live and shape their lives, and how these lives are practically embedded into a 
broader institutional context. According to (De Haan et al. 2000:1), migration is not an 
atomistic reaction to economic or environmental pressure, but it is embedded in societal rules 
and norms. Two kinds of institutions have a significant impact on migration: migration 
networks and households' structure and management. These institutions determine the 
contribution migration can make to improving livelihoods, but this link is by no means direct 
or simple. 
The choice of the household as the primary unit of analysis can be seen as a kind of optimum 
strategy or a compromise between actor and structure approaches, and most migration 
researchers now seem to agree that households are the most appropriate unit of analysis of 
migration in the developing world, acknowledging that the forms of households vary across 
time, space, and socio-economic groups (De Mas 1990; Lucas and Stark 1985; McDowell and 
De Haan 1997:3; Penninx and Selier 1992:15; Stark 1978). Such household approaches seem 
mainly applicable in developing countries where for most people it is not possible to secure 
the family income through private insurance markets or government programs (Bauer and 
Zimmermann 1998), increasing the importance of implicit contracts within the family. 
However, there is a danger of excessively focusing on households, as (unequal) relations 
within the household and relations with other family and community members are relevant 
too, and should therefore not be neglected. It might also frequently be that individuals decide 
on their own to migrate, without consulting other household members. Although the 
household approach seems to be the best compromise, this means that we should also 
consider other levels of analysis whenever relevant. 
In perceiving migration as a household livelihood strategy, we acknowledge that 
structural forces leave at least some room for individual agency. Under certain circumstances, 
migration can be a so-called survival or coping strategy. This is, for example, the case for 
people fleeing disasters such as wars, droughts, or famines. However, most forms of labor 
migration are typically not a "flight from misery"—a last resort to escape from extreme 
conditions of poverty and unemployment (cf. Appleyard 1995)—but rather a deliberate 
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attempt by households to improve their social and economic status. This clearly goes against 
the premises of cumulative causation and historical-structuralist approaches. Besides directly 
diversifying family income, migration has at least the proven potential to alleviate poverty, 
and increase income, well-being, and productivity. The extent to which, and where, this 
happens, depends on the specific development context in which migration takes place. 
2.5.3. Current insights into migration and development interactions 
In this section, the central hypotheses of cumulative causation-derived pessimist views on 
migration and development will be critically examined against the background of recent, 
mostly NELM-inspired research done by economists and research from predominantly 
geographical researchers on the spatio-temporal dimensions of migration and development 
interactions. The state-of-the-art insights presented in this section will serve as a set of 
hypotheses that form the starting point for the empirical part of this study. In this effort to 
make a synthesis of current insights concerning the role of migration in development in 
migrant sending areas, we will attempt to integrate insights from earlier theories on migration. 
Elements of neo-classical, structuralist, transitional, migrant network, and migration systems 
theory have all offered useful insights into the nature and causes of the migration process, 
which provide essential input in understanding the temporal-spatial dimensions of migration 
impacts. 
Migration and the propensity to invest in migrant sending areas 
The most common assertion of migration impact studies is that migrants hardly invest their 
money, but, instead, spend it on consumption and consumptive or non-productive 
investments. In the past two decades, however, an increasing number of NELM-inspired 
studies have emerged, which reveal that, in the majority of cases, international migrant 
households are more inclined to invest than nonmigrant households (cf. Adams 1991; Massey 
et al. 1998; Taylor 1999). This empirical evidence fundamentally challenges the notion that 
migration automatically puts a drain on sending areas, and seems to point to the contrary—the 
counterflow of remittances and local investments more than compensates for backwash 
effects such as the "lost labor effect". The overly negative assessments of most pnor research 
on migration and development can be attributed to serious deficiencies in the methodological 
design of such studies, which makes it almost impossible to properly assess migration 
impacts. Moreover, in their very set-up, they fail to capture the wider effects of migration, 
which go far beyond migrants and their households only, and which extend beyond economic 
impacts only. Furthermore, as we will argue, most studies fail to capture the temporal 
dimensions of migration and development-interactions, which have proven to be of crucial 
importance. 
First, there is the striking fact that the majority of studies that claim to study migration 
impacts, only consider migrants, and have not included nonmigrants in their analysis. It is 
therefore difficult to understand the empirical foundations of the broad statements on the 
behavior of migrants that many studies nevertheless make (Stahl 1988:157). Without a 
systematic comparison between migrants and the use of a nonmigrant control group13, any 
judgment on migration impact becomes rather shaky (Adams 1991:696). It then becomes 
" Controlling for the selective character of migration and taking into account the potentially endogenous 
character of variables 
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difficult to assess whether, for example, investments by migrants are relatively high or low. 
This casts doubt on the analytical foundation of assertions like "very little income is devoted 
to productive investments" (Stahl 1988:157). For what does "very little" mean in the absence 
of a control group? 
Second, NELM scholars have argued that it is not enough to make a simple comparison 
between migrants and nonmigrants, as such a comparison ignores the selectivity of migration, 
the indirect community-wide effects of migration, and the fungibility of remittances with 
other sources of household income. In order to find out whether migration coincides with 
more investment-prone attitudes (i.e., beyond direct income effects), income and selectivity of 
migration should be controlled for. Only by comparing marginal propensities to invest 
between migrant and nonmigrant households can valid judgments be made about the relative 
propensity of migrants to invest (Adams 1991; Russell 1992; Taylor 1999). 
It is fundamental that migration impact studies are sensitive to the issue of migration 
selectivity. Thus, in order to properly analyze the relationship between migration and 
investments—or any other aspects of socio-economic behavior of households—in sending 
regions, it is important to know who migrates. For example, if migrants in a certain area tend 
to invest far more than nonmigrants, it should not be automatically concluded that "migration 
leads to agricultural investments". It might well be that migrants come from relatively 
wealthy agricultural families, possessing much more land and income from other sources than 
most nonmigrant households do. In cases where migrants are the relatively better-educated 
members of their community, such human capital variables may be an equally or more 
important factor than their migration status in explaining their social and economic 
(expenditures and investments) behavior. This means that analyses should control for such 
factors. 
Most studies fail to address, or do not seem aware of, the fungibility of household 
income, which means that it is not possible to "earmark" migrant remittances (Taylor 1999). 
The diverse sources of family income are typically pooled in the common household budget, 
and different income streams can therefore not be separated, let alone be linked to certain 
expenses. Worse, many migration impact studies have only enumerated remittances and 
migrants' activities, and do not consider other sources of income1''. This makes common 
assertions such as "remittances are spent on x, y, or z....", somewhat difficult to sustain. 
Moreover, migration may have an effect on income from other sources. For example, 
migration may theoretically lead to lower income from agriculture or other local economic 
activities, as migrants' labor has migrated away. On the other hand, non-migratory, local 
income from other sources may also increase, due to the investments made by migrant 
households. Thus, in order to rightly assess the effect of migrant remittances on total income, 
and to be able to evaluate the effect of remittances on the marginal propensity to invest, all 
sources of household income should be recorded and included in the analysis. This further 
emphasizes the need for a whole household approach in migration research (cf. Taylor 1999), 
in which all livelihood activities of all members of the household are considered. 
Third, the impact of migration on village communities, regions, or countries has the 
tendency to change over time. However, most prior research has not been sensitive to the 
crucial temporal dimensions of migration and development interactions, which has also 
14
 Apparently, many migration surveys contain questions such as "on what have you spent your remittances''" 
(Adams 1991:695; Bovenkerk 1978; De Haan el al. 2000:8). This can easily lead to conclusions such as "most 
of the remittances are spent on consumption: only 23 percent is used for investment" (De Haan et al. 2000:8) 
This ignores olher livelihood activities and sources of income of migrant households Moreover, such 
expenditure and investment behavior is generally not compared with nonmigrant households 
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contributed to overly pessimistic conclusions It becomes increasingly clear that development 
responses to migration take time to fully materialize Activities, expenditure and investment 
patterns are likely to change over the course of life (Conway and Cohen 1998 32) The 
historical expenences from several developed countries, as well as the more recent examples, 
seem to indicate that the positive links are most clear in the long term In the short term (i e , 
one to two decades), it is difficult to see any "automatic mechanism" by which international 
migration results in development" (Russell 1995) In a study of the effects of temporary labor 
migration from five African countries to South Africa's mines on agricultural production in 
the countries of origin, Lucas (1987 313) concluded that migration diminishes domestic crop 
production in the short run, but enhances crop productivity and cattle accumulation through 
invested remittances in the long run, and increased domestic plantation wages 
We could even hypothesize that the short-term effects of migration on livelihood 
activities (and development) in sending regions might well be negative due to the direct lost 
labor effect, and that only at a later stage—when the migrant has more or less settled at the 
destination, has found relatively secure employment, and the most basic needs of the 
household "back home" are fulfilled—there comes increasing room for investments 
Moreover, in the meantime, the household has had the chance to readjust its local 
(agricultural) production system (labor allocation, intra-household task divisions) to the 
absence of the migrant or migrants 
The lesson is that researchers should keep in mind the particular point in time, or 
"migration stage" in assessing development impacts It is therefore probably unrealistic to 
expect any significant developmental spin-off from migration in the following one or two 
decades after the moment of migration, beyond the direct improvement of the household's 
living conditions and well-being This might have played a role in the studies that were 
earned out in Morocco and Turkey in the mid-1970s, which tended to conclude that Turkish 
and Moroccan migrants only invested modestly in the local economy (Abadan-Unat et ai 
1976, Heinemeijer et al 1977) However, it was only in the late 1960s that large-scale 
international migration from southern and eastern Mediterranean countries to northern Europe 
gained momentum Thus, most of these studies were earned out too early in the migration 
process to assess their more long-term impact Most studies on migration and development 
are "snapshots", and truly longitudinal research is very rare As an alternative, it might 
therefore be interesting to re-study migrant sending areas that were already studied two or 
three decades ago 
Local development effects seem to take at least two, three, or even more decades to 
fully matenahze, as migrants have to save money before being able to invest Only when 
migration matures do investments in economic activities become more likely We can 
therefore hypothesize that in the first years following migration, migrant households are 
pnmanly focused on filling their most urgent needs and improving their basic well-being 
(food, health, clothing, primary education, basic household amenities, paying off debts, etc ) 
In this early stage, household production might even (temporarily) decrease due to the lost 
labor effect 
At a later stage—after an underdetermined number of years (but mostly within 5 to 10 
years) when the migrant is more or less settled and has found stable employment—migrant 
households tend to spend money on building houses and items such as basic consumer 
durables and household appliances Only in later stages do migrants tend to invest their 
money in commercial enterpnses (agriculture, large-scale housing, commerce, and so on), at 
least if they do not decide to depart once and for all, most usually coinciding with family 
reunification at the destination The extent to which investments occur, and where and in 
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which sector they are allocated, fundamentally depends, however, on the household's 
income15 as well as the specific development context in the regions of origin. 
This hypothesized relationship between household migration stage (related to the 
family life cycle) and consumption and investment patterns by migrant households in sending 
areas has been summarized in table 2.1. To a certain extent—and without committing an 
"ecological fallacy"—this temporal model at the household-level can be translated to the 
community (village) or even regional levels, taking into account the fact that migration is 
rarely an isolated act by one individual or household, but that—as transitional migration 
theory has taught us—the migration experience tends to diffuse throughout communities once 
localities and regions get linked to the outside world through general processes of 
development. These include the incorporation in the wider context of the capitalist economy 
and the modem state, the development of infrastructures, and a moderate increase in living 
standards and wealth enabling people to bear the risks and opportunity costs of migrating. 
Moreover, migration systems and migration network theory have offered us the insight 
that this community-wide diffusion of migration is further encouraged by network effects, 
which make migration self-perpetuating and partly independent from its initial causes. 
However, both internal and external forces explain why migration networks tend to weaken 
over time, which is associated with a leveling-off or decrease of migration rates. Sustained 
development—which can evidently not be taken as an axiomatic function of time—at the 
origin may eventually also decrease the propensity to migrate internally, and, in particular, 
abroad. 
Table 2.1. Relation between household migration stage, consumption, and investments 
Stage migration consumption and investment patterns by migration 
households 
I 
II 
3 
o 
o 
f 
Illa 
Illb 
IIIc 
Migrant is in the process of 
settling 
Migrant is settled and has 
more or less stable work 
Ongoing stay 
Return 
Family reunification 
Most urgent needs are filled if possible: food, health, debt 
repayment, education of children 
Housing construction, land purchase, basic household 
amenities, continued education 
(Higher) education of children. Diverse investments: 
commercial housing & land, shops, craft industries, agriculture. 
Magnitude, spatial and sectoral allocation depending on (i) 
income household, (ii) macro and (iii) local 
development/investment context 
Continuing investments (as Ilia) if the household has access to 
external income (e.g., pensions, savings or creation of 
businesses); no significant investments if migration income 
ceases and is not continued by "relay migration". 
No significant investments, besides help to family/community 
members 
Therefore, one could also hypothesize that communities and regions as a whole go through 
different migration stages, characterized by the "innovators" stage (first pioneering migrants 
leave), "early adopter" stage (migration spreads throughout the community, aided by network 
effects) and the "late adopter" stage (migration stabilizes, and may eventually decrease) (cf. 
Jones 1999). On the basis of these models, one might hypothesize that the full developmental 
effects of migration can only materialize in the second and, in particular, third stages of 
15
 For instance, the income and remittances of internal and international migrant households may differ 
significantly. 
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migration, when the majority of migrant households have been involved in migration for 
several decades. 
However, the extent to which this potential is realized crucially depends on the 
specific investment environment. It is important to stress that there is nothing automatic about 
this relation. Structuralist theory has rightfully pointed to the fact that structural factors of an 
economic, political, social, or cultural nature might prevent migrant households from 
investing, and external remittance earnings may even enable them to withdraw from local 
economic activities. 
The indirect effects of migration on economic development 
Prior research on migration and development has been unduly negative in its assessment of 
the potentially positive role of consumption and so-called non-productive investments, 
because they fail to take into account the indirect impacts of migration on local and regional 
economies (Taylor et al. 1996; Taylor 1999). Again, this is partly related to the non-inclusion 
of nonmigrants in many surveys. Moreover, prior research has tended to analyze only the 
direct social and economic effects of migration, that is, their impact on migrants and their 
households, whereas remittances may also have a significant impact on nonmigrant 
households, and may, hence, reshape sending communities as a whole (Taylor 1999:65). Prior 
research has tended to negatively evaluate consumptive expenses as non-contributive to local 
economic development. However, consumptive expenses, provided that they are done locally, 
can have highly positive impacts by providing nonmigrants with labor and income. This 
seems to be confirmed by increasing evidence that a high local consumption level of migrant 
households lead, via multiplier effects, to higher incomes for nonmigrant households 
(Adelman et al. 1988; Durand et al. 1996). 
The same holds true for so-called non-productive investments. For example, prior 
research has generally bemoaned the high amounts of money spent on housing. Nevertheless, 
various NELM-inspired empirical studies have reported that construction activities can 
generate considerable employment and income for many nonmigrants. In this way, the 
benefits of remittances might accrue to households other than the ones that directly receive 
them (Taylor 1999:70). This increases consumption levels that may—by easing capital and 
risk constraints on local production—in turn facilitate local investments by migrants and 
nonmigrants alike (Stark 1980; Stark and Bloom 1985). In this way, expenditure on housing 
and consumption may have significant multiplier effects in the wider economy (Djajic 1986; 
Russell 1992:270; Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1996a). Consequently, nonmigrants may benefit 
from migration, even if they do not receive any of the remittances themselves (Djajic 1986). 
Migration and remittances have the potential to increase income and improve local 
livelihoods through direct and indirect income effects, "provided that the magnitude of 
migrants' remittances exceeds a critical threshold roughly equal to the value of production 
they would have produced had they stayed" (Taylor 1999:69; cf. Djajic 1986). This means 
that, in cumulative causation terms, the "spread effects" may well exceed the "backwash 
effects". 
Narrow and arbitrary definitions of investments 
Besides ignoring the indirect ways in which consumptive expenses and "non-productive 
investments" expenses can contribute to economic growth, common views on migration and 
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development also tend to rest on rather arbitrary definitions of what actually constitute 
"productive investments" (Conway and Cohen 1998 42), reflecting rather narrow views on 
what actually constitutes development Moreover, the literature often reveals a lack of 
comprehension of migrants' so-called "irrational" investment behavior that typically ignores 
the specific—far from ideal—social, economic, and legal conditions prevalent in most 
developing countries 
For instance, there is ample evidence that education tends to be high on the list of 
migrants' expenditures (Lipton 1980, Russell 1992 275, Stahl 1988 157) Nevertheless, 
schooling is normally off the list of productive investments in migration research (Taylor 
1999 72) This is at least a doubtful proposition, as education is generally considered a crucial 
investment in human capital, which may greatly stimulate social and economic development 
in the longer term (Russell 1992 275) From the perspective of a household, spending on the 
education of children may count as a productive investment and an income assurance strategy 
for the parents This is especially important for people without access to formal social security 
arrangements, as is typically the case in developing countries However, in spite of its 
obvious relevance to development, education is mostly neglected in migration studies as an 
investment goal and as cause of migration16 
Housing almost universally occupies the highest rank after consumption on the list of 
migrants' expenditures However, housing construction is mostly downplayed, sometimes 
even caricatured as non-productive investment in opulent status symbols with no economic 
utility However, there is a radically different way to look at it We have already seen that 
construction activities may have a positive impact on the local economy in stimulating local 
employment But perhaps a more fundamental argument is that the quest to have a clean, safe, 
and spacious house and basic electncity and sewage facilities seems a universal aspect of 
human well-being Furthermore, good quality housing might have potentially important 
positive effects on health (Taylor 1999 73) 
Sometimes, the portrayal of migrants' economic behavior becomes outright 
paternalistic For instance, when discussing migrants' tendency to invest in housing in Kerala, 
India, Zachanah et al (2001 83) stated that "the size and quality of houses built by the 
migrants have very little relation to the needs of their families" By apparently suggesting that 
people should stay in their "mud bnck huts", social scientists apply different standards to 
them than they would probably do for themselves, and typically ignore well-being as an 
intrinsic element of "development" Furthermore, there may also be economic arguments 
which go beyond well-being when investing in housing In his study on the use and impact of 
international remittances on a rural area in Egypt, Adams (1991) made an a priori distinction 
between consumption, durables, and investments However, based on his ficldwork he 
concluded that 
on a practical level the difference between these three types of expenditures becomes blurred 
Yet from the standpoint of the individual, housing expenses should be classified as an 
"investment," since new and improved housing offers possible future economic returns to the 
individual (Adams 1991 705) 
After concluding that migrants exhibit a higher propensity to invest than nonmigrants, Adams 
tried to understand their tendency to invest a large proportion of their income in land 
(agricultural and building) by taking the general investment environment in the study area 
16
 The desire to obtain more education is often one of the very reasons for rural-to-urban and sometimes 
international migration (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998, De Haas 1998) 
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into consideration He concluded that, considering the surge in land prices throughout Egypt, 
the high rate of inflation, and the lower or even negative returns on other investments, land 
purchase represented a good investment from the standpoint of the individual migrant (Adams 
1991-719-20) 
The distinction between consumption and investments is often blurred and the 
outcome of evaluations on the relative merits of such expenditure typically depends on the 
perspective of the analyst (Russell 1992 270) Expenditure on items such as land, housing, 
education, transport, and jewelry can be rational under certain conditions, as they frequently 
offer better rates of return or are safer stores of value than high-risk investments in, for 
instance, agriculture or industry (Russell 1992) Researchers should keep in mind that the 
investment conditions in most developing countnes radically differ from most developed 
countries Under the prevailing conditions of economic, political and legal insecurity, and 
malfunctioning markets, investments in items such as housing, land and education can be 
considered—by people that are relatively poor and do not have access to power—as relatively 
secure investments in an insecure investment environment The tendency to classify behavior 
of migrant households as "irrational" often unveils an apparent inability to comprehend the 
specific social, economic, legal, and political context in which people make decisions on 
migration and expenditure 
Migration and inequality in a spatio-temporal perspective 
One of the "truths" of mainstream migration and development research is that migration has a 
negative effect on income inequality within migrant sending communities (cf Lipton 1980) 
On the basis of recent research, however, there seems enough evidence to reject this as a 
general hypothesis Although such an effect has been found in vanous studies (cf Adams 
1989), this mechanism is neither automatic nor inevitable Besides the fact that nonmigrants 
might equally profit from consumption and investments by migrant households, there are 
other arguments to contradict claims that "migration leads to more inequality", which are 
strongly related to the spatio-temporal dimensions of migration 
The effect of migration on income distribution and other aspects of wealth is primarily 
a function of migration selectivity These selectivity patterns have important consequences for 
the impact of migration on inequality If migrants mainly originate from relatively wealthy 
households, migration is more likely to imply greater inequality in the community of origin, 
but the reverse seems true if migrants come from relatively poor households We have seen 
that, in many instances, pioneer migrants tend to be generally from relatively wealthy 
households, as migration—analogous to the adoption and diffusion of a new technology 
through space and populations—initially entails high costs and risks Although it seems that 
(pioneer) migrants tend to be relatively wealthy and educated in general, this is certainly not 
always the case The initial pattern of migration selectivity differs according to destination 
(e g , international migration is generally more costly and risky than internal migration), type 
of work (e g , lowly or highly skilled, legal or undocumented), and mode of job acquisition 
(e g, direct recruitment or "self-help") This makes it difficult to make sweeping 
generalizations 
Furthermore, migration selectivity has the tendency to change over time, primarily due 
to network effects In the first stages of the development of a (micro) migration system— 
spatially clustered flows and counterflows of people, goods, and remittances between a 
particular community or region of origin and a particular destination—selectivity tends to 
decrease rapidly Through the development of networks, which diminish the risks and costs of 
migration (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998 5), and the flow back of information (Komer 1987), 
less wealthy households tend to gain increasing access to migration labor markets As a 
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consequence of this "diffusion", the initially negative effect of remittances on income equality 
might be dampened or even reversed (Taylor 1999 79) Thus, the impacts of migration on 
village income distribution clearly differ for different types of migration and for different 
penods in a village's migration history (Stark et al 1988 309) However, Jones (1998b) 
demonstrated that inequality may again increase at the "late adopters" stage of migration, 
when selectivity of migration tends to increase again 
Finally, differences in spatial scales of analysis may account for contradictory 
conclusions concerning the effect of migration on income distribution (Jones 1998b, Taylor 
and Watt 1996) For instance, one might conclude that, within a certain village or region, 
migration has contributed to increasing inter-household income inequality However, 
comparing the migration sending region as a whole with other, more wealthy and centrally 
located regions in the same country (or between countries), one often finds that inequality 
between the regions has actually decreased as a consequence of the developmental effects of 
migration (Taylor et al 1996a) The choice for either of the two scales is not obvious, and 
partly reflects value judgments, in particular with regard to the weight attached to 
distributional versus mean income objectives (Stark et al 1988 309) Scales of analysis do 
also matter when identifying whether so-called extra-regional leakage of migrant 
remittances—a common assertion of migration pessimists— occurs For instance, it matters 
whether the village or the wider region in which it is located is identified as "origin" In the 
first case, all investments done outside the village are considered as marginalizing and 
increasing spatial inequalities In the second case, the analysis will tend to be far more on the 
positive side 
2.5.4. Discussion 
Most recent studies seem to confirm the solidity of the NELM and livelihood approaches, and 
seem to support the hypothesis that migration is a household strategy to diversify income and 
overcome local constraints to investments and development We have also seen that the 
outcome of analyses concerning migration impact strongly depends on spatial and temporal 
scales of analysis, stressing the need to put migration and development research within a 
spatio-temporal perspective This all challenges the unrealistic determinism of both the 
developmentallst ("optimist") and structuralist ("pessimist") perspectives, and gives rise to a 
subtle vision, in which, depending on the specific development context, both positive and 
negative development responses to migration are possible 
One of the additional strengths of this approach seems to be its ability to integrate the 
various valuable insights from different theoretical perspectives on migration, such as neo-
classical migration theory (role of income and unemployment differentials, selectivity), 
cumulative causation and structuralist approaches (role of structural constraints on agency 
and exclusion mechanisms), network approaches (decreasing selectivity), migration systems 
theory (impact of migration on both the origin and destination, "non-random" geographical 
clustering of migration patterns), and transitional theones, notably mobility transition theory 
and migration hump theory (migration "diffusion" patterns, non-linear temporal paths of 
migration, importance of migration stage) 
However, NELM has also some drawbacks First, NELM was developed for international 
South-North migration, and hardly considers the role of internal migration In practice, most 
migration impact studies consider either international or internal migration (Skeldon 
1997 39) This is unfortunate, as both forms of migration are often intertwined (McKee and 
Tisdell 1988, Fawcett and Arnold 1987 1529) There is ample evidence to suggest that 
internal (rural-urban) migration facilitates, and often precedes, international migration This 
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process of "leapfrogging" from the countryside, via towns and cities, to foreign destinations, 
has been described for many migration systems Internal and international migration are 
prompted by the same processes of socio-economic transformation and development 
(Appleyard 1992 256) Households may pursue multiple migration strategies, and contain 
both internal and international migrants The relationship between migration and development 
is not confined to, nor does it begin with, international migration, and we should therefore 
consider both internal and international migration within a unified framework (cf Skeldon 
1997 39) 
Furthermore, by postulating that migration is a household strategy to overcome local 
constraints to economic production and development, NELM scholars tend to suggest that 
migration "thus" contributes to development in sending areas However, it strongly depends 
on the specific development context whether and to what extent this developmental potential 
is actually fulfilled Suggesting an "automatic" mechanism in which migration leads to 
development—as "developmentahsts" have done—would be to ignore the accumulated 
evidence pointing to the heterogeneous or disparate nature of the spatial, temporal, and 
sector-specific impact of migration For instance, if the conditions for development in sending 
areas are very unfavorable, most migrants may decide not to invest, and in such cases the 
negative ("backwash") effects of migration might indeed overshadow the positive ("spread") 
effects 
NELM also fails to conceptualize why migrants would invest money in sending regions 
if the development conditions are apparently negative If one assumes that migration is a 
strategy to stabilize and increase income because this is not possible locally due to all kinds of 
developmental constraints, how can one expect migrant households to invest much of their 
financial resources in such an unfavorable environment9 Thus, if the (constraining) conditions 
in sending areas—that partially explain migration—do not improve over the course of the 
migration process, one cannot expect that the developmental potentials of migration will fully 
materialize 
NELM'S criticism of the weak methodological foundations, the lack of analytical rigor 
and the "impressionistic" character of most prior work seems right to a large extent (Taylor 
1999) Nevertheless, NELM itself can be criticized for its one-sided emphasis on quantitative 
methods It would be erroneous to equate "impressionistic" with "qualitative", and to infer 
that quantitative modeling is the one and only "good" methodology, as NELM scholars, 
however, have tended to suppose On the one hand, socio-cultural, institutional, political, and 
environmental conditions play an important role in determining migration impacts On the 
other hand, the developmental impact of migration extends well beyond economic and 
demographic factors to the social and cultural sphere 
Many such non-economic dimensions of development are notoriously difficult or 
impossible to quantify The same goes for relevant factors such as the impact on gender 
relations and the importance of socio-cultural impacts in affecting migration and development 
patterns Instead of considering quantitative modeling as the hallmark of "new" migration 
research, I would rather argue that the choice of a particular research methodology depends 
on the specific research question In order to study development-relevant impacts outside the 
economic and demographic domains, studies on migration and development should also leave 
room for qualitative, non-survey based, research techniques, which unveil patterns and 
structures that surveys cannot capture 
Most NELM scholars equally use rather narrow interpretations of "development" with a 
focus on income and investments Although some NELM scholars have argued that aspects 
such as education should be included in migration and development research, this is mainly 
done in an utilitarian framework, based on the conviction that education is an important 
human capital asset that is conductive to economic growth However, this reflects a 
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particularly narrow concept of development, which ignores well-being and socio-cultural 
factors On the other hand, qualitatively-onented researchers generally ignore or 
misunderstand the economic dimensions of development This tendency to separate economic 
and socio-cultural impacts is unfortunate, as the role of migration in social, cultural, and 
institutional change is also likely to influence economic aspects of development, and vice-
versa What we need, is a broad and clearly defined concept of development that integrates 
the different dimensions of development 
2.6. Human capabilities, development, and migration 
The absence of a foundational debate on development concepts has severely hampered the 
ngor of the migration and development debate Historical structuralist, neo-classical, and 
developmentallst approaches towards migration and development have all tended to focus on 
income indicators Migration impact is primarily evaluated on the basis of its impact on 
investments in productive enterprises and in promoting "modem" economic development, 
with a particular focus on the production of goods through industrial and agricultural 
development 
Nevertheless, this choice is arbitrary, since many other items may be added to this list, 
such as the impact of migration on investments in human capital (e g, education), gender 
inequality, birth and death rates, ethnic relations, political change, the environment, and so 
on Migration impacts may also differ significantly across these various dimensions of 
development Therefore, evaluating "the" impact of migration is far from straightforward, as 
this depends on the dimensions considered as developmental and the relative weight attached 
to them What is seen as developmental, moreover, depends on the disciplinary, cultural, and 
ideological perspectives of researchers and policy makers, who tend to project their own 
norms, preferences, and expectations—for instance, on appropriate styles of consumption, 
housing, and investments—onto the communities concerned 
This brings us to a more fundamental question what is development'' To a large 
extent, the controversy over whether the effects of migration on development are positive or 
negative might in fact pertain to important differences in development concepts used, and, 
closely associated with this, value judgments regarding appropriate styles of consumption and 
production (cf Hayes 1991) This points to the importance of giving an explicit definition of 
development, an endeavor which has been seldom undertaken in migration and development 
research 
For evaluative reasons, it is essential to conceptualize what development is actually 
about In order to integrate the different aspects of migration-affected processes of social and 
economic change into one single, broad perspective on development, it seems useful to take 
the development concept elaborated by Amartya Sen as a point of departure Sen (1999) 
defined development as the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy 
In order to operationalize these "freedoms", he used the concept of human capability, which 
relates to the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to enhance 
the substantive choices they have (Sen 1997 1959) The basic assumption here is that the 
expansion of human capabilities adds to the quality of people's lives Sen's capabilities 
approach contrasts with narrower views of development that are largely, if not uniquely, 
restricted to income indicators (e g, GNP per head) and mat en al growth Sen argued that 
income growth itself should not be the litmus test for development theonsts, but more the 
question of whether the capabilities of people to control their own lives have expanded While 
acknowledging that incomes can have a high potential to contribute to the expansion of the 
62 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
real freedoms people enjoy, the relationship between income and development is by no means 
direct or automatic, making income indicators alone an inadequate indicator of the quality of 
people's lives (Sen 1999:291,3-5). 
Sen argues that freedom11 is central to the process of development for two reasons. 
First of all, there is the intrinsic importance of human freedoms as an objective of 
development, which has to be clearly distinguished from the instrumental effectiveness of 
freedoms of different kinds in contributing to economic progress (Sen 1999:5,37). The value 
of freedoms should not only be judged in their income-generating capacity, but should first 
and foremost be seen as the principal ends of development in themselves. Sen's fiindamental 
point is that freedoms, such as the opportunity to live long and healthy lives, being well-
housed and well-clothed, having the right and access to basic education, enjoying the freedom 
of employment choice, being able to participate in public debate without fear, and so on, are 
intrinsic developmental virtues in themselves. Second, besides their intrinsic value, increasing 
individual freedoms (better education, skills, health, security and access to markets and 
politics) also happens to be very instrumental in promoting economic growth and the further 
expansion of human freedoms. 
Macro-indicators can hide extreme intra-family (in particular gender), inter-
community, and inter-regional inequalities. Sen therefore urges us not to focus only on 
macro-indicators of economic growth or GNP per head, but to look at the internal distribution 
of capabilities within populations, which are strongly affected by social and cultural factors. 
Any development assessment should therefore pay attention to inequality, which should not 
be limited to income but also to inequalities in the social, cultural, and political domain, 
determining the extent to which people enjoy basic capabilities-enhancing freedoms. In this 
context, Sen pays particular attention to gender inequality. 
The human capabilities perspective is an agent-oriented approach, as it stresses the 
capacity and responsibility of individuals to shape their own destiny. An agent can be defined 
as "someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in 
terms of her own values and objectives" (Sen 1999:19). People should not be seen as pawns 
of structural macro-forces or as "passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development 
programs" (Sen 1999:11). 
Nevertheless, Sen certainly does not ignore that the scope for human agency is often 
severely limited by structural constraints—especially in developing countries. The extent to 
which people are really capable to shape their own lives (i.e., to act as free agents) is 
extremely contingent on the wider institutional and natural environment in which people live. 
Sen defines poverty as a situation in which people suffer from substantial "unfreedoms". The 
lives of many poor in the world are characterized by lack of access to meaningful 
employment, stable and sufficient income, schooling, health care, and social security. This 
makes them particularly vulnerable to environmental, economic, or political shocks, and 
deprives them of the basic freedoms to (re)shape their own destiny18. 
It is important to note that the concept of freedom or liberty is not unproblematic and that there is no general 
agreement on the definition of the concept. This point was emphasized by Berlin (1958), who made a basic 
distinction between "positive" and "negative" freedom. Negative liberty for Berlin is freedom from restraint, 
that is, being free from the interference of "others". Positive liberty is that which the state permits by imposing 
regulations that limit some freedoms in the name of greater liberty for all There is a clear tension between both 
forms of liberty, but Berlin argued that both kinds of liberty were required for a just society Equally, Sen (1999) 
implicitly includes both forms of liberty in his concept of freedom, although the tension is not explicitly 
resolved. 
Here, Sen sees a pivotal enabling role for public policy in creating proper contexts for human development 
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Representing people as atomistic individuals enjoying free choice and full access to 
factor markets ignores the (constraining) social and institutional context in which 
development takes place Particularly in the developing world, structural constraints severely 
limit people's capability to increase their freedoms and to contribute to development It is on 
this fundamental point that the capabilities approach corresponds with NELM If we put NELM 
and related household-oriented livelihood approaches into a capabilities perspective, 
migration can be seen as a livelihood strategy used by households to overcome such 
developmental constraints (imperfect markets, unemployment, inadequate government 
services) in order to access resources elsewhere that will enable them to increase their 
freedoms However, as NELM scholars argue, moving to another place is not only a response 
to developmental constraints, but also a potential means to overcome such constraints and 
increase the capabilities of individuals and the households that contain them at the origin 
Sen's human capabilities perspective offers a view on development which is broader 
than views that only focus on income indicators by evaluating the value of processes of social 
and economic change in terms of their contribution to the expansion of human freedoms As 
migration and development are closely interwoven, and because migration is supposed to 
affect both economic and non-economic dimensions of development, the human capability 
perspective seems to provide a useful background against which to assess migration and 
development interactions 
Within a capabilities perspective, migration is potentially developmental in three 
different ways First, as transitional migration theory indicates, a certain minimum level of 
development is necessary for labor migration to occur in substantial numbers People need 
certain freedoms and access to social and economic resources in order to be able to migrate 
This relates to the intrinsic value of the ν'ery freedom oj moving and working Until recently, 
bonded labor used to be the common fate of many poor across the globe who suffered from 
persistent denials of basic freedoms to seek wage employment away from their traditional 
bosses In this context, Sen (1999 113) stated that 
the loss of freedom in the absence of employment choice and in the tyrannical form of work 
can itself be a major deprivation Even that great cntic of capitalism Karl Marx saw the 
emergence of freedom of employment as momentous progress 
If labor migration then, for instance, offers people new opportunities to break away from their 
humble position, and to gain an independent—though not even necessarily higher—income 
elsewhere, this intrinsically liberating value should therefore be considered as 
"developmental" While acknowledging the potential intrinsic value of migration as a 
liberating expenence in itself, it is highly important to stress that freedom of mobility also 
pertains to the freedom not to migrate' Therefore, if people move involuntarily because of 
political conflicts, environmental disasters, or if other people force them to do so (e g , slave 
trade, governments resettling people, parents in rural areas forcing their children to work in 
cities, etc ) migration is a direct expression of a lack of freedom Such exploitative forms of 
forced migration may serve the direct economic interests of others, but generally represent a 
clear decrease in the well-being and capabilities of the migrants themselves 
Second, migration has the potential to contribute to the well-being of people We have 
seen that the potential contribution of migration (principally through remittances, but also 
through transfer of knowledge and values) to enable people to live in more spacious, cleaner, 
and better aired houses, to be better fed, be better able to pay for medical treatment, to be 
decently clothed, and to educate their children, have often been dismissed as "non-
developmental" However, in a capabilities perspective, such well-being aspects are 
intrinsically developmental as long as they increase the capacity of people to be more secure 
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and live the lives they have reason to value Such well-being aspects are to be considered 
developmental virtues in themselves, although they have to be weighed against the 
considerable psychological and social costs that migration may also entail 
Third, besides the intrinsic and well-being enhancing potential of migration as such, 
the freedom-enhancing potentials of migration may also have an instrumental value in 
increasing people's capabilities to improve their livelihoods and in contributing to general 
economic growth and social change, the benefits of which may also accrue to people in 
nonmigrant households For instance, healthy, well-educated, and socially secure people are 
more likely to be more productive, innovative, and prone to invest Moreover, as NELM has 
revealed, even consumption and so-called "non productive" investments can have positive, 
economy-wide multiplier effects that extend well beyond the direct social environment of the 
migrant's household 
We should nevertheless avoid jumping to the conclusion that migration has "thus" a 
direct positive impact on the overall well-being of people and their capabilities The specific 
impact of migration on development is mediated by other, contextual factors, which explain 
why there is nothing deterministic about the migration-development relationship Migration 
may have widely diverging—positive or negative—concrete impacts on the lives of people, 
depending on the type and causes of migration, the selectivity of migration, and the broader 
developmental context in which migration occurs 
Notwithstanding the potential of migration to increase well-being and economic 
growth, the extent to which these potentials are fulfilled is contingent on various conditions 
Obviously, the income of migrants is very likely to influence his or her capacity to remit 
money and goods In this, the difference between international and internal migrants may be 
significant The amount of remittances actually sent back also depends on the strength of the 
bonds between migrants and his or her family, which tend to be rather culture-specific, and 
may decline over time Moreover, all kinds of institutions, such as the quality and reach of the 
formal banking system and macro-economic and taxation policies, are also likely to have a 
major influence on remittance and investment behavior 
Moreover, the capability-enhancing effects of migration on well-being are not likely 
to be equally distributed among households and communities For instance, gender inequality 
may have a high impact on the intra-family allocation of remittances This might also bias the 
further allocation of freedoms and resources among different family members, for instance by 
favoring male members in receiving education and health care Therefore, it is also important 
to ask who reaps the benefits of migration 
Sen has emphasized the intrinsic relevance of social change to the development 
process, in particular concerning the distnbution of capabilities within populations Migration 
has an impact on the cultural, social, and economic domain that reaches well beyond the 
direct remittance effect Social and cultural change may alter the allocation and distnbution of 
migration-induced capabilities within communities and households both in a positive and 
negative sense For instance, migration is believed to have a major impact on gender relations, 
and may potentially increase the responsibilities and power of women, either as "stay-
behinds" or migrants (Day and Içduygu 1997, De Haan et al 2000, Myntti 1994, Osaki 1999, 
Taylor 1984, Zlotnik 1993) Moreover, improved access to education, paid labor and 
migration can significantly improve their position within the "development game" 
In sum, it seems useful to evaluate migration-development interactions against the 
broader conceptual background of Sen's capabilities approach perspective This allows us to 
include both (1) the direct impact on people's well-being, its (2) indirect impact on economic 
growth, and the role of migration in (3) processes of social change (cf Sen 1997), into one 
single perspective The potentially positive impact on human freedoms is neither automatic 
nor uniform Under certain conditions, migration may actually decrease the freedoms of 
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people, and even when its aggregate impacts are judged to be positive, the fruits of migration 
are not always equally distributed among different members of households and communities. 
Depending on the circumstances (selectivity of migration, cultural norms, migration stage, 
and so on) migration may both increase and decrease inequality. 
Figure 2.3. Conceptual framework of pluralist migration and development interactions (short to medium-
term) 
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Adopting the capabilities approach does not imply a choice for a more positive or negative 
vision of development. Rather, it is a choice for a qualitative change towards a broader 
approach, which includes the reciprocally related social and economic dimensions of 
development. The choice of this perspective implies that the high potential of migration to 
increase both the material and nonmaterial well-being of people should be acknowledged, and 
that the impact of migration should be considered as developmental as long as it increases the 
capability of people to live the lives they have reason to value. 
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If we integrate the main insights offered by NELM and affiliated "pluralist" livelihood 
approaches into a capabilities approach, we have a conceptual framework depicted in figure 
2.3, which shows the various mechanisms through which migration can affect development in 
migrant sending areas in the short to medium term (one to three or four decades after mass 
migration), and how this developmental impact may affect migration in its own right. 
2.7. Space, structure, migration, and development 
Migration has at least the potential to contribute to development in sending areas. However, 
the extent to which this developmental potential is realized depends not only on the 
characteristics of migrants and the type of migration, but also on the cultural, social, 
economic, legal, political and environmental context prevailing in the sending area. Local, 
regional, and national differentiation in this general "developmental" context can partly 
explain the varying degrees to which migration is positively or negatively associated with 
development m the areas of origin. In addition, if we take account of the generally "lagged" 
development responses to migration, differences remain important. 
Although most NELM studies clearly tend to be on the positive side, negative effects 
should certainly not be ruled out. Although it is clear that the laws of cumulative causation 
have no overall legitimacy, the lesson should not be that the "optimistic viewpoint was 
correct because the pessimistic framework predictions were incorrect" (Keely and Tran 
1989:524). The lesson should be that migration research should not fall back into another 
determinism, but should aim at gaining further insight into the mechanisms explaining the 
heterogeneity of migration-development interactions. 
Hence, research on migration and development should go beyond the crude and 
simplistic "negative-versus-positive" debate through the systematic inquiry of differentiated 
responses to migration. These may be heterogeneous across the different domains of 
development (e.g., poverty, well-being, (gender) inequality, income growth, social relations) 
and which may differ according to spatial (from the household to nation-wide) and temporal 
scales (e.g., migration stage). Only through such an approach, which requires good-quality 
empirical data at the micro-level, does it seem possible to better understand the complexities 
of the migration and development relationship and to find certain regularities. 
The fundamental question seems to be why migration has contributed to development 
in some communities and much less or not at all in others (Ghosh 1992b:432). Both negative 
and positive effects are found for both internal and international migration, and this suggests 
that a better question might be under what conditions migration contributes to development 
(cf. Jones 1998a:4). 
Obviously, this is a question with a high geographical content. As Salt (1987:244) 
argued, the most significant contributions to migration theory have come from within 
economics, and one of the results of this seems to be a diminishing awareness of the 
geographical variability of international migration. However, NELM scholars increasingly 
pose such geographical questions, possibly reflecting a broader trend of increasing interest in 
spatial or geographical issues among economists (cf. Krugman 1995)'9. 
Some would prefer to call this academic imperialism typical of economists Stated more positively, one could 
also say that economists have learnt from geographers and other non-economic social sciences by internalizing 
insights into the relevance of culture, space, and institutions for economic development, and have subsequently 
started to make their theoretical models more sophisticated and broadened their view on development by— 
successfully—extending their interest towards issues that were traditionally hardly considered by economists 
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The current research aim seems to better understand the spatial heterogeneity in 
migration and development relationships. The search is for a geographical perspective on 
migration and development that is able to account for spatial variability—acknowledging the 
differentiation in local responses to the general changes affecting societies—and to model the 
extent to which both general conditions or constraints and place-specific factors play a role in 
determining development outcomes of migration. 
Such a theoretical perspective should incorporate both agency and structure, and 
recognize that migration decisions are usually taken within broader social (e.g., household, 
community) and political-economic (e.g., absent or hardly accessible markets) contexts, 
which can form constraints (or incentives) for economic development. On the other hand, it 
does not reduce migrants to passive pawns of forces at the macro-level, and recognizes 
individual agency, embodied in the ability—within certain margins determined by the 
structure—of human beings to overcome constraints and to shape their own lives. 
In this effort to conceptualize spatially differentiated migration and development 
interactions it is useful to consider the so-called new regional geography. In the mid-1980s, 
Johnston (1984) called within geography for more emphasis on regional differentiation, 
without losing more general aims. In doing so, he made an analytical distinction between the 
unique and the singular. The unique is defined as something which is peculiar, because there 
is no other instance of it, but whose peculiarity can accounted for by a particular combination 
of general processes and individual responses. The singular is something that is entirely 
remarkable, because no general statements can be made in reference to it. 
Johnston did not propose a return to "traditional" regional geography with its 
exceptionalist position, focusing on the singularity of places and treating them as separate 
entities to focus on the singular. Instead, he called for a revival of regional geography 
through the "study of the unique characteristics of regions that result from the interaction of 
general economic processes with individual decision-making agents acting in their cultural 
contexts" (Johnston 1984:443). He stated that regional geography should focus on the unique 
characteristics of the places, but must not express them as if they were singular, since there is 
no place on earth that is not influenced by general processes at the world scale in some way. 
However, at the local scale, these general processes are supposed to be interpreted 
through particular cultural lenses. The actual behavior of people is believed to reflect 
reactions to both the local physical environment and the international economic situation, 
which are mediated by local institutional structures, and which are influenced by the historical 
context. 
Within this context, regional differentiation is viewed "as a set of individual responses 
to general imperatives". However, Johnston warns of the pitfalls of (structuralist) 
deterministic thinking, as people have a certain power, or agency, to change human societies 
and their own environments: 
We need a regional geography that finds a middle course between, on the one hand, the 
generalizing approaches which allow for no freedom of individual action, and, on the other, the 
singular approaches which argue that all is freedom of action. We need to focus on the unique, 
to portray regional variability as local responses to general conditions, responses that create 
local environments within which future responses are set (Johnston 1984:447) 
(cf Lazear 2000) Through this flexibility, economists have clearly taken the initiative in research on migration 
and development in the final two decades of the twentieth century, whereas geographers and migration 
researchers from other academic fields have played a relatively marginal role 
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The essence of Johnston's theoretical framework is that uniqueness results from a particular 
combination of general processes and individual responses. Johnston's new regional 
geography seems closely affiliated to Giddens' (1984) structuration theory, as they both aim 
to reconcile the actor and structural strands of social theory. By linking agency and structure, 
structuration theory emphasizes that structures, rules, and norms emerge as outcomes of 
people's practices and actions, both intended and unintended. These structural forms 
subsequently shape (enable, constrain) people's actions, not by strict determination—as 
structural approaches tend to assume—but within a possibilistic range. 
Although some individual action is routinized and mainly serves to reproduce 
structures, rules, and institutions, other action has agency20, serving to change the system and 
perhaps, in time, remake new rules (Giddens 1984, cf. Leach et al. 1999:230). This constant 
recreation of structures through agency is what Giddens refers to as the recursive nature of 
social life, in which structures are considered as both medium and outcome of the 
reproduction of human practices21. 
Like NELM, the livelihood, and the human capabilities approach—which can all be 
grouped under the umbrella of the structuration paradigm—the new regional geography 
recognizes the relevance of both agency and structure, and puts both in a spatial perspective: 
although human beings are constrained by the general context on the one hand, they have the 
ability, to a certain extent, to transform the very (social, cultural, political, economic, natural) 
environment that constrains their agency. The concept of uniqueness can also be applied to 
the relationship between migration and spatially differentiated—unique but not singular— 
localized development processes. Thus, within certain constraints, migration affects the 
context in which migrant households make future decisions on their migration and livelihoods 
and changes the developmental context of places between which people move22. 
Migration needs to be seen as a constituent component of the broader process of 
change that is implied in the term "development" (cf. Skeldon 1997:3). General processes of 
political, social, cultural, economic, and technical change at the macro-level have facilitated 
increasing mobility and migration, but also have a distinct impact on the local development 
process itself. Migration should not only be seen as the response by households to changes in 
the general context—such as the development of infrastructure or the expansion of capitalist 
Giddens (1984:9) emphasizes that "agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their 
capability of doing these things in the first place". This is "why agency implies power . . . Agency concerns 
events of which the individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given 
sequence of conduct, have acted differently. Whatever happened would not have happened if that individual had 
not intervened I am the author of many things I do not intend to do, and may not want to bring about, but 
non the less do. Conversely, there may be circumstances in which I intend to achieve something, and do achieve 
it, although not directly through my agency" 
21
 Giddens (1984.xxiii) argues that the repetitiveness or routimzation of day-to-day activities is the material 
grounding of what he calls the "recursive" nature of social life. By its recursive nature, Giddens (1984:xxiii) 
means that the "structured properties of social activity are constantly recreated out of the very resources 
which constitute them" This recreation happens via "duality of structure", a central concept in Giddens' 
structuration theory, which refers to the "structure as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively 
organizes, the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically implicated 
in its production and reproduction" (Giddens 1984:374). By integrating agency and structure in the concept of 
the "duality of structure", Giddens seeks to transcend the dualism of agency versus structure in social theory. 
22
 Salt (1987) argued that it is also possible to apply the concept of uniqueness to international labor migration 
networks "the migration process itself changes the context in which migrants make decisions about movement 
and also changes the characters of places—nation states or local regions—between which people move In sum, 
regional migration networks should be seen as space-specific responses to more general contextual conditions, 
but responses that create new local environments in which future decisions are set" 
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market economies—but also as a cause of social, cultural, economic, and institutional 
changes in the local development context, in which subsequent decisions on migration and 
investments are made. 
Thus, migration is not only a factor explaining change, but is an integral part of 
change itself in the same degree as it may enable further change. This is why it is more 
correct to refer to the recursive relationship between migration and development instead of 
the—one-way—impact of migration on development. 
This recursive nature of migration and development interactions is depicted in figure 
2.4. In the analysis of the factors underlying the geographical differentiation in migration and 
development relationships, a distinction can be made between (I) the development context at 
the general, macro level (national, international); (II) the development context at the local or 
regional level; and (III) the factors related to the migrant and his direct social and economic 
environment—in most cases the household. These three sets of variables are reciprocally 
linked through various direct functional relations and feedback mechanisms. 
Figure 2.4. General conceptual framework of recursive migration-development interactions 
^. Macro development context 
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Local development context (micro-
a. The macro-level development context—the above-regional (national, international) whole 
of economic, political, social, and economic structures—partly determines the local 
development context, for instance through public infrastructure, social facilities, 
legislature, taxation, regional development programs and access to markets. 
b. The macro-context also determines the extent to which there are opportunities to migrate 
and earn a salary elsewhere, either internally or abroad, for instance through immigration 
policies, income levels and levels of unemployment. This affects the magnitude, nature 
(undocumented, legal, labor, family migration), and the (initial) selectivity of migration. 
c. The local development context determines to what extent people are able to lead lives 
they have reason to value and to enhance the substantive choices they have (cf. Sen 
1997:1959) through local activities. The extent to which this is possible determines their 
(i) aspiration to migrate. A second way through which the local development context 
affects the propensity to migrate is the influence of development on the (ii) capability to 
migrate; a certain level of development is possible in order to be able to bear the costs and 
risks of labor migration. Thus, the propensity to migrate is seen as a function of people's 
aspirations and capabilities to do so. 
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d. In its tum, migration affects the local development context through its recursive effects 
(system feedbacks) on labor supply, consumption, investments, inequality, social 
stratification, relative deprivation, culture, institutions, perceptions, and aspirations. The 
specific nature of this impact is spatially heterogeneous to a large extent, and is contingent 
on the characteristics of the local development context as set by the behavior of previous 
actors. 
e. Changes in the local development context—for instance as the result of migration—may 
eventually affect the macro-level development context. 
This insight into the recursive nature of the relationship between migration and development 
obliges us to study migration impact in the context of its wider societal context, and not to 
artificially attempt to separate migration impacts from general processes of social change. A 
major weakness of many studies on migration and development seems to be that they attempt 
to separate causes and effects of migration, whereas both are two sides of the same coin. As 
Taylor (1999:63-64) argued, this is unfortunate, since the factors influencing migration 
decisions are also likely to shape the development outcomes in the sending areas. If people 
leave areas because structural obstacles make them believe they cannot fulfill their aspirations 
in their places of origin, it is naïve to expect that they will tend to invest massively in those 
places. 
Nevertheless, migration has—not only through remittances, but also through transfer 
of skills (Stahl 1988) and knowledge, or by enabling social change—the potential to 
overcome local constraints on development at least to a certain, although limited, extent. So, 
there is room for human agency. However, if constraints in the general context remain 
unaddressed, the room for human agency remains limited, and under such circumstances it is 
unlikely that the potential of migration will be fiilly realized. 
Recognition of the spatial heterogeneity and context-sensitivity of migration-
development interactions should, however, not tempt us to stop looking for generalizations. 
This will certainly lead us down a sterile path of relativism and return us to an exceptionalism 
that was all too common in geography in the past (Johnston 1984; Skeldon 1997:13). The 
challenge for migration researchers is to deal with this spatial diversity, and to discern 
regularities in the complex realities of migration and development interactions. This can only 
be done via systematic research and comparison should "help us make sense of social 
structures and processes that never recur in the same form, yet express common principles of 
causality" (Tilly 1984:146, cited in Skeldon 1997:13). Unraveling such principles 
determining the spatial heterogeneity of the interaction between migration and development 
should be the aim of analysis. 
Johnston's geographical framework leaves room for feedback mechanisms. As such, 
this insight is not new at all. Feedback mechanisms were already described by, for instance, 
Myrdal (1957), who stated that migration is likely to change the development context at both 
the origin and destination. However, Johnston's perspective differs from cumulative causation 
theory, since it is a possibilistic model leaving room for various local responses to general 
imperatives. Cumulative causation theory is deterministic, as it presupposes a fixed 
relationship between migration and development at the origin. It assumes that migration 
creates more underdevelopment at the origin, which in turn creates more out-migration and, 
hence, increasing dependency and underdevelopment. Empirical research has clearly proved 
such automatic mechanisms wrong. 
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Within a combined NELM, livelihood, and new geographical perspective, there is 
"possibilistic" room for differentiated responses by households operating in a local context to 
the opportunities and development potential offered by labor migration Hereby, it also leaves 
room for positive local development responses to migration Moreover, it acknowledges that 
migration can partly reshape the local social and economic context, creating "feedback loops" 
to the development context in which future migration and livelihood decisions are set 
Therefore, both negative and positive feedback mechanisms are possible in different domains 
of development and to varying degrees 
Migration cannot be "blamed" for a perceived lack of development, as the nature of 
migration-development interactions is fundamentally contingent on other conditions It is the 
very nature of migration-development interactions, and how these are shaped by the localized 
development context, which will be the subject of the following empirical study 

3 
Research questions and methodology 
3.1. Problem statement and research questions 
In the previous chapter, we saw that contemporary labor migration within and from the 
developing world can be seen as a part of a broader household livelihood strategy which 
serves three general aims First, labor migration allows households to spread income risks 
through a diversification of their income portfolio In this, we assume that the migrant leaves 
other household members behind, who continue with agriculture and other local productive 
activities If the migrant does not return eventually, it is often only after many years or even 
decades—provided that the migrant has obtained stable employment—that family 
reunification at the destination occurs Second, migration is a household livelihood strategy to 
potentially increase income Third, higher and more stable incomes allow migrant households 
to overcome local social and economic constraints, by improving their living conditions 
(health, nutrition, housing, sanitation, and so on), and potentially enabling migrant households 
to invest in their region of origin and to allow younger household members to go to school or 
university 
Such potentially positive effects of migration are seen as "developmental", not 
because of their income-increasing capacity per se, but because of their capacity to expand 
the substantive "freedoms" that people enjoy through an increase in human capabilities, 
which relates to the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to 
enhance the substantive choices they have (Sen 1999) Migration potentially allows 
households in the developing world to escape from the vicious circle of poverty through 
increasing their capability to shape their own destiny However, we have also stressed that 
these positive effects are potential effects, and that negative effects (increasing inequality, 
retreat from local production, extreme income insecunty) might equally occur The fruits of 
migration might also be unequally distributed within households (e g , along gender lines) or 
across communities Moreover, the impact of migration tends not to be uniform in the various 
social and economic domains of development 
The degree to which migration itself represents "freedom" for people depends very 
much on the circumstances under which people move Migration bom out of freedom-
increasing development is also more likely to further contnbute to development, and if 
migration is generated by situations of a lack of freedom ("a flight from misery"), it is also 
unlikely to generate development Our general hypothesis is that the extent to which the 
potential of migration to increase the capabilities and freedoms of people is actually realized 
fundamentally depends on the specific development context in the sending areas in which 
migration has occurred In the case of voluntary labor migration—which will be the subject of 
this thesis—we hypothesize that these effects are potentially high, although the actual impact 
of migration is neither uniform nor automatic We still lack sufficient insight into the 
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mechanisms that explain the spatial and temporal variability in migration and development 
interactions and the identification of enabling conditions for positive effects on local 
development. 
The principal aim of this study is to gain more systematic insight into the impact of 
out-migration on socio-economic development in migrant sending areas, based on empirical 
research in the Todgha oasis valley in southern Morocco. The problem statement has been 
formulated as follows: What has been the impact of internal and international labor 
migration on the social and economic development of the Todgha valley over the second half 
of the twentieth century? 
It seems useful to briefly discuss the terminology used in the problem statement. First, 
the problem statement mentions the impact of migration on development. However, migration 
itself is an integral part of broader processes of development in the sense that the migration 
process alters the very development context from which migration emanates. Because of these 
recursive effects, migration is both a consequence and cause of development. In its empirical-
analytical set-up, this study has operationalized this insight by first studying the 
developmental background of migration from the Todgha valley before focusing on the 
recursive impacts of migration on development. Strictly speaking, it would therefore be more 
accurate to speak of the role of migration or the interaction between migration and other 
processes of development, instead of the (one-way) impact of migration. Nevertheless, the use 
of the term impact is so widespread, that we will, in practice, not be able to avoid it. 
Second, the term social and economic development indicates that a broad, capabilities-
based concept of development, which includes both economic and non-economic (social— 
used in a broad sense—is used to indicate this) dimensions. Other key concepts (migration, 
migrants, household, household head, nucleus) are defined in appendix 1. 
This study focuses on migration-development interactions in the second half of the 
twentieth century, which largely coincides with the post-independence period (1956-2000). 
Most secondary data on population, migration, and development in the Todgha are only 
available over this period. This period is of sufficient length to study the more long-term 
interactions between migration and development, as it covers at least two generations of 
internal and international migrants. A particular emphasis will be put on the period after 1975, 
on which primary data have been collected. The study has been pursued through a research 
methodology which was carried out in six different villages within the Todgha valley 
involving several methods such as a household survey (standardized questionnaires), a plot-
level survey, a "participatory appraisal", open interviews, and the study of secondary data 
sources. 
The research questions addressed in this study are: 
1. What have been the main characteristics and developmental causes of migration patterns 
from, within and towards the Todgha valley in general, and the research villages in 
particular, over the second half of the twentieth century? 
This question is largely descriptive, and serves to gain a basic insight into migration patterns 
as they have evolved over the past half-century, including the factors explaining the origin, 
character, selectivity, and evolution of migration patterns. These issues will be analyzed at the 
valley, village and individual level, using both primary and secondary data sources, such as 
government statistics, policy documents, and previous studies. These data will be placed 
within a general (macro) perspective of Moroccan migration, serving as a general framework 
in which specific migration patterns from the Todgha-valley are interpreted. The sub-
questions are: 
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a How has internal and international migration within and from Morocco evolved over 
the twentieth century, and what are the developmental causes of changes in these 
patterns9 
b What has been the evolution of internal and international migration patterns from, 
within, and towards the Todgha valley7 
c To what extent have the different types of migration been selective according to 
personal, household, and ethnic characteπstlcs', Have there been changes in selectivity 
patterns over time, and how can these changes be explained7 
d What (changing) structural factors at the macro and micro level have enabled 
migration patterns to occur and what structural and network-related factors explain 
their evolution (change) over time7 
Chapter 4 examines the evolution of migration patterns within and from Morocco over the 
twentieth century and will serve to answer sub-question 1 a Chapter 5 will give a general 
introduction to the Todgha valley Chapters 4 and 5 will allow a better comprehension of the 
(macro-) developmental causes of the Todgha migration Chapter 6 will analyze empirical 
data on the character, evolution and causes of migration patterns from, to and within the 
Todgha Together, chapters 4, 5, and 6 will serve to answer sub-questions 1 b-1 d 
2 What role has migration played in changing the livelihoods of oasis households, and what 
has been the direct impact of migration on income levels and structure, wealth and living 
conditions7 
This question serves to evaluate the NELM-hypotheses that migration is a household strategy 
to stabilize livelihoods through the spreading of income risk and to actually improve 
livelihoods In this analysis, "development" will be conceptualized on the basis of the 
capabilities approach, and will therefore not only focus on income indicators, but also on 
actual living conditions The sub-questions, which will be examined in chapter 7, are 
a What household categories can be determined on the basis of the migration 
characteristics of their members7 This classification will serve as basis for the further 
migration-impact analysis in the study 
b What is the role of internal and international migration in changing household 
livelihoods, what is their function within the household life cycle, and what ideal-
typical "migration trajectones" can be distinguished7 
c How does migration affect other (local) livelihood activities of households7 
d What has been the direct effect of migration on household income level and structure7 
e How has migration affected household wealth and living conditions7 
f To what extent can inter-village differences in living conditions and wealth be 
explained by differences in migration participation and temporal aspects such as 
migration stage7 
3 To what extent and in what way has migration affected the investment behavior of 
households and how can the spatial and temporal differentiation in this behavior be 
explained7 
This question is crucial to the study as it goes to the heart of the heated debate between 
"migration optimists" and "migration pessimists" Do migrant households indeed—as prior 
research has seemed to suggest—tend to spend their income on consumption and so-called 
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"non-productive" investments, and withdraw from local production, passively relying on 
remittances9 Or is the NELM hypothesis correct that migrant household tend to exhibit a 
higher propensity to invest than nonmigrant households9 Does migration contribute to 
economic development or instead put a labor and capital drain on the region of origin9 In 
order to explore these issues in detail, the following sub-questions have been formulated 
a How does migration affect the general propensity of households to invest9 
b To what extent does migration affect the sectoral' allocation of investments, and how 
can inter-household and inter-village differences in investments preferences be 
explained9 
c What is the effect of the household life cycle or "household migration stage" on the 
volume and sectoral preferences of investments9 
d To what extent have migrants' investments and consumption (indirectly) affected 
livelihoods (e g, activity patterns, occupational status, income) of nonmigrant 
households9 
e What are the main obstacles to investments9 
4 What has been the role of migration in the economic-geographical transformations of the 
Todgha valley9 
This is a more general question which aims to assess the role that migration—seen as part of a 
complex whole of vaned factors that affect development—has played in the general 
development and economic-geographical transformations of the Todgha valley over the past 
half-century Because of their significance, changes in the agncultural realm and patterns of 
human settlement (e g, housing construction, urbanization) will receive particular attention 
This analysis will serve to analyze the extent to which specific locational factors influence 
both the volume and allocation of investments, and how geographically differentiated 
migration impacts can be explained This research question pertains to the wider impact— 
transcending household and village level effects—that migration has had in changing the 
regional development context, and to what extent and in what way these recursive effects 
have, in their tum, affected migration patterns The following sub-questions have been 
formulated 
a What is the nature of the major transformations that have been taking place in the 
agncultural and other economic domains9 
b To what extent can these general processes of economic-geographical development be 
attributed to the socio-economic effects of migration9 
c What characterizes the geographical allocation of agricultural and non-agricultural 
investments and how can this be explained9 
d Do investment preferences differ across locales (i e , villages), and to what extent can 
any such differentiation be explained by geographical differences and differences in 
the migratory background of villages9 
e What have been the recursive effects of economic-geographical transformations on 
patterns of migration from, within, and towards the Todgha valley9 
I e , the allocation among different investment categones such as agriculture, housing, education, retail, 
catering, transport, commerce and so on 
Research Questions and Methodology 77 
Chapters 8 and 9 will serve to answer research questions 3 and 4 Chapter 8 analyzes the 
developmental impacts of migration in the agricultural domain Chapter 9 examines the 
impact migration has had in non-agncultural economic domains, including education 
5 To what extent and in what way has migration affected social stratification, gender roles, 
culture, and institutional change9 
The role of migration in social and cultural change is potentially high, and from a capabilities 
perspective these changes are highly relevant to development, not only because of their 
intrinsic value, but also because social and cultural changes can affect the local conditions for 
economic production Furthermore, social and cultural change might affect the allocation of, 
and access to, resources at the intra-household level (e g , gender inequality) and community 
level (e g, income inequality) Moreover, changes in attitudes, tastes, preferences, and 
aspirations might recursively influence subsequent migration patterns as well as the 
propensity to invest The sub-questions are 
a To what extent and in what way has migration affected pre-colonial patterns of socio-
ethnic stratification7 
b To what extent and in what way has migration led to changes in attitudes, tastes, 
preferences, and aspirations, and how do these changes affect migration patterns'' 
c To what extent and in what way has migration affected gender roles, women's 
influence on household decision making, and the well-being of women9 
d To what extent and m what way has the local institutional environment changed, and 
to what extent can these changes be attributed to the social and cultural impact of 
migration9 
These questions will be examined in chapter 10, which will also describe how migration has 
affected oasis life in more general terms, transcending the household-focused analysis of the 
preceding chapters 
The research questions will structure the data analysis presented in the remainder of 
this study Together, the answers to these five research questions will allow us to review 
current insights into and hypotheses on spatio-temporal migration and development 
interactions as presented in section 2 5 3 On the basis of this evaluation, more general and 
fundamental theoretical questions on the developmental role of labor migration will be 
addressed To what extent does this study support, falsify, or modify prevailing insights9 
Can migration indeed be interpreted as part of a (positive) household livelihood 
strategy to diversify livelihood, increase income, and to overcome local developmental 
constraints to investments, or were the structuralists right when they stated that most migrants 
do not have a veritable free choice and that migration is therefore better interpreted as a 
(negative) "flight from misery"9 In brief, are migrants agents or victims9 Or are there 
elements of truth in both assumptions9 
Linked to this discussion on the very nature of migration is the question of whether 
migrant households can be considered as agents of social and economic development Do they 
indeed play an innovative role in breaking down social and economic obstacles to 
development, or do they rather tend to rely passively on remittances and tend to retreat from 
local economic activities9 How has this affected inequality in the distribution of substantive 
freedoms and capabilities among different social categories, such as nonmigrants and 
migrants, women and men, and vanous ethnic groups9 How have the social and economic 
impacts of migration on development affected subsequent migration patterns9 Have the 
recursive effects of migration stimulated further out-migration in a negative cycle of 
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"cumulative causation", or have migration patterns been reshaped or reversed as a 
consequence of many decades of partly migration-triggered development? Or do both 
processes occur simultaneously, or change over time, or do different mechanisms apply to 
internal and international migration? And, last but not least, what are the main enabling or 
constraining conditions that affect positive or negative migration and development 
interactions? This study tries to address these vital questions. 
3.2. Methodological implications of recent theoretical insights 
Before presenting the research methodology, it seems useful to briefly review the implications 
of the recent shift in recent theoretical insights for the methodological design of migration 
studies. This seems necessary in order to ensure that the empirical results of the study can 
contribute to the broader theoretical debate. As has been demonstrated, the poor 
methodological design and a lack of connection to theory have severely hampered the 
theoretical progression of the migration and development debate. Among the methodological 
considerations, the four key issues are (1) the units of research and analysis; (2) scope of the 
research populations; (3) what data to collect; and (4) what instruments of data collection to 
use. 
3.2.1. A multilevel approach with the household as the basic unit of analysis 
Migration does not take place in a social, cultural, and institutional void. The logical 
consequence is that migration should not (only) be studied at the individual level, as is 
typically the case in studies based on census data and other macro-studies. Both livelihood 
and NELM researchers have therefore strongly advocated the use of the household as the 
primary unit of analysis (McDowell and De Haan 1997; Stark 1991). There seems to be a 
general consensus on the relevance of the household as the most appropriate management unit 
in which decisions on migration, consumption, and investments are taken, at least within the 
context of Middle-Eastern and North African societies such as Morocco (cf. De Mas 1990a)2. 
However, such a household approach has also been criticized on various grounds. 
First, there is the risk of a reification of the household, which is often seen as a unit with a 
clear will, plans, strategy, and aims (Lieten and Nieuwenhuys 1989:8). It is often implicitly or 
explicitly assumed that the household takes unanimous decisions that are to the advantage of 
the whole group (Rutten 1987:4). Feminist researchers in particular have argued that this 
masks intra-household inequalities and neglects the issue of power. As Rodenburg (1997:4-5) 
argued, 
The use of households as the primary unit of decision-making and research has been criticized in the context 
of, for instance, sub-Saharan Africa, where individuals within households may have considerable social, 
economic, and migratory autonomy Moreover, this fragmentation of households seems to have been increasing 
over past decades Although Moroccan family life is also characterized by a certain degree of fragmentation and 
loosening of ties, the nuclear household can (still) be considered as the primary organizing principle of daily life 
and decision making, within which the autonomy of individuals is severely restrained, certainly in rural settings. 
In general, individual socio-economic behavior and migration or life histories cannot be understood without 
considering the wider context of the household. However, this is neither to suggest that any action is undertaken 
after consulting household members, nor that household members have equal power. Therefore, this study will 
pay substantive attention to the internal composition of households and in particular to the position of women. 
Nevertheless, the household remains the central unit of analysis 
Research Questions and Methodology 79 
The concept of household strategies presumes that there is consensus and co-operation 
between household members. It is usually believed that the household pursues one collective 
goal based on a set of common interests . . . . what is often presented as the strategy of a 
household can also be conceived as the outcome of a struggle for domination between male 
and female, old and young, powerful and powerless. 
Furthermore, there will obviously also be instances in which decisions on migration—as any 
other issue—are taken individually, without consulting and sometimes even without 
informing other household members. In Morocco, for example, men often do not always 
consult their wives and other household members before migrating. In a way, the NELM-
assumption that migration is a household livelihood strategy presupposes an equality of 
power and interests within the households and decision-making on the basis of a consensus 
between household members. Moreover, non-household members (family, friends) might 
equally influence decision making. Thus, the ideal-typical image of the household as a 
(unified) decision making unit can be far from reality. 
However, the lesson should not be to reject the household as a central unit of research 
and analysis altogether, as the household still seems to be the level at which most decisions 
are made. Neither individual nor macro-approaches can offer us the insight that a household-
centered analysis can give. Given its proven usefulness in research, the household approach 
should not be discarded, especially in view of the lack of a viable alternative. A household 
approach is also useful in overcoming the limitations of both structural (macro) and 
individual-atomistic (micro) perspectives on migration (Rodenburg 1997:3). The household 
can be considered a mediator between the demands and opportunities of the labor market and 
individual decisions to migrate (Rodenburg 1997:3). 
While maintaining the household as the primary research unit, migration researchers 
should also consider relevant processes that play out on other levels. We should therefore 
adopt a flexible, multi-level analysis. Although the household seems the most appropriate unit 
of analysis, we should not lose sight of intra-household relations and inequalities. We have 
already seen that migration tends to be a selective process according to sex and age. 
Therefore, it is possible, or even likely, that not all members of households will equally reap 
the benefits of migration. Some household members may even see their labor burden and 
material insecurity increase, while others will improve their situation. The relative power of 
household members to influence resource allocation will, in fact, be highly dependent on 
cultural norms and vested social structures. From a capabilities perspective on development 
(Sen 1999), therefore, such intra-household distributional issues are highly relevant in 
assessing to what extent "development" has taken place. 
Data on income, consumption, investments, possessions, and agricultural and other 
enterprises can best be collected at the household level, as income and expenditures are 
typically pooled in the common household budget, and different (individual or collective) 
income and expenditure streams can therefore not be separated. However, in order to analyze 
important aspects such as the selectivity of migration and intra-household gender inequality, 
it is necessary to have data on variables such as the age, sex, education, and work and 
migration status of all the individual members of the household. This individual data can be 
aggregated at the household or community (village) levels afterwards whenever necessary. 
Trying to do this the other way around is typically not possible. 
Social relations with other individuals or households may be important in studying 
network migration and how the impact of migration on social relations might influence local 
development responses to migration. The cultural impact of migration should equally be 
considered, as it affects communities as a whole, and this may equally affect the conditions in 
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which future decisions on migration and livelihoods are made. Despite their room for agency, 
migrants or migrant households are not independent actors with free and equal access to 
resources and markets. Structural factors influence migration patterns and constrain the extent 
to which migrants (and nonmigrants) will tend to invest in the local economy. Therefore, it is 
important to consider factors such as the functioning of various institutions, ranging from 
markets to village councils, the geographical position of a place or region vis-à-vis economic 
hubs, and—in particular for agricultural development—environmental factors. Together, such 
factors shape the localized development context in which decisions on migration and 
livelihood activities are made, and which, in its tum, is partly reshaped by the recursive 
impact of such decisions. 
These structural factors are easily ignored if the focus is only at the household or 
individual level. Therefore, besides household level research, empirical studies should also 
simultaneously collect community level data at the research sites, which provide another 
significant level of analysis. As Fawcett and Arnold (1987:1526) stated, migration studies 
should incorporate individual data, household data, and community or "contextual" data. If 
necessary, they should also consider development-relevant factors present at the regional, 
national, and international level. This allows us to analyze the interaction among the different 
levels of aggregation, which reflects reciprocal influences. Thus, while retaining the 
household as the primary level of analysis, it also seems indispensable to collect data at other 
relevant levels. 
3.2.2. Determining research populations 
Migration systems, cumulative causation, and NELM theories have demonstrated that the 
cultural, social, and economic impacts of migration are likely to affect migrant sending 
communities as a whole, that is, both migrant and nonmigrant households. Nonmigrants are 
also essential as a control group3 to assess the selectivity of migration as well as migration 
impact. It is, therefore, necessary to include both migrant and nonmigrant households in 
research populations. 
Most migration studies limit their analysis either to long-distance international 
migration or to relatively short-distance internal migration. This is unfortunate, as migration 
systems and migration network theories have demonstrated that internal and international 
forms of migration are closely interwoven. Internal migrants can become international 
migrants, internal migration may cause international migration, and vice versa. Moreover, 
households may contain both internal and international migrants. This seems sufficient reason 
to study both types of migration together, to analyze the relationship between both and to 
include both internal and international migrant households in empirical studies. 
However, we should be aware that the use of a conlrol group in a "natural" social setting is not possible in a 
strict sense, as it is impossible to isolate research units from their wider social context Unlike a "pure" 
laboratory expenment, members of social categories (e g , migrant and nonmigrant households) have not been 
randomly allocated to those groups from an initial research population with equal characteristics (cf Llobera 
1998) As migration tends to be a selective process, migrant and nonmigrant households will also differ on many 
different characteristics than migration alone In other words, these factors cannot be held constant, rendering a 
pure expenment impossible The more or less endogenous character of such variables makes it difficult to 
straightforwardly assess the impact of migration on development. In such a comparative natural expenment, 
statistical analysis should therefore not simply compare migrants and nonmigrant groups, but assess the 
influence of other variables that might intervene or mediate in migration impacts on development 
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3.2.3. What data to include 
As we have seen in chapter 2, many migration studies attempt to isolate migrant remittances 
from other sources of household income. However, this is an artificial and simplistic 
approach, neglecting the fungible character of household income. Different sources of 
household income are pooled within a common household budget rather than earmarked for 
specific expenditure. Moreover, if we agree that migration should be considered as a 
constituent part of general household livelihood strategies, its impact can only be studied in 
relation to other economic activities and sources of household income. As Taylor ( 1999) has 
argued, this obliges us to adopt a whole household approach, covering the entire livelihoods 
of households, that is, all the activities and sources of income of the individual household 
members. 
Within a broad, capabilities-based concept of development, studies on migration and 
development should assess the role of migration in (1) the direct well-being of people; (2) 
income growth; and (3) social change. Consequently, we should not only consider income 
(cash or in kind) or investments in economic activities, but equally the well-being aspects and 
investments in human capital (e.g., education). Moreover, the analysis of the impact of 
migration in these different dimensions of development should be sensitive to intra-household 
and intra-community inequality. 
The impact of migration cannot be assessed by simply comparing migrant and 
nonmigrant households. We have seen that migration tends to be selective on personal 
characteristics such as sex, age, and human capital (such as education) as well as the 
household's physical and social capital assets such as income, land possession, and relations 
with already established migrants. Insight into migration selectivity is indispensable to 
properly assess the impact of migration on well-being, inequality, and growth. In brief, it 
matters who migrates, to what place, under which circumstances, and why. The 
methodological consequences are that we should include variables on human, social, and 
physical capital assets both at the individual and household level in empirical studies. 
We have also seen that spatial and temporal scales of analysis may heavily influence 
the results of analyses (cf. Jones 1998b). In chapter 2, we hypothesized that there might be a 
relation between the "migration stage" of the household (related to the family life cycle) and 
at the community level on the one hand and migrants' economic behavior on the other (see 
table 2.1). In order to test this hypothesis on "lagged development responses", we should not 
only collect data on location and type of investments, but also on the point in time in which 
certain investments were made. 
Migration network theory indicates that migration has the tendency to become less 
selective over time, although selectivity might increase again in the longer term. It has been 
hypothesized that such changing selectivity patterns-over time-might affect income 
inequality at the community (i.e., village) level. This is another reason to specify the years in 
which certain migratory and economic acts were initiated or ended. In order to study the role 
of networks, it seems relevant to assess the extent to which migration streams are 
geographically clustered (e.g., limited to particular villages or regions) and concentrated 
within particular families or entire groups. Again, this stresses the need to collect data on the 
place and time of migration. Ideally, this should involve a longitudinal approach. If this is not 
possible, retrospective questions should be included in empirical studies. 
Furthermore, migration is believed to have a potentially high socio-cultural impact, 
which might in turn influence intra-household resource allocation or the functioning of all 
kinds of institutions. Such changes do not only have an intrinsic developmental value in 
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affecting people's capabilities and freedoms, but might in tum also have a recursive effect on 
economic production (cf. Sen 1999). This points to the importance of collecting qualitative 
data revealing (changing) perceptions, ambitions, tastes of people of different sexes, ages, and 
migratory status This will increase the degree to which we can understand—in the Webenan 
sense of verstehen*—the social, economic, and migratory behavior of people and our ability 
to shed light on more society-wide processes of cultural and social change It is not only 
important to measure what is happening and how people behave, but also to get an 
hermeneutic understanding of why people behave that particular way from within their own 
viewpoint 
3.2.4. The need for mixed methods 
We can conclude from the previous sections that, in order to study the complex relationships 
between migration and development, we need a research design that collects and analyzes 
data at different levels (individual, household, community) (cf De Mas 1992) Although the 
household seems most apt as a central variable, individual and community-level data also 
seems essential We should not isolate migrants or the households they belong to, but study 
communities as a whole at different levels, including internal migrants and nonmigrants 
Following a capability-based definition of development and recognizing the relevance of 
socio-cultural and institutional aspects both as causes and effects of migration, both 
quantitative (demographic and economic items) and qualitative (social and cultural items) 
methods seem necessary 
Migration researchers tend to be divided between those adopting a survey-based 
quantitative approach (mostly economists and geographers) and those adopting a qualitative 
approach based on interviews and participant observation (mostly sociologists and 
anthropologists) Unfortunately, there is only a limited amount of data sets from migrant 
sending regions that contain data taken at both the individual and household level, covering 
the temporal and spatial allocation of both migration and investments 
Whether it is more accurate to choose quantitative or qualitative methods depends on 
the specific research question In general, the structural and cultural dimensions of 
development are difficult to capture by quantitative research techniques alone, whereas 
aspects related to the demographic and economic characteristics of individuals or households 
are generally easier to quantify In order to investigate the recursive relationship between 
agency and structure, research on migration and development should therefore ideally 
combine qualitative and quantitative methods 
Wherever quantitative measurement and analysis is possible, it seems preferable to use 
these techniques as they allow for more analytical ngor, increase precision, and decrease 
researcher's bias Quantitative techniques can be easily used to collect and analyze 
demographic and migratory data Data on income, expenditure, investments, and agricultural 
production can also be easily expressed in quantitative terms However, problems of 
reliability are often greater with such sensitive issues Unfortunately, this argument has often 
been used to refute quantitative techniques in more general terms First, the reliability 
depends on the way the research is conducted in the field This implies that the reliability can 
be greatly enhanced by factors influencing the trust of respondents, such as a good 
introduction in the field and the personal involvement of the researcher in the fieldwork 
4
 This term refers to the social scientist's attempt to understand both the intention and the context of human 
action 
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Much also depends on the structure of questionnaires. Second, limitations in reliability and 
measurement validity do not necessarily discredit quantitative research, as long as no 
unrealistic semblance of precision is suggested in presenting the outcome of statistical 
analysis. The aim should rather be to detect general trends and make statistically significant 
inferences. 
Although the criticism on quantitative research is often out of proportion, it seems true 
that some crucial dimensions of migration and development interactions indeed ask for other 
methods. If we wish to achieve a more hermeneutic understanding of the social world in 
which people live, to understand why they make certain choices such as migrating or 
investing, how their perceptions and aspirations have changed, why women are sometimes 
not allowed to migrate, to know how institutions work or why they malfunction, qualitative 
research methods are essential. The ideal, therefore, would seem to be a mixed approach 
combining both quantitative and qualitative research. 
3.3. Research methodology 
3.3.1. Background of the study 
This study was carried out in the context of the IMAROM research project, which was 
conducted between 1998 and 2001. The IMAROM project aimed to study the impact of 
migration and the concomitant socio-economic and political changes on land and water 
management and resource exploitation in the oases of Morocco and Tunisia. In addition to 
identifying the enabling socio-economic and biophysical conditions for investments in 
irrigated oasis agriculture, IMAROM aimed to assess the ecological consequences of current 
changes in the land and water management of oases (cf. De Haas 2001)5. 
The IMAROM project entailed empirical research in different research sites located in 
oases in southern Tunisia and Morocco which included both natural and social scientists 
(physical geographers, soil scientists, human geographers, sociologists, economists) The 
Moroccan research sites were located in the Todgha valley (province of Ouarzazate). Among 
the Tunisian sites, two were located in Mareth, a coastal area near Médenine, and one, 
Fatnassa, in the continental oasis area of Nefzaoua. I was responsible for co-ordination of the 
socio-economic part of the research in Morocco. While staying in the Todgha, I 
simultaneously carried out my Ph.D. fieldwork. Whereas IMAROM was focused on processes 
of agricultural and environmental change, this particular study focuses on the role of 
migration in processes of local and regional development in a broader sense. This means that 
the role of migration in non-agricultural economic sectors as well as social and cultural 
domains were studied too. Questions related to ecology and sustainability (e.g., land 
degradation, depletion of water resources), which were central to IMAROM, are not explicitly 
addressed in this study. 
5
 IMAROM stands for Interaction between Migration, Land and Water Management and Resource Exploitation in 
the Oases of the Maghreb This research was designed and coordinated by the AGIOS (Amslerdam Research 
Institute for Global Issues and Development Studies) institute of the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 
and funded by the INCO-DC program of DGX11 of the European Commission (IC18-CT97-0134). In Morocco, 
participating institutions included the Université Mohammed V (Rabat) and the Université Mohammed I 
(Oujda), in Tunisia the Institut des Régions Arides (Médenine); and in Spain the Estación Experimental de 
Zonas Andas (CSIC, Almeria). In Us final stage, the project received support from the CIDIN (Centre for 
International Development Issues Nijmegen) of the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
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The empirical part of this PhD research took place between March 1998 and July 2000, 
which comprised a preparation penod of six months and the actual fieldwork, which took 
place between September 1998 and July 2000 During this period, I lived in Tinghir, the 
urban center of the Todgha valley In the field, I intensively co-operated with Hassan El 
Ghanjou, a PhD student in geography from the Université Mohammed V in Rabat, Morocco 
We elaborated most of the methodologies jointly and during most of the actual fieldwork we 
lived in Tinghir in the same house and carried out parts of the research together In the 
following sections, the general course of the project will be described, thereby elaborating the 
different research methodologies that were applied 
3.3.2. Preparation and selection of the research area 
The first half-year of the study (March-August 1998) was devoted to a literature review, the 
design of research methodologies, and the selection of research sites General literature on 
migration and development was studied in order to develop a theoretical framework as 
presented in chapter 2 This theoretical study has guided the data collection Furthermore, 
specific empirical literature on migration and development in the Maghreb and Morocco was 
collected 
In March 1998, an orientation tnp was made in southern Morocco to select a research 
area It was decided to locate this research area in the and part of Morocco, south of the Atlas 
Mountains, where population settlements are concentrated in oases located in river valleys or 
near springs Two main reasons underpinned the choice to conduct the research in an oasis 
area The first reason was practical this study was part of the broader IMAROM research 
project, whose main aim was to study the role of migration in the (agricultural) transformation 
in oases in Morocco and Tunisia Secondly, most Moroccan oases have witnessed high rates 
of internal and international migration over several decades, which made them appropnate for 
the study of migration impacts An additional advantage of oases is their clear spatial 
delimitation as a region, and the high internal social, ethnic, geographical, and agncultural 
diversity that can usually be found within the confines of most oases 
Concerning the choice of a particular oasis, the pnmary selection criterion was the 
simultaneous occurrence of both internal and international migration to a rather high degree 
A second criterion was the existence of a certain (inter-village) differentiation within the 
research area itself concerning migratory, agncultural, and socio-ethnic characteristics Such 
differentiation allowed us to study factors determining the spatial differentiation in migration-
development interactions and to study the relevance of "migration stage" (i e, temporal 
aspects) in studying migration impacts 
The Todgha valley fulfilled the above-mentioned criteria First, it is a typical 
emigration region, with, however, significant variations in migratory background—both 
pertaining to destinations as well as "migration stage"—among villages and parts of the 
valley Second, the valley (with a length of approximately 40 km including the downstream 
Ghallil plain) comprises a high differentiation in natural environments between the upstream 
and downstream parts, shaping rather different conditions for agncultural production Third, 
some villages are more isolated than others, measured by their distance to roads and the 
proximity to Tinghir, the valley's urban center It was supposed that the study of several 
villages located across the valley would enable study of the influence of such locational 
factors on migration patterns and the spatial and sectoral allocation of investments A 
practical advantage was that the valley is relatively small, so that the selected research 
villages could all be reached from Tinghir within one hour by car or collective transport by 
transit (small vans operated by individual entrepreneurs) A final reason for selecting the 
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Todgha valley was the availability of scientific and policy documents on the valley. This 
means that less time was lost in the collection of general baseline data on the valley, so that 
more time was available for the actual migration research. 
Between June and August 1998, a draft questionnaire for the household survey was 
written. Moreover, the available policy documents, scientific literature, maps, and aerial 
photographs of the valley were collected and studied (Beaurpère 1933; Raclot 1936; but in 
particular the research carried out by Büchner 1986) and proved to be very useful in 
providing much basic geographical and historical data on the region. Other useful sources of 
secondary data were Bouzid (1992), Steinmann (1993), and Nairn (1997)6. 
3.3.3. Preliminary research, participatory appraisal, and household survey 
The actual fieldwork started in September 1998 with a general orientation study of the 
Todgha, which was achieved by transect walks and observations in all parts of the valley, 
informal conversations with villagers, and interviews with government officials, returned 
migrants, and peasants. Moreover, secondary data on population and migration were collected 
from the local authorities in Tinghir. With the agricultural extension service of Tinghir (CMV), 
general data on agricultural production were obtained (CMV 1996). Information was recorded 
in a field logbook and transcripts of the interviews were made. This orientation study was 
completed in November 1998 (cf. De Haas and El Ghanjou 1998). It not only provided a 
general image of the socio-economic and migratory dynamics and patterns of spatial change 
in the valley, but was also useful as an informational basis for the subsequent selection of 
research villages. 
During the same period, the household questionnaire was tested numerous times and 
revised twelve times before drawing up the final version. The length was significantly 
reduced so that most interviews did not last longer than one hour, in order to prevent fatigue 
among the respondents. This exercise proved to be instrumental, as it forced the researcher to 
specify and operationalize the research questions as clearly as possible. Some useful 
questions had unfortunately to be omitted from the questionnaires as they proved to be too 
sensitive or difficult to answer. This mainly concerned questions on savings, debts, and 
expenditures on health care and religious feasts. The final questionnaire consisted of pre-
coded and some open-ended questions on the following items: 
Individual level 
a. Demographic structure of the household (age, sex, relationship to household head); 
b. Migration characteristics of oases and individuals; 
c. Educational levels; 
d. Activity patterns (men and women, including migrants); 
Household level 
a. Income characteristics (including agriculture and migrant remittances); 
b. Expenditure and investment patterns; 
c. Ownership of land, water rights, and cattle; agricultural production 
6
 Büchner (1986), Steinmann (1993) and Nairn (1997) all examine the impact of migration Nevertheless, these 
studies neither consider the issue of migration and development theoretically nor systematically compare 
nonmigrant and migrant households. Nevertheless, the studies were highly valuable as a basic reference. 
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For practical reasons it was impossible, and for analytical reasons unnecessary, to study all 
(64) villages in the valley. One option considered was take a random sample from the entire 
population of the valley. However, this was difficult to achieve due to the absence of a sound 
sampling framework. Although lists of households exist at municipality level, they were 
difficult to access, not complete for all villages, and potentially unreliable. Moreover, the 
local chiefs such as shiukh and mqaddemin, who are responsible for compiling these lists, do 
not use a common household definition. Moreover, in order to study social and ethnic 
relations at the village level and the functioning of village institutions, it seemed necessary to 
use qualitative research methods in which the village community was studied as a whole. In 
addition, in order to study the role of geographical-environmental factors in investments 
patterns, it seemed desirable to thoroughly study a limited number of sites within the valley 
instead of opting for a random survey in the entire valley. Therefore, it seemed a better option 
to select a limited number of villages, which were subsequently studied both as a whole and at 
the household level. 
In November 1998, it was therefore decided to select the villages and households on 
the basis of a spatially clustered, non-random sample. Among the 64 villages located in the 
Todgha valley, six villages were selected in order to study in more detail the linkages between 
migration and development7. The villages, located both in the upstream and downstream parts 
of the valley, were selected non-randomly, in such a way that the survey covered the 
migratory, agricultural-environmental, and socio-ethnic variability prevailing in the valley. 
These villages were Zaou'ia, Tikoutar, Ait El Meskine, Ikhba, Tadafelt, and Ghallil n'Ait 
Isfoul (see map 2). 
As the research villages were rather small (28-124 households), and taking into 
account the importance of covering enough8 households of all socio-ethnic and migratory 
(nonmigrant, internal migrant, international migrant, return migrant) groups within each 
village, it was decided not to use sampling techniques for the survey, but to conduct a 
complete village census. This implies that all households within each village were included in 
the survey. Before starting the actual survey, the researchers spent at least two weeks in each 
village, conducting a "participatory appraisal" (cf. Chambers 2002). This participatory 
appraisal comprised participant observation, informal conversations with oasis dwellers, 
transect walks in the village and the agricultural fields, and open interviews with peasants in 
the field and informants such as local shiukh and mqaddemin, school teachers, and returned 
migrants. This "participatory appraisal" was also instrumental in decreasing the distrust 
villagers generally felt towards outsiders. 
The next step was the selection of research assistants. The importance of a certain 
level of trust among the respondents was the main reason for appointing research assistants 
who originated from the same ethnic groups as the respondents. It was assessed that, in this 
particular context, the advantages of using "insiders" outweighed the potential disadvantages 
of such an approach. Strong ethnic rivalries prevail in the Todgha valley, so the research 
would probably have suffered from appointing "outsider" assistants from other villages or 
ethnic groups. For each village, an assistant was selected after finishing the introduction in the 
village. All assistants were young and jobless men9, with at least some years of university 
education. 
7
 In the context of the IMAROM project, 12 village were studied The other six villages were studied by 
geographers from the Mohammed V University Rabat (cf De Haas 2001). 
8
 "Enough" in the sense that statistical inferences can be made not only on aggregate, but also at the village 
level 
' Hardly any indigenous women with higher education live in the valley. This may change in the near future, as 
more and more girls are following higher secondary education. 
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The surveys were carried out in the period December 1998-July 1999. In total, 507 
households in six villages were enumerated. Before starting the survey, a complete list of all 
households in the village was drawn up with the assistant. In principle, household 
questionnaires were conducted with the household head. In many instances, however, the 
household head was absent or had migrated. In that case, the questions were asked to another 
person, in most cases a brother, the head's spouse or an adult son. This means that other 
people had to supply information about the absent person. As Schoorl (1998:19) stated, such 
"proxy" information can be of a low quality, despite the respondent's best intentions, and this 
implies that questions on attitudes or opinions of the migrants cannot be included in the 
survey. In order to partly tackle that latter problem, open interviews were conducted with 
migrants on temporary return during summer holiday. 
Assistants were appointed to carry out the survey (see section 3.4.2). During the first 
days, the assistant and researcher carried out the interviews jointly. Once familiar with 
interviewing, the assistants carried out most of the remainder of the survey alone. The 
researcher visited the village every one or two days, and regularly participated in 
interviewing. All completed questionnaires were checked by the researcher, and in case of 
doubt on the reliability of certain answers, respondents were revisited. 
After verifying information, questionnaire data was stored in an SPSS database. I 
decided to do the data entry myself, and not by assistants, in order to reduce data entry errors. 
A data entry form was used (with limited value ranges on variables) in order to further 
decrease data entry errors. Two databases were set up: one for the household-level data, 
another for demographic and migratory data that was recorded at the individual level. This 
allowed maximum flexibility in analyzing data and constructing new variables by aggregating 
data from the second data-file at the household level, in which the household number 
functioned as a key variable. 
3.3.4. Open interviews, plot-level research, and participant observation 
In the period June-August 1999, I conducted open interviews with 20 migrants who returned 
during the summer holidays. The goal of these interviews was to gain further insight into their 
migration histories, their motives for migrating, their experiences, and future plans 
concerning migration and investments. It also offered me the chance to better understand why 
migrants and their households make certain migration and livelihood decisions which might 
be regarded by some as "irrational", but for which there is almost always an explanation in 
the wider social, cultural and economic development context. This also offered me the chance 
to gain further insight into their perceptions of the Todgha as a place to concentrate activities 
and investments, and structural obstacles which might explain why migrant households do not 
invest in certain economic sectors. Since quantitative surveys tend to be largely blind on such 
topics, the open interviews had an important added value. The respondents were not selected 
on the basis of a sample, but through chance meetings. As the primary goal of these 
interviews was rather to gain insight into the experiences and perceptions of migrants to help 
to develop a categorization (typology) of migration and livelihood strategies, questions of 
statistical representation were less relevant here. 
Between September 1999 and January 2000, additional plot-level research was 
conducted, involving interviews with all peasants cultivating plots within a specific sub-sector 
of the oasis, so as to gain more insight into agricultural practices. Although this part of the 
research was primarily designed for the IMAROM project, the results of this research also seem 
instrumental in assessing the impact of migration on land use and cropping patterns. The 
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questions mostly pertained to (a) cropping patterns (actual land use), (b) intensity level of 
agriculture (input factors such as pesticides, fertilizers, HYVs), and (c) irrigation methods and 
patterns In the last phase of the research, February-June 2000, supplementary research was 
conducted in the Ghalhl, an alluvial desert plain which had recently been colonized by 
farmers through the installation of water pumps This research was done in order to gain 
additional insight into the role migration plays in agricultural innovation For that purpose, 
basic data were collected on all farms in the plain and interviews with several farmers were 
conducted 
It is important to stress that, besides the more formal parts of my research (household 
survey, plot survey, open interviews), I used (participant) observation throughout my stay in 
the Todgha I noted down these observations and experiences in a field logbook on a daily 
basis Through living in the valley for almost two years, my daily visits to the villages, and 
intensive contacts with oasis dwellers, I learned more about the daily lives, perceptions, 
aspirations, and problems of people, and in particular of the preponderant place migration had 
in their minds The experience of staying in the Todgha taught me better why, for what 
reasons, and with what intentions people migrate, and what explains their livelihood 
strategies Participant observation also taught me to comprehend the nature and intensity of 
ethnic rivalries in the valley, the jealousy nonmigrants feel towards migrants, how corruption 
and lawlessness affect the daily life of people and can drive people to despair, how media and 
education affects the perceptions and aspirations of people, how lack of trust towards the state 
and its institutions affects the behavior of people, what it is to be young, ambitious, but at the 
same time without prospects, why some young and frustrated youth seek refuge in ethnic or 
religious extremism, and how a combination of exposure to education, media, and the relative 
wealth of migrants has literally "mobilized" the mindsets of young men and women 
Staying among, observing, and interacting with the Todghawis also taught me to 
comprehend why people tend to invest, for instance, so massively in economic sectors such as 
housing, or why some migrants have preferred to invest in the education of their children in 
Morocco instead of taking them to Europe This daily interaction and observation offered me 
insights that I would never have been able to obtain by a survey alone Moreover, this insight 
into people's motives helped me to structure and explain the expected and unexpected 
outcomes of quantitative data analysis, and to formulate certain new hypotheses on migrants' 
behavior 
3.3.5. Students' research on institutions and gender relations 
In 1998, an MA student conducted valuable background research on trends in migration and 
remittance flows between Morocco and Europe (Muller 1998) In 1999, two MA students 
earned out supplementary research in the Todgha valley on behalf of the University of 
Amsterdam and the IMAROM project A student in cultural anthropology (Corine Otte) earned 
out fieldwork in the Todgha valley from February to May 1999 She studied the changing 
relations between social actors and the role of traditional institutions relating to water 
management in Tadafelt, one of the research villages From June to August 1999, a student in 
human geography (Aleida van Rooij) carried out research on the effects of migration on the 
position of women household decision-making processes The MA theses containing the 
findings of both studies have been published as IMAROM working papers (Otte 2000, Van 
Rooij 2000) Both studies have provided supplementary—largely qualitative—data on 
important aspects that had originally not been addressed by the PhD research Their research 
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has provided a useful input for this PhD research, and has been particularly instrumental in the 
analysis of the socio-cultural impact of migration (chapter 10). 
3.3.6. Data analysis, literature study, and reporting 
The period between September 2000 and March 2001 was used to analyze data and to draw 
up the final report of the IMAROM research in collaboration with other research partners (cf. 
De Haas 2001). This report contained a general description of the Todgha valley and a basic 
analysis of migration impacts on investments in the Todgha valley. Part of this final report 
was based on an earlier, general report on the Todgha by De Haas and El Ghanjou (2000a). 
This latter report forms the basis for some sections of chapters 5 and 8. In the period April-
July 2001, a second review of the international theoretical literature on migration and 
development was made to update the first review made in spring 1998. On the basis of this 
review, the theoretical chapter 2 was drawn up. The period August 2001 - November 2002 
was largely dedicated to more detailed data analysis (using SPSS) and the writing of the 
empirical chapters and the conclusion of this thesis. 
3.4. Problems encountered and appraisal of methodology 
3.4.1. Conflicting interests: respondents' trust vs. contacts with local authorities 
Taking into account the political culture of Morocco, it is virtually impossible to carry out a 
large-scale empirical study in a rural area over a period of two years without being in regular 
contact with the local authorities. After arriving in the area, it was an obligatory step to 
inform the local qa id and pasha (government-appointed heads of the valley's rural and urban 
districts) about our stay. Not respecting this rule would have embarrassed these authorities 
and would have seriously impeded the progression of the research. After the local authorities 
had verified whether we had indeed obtained a research permit from the Ministry of the 
Interior, we received their full collaboration, and were provided with basic information and 
policy documents on the valley and Tinghir. Moreover, the qaid convened all the heads of the 
sub-districts (shiukh) for a meeting, informing them of our research and summoning them to 
collaborate. Following the same logic, before starting research in a particular village, it was 
obligatory to inform the shikh—the sub-district head—and the moqaddem—the village head. 
On the instructions of their superiors, these officials co-operated with our research and 
provided us with useful basic information. 
Although this cooperation of local authorities might seem positive, these good 
contacts also constituted a potential threat to our research. This concern was related to the 
interest we had in the trust of respondents towards us. A too close association with local 
authorities might harm the research, as people in this rural, Berber-speaking area, tend to 
distrust the makhzen, the civil servants and functionaries associated with the central state-
apparatus directed from Rabat10. In addition, most high officials of the local authority as well 
as police and gendarmerie originate from other, predominantly Arab regions, and are 
w
 Large parts of rural Morocco, including the Todgha valley, used to be autonomous or semi-autonomous from 
central state power Although the rebellious tribes of the interior have been largely pacified since French 
colonization, the makhzen are still seen by many as "intruders" who are to be distrusted. 
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therefore considered as berraniyin, or "outsiders", who are often distrusted. The shmkh and 
mqaddemin, though natives of the region, are equally distrusted. They are generally seen as 
the eyes and ears of the qaid and pasha, as they are expected to report back information on 
the behavior of villagers to their superiors. This also applied to us. As the qaid and pasha 
always happened to know exactly were we had been the previous days or even hours, we 
could not avoid the impression that our activities were closely watched. 
Thus, too close an association with the local authorities entailed the risk that our 
respondents would associate us with the makhzen as well. Our biggest fear was of being seen 
as tax collectors, especially relating to the reliability of questions on income and investments. 
Therefore, we tried to minimize contact with the local authorities. When circumstances 
obliged us to pay a courtesy visit to a shikh or moqaddem, we tried to meet him discreetly 
outside the village in order not to be seen together with him. However, this strategy was not 
successful in all instances, especially when we accidentally met such a "chief in his village, 
and were then subsequently obliged to drink tea at his house. It was therefore not always 
possible to escape. 
It is difficult to assess exactly to what degree this harmed the quality of the research. 
Interestingly, the level of trust towards me, the foreign researcher, seemed higher in 
comparison to my colleague, the Arab Moroccan researcher, as the latter was always 
incriminated as being somebody representing the (distrusted) government. As a foreigner I 
was a "real" outsider, and therefore less suspected of "spying", and found it easier to gain 
access to people and collect information. The advantage of the Moroccan researcher, 
obviously, was his better knowledge of Moroccan society and his better command of 
Moroccan-Arabic ". 
The long preparation phase that preceded the actual research in the village did not tum 
out to be a waste of time. Instead, spending a significant amount of time in informal settings 
and showing interest in people seems to have increased trust and facilitated the household 
survey. Also the assistants played an important role in explaining the purely scientific nature 
of this research—and stressing that we were no tax-collectors!—and thereby convincing 
people to co-operate. This resulted in a non-response rate of less than 5 percent in all villages. 
Furthermore, this preparation phase also provided valuable, qualitative data at different levels. 
Despite all these precautions, some data, especially on income and investments, should be 
handled very prudently. As it is likely that some respondents have under or over-reported 
incomes and expenditures, the exact figures in the tables give an unrealistic semblance of 
precision. However, the fact that the differences between the different household categories 
are very distinct and that these patterns are largely repeated across the research villages as 
well as the villages studied by the Mohammed V University (cf. Bencherifa and El Ghanjou 
2001), seems to suggest that the data can be used for generalizing purposes and to detect 
general trends. 
3.4.2. Assistants: informants, stakeholders, and gatekeepers 
During my first weeks in Tinghir, I was the center of interest. Everybody, especially 
youngsters, wanted to talk to me. Despite the modest flow of tourists visiting the valley and 
its magnificent gorges, it is rare that foreigners stay for more than a couple of days. It was 
" Although the Todghawis speak Berber as their native language, most adults understand and speak Moroccan 
Arabic, and many educated people speak French too. As I speak French and Moroccan Arabic, 1 was able to 
interview most people myself without interpreters 
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also clear that many hoped to collaborate with me Nevertheless, the selection of assistants 
was not a straightforward affair at all First of all, they needed to have a sufficient educational 
level and motivation to work seriously It took a lot of time to identify the people that fulfilled 
these conditions Furthermore, many wanted to help us, but refused to work as paid assistants 
Whereas some seemed to find this denigrating to their status as ex-university students, other 
seemed hesitant because of the obligations this would involve 
Interestingly, some proposed to work for free In retrospect, one of the reasons behind 
this seemed to be that some hoped for more than just a temporary job as a research assistant 
Many young men had put their hopes on me in order to escape from their joblessness and 
frustrated aspirations I have received countless implicit or explicit requests for help in getting 
a job at a Dutch company or a scholarship to a Dutch university, or it was expected that I 
could lend a helping hand to get a visa to migrate to Europe This confronted me with the fact 
that migration was not only an abstract research topic, but that migration forms a genuine 
obsession for many assistants and friends, who longed to leave to the other side of the Strait 
of Gibraltar themselves' In this sense, the course of interaction between researchers and 
assistants happened to be an interesting source of information in itself 
In order to avoid creating false hopes, I clearly stated that I intended to pay them for 
their work and that I would prefer to see them as employees rather than as friends This was in 
order not to create a kind of "debt" in the form of expectations amongst assistants that I would 
help them to go abroad Despite this, some assistants and other "friends" kept putting high 
hopes on me In practice, it was therefore impossible to create a certain distance and the 
desired formal employer-employee relationship between the assistants and me The 
disadvantage of this was that it was often difficult to be direct and clear when things went 
wrong, they did not keep an appointment, or the quality of work was not satisfactory, as you 
cannot be too harsh towards a "friend", certainly not m a cultural context where criticism 
tends to be expressed indirectly Some assistants feigned that they considered the payment not 
as their right, but rather as a kind of "favor" offered by me (their "patron"), which was "really 
not necessary", as "they were my friends after all" 
In a way, some of them fostered a sort of patron-client relationship in which the 
professional dimension of our contact—which I tried to stress—was deliberately mixed up 
with the friendly contacts Therefore, the feeling remained that they would be rewarded by me 
at the end of the research Whereas most assistants had been of great value as enumerators 
and key informants during the research, the relationship with some of them deteriorated at the 
end of our stay in the field because of their disappointment This produced problems at the 
end of the fieldwork, when two assistants refused to continue their work, apparently because 
they were clearly disappointed by the fact that I could not (in their opinion, I could, but I did 
not want to) offer the expected compensation They clearly had expected more This 
endangered the completion of the research in some of the villages 
It then became clear to me how dependent I had become on the assistants They were 
not only informants providing us with all kinds of information, but also gatekeepers who 
could shut the door to that same information if I—seen as the gatekeeper to Europe—would 
keep the door closed towards a better life abroad Some of them presumably started to spread 
negative rumors on my co-researcher and me I also discovered that there existed 
competitions and patron-client relationships among the assistants In this, one assistant we 
met at the beginning of the fieldwork played a particular role He had become the most 
important informant as he had an excellent knowledge of the entire valley Most of the other 
assistants were equally contacted through him Towards the end of the research, we 
discovered that he exacted commission payments from the salaries of other assistants, as, 
according to him, they owed their job to him This "patron" assistant presented himself as our 
big friend and was the gatekeeper towards assistantship and close relationships with the 
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person who was considered for a period as the hope of young and ambitious—but jobless— 
Tinghir. 
When this assistant—who tried everything to emigrate—became disappointed towards 
the end of the research, his bitterness grew. This led him to an alleged attempt to secretly 
organize an assistants' strike against my co-researcher and me, thereby asking for the loyalty 
of his "clients". In order to mobilize the other assistants, he spread the rumor that we received 
much more money from the IMAROM project for project assistance than we paid to the 
assistants. As a consequence, one other assistant suddenly refused to co-operate further. The 
only reason he gave for this, was that he "did not have time", which was highly implausible 
regarding his joblessness. Only after long talks did we discover what apparently was going 
on. Afterwards, the relationship was partially restored, which allowed us to complete the 
fieldwork. 
This all happened in the final three months of the fieldwork. After good co-operation 
for more than one year and a half, things suddenly deteriorated. I strongly had the impression 
this was no coincidence, as some assistants felt that we—the researchers—would leave soon 
without rewarding them. For some, their friend had turned out to be a selfish individual who 
would leave the ones that helped him so much back in their hopeless situation after having 
exploited them. In general, the impossibility of separating the professional from personal 
relationships complicated the research. Although the assistants were well paid according to 
Moroccan standards, I was also aware that I indeed profited from their joblessness, and that 
this temporary job did not provide a long-term solution for their problems. This had been the 
main reason why I initially tried to stress the "professional" side of the relationship. However, 
regarding their often-difficult personal situation, it was impossible not to pay personal 
attention. In practice, it was therefore impossible to rule out all kinds of implicit expectations. 
This all happened at the end of the stay in the field, so that it did not significantly 
harm the research, despite the increasing amount of time I lost in maintaining and restoring 
the demanding relations with assistants. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned problems left a 
certain feeling of bitterness on both sides. This experience exemplified again that it was 
impossible to maintain an artificial distance between them and me. Inevitably, during my stay 
I increasingly became more part of the social setting I studied. In the first phase, this 
increasing familiarity with people, cultural codes and the language improved my access to 
respondents and probably also the research quality. In the last phases of the research, 
however, my ongoing "integration" became an obstacle to data collection, making social 
interaction more problematic and less frank. 
Assistants and "friends" clearly had their own interests and expectations, and they had 
expected much more than I could offer. Through my daily contacts—and problems—with 
them, I was directly confronted with this state of despair of many young Moroccans, and in 
this way it became very tangible what a "culture of migration" (see chapter 10) means in 
practice. It was therefore impossible to establish a formal employer-employee relationship. 
The intensive, lively, and sometimes emotional contacts with the assistants over a period of 
almost two years was also a valuable participatory experience, which taught me a lot about 
the difficult world many young Moroccans live in. This participation and interaction made me 
comprehend why even well-educated sons and daughters of relatively wealthy families dream 
of emigrating to the European "paradise". 
3.4.3. Gender bias, reliability, and validity 
The research was heavily male-biased, not only because all researchers and assistants were 
male, but also since most respondents (and migrants) were male. In order to partly tackle this 
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problem, data was collected on all individuals within each household. Through statistical 
analysis (e.g., of gender gaps in educational level), it was therefore possible to make some 
gender-sensitive analyses on migration impacts. In order to gain more insight into the position 
of women, and how migration affects possible changes in their status, a female Dutch student 
carried out a qualitative research in one village within the Todgha valley (Taghzout), 
comparing migrant and nonmigrant wives (cf. Van Rooij 2000). Furthermore, secondary data 
from another, earlier study by Steinmann (1993) on changing women's roles in the Todgha 
was included in the analysis. 
We have already discussed the importance of trust among respondents, and the lack of 
reliability that profound distrust among respondents might engender. This seems in particular 
true for sensitive questions on income and investments. A long introduction into the villages 
and the employment of local assistants were the principal means used to decrease such risks. 
In order to further decrease the risk that respondents provided incorrect information, a number 
of test questions were included in the questionnaire which allowed the cross-checking of 
answers to different questions. As stated above, some too sensitive or difficult-to-answer 
questions harmed the course of interviewing as many respondents found the large number of 
such questions embarrassing. Therefore, it was decided to omit some of these questions. 
Therefore, the stated goal of a "whole household approach" has not been entirely achieved. 
Questions on personal and demographic characteristics are generally less sensitive. The major 
problem was that many elderly do not know their exact age. Therefore, the actual age might 
differ by some years from that reported. However, this has probably not seriously affected the 
overall outcome of the research. 
Another problem was related to the temporal dimension of the research. In order to 
gain insight into the effect of household life cycles and "migration stage" on economic 
behavior, the dates of important migration moves and investments decisions were recorded. 
However, going progressively further back in time, answers tend to become less accurate. It 
was therefore necessary to maintain a reasonable balance between the interest of being 
accurate and the interest of gaining insight into temporal processes. 
For major investments, it was decided only to record investments made as of 1975. 
This latter year was chosen as it coincides with the so-called Massira, the Green March12, 
which is the most important historical event in post-independence Morocco. This event is so 
significant that most people clearly remember whether things happened before or after the 
Green March. For migration moves, those occurring before 1975 were also recorded, as most 
people still remember such major events. Moreover, the great wave of migration to France 
and other European countries took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which would be 
missed otherwise. Although it is probable that some answers might have deviated from actual 
dates, there seems no reason to suppose that this fundamentally influenced research results. 
There were also questions on the spatial allocation of investments and migration 
destinations. Generally, such questions did not raise significant problems. The major problem 
was how to code migration destination in case of multiple migration moves. In that case, the 
place was mentioned were most of the time was spent. Furthermore, international migration 
moves were given "priority" over internal migration moves. Migrant seasonal workers with 
no fixed destination were coded as "itinerant". 
Local land measures were used to record land possession, which were converted into 
hectares later on. In one village (Tadafelt) the problem was that land possession is expressed 
in the amount of water rights (i.e., the number of hours a person is allowed to irrigate within 
12
 During the Green March, Morocco invaded the "Western Sahara", which was colonized by Spain up to 1975, 
and which Morocco considers part of its national temtory. 
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one irrigation cycle). Although water rights are generally strongly correlated with land 
possession, this is not a perfect match. Nevertheless, as there was no alternative, water rights 
were used as a rough indicator of land possession. 
Concerning agricultural production, only the figures over the last years have been 
recorded. As with land, farmers' estimates were recorded in local measures, which were 
converted into kilogram units later on. In order to estimate the monetary value of non-
commercialized agricultural production, price surveys were conducted on the local markets of 
Tinghir and Taghzout throughout the year. On the basis of this, a mean price was calculated 
for each agricultural product. 
After completion of the research, the measurement validity was assessed through 
comparing migration data with census data and general valley-level figures provided by the 
municipality on population, population growth, migration, literacy, gendered school 
enrollment, and access to sanitary facilities and public amenities such as electricity and 
drinking water. As we will see in the empirical chapters, the survey data seem largely in line 
with the secondary data, and the inter-village data largely reflect patterns of spatial variability 
found at the inter-municipal level (see section 5.6). This all seems to indicate a fairly high 
criterion validity13. Furthermore, when the survey data were compared with those collected by 
the Université Mohammed V (Rabat) in other Todgha villages (cf. Bencherifa and El Ghanjou 
2001), both databases revealed the same general trends—and gross income and investment 
indicators were even remarkably similar—suggesting that researcher's bias probably did not 
substantially distort the research results. 
Another question pertains to the external validity of this study: to what extent can the 
results of this study be generalized to other populations and to what extent is this relevant to 
the aim of the research? Concerning the latter question, this typically depends on the type of 
research question. This study analyzes a theoretical problem by comparing different groups 
(i.e., household migration types) in heterogeneous settings. The primary goal of this study is 
to evaluate hypotheses and review insights from prevailing theories on migration and 
development in migrant sending areas. The research results bear relevance to the general 
debate on this issue, which make them theoretically "generalizable". Consequently, the 
question of external validity is less relevant, as the primary aim of this study is not to make 
generalizations on migration volume and patterns for Morocco in general, but to respond to an 
analytical question about the relationship between migration and development in sending 
areas. 
Nevertheless, the results from the six village studies can be generalized to a certain 
extent to the whole of the Todgha valley. As we have argued, validity checks through 
comparison with secondary demographic and agricultural data at the valley level (from the 
municipality and earlier studies) and with other villages studied by the University Mohammed 
V seem to suggest that the aggregate village data largely reflect migration and development 
patterns in the rest of the valley. When presenting data at the village level, we will, in 
combination with primary and secondary data collected at the valley level, attempt to 
generalize for the Todgha as a whole. This is why the statistical significance of measures of 
association and correlation has been calculated (see appendix 2). Moreover, in order to 
properly understand patterns of migration and development interactions found at the village 
level, it is necessary to interpret this in a larger context, requiring valley-level data. The goal 
of this effort will be to detect general trends in migration and development patterns across the 
valley, and to assess to what extent the spatial heterogeneity in these interactions can be 
Criterion validity involved the comparison the results of empirical studies with established indicators of the 
same concept (Seale and Filmer 1998.134). 
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explained by local differences in the geographical environment, migration patterns, and 
migration stage. In this sense, it is an explicit goal to interpret and link the results of the six 
village studies into a broader, valley-level context. To a certain extent, indeed, we will make 
generalizing inferences for the entire valley on general migration and development patterns 
that characterize the valley. However, we do by no means pretend that exactly the same 
migration and development patterns will repeat themselves in other villages. The goal is, 
indeed, to detect general trends. 
While this study examines the effect of internal and international migration on 
development in the regions of origin, this is done for a specific social and natural 
environment, that is, oases. Oases have a number of characteristics in common concerning 
their agricultural, historical, ethnic, and migratory background (cf. De Haas 1998). This study 
is on migration and development in this specific environment, and claims to bear some 
relevance to other Moroccan and Maghrebi rural regions of out-migration, and oases in 
particular. The minimum pretension is at least that the (modified) hypotheses emanating from 
the conclusions of this study can be readily tested in other, similar environments of out-
migration. 
In retrospect, it would have been better to include one sub-survey in the urban center 
of Tinghir. Now, the survey only bears direct relevance to the rural parts of the valley, which 
primarily reflects our own "popular" view of the intrinsic "rurality" of oases, ignoring how 
this oasis valley has been partly de-agrarized and urbanized. This is unfortunate, as Tinghir is 
not only growing rapidly in numerical terms, but is also increasingly becoming important as a 
focus of economic activity for the entire valley and surrounding areas. Many villagers work in 
Tinghir or set up their businesses there. Fortunately, the questionnaire contained questions on 
the location of investments, so that we have an idea about the extent to which villagers 
relocate their activities towards Tinghir. Furthermore, we have collected secondary data 
sources on the town and collected primary data on market activities. Nevertheless, the study 
would have been more complete with a separate household survey in Tinghir, especially 
because the town contains many immigrants originating from areas outside the Todgha. 

4 
Morocco as a "labor frontier" country 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes and explains the evolution of migration patterns within and from 
Morocco over the twentieth century. The analysis will focus on the economic and political 
processes at the national and international level (i.e., changes in the structural conditions), 
which explain how traditional patterns of (largely circular) migration have been extended and 
radically transformed over the past century. The chapter will equally show how the Moroccan 
and European states have attempted to influence migration. This chapter will equally examine 
the vital macro-economic interests migration and remittances represent for Morocco, and how 
and why government policies aimed at increasing remittance transfers and migrants' 
investments have evolved over the past decades. Finally, on the basis of an analysis of 
economic and demographic factors within the theoretical framework of transitional migration 
theory, it will attempt to make some tentative predictions on future migration and remittances 
patterns. 
This general framework will serve to better comprehend the (macro-) developmental 
causes of the specific migration patterns from, towards, and within the Todgha study area 
(research question 1). This chapter aims to gain insight into how structural political and 
economic factors at the macro-level affect specific migration and development patterns. Such 
structural factors at the macro-level would have been lost out of sight if we had uniquely 
focused on the Todgha, and will potentially play an important role in our explanation of 
migration and development interactions found in this particular region. 
4.2. Moroccan migration history 
4.2.1. Pre-colonial population mobility 
Pre-modem rural societies tend to be portrayed as being more or less isolated, stable, self-
sufficient, and immobile. However, Morocco's pre-colonial history exemplifies that pre-
modem societies can, in fact, be highly dynamic and mobile. Historically, Morocco's 
population history has been characterized by continually shifting patterns of human 
settlement. Nomadic or semi-nomadic groups traveled large distances with their herds 
between summer and winter pastures. While some nomadic tribes settled down and became 
peasants, other sedentary groups became nomadic or settled down elsewhere. Apart from 
livestock breeding, most nomadic groups were important in maintaining economic and 
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political links between rather distant population centers. Sedentary populations were rarely 
totally self-sufficient, and partly relied on trade with nomads, and the opposite. 
Conflicts between numerous sedentary, transhumant, and nomadic tribal groups over 
natural resources—land, water, pastures—and the control over trade routes were the rule 
rather than the exception. This strife is associated with the regular uprooting, movement, and 
resettlement of people. Ever since the eighth century AD, the urban-based sultanic dynasties— 
the makhzen—have attempted to gain control over the independent Berber and Arabic tribes 
of the mountains and the deserts of the interior. Although the makhzen have never been 
successful in permanently pacifying the autonomous tribes of Morocco's vast hinterland, the 
continuously shifting alliances within ethnic groups, zawiyas (religious lodges), and qiad 
(tribal chiefs) the makhzen engaged in, strongly influenced inter-tribal balances of power, 
commercial relations, and patterns of mobility (Park 1992). 
Islam has been another factor in stimulating mobility over larger distances ever since 
the eighth century (cf. Netton 1993). Besides the hajj, the numerous marabutic pilgrimages 
(mussems) prevailing within the entire Maghreb and West African cultural realm, mobility 
related to religious schooling of pupils and students at medersas and Islamic universities, as 
well as the peregrination of religious teachers has put people into contact over large distances. 
Perhaps even more than Muslims, Moroccan Jews have been highly mobile both within 
Morocco and internationally. Their extended networks enabled them to travel and to settle 
elsewhere, and Jews played a vital role as intermediaries and commerçants in the trans-
Saharan trade as well as in establishing contacts and trade relationships between Moroccan 
sultanates and European countries from the sixteenth century onwards (Bellakhdar et al. 
1992;Kenbib 1999). 
The establishment and growth of imperial cities in western Morocco (Rabat, 
Marrakech, Fes, Meknes) attracted merchants and migrants from rural Morocco, although the 
magnitude of this migration was not comparable to present day rural-to-urban migration. 
Furthermore, the makhzen's strategic economic interests in the Trans-Saharan caravan trade 
required them to establish military strongholds and trading posts in the interior—which 
sometimes developed into large towns, such as Sijilmassa located in the southern Tafilalt 
oasis, which attracted people from both within and outside present-day Morocco (Lightfoot 
and Miller 1996). Southern oases were commercial and migratory junctions, which attracted 
many merchants and migrants. The diverse ethnic composition of oases—with their blend of 
Sub-Saharan, Berber, Arab, and Jewish influences—testifies to a long history of intensive 
population mobility. However, when trade routes were relocated, or warfare, droughts, floods, 
and epidemics ravaged oases, population groups could be uprooted again to become nomadic 
or resettle elsewhere. 
Far into the twentieth century, the slave trade constituted an important form of forced 
migration within and to Morocco (Becker 2002; Ennaji 1997; 1999). One category of slaves 
originated from sub-Saharan Africa, and was traded through the Trans-Saharan trade. In 
contrast to what is commonly believed, not all (black) slaves originated from sub-Saharan 
Africa but were also captured in rural Morocco itself. Violent abductions of children, 
particularly young females, were commonplace in Morocco (Ennaji 1999). This was 
particularly the case in the southern oases, with their sizable population of haratin. Food 
shortages and general economic depression often led to the selling of generations of children, 
daughters in particular, into marriage and lifelong enslavement (Ennaji 1997). There were 
probably several hundred thousand slaves in Morocco in the nineteenth century. Some men 
were used in the sultan's army or in the militias of powerful tribal chiefs in the countryside. 
Others were sold to rich feudal families as domestic servants or concubines. Slaves equally 
worked in craft production and the state bureaucracy as well (Ennaji 1994; cf. Lovejoy 2000). 
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Especially in the southern oases, slaves worked the land, and could be crucial in sustaining 
oasis agriculture (De Haas 1998; Ennaji 1997). 
One could discuss at length whether forms of mobility associated with nomadic 
livelihoods, warfare, and slavery should be defined as "migration"1. Nevertheless, pre-
colonial Morocco was also characterized by other forms of mobility, which certainly fall 
within this category. Centuries-old circular migration patterns existed between relatively 
densely populated, climatologically and agriculturally marginal areas—such as the northern 
Rif Mountains and the southern oases—and the relatively more wealthy and humid regions 
located in western Morocco. Many migrants worked as agricultural laborers, who left their 
village only during agricultural peak seasons in western Morocco, to return afterwards. 
Distinct rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration patterns were maintained by occupational 
specialists, such as well and khettara diggers, specialists in traditional architecture, certain 
trades, and crafts (cf. Büchner 1986). 
The phenomenon that people leave traditional peasant communities to work elsewhere 
and then return after a while is a well-known phenomenon in Moroccan mountain and oasis 
areas (De Mas 1991). Such "circular migration" served to partially alleviate poverty and food 
shortages in the villages of origin, especially in penods of crisis. Risk spreading seems 
another explanatory factor for the occurrence of circular migration: De Mas (1990a) argued 
that households in climatologically and ecologically uncertain areas do not prefer to deploy 
the entire work force in a high-risk sector such as agriculture. 
Circular migration generally involved the migration of one adult man—typically the 
father or eldest son—leaving his wife and children in the care of the extended family. Other 
household members had to stay in order to ensure agricultural production (De Mas 1990a). 
Most migrants only left during certain seasons or for a couple of years. The normal pattern 
was that they returned, although permanent settlement at the destination occurred too. Upon 
the return of a migrant, there was often another household member (e.g., the eldest son of the 
migrant) who took over the place of the first. Arizpe (1981) used the term "relay migration" 
to indicate such a process in which households try to maintain a continuing stake in migration 
in the interest of their survival. From this perspective, circular migration can be interpreted as 
a strategy which enables households to stay at home and continue their agricultural 
livelihoods. As Heinemeijer et al. (1977) put it aptly, Moroccan migration has predominantly 
been a livelihood strategy of "partir pour rester". 
4.2.2. Migration under colonial influence (1830-1962) 
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, international migration from Morocco was 
mainly limited to a relatively small number of merchants from the city of Fes relocating to the 
West Africa coast and Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century, and to the United Kingdom 
(Liverpool and Manchester) and France (Marseilles) in the nineteenth century (Abu-Haidar 
1999:39; Ben Ali 1996:346)2. The French colonization of Algeria in 1830 heralded the 
beginning of a period of economic and political restructuring which was to create completely 
new migration patterns within the Maghreb region. The increasing possibilities for wage labor 
at the farms of French colons and in the northern Algerian cities such as Algiers and Oran, 
' According to our definition in appendix 1, most of such forms of mobility can be considered as migration. 
2
 We will neither examine the important immigration waves of tribal groups to Morocco following Arab-Islamic 
conquests as of the seventh century, nor the immigration of important numbers of Muslims and Megoraihim 
Jews following the reconquuta of the Iberian peninsula, as this is clearly beyond the scope of this study. 
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attracted a rising number of—mostly seasonal—migrants onginating from the northern Rif 
mountains and southern oases in the second half of the nineteenth century (cf Büchner 1986, 
Fadloullah et al 2000 51) 
In 1912, the French-Spanish protectorate over Morocco was formally established 
While France gained control over the heartland of Morocco, the Atlas mountains, and the 
oases south and east of the Atlas, the Spanish protectorate was limited to the deep south (the 
"Western Sahara") and the northern zone, which mainly consisted of the Rif mountains 
Although it would take an armed struggle of more than twenty years to subject the rebellious 
tribes of the Rif and tribes such as the Ait 'Atta in the southern Presaharan region to colonial 
rule, colonization almost immediately affected patterns of both internal and international 
migration Road construction, other infrastructure works and the rapid growth of towns and 
cities shaped new and growing markets for unskilled wage labor, which attracted increasing 
numbers of rural-to-urban migrants Rural population growth and the falling costs and risks of 
transportation further stimulated this new form of internal migration Throughout the 
twentieth century, internal rural-to-urban migration remained high, and created increasingly 
strong spatial linkages between the rural and urban spheres 
The colonial era also marked the beginning of labor migration to France During the 
First World War, an urgent lack of manpower in France led to the active recruitment of 
Moroccan men for the army, industry, and mines (Obdeijn 1993) They were predominantly 
recruited in the southwestern Sous region, near Agadir and Tiznit Between 1914 and 1918, 
more than 35,000 Moroccans left to France, and between 34,000 and 40,000 joined the 
French army (Muus 1995 198) The workers were especially recruited in areas that had shown 
strong resistance against the French, as it was expected that this would curb internal political 
unrest After the end of war, most migrants returned to Morocco However, international 
migration increased again after 1920 due to the flourishing French economy Tn 1929, on the 
eve of the world economic crisis (Great Depression), more than 20,000 Moroccan migrants 
worked in France Again, most workers were sent back to Morocco after the onset of the 
global economic depression of the 1930s (Obdeijn 1993) 
In the Second World War, labor shortages again led to the recruitment of Moroccan 
men in the "French zone" About 126,000 Moroccan men served in the French army during 
the Second World War and in the subsequent wars in Korea and French Indochina (Bidwell 
1973), most of whom returned to Morocco after the end of war Following the Second World 
War, Moroccan labor migration to France slowly gained ground As France stopped recruiting 
Algerian workers during the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962), migration from 
Morocco and Tunisia was boosted Between 1949 and 1962, the Moroccan population in 
France increased from about 20,000 to 53,000 Most worked in the mines or in the steel 
industry (Obdeijn 1993) 
Despite modest direct migration to France, migration to Algeria, which had already 
started in the nineteenth century, remained the most important form of international migration 
throughout the colonial period Despite its predominant character, migration to Algeria turned 
out to be the first leap in subsequent migration to France In fact, many early Moroccan 
"guestworkers" in France were directly recruited in Algeria In this way, Algeria remained an 
important "springboard" for Moroccan "leapfrogging" migration to France until Algerian 
independence in 1962 Regions in northern Morocco, located in and around the Rif 
Mountains, were dominant in early international migration to Algeria In the late 1930s, the 
number of Moroccan migrants to Algeria was estimated at about 85,000 each year, of whom 
35,000 originated from the region of Oujda-Nador and 20,000 from the region of Taza 
(Obdeijn 1993) It was estimated that in 1950 about one third of the male adults in the region 
of Nador participated in this type of migration (Fadloullah et al 2000 51 ) 
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Besides the proximity of the Rif to Algeria, the preponderance of migration to Algeria 
can be partly explained by the fact that the Rif fell under the Spanish protectorate, which 
limited the opportunities for internal migration to the large cities in French Morocco About 
40,000 Riffians found employment in Franco's army during the Spanish civil war and 
afterwards in auxiliary troops in Spanish Morocco (De Mas 1991 113) Apart from soldiers 
and a small group of merchants, labor migration from Morocco to Spain was negligible Until 
the 1960s, Spain itself remained a source of labor migrants to northern Europe and even to 
Algeria (Lopez Garcia 1999, Mansvelt-Beck 1993) Circular migration to Algeria came to a 
definitive stop in 1962 following the closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border (Heinemeijer 
et al 1976 89, Muus 1995) 
The fact that most of the Rif area fell under the Spanish protectorate, also explains 
why migration to Europe from this region has always exhibited a distinct pattern compared to 
"French" Morocco. From the north, relatively few people migrated directly to France This 
remained so in the post-independence penod, when migrants from the Rif were concentrated 
in destinations outside France, such as the Netherlands, Germany, and, as of the 1980s, Spain 
This exemplifies how colonization has had a major influence on later migration patterns 
During the entire protectorate penod (1912-1956), Moroccan migration came to the 
service of French and, to a lesser extent, Spanish colonial interests Depending on the labor 
demand in France and Algeria, migrants were recruited or sent back (Belguendouz 1987 43, 
Muus 1995, Obdeijn 1993) In the years following independence in 1956, Moroccan 
migration remained mainly limited to France Nevertheless, this migration was only modest 
compared to the developments in the penod 1963-1973, which dramatically changed the face 
of Moroccan migration 
4.2.3. The great migration boom (1963-1973) 
Rapid post-war economic growth in northwestern Europe created increasing unskilled labor 
shortages in sectors such as industry, mining, housing construction, and agriculture as of the 
1950s This tnggered an increasing flow of "guestworkers" from poorer countries around the 
Mediterranean Until the early 1960s, most were recruited in southern European countries 
such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece When this migration stagnated, 
attention focused increasingly on southern Mediterranean countnes such as Turkey, Tunisia, 
and Morocco (West) Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands concluded agreements 
with Morocco on the recruitment of guestworkers in 1963, 1964, 1964, and 1969, respectively 
(Obdeijn 1993) This was the onset of a spatial diversification of Moroccan migration to 
Europe, which used to be exclusively directed towards France 
The system of formal recruitment was only important in the first years of labor 
migration Administrative obstacles, long waiting lists, and the accompanying bnbery incited 
people to migrate as "tourists" Migrants were often assisted by already-migrated relatives or 
friends, who often acted as intermedianes between employers and potential migrants (Reniers 
1999 683) As there was a high demand for migrant labor, those "spontaneous" settlers were 
generally welcomed and did not initially experience too many problems in finding work and 
accommodation Although the attitudes of the host societies towards migration became more 
restrictive and negative as of the 1970s, most migrants succeeded in obtaining permanent 
residence papers through a series of legalization campaigns in the Netherlands (1975), 
Belgium (1975), and in France (1981-1982) (Muus 1995 199) 
Numerically, spontaneous settlement and recruitment by companies has been more 
important than formal labor recruitment by agencies For instance, in 1976, only 13 percent of 
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the Moroccans living in the Netherlands had migrated through formal recruitment, 43 percent 
through personal relations ("networks"), and 24 percent through direct recruitment by 
companies (Shadid 1979 165) Another, more recent study demonstrated that only 3 5 percent 
of the Moroccans in Belgium had been recruited through official selection (Hemers 
1999 684) 
In 1965, about 30,000 Moroccans were living in Europe, almost exclusively in France 
In 1972, this number had increased tenfold to almost 300,000 (Muus 1995 1999), increasing 
further to over 400,000 only three years later In this relatively short penod, Morocco became 
firmly incorporated into the Mediterranean-European migration system (see section 2 3 2), 
and the foundation was laid for the permanent establishment of a large Moroccan Diaspora in 
Europe Although France remained the primary destination for Moroccan workers, accounting 
for two thirds of the total migrant stock, Belgium and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent 
Germany, developed as increasingly important secondary destinations A small minority 
worked in other European countries, and in 1972 about 15,000 migrants were working in the 
Arab oil countries (Bonnet and Bossard 1973) In Europe, most Moroccan migrants tended to 
live in a relatively limited number of large cities, often concentrated within certain quarters 
(cf Ben Ah 1996 348) Migration flows tended to be spatially clustered, as migrants 
originating from the same village, region, or town often predominantly lived in one or two 
specific cities (or even quarters) in Europe 
A distinct pattern of out-migration was that of Moroccan Jews, who formed a sizeable 
community until the mid-twentieth century In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
Moroccan Jews started to migrate to Gibraltar, London, Manchester, or Marseilles, 
principally for economic reasons (Kenbib 1999 233) Nevertheless, this migration was 
relatively limited compared to the mass migration that followed the creation of the state of 
Israel in 1948 On the eve of this migration, Morocco's Jewish population amounted to over 
250,000 (Kenbib 1999) Between 1948 and 1956, 90,000 Jews had already migrated After 
independence, migration continued, although a sizeable community stayed in Morocco 
However, after the Six-Day War of 1967, which further increased tensions between Jews and 
Muslims in Morocco, most Jews decided to leave the country Presently, only about 5,000 
Jews remain in Morocco (Zafrani 1998) 
Between 1948 and 2000, over 250,000 Moroccan Jews migrated to Israel Estimates of 
the number of Jews of Moroccan descent living in Israel vary between 400,000 (Jeller-
Goldenberg 1999 241) to 700,000 (Maroc Hebdo International, 25-31 January 2002) 
Although most settled in Israel, others migrated to France (Pans), Canada (Montreal), Latin 
Amenca, and Spain Although most Jewish migration might not be labor migration in the 
classical sense, it cannot be perceived as purely political or refugee migration either Also in 
this case, it is difficult to separate political and economic causes of migration Although 
tensions between Jews and Muslims existed, and Jews felt increasingly uncomfortable in 
Morocco after the Six Day War 1967, Jews did generally not have to fear life-threatening 
persecution in twentieth century Morocco The lack of sufficient economic prospects in 
Morocco, which equally pushed other non-Jews to migrate, has certainly played an important 
role too 
4.2.4. Family reunification (1973-1990) 
In many respects, colonial and post-colonial patterns of internal and international migration 
can be seen as a continuation and extension—though in a modified form—of older patterns of 
circular migration (cf Ben Ah 1996 346, Chattou 1998 235, De Mas 1991, Obdeijn 1993) 
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Not only the host societies, but also the majority of the migrants themselves expected that 
their migration would be a temporary affair (Entzinger 1985 275) Standing in an ancient 
tradition of circular migration, most migrants themselves intended to return after a certain 
amount of money has been saved that would secure their livelihoods by buying some 
agricultural land, constructing a house, or starting their own enterprise 
The 1973 Oil Crisis heralded a penod of economic stagnation and restructuring, 
resulting in rising unemployment and a structurally lower demand for unskilled laborers 
Consequently, northwestern European countries closed their frontiers to new labor migrants 
However, contrary to expectations, most migrants did not return, but ended up staying 
permanently (Obdeijn 1993) The Oil Crisis radically changed the political-economic context 
m which migration took place, both in Morocco and in Europe More than European 
countries, Morocco suffered from the high oil prices and the global economic downturn As 
result of the same Oil Crisis, the economic situation in Morocco deteriorated, and the country 
entered into a period of increasing political instability and repression This further reduced the 
trust of migrants in the future of their country, and made return migration an increasingly 
unattractive and risky option 
Many migrants feared not being able to return again to the receiving country if their 
return migration was not successful (e g , because of business failure or difficulties in social 
re-adaptation) The discontinuation of this "return option" through the increasingly restrictive 
immigration policies on the one hand, and the grim political and economic prospects in 
Morocco on the other, explain why many migrants decided to stay on the safe side, that is, in 
Europe Therefore, paradoxically, the recruitment freeze stimulated permanent settlement 
instead of the reverse (Obdeijn 1993) In fact, return migration rates among Moroccans have 
been among the lowest of all migrants groups in Europe, which might be explained by the 
particularly unfavorable political-economic conditions prevailing in Morocco in the 1970s 
In the 1970s, it was generally expected that the growth of immigrant populations 
would soon come to an end In reality, exactly the opposite happened Moroccan migrants in 
particular massively opted for family reunification Policies to stimulate return migration 
largely failed, as they could not remove the structural disparities in economic and political 
conditions between Morocco and European countnes Another "perverse" effect of the 
increasingly restrictive migration policies seems to have been that, because many migrants 
feared that family reunification might eventually be forbidden completely, family 
reunification was actually only stimulated (Entzinger 1985 267) It was mainly through 
family reunification that the total population of Moroccans m the main destination countries 
(France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany) further increased from 400,000 in 1975 to 
almost one million in 1992 (OECD 1992 cited in Muus 1995 202) 
In a way, the increasingly restrictive immigration policies interrupted the traditional, 
circular character of Moroccan migration Family reunification heralded this shift from 
circular to permanent migration, apparently turning "partir pour rester" into "partir pour 
quitter" for many migrants (cf De Mas 1990a, Kagermeier 1997) Notwithstanding their 
initially "temporary" intentions, most migrants ended up staying Although the social 
imagination of many Moroccan migrants is haunted by the "myth" of an eventual return to 
their homeland (Boudoudou 1985), most have been unable to realize this dream 
Simultaneously confronted with severe social, political, and economic constraints and 
uncertainties in Morocco, as well as the increasingly restrictive migration policies in Europe, 
most opted for family reunification In this way, most former guestworkers have become 
permanent migrants 
Although the majority of labor migrants that arrived in northwestern Europe during 
the 1960-70s migration boom ended up staying permanently, the late 1980s and early 1990s 
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were characterized by a wave of return migration of relatively elderly, retired, or jobless 
Moroccans. Between 1985 and 1995, some 314,000 migrants returned to Morocco from 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, the UK, and Denmark (see figure 4.1). Between 
1985 and 1989, an average of 23,000 migrants returned to Morocco each year. Between 1990 
and 1994, an average number of 32,000 Moroccans returned annually. This return migration 
wave reached its peak in 1991 with 38,000 return migrants. Since 1994, return migration has 
fallen to less than 20,000. 
4.2.5. Diversifying migration patterns (1990-2000) 
Whereas family reunification in northwestern European countries was largely complete at the 
end of the 1980s, family formation gained significance as a major source of new migration 
from Morocco over the 1990s. For most Moroccans, marrying a partner in Europe has become 
the only option to enter the classic destination countries (France, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Germany) legally (Muus 1995:201)3. It is striking that, for various reasons, large proportions 
of the second generation Moroccan descendents prefer to marry a partner—preferably kin— 
from the country of origin (Hooghiemstra 2003; Elevens 1999; Reniers 2001 )4. Moreover, the 
countries in northwestern Europe continue to attract a share of undocumented migrants, who 
are attracted by the continuing demand for cheap labor in sectors such as agriculture, housing 
building, cleaning, and diverse service jobs (cf. Zorlu 2000). They often manage to obtain 
residence permits through marriage with a Moroccan or European partner they meet in the 
destination country. 
Figure 4.1. Return migration from France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
and Denmark to Morocco (1984-1995) 
Source: SourceOECD 
Although the migration of Moroccans to northwestern Europe seems somewhat lower than in 
the 1960-1990 period, immigration has continued at much higher than expected levels (see 
figures 4.2 and 4.3), which is largely due to the persistence of family formation. Between 
1995 and 2000, the average annual net out-migration was 44,000 (1.5/1000), and this only 
3
 The high demand for such marriages is reflected in an enormous increase in bride prices (Obdeijn 1993). 
4
 For instance, among the "second generation" Dutch of Moroccan descent (either bom in the Netherlands or 
migrated before the age of 6), 56 percent of the men and 62 of the women have married a partner who lived in 
Morocco prior to marriage. For the first generation, these percentages are 78 and 68 percent, respectively 
(source: CBS Netherlands; for a detailed empirical study on the high popularity of "network marriages" among 
Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, see Hooghiemstra 2003). 
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concerns documented migration (source: UNPD). This exemplifies the significance of migrant 
networks in perpetuating already started migration movements. In the classic destination 
countries (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany), Moroccan communities have continued 
to increase over the 1990s. Besides through natural increase, it was mainly through family 
formation that the Moroccan population in those four countries increased from approximately 
one million in 1992 to more than 1.3 million in 1998 (see figure 4.2). At the same time, return 
migration remained low (De Mas 1990b). There is also an increasing tendency towards 
naturalization, especially among the second generations (Berrada 1990). All in all, this 
underscores the permanent character of Moroccan migration to Europe. 
Figure 4.2. Expansion of population of Moroccan descent in Western Europe, specified for France (1965-
2P01)5 
- France 
-Total 
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year 
Source: National statistical services of mentioned countries; El Mansouri 1996:85; Basfao and I aar ji 
1994 
The increasing reliance on family migration—either through family reunification or family 
formation—has been one of the strategies through which Moroccans have continued 
migration to Europe, in defiance of increasingly restrictive immigration policies. One of the 
other consequences of increasingly restrictive immigration policies has been a significant 
increase of undocumented or "illegal" migration. Another significant development has been 
the diversification in migration destinations (Kagermeier 1997). South-European countries, 
and Spain and Italy in particular, have emerged as new destination countries for Moroccans 
since the mid-1980s (Lopez Garcia 1999; Mansvelt-Beck 1993; Obdeijn 1993). These 
countries used to be labor exporters themselves until the 1970s. However, the rapid economic 
growth these countries have experienced has created labor shortages in particular sectors, and 
this explains why they have become labor importers themselves. In southern Europe, 
Moroccans typically find employment in agriculture and housing, although a significant 
number of migrants also earn a living as merchants (Huntoon 1998; Mansvelt-Beck 1993). 
This figure is based on estimations of residents of Moroccan descent, whether nationals or non-nationals, 
including second and third generation descendants, living in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
and Italy. Consequently, the figure also includes natural growth, not only net immigration. Therefore, such data 
on immigrant stocks should not be interpreted as migration rates. Registration methods vary between countries, 
so statistics are not perfectly comparable, and do not include undocumented migrants. 
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Figure 4.3. Expansion of population of Moroccan descent in main destination countries outside France 
(1965-2001) 
300,000 
1965 1975 
Source: National statistical services of mentioned countries; Basfao and Taarji 1994 
Until Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements in 1990 and 1991, respectively, Moroccans 
could enter easily as tourists, after which many of them overstayed and became de facto 
undocumented migrants. However, most of them have been able to obtain residence papers 
through a series of legalization campaigns. A recent survey demonstrated that among migrant 
workers in Spain who reported illegal entry or overstay, the proportion reporting to have been 
successful in their attempts to attain legal status is two thirds or more (Hearing and Van der 
Erf 2001:6; Schoorl et al. 2000:xix). This pattern of more or less spontaneous settlement and 
legalization afterwards largely resembled Moroccan migration to northwestern Europe until 
1973. In this way, Moroccan communities gradually gained a firm and legal foothold in Spain 
and Italy. 
The establishment of visa requirements has not stopped migration, but has rather led to 
the increasing reliance on undocumented migration to southern Europe. Various economic 
sectors, horticulture in particular, seem to rely so heavily on cheap, "illegal" migrant labor, 
that they cannot survive without it. On several occasions in the 1990s, both Italian and 
Spanish governments were compelled to grant legal status to most undocumented migrants, 
further contributing to a spectacular increase in the legally residing Moroccan populations in 
those countries (Bodega et al. 1995; cf. Carella and Pace 2001; Lopez Garcia 1999). The long 
coastlines of Spain and Italy make it relatively easy to illegally enter those countries. 
Moreover, there is a high demand for unskilled labor, especially in the relatively large 
informal sectors of these countries, Italy in particular. This makes it relatively easy to find 
work given local demand for low-skilled, low-paid workers. It has become increasingly 
difficult to find natives willing to do such jobs. This explains why high rates of native 
unemployment coexist with continuing immigration (Huntoon 1998; Mansvelt-Beck 1993). 
Especially in the case of Spain, the geographical proximity to the North African coast 
made it easy for potential immigrants to travel back and forth to Morocco, and this initially 
made it easy to stick to traditional patterns of circular or seasonal migration. However, the 
tightening of immigration policies put an end to this option and stimulated the permanent 
settlement of migrants. The fact that many recent migrants eventually succeeded in remaining 
in Europe has contributed to the perception among prospective new migrants that it is worth 
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the trouble to migrate illegally. This seems to have further stimulated undocumented 
migration in recent years. In some respects, Spain and Italy have become the new lands of 
hope for young Moroccans. 
Despite increasingly stringent immigration regulation and intensified border controls, 
a large and probably increasing number of Moroccans manage to enter Europe each day. 
Located at only 13 kilometers from the Moroccan coast at its narrowest point, the Iberian 
Peninsula is visible from Morocco. Moreover, the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melillia 
on the northern Moroccan coast literally represent "Europe in Africa". This makes Spain the 
main entrance towards Europe for new, undocumented immigrants from both Morocco and 
other African countries. Spain is a gateway to the EU through which most migrants have to 
pass on their way to other destinations, as well as an increasingly popular destination in itself 
(Huntoon 1998). Migrants usually enter either in paieras, small fisher boats chartered by 
smugglers, hidden in cars and trucks, or carrying false papers. A true "migration industry" has 
developed in southern Spain and northern Morocco, in which migrant traffickers exact high 
prices from would-be migrant workers6. 
Over the 1990s, border controls around the Strait of Gibraltar have become 
increasingly intensive. This has incited migrants to cross the Mediterranean from other, more 
eastern places on the Moroccan coast. Although the distance to cross is larger, the sea is 
generally calmer and less patrolled than the Strait of Gibraltar. In recent years, migrants have 
explored totally new crossing points to Europe, such as the Canary Islands located about 56 
miles northwest of Morocco's coastal Tarfaya region. An increasing number of Moroccan 
migrants enter Europe via Tunisia and then southern Italy, which, with its long coastline, is 
increasingly becoming what has also been called the "soft underbelly" of Europe (Fadloullah 
et al. 2000:113-5). 
Between 1980 and 2000, the combined Moroccan population officially residing in 
Spain and Italy has increased from about 20,000 to 400,000. With this, Spain and Italy have 
taken over the position of France as the primary destination for new Moroccan labor migrants 
(Fadloullah et al. 2000:99). To this, an unknown but undoubtedly large number of 
undocumented migrants should be added. In recent years, even Portugal has emerged as a 
migration destination for Moroccans. 
Until recently, the overwhelming majority of Moroccan labor migrants were men, and 
most female migrants came as family migrants. However, this pattern has recently altered 
through an increasing number of single or divorced women who migrate independently to 
work in southern Europe. Most independent female migrants seem to find employment as 
domestic servants and in other service jobs in Spanish and Italian towns (Costanzo 1999; 
Lopez Garcia 2001; Mansvelt-Beck 1993). There is also increasing trafficking in Moroccan 
women working as prostitutes in Europe (Migration News, January 2001). 
Since the 1980s, an increasing number of Moroccans have migrated to Libya and the 
oil-rich Gulf Countries. Whereas the Gulf countries are the dominant destination for 
international labor migrants from countries such as Egypt, international migration from 
Morocco has remained overwhelming oriented towards Europe. Most Moroccan migrants to 
the Gulf worked there on the basis of temporary contracts (Moulali 1992). In 1992, 120,000 
Moroccans were working in Libya, and an approximate 15,000 in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, 
due to political tensions following the second Gulf War (1990-1991), these numbers have 
decreased since then to an unknown level. 
6
 At the end of the 1990s, an illegal crossing of the Mediterranean cost between US$ 600 and 3,000, and 
sometimes even US$ 4-5,000 (Fadloullah et al 2000). 
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Table 4.1 gives an overview of the Moroccan population currently living abroad. At 
the end of the 19990s, France housed the largest population of Moroccan descent with an 
estimated 840,000 individuals. The second largest community of Moroccans lives in the 
Netherlands with over 250,000 Moroccans. According to official statistics, Belgium, Spain, 
and Italy had Moroccan communities of approximately equal size, that is, between 150,000 
and 200,0007. Germany is the sixth destination with about 90,000 people of Moroccan 
descent. Smaller, but significant communities exist in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
Austria. Outside Europe, the United States and the Canadian Province of Quebec have 
attracted relatively small numbers of mostly educated and relatively wealthy migrants, in 
contrast to most labor migrants in Europe. 
Table 4.1. Estimates of population of Moroccan descent living outside Morocco (1998-1999) 
Western countnes 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Germany 
Spain 
Italy 
UK 
Scandinavia 
US 
Canada 
Total Western 
Population 
840,000 
252,000 
155,000 
98,000 
200,000 
195,000 
25,000 
10,000 
25,000 
40,000 
1.84 million 
Middle East/North Africa 
Libya* 
Algeria 
Tunisia 
Saudi Arabia 
Total Arab Countnes 
Israel 
Total 
Population 
120,000 
100,000 
24,000 
15,000 
259,000 
400-700,000 
2 5-2 8 million 
Sources: INE Spain; 1ST AT Italy; CBS Netherlands; Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland; Danmark 
Stastistik; Statistics Norway; Abu-Haidar (1999); Obdeijn and De Mas (1999) 
Including other European countries, North America, and the Arab oil countries, the total 
number of Moroccans abroad—including naturalized residents of Moroccan descent— 
amounted to almost 1,800,000 in 1993 (Obdeijn 1993). In 2000, this number had risen to 
approximately 2 million. This is an increase of almost 7 times since 1972, on the eve of the 
Oil Crisis, when it was generally expected that migration would soon come to an end. This 
means that out of a total population of 30 million, 6.5 percent of all Moroccans are living 
abroad. It should be noted that this number also includes the increasingly important second 
and third generations, which are often bom in Europe9. Nevertheless, besides natural growth 
and the increasing reliance on family migration which often functions as labor migration "in 
disguise", new "primary" labor migrants continue to cross the Mediterranean on a daily basis, 
nowadays laying the foundations for a new and permanent Moroccan Diaspora in countries 
such as Italy, Spain, and even Portugal. 
It should be noted that the actual figures in Spain and in Italy might be far higher, as many migrants to these 
countries are undocumented migrants 
8
 Data from Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia are from 1992 More recent data are not available, 
although the number of Moroccan migrants to those countnes has probably dwindled following the second Gulf 
War (1990-1991). Nevertheless, emigration to these countnes has increased again in more recent years. 
Estimates of the number of Moroccans in Europe vary considerably, depending on definitions and methods 
used (cf. Sabagh 1997) Some statistics only count non-naturalized residents as "Moroccan", others include all 
residents of Moroccan origin In this study, we stick to the latter definition as much as possible. We do so 
because second and third generation "migrants" turn out to be major factors in perpetuating migration through 
family formation. 
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Morocco has become one of the leading labor exporting countries to Europe and 
Moroccans form, with the Turks, one of the largest and most dispersed migrant groups in 
Europe. In many rural areas—in the Rif Mountains, the Sous valley, and many southern 
oases—between one fifth to more than half of all households have at least one member who 
has migrated abroad (cf. Schoorl et al. 2000:xv). After comparing Ghana, Senegal, Turkey, 
and Egypt—which are all known as labor exporting countries— Schoorl et al. (2000:xv) 
concluded that Morocco had the strongest migration tradition, and that migration had become 
an "all-pervasive phenomenon" in this country. Several studies seem to corroborate that 
Morocco is among the world's leading large labor exporting countries. Giubilaro (1997:59) 
demonstrated that—after comparing the Maghreb countries and Turkey—Morocco is the only 
country to show a recent increase in the total absorption of national labor by the foreign labor 
market, mainly due to an increase in the flow of irregular workers to Europe. 
It is noteworthy to mention that over the 1990s Morocco increasingly developed into a 
migration transit country for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Spain and further into 
Europe (Barros et al. 2002). The destination of such people is mostly Tangiers, where they 
wait for the possibility to cross the Strait of Gibraltar. However, an unknown number—but 
probably several thousands of migrants from countries such as Senegal and Mali—seem to 
live in several Moroccan cities like Tangiers, Casablanca, and Rabat on a semi-permanent 
basis, where they work in irregular jobs in the service sector. For many sub-Saharans, 
Morocco is a relatively wealthy and easily accessible country. This might herald an era of 
increasing African migration to Morocco and the coexistence of immigration and emigration 
typical of "transitional" countries. 
4.3. Regional differentiation in international migration participation 
4.3.1. The historical migration belts: Rif, Sous, and the oases 
There are distinct patterns of geographical clustering and "specialization" concerning the 
origins and destination of international migrants. Migration from particular regions within 
Morocco is focused on certain countries, regions, or even cities within Europe. These patterns 
seem to be partly reproduced and reinforced by migrant networks. The northern Rif 
Mountains, the southwestern Sous area, and the southern river oases located in the pre-
African fault between the Saghro and High Atlas (mainly Dadès, Todgha, Ferkla), have been 
the earliest and most renowned "expulsion zones" of international migrants (see map 1 ). The 
provinces with the highest international migration rates are Agadir (Sous), Ouarzazate (which 
comprises most oases), and the northern provinces of Al Hoceima, Nador, and, to a lesser 
degree, Oujda (Refass 1990:228). The Rif, the Sous, and the southern oases form the principal 
"migration belts", where ancient traditions of internal, largely circular and seasonal labor 
migration have been continued, extended, and transformed in the twentieth century following 
colonization, state formation, and modernization. 
Several factors explain why international migration has predominantly occurred from 
these regions. First, it has been argued that in Morocco the most intensive out-migration has 
typically occurred in rural regions characterized by low rainfall (Bencherifa 1996:404) and 
high population densities in relation to limited agricultural resources (Fadloullah et al. 
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2000:53)10. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that these areas—with the possible 
exception of parts of the Rif—are not among the most marginal in Morocco. For instance, 
oases that have heavily participated in international migration are relatively prosperous oases 
located in fertile river valleys. More peripherally and agriculturally marginal oases (e.g., the 
Bani and mountain oases) tend to be far less involved in international migration (cf. De Haas 
1998). 
Second, the fact that these regions had already established ancient traditions of 
circular migration within Morocco and to Algeria appears to have greatly facilitated their 
participation in new forms of rural-to-urban and international migration to Europe. Third, 
recruiters and employers in Europe generally preferred illiterate people, as they were seen as 
hard working, non-plaintive, and not prone to "subversive" activities such as trade union 
membership. Finally, the Moroccan government actively stimulated labor recruitment from 
these regions. It saw migration as an instrument to decrease tensions in these poor, generally 
Berber speaking, rural areas, which had a rebellious reputation vis-à-vis the power of the 
predominantly urban, Arab-speaking makhzen. This was particularly the case for the Rif, 
where violent rebellions had occurred on several occasions before and after independence 
(Obdeijn 1993, Reniers 1999:684). 
According to (Fadloullah et al. 2000:51), nowhere else in Morocco is migration as 
rooted in social life to the same extent as in the northern Rif mountains and the surrounding 
areas. The Rif was among the first regions to participate in labor migration to France in 
colonial times, mostly via Algeria (Heinemeijer et al. 1976:90). 
Direct migration to France and internal migration to central Morocco was limited, 
however, as the north was part of the Spanish protectorate, and therefore had developed little 
links with central Morocco and France. As of the late 1950s, the Rif entered a period of deep 
economic crisis, which resulted in a rebellion against the Moroccan state in 1958-1959. After 
the definite closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border in 1962 following political-military 
tensions between the two countries, new migration destinations were increasingly explored in 
northwestern Europe (De Mas 1991), where high economic growth led to an increasing 
shortage of unskilled labor. 
Since the 1960s, the Rif mountains and surrounding areas in the north have 
concentrated on migration to the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. The large majority of 
Moroccans in those three countries are from the north. For instance, more than three quarters 
of Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands originate from the Rif mountains (provinces Nador, 
Al Hoceima, Taza, Chaouen and Tétouan) and the region around Oujda and Berkane (Maroc 
oriental) (De Mas 1990b; Haleber 1990:139). France is also an important destination, but less 
than in other regions, which can partly be explained by the absence of historical colonial 
links. A smaller but significant migration stream existed from the Rif towards Spain. Before 
1986, migration to Spain was weak, but gained considerable ground afterwards. Until the 
1980s, the vast majority of Moroccan immigrants in Spain originated from northern Morocco 
(provinces of Tétouan, Tangiers, Laârache and Chaouen). 
10
 Similar migration patterns were observed in Tunisia, where both internal and international migration is the 
oldest and the strongest in the southern, and parts of the country (Michalak 1997) The fact that migrants tend to 
come from relatively marginal areas seems to contradict the hypothesis that it is generally not the poorest who 
migrate However, to go from arguing that "poor regions expel more migrants" to "poor people are likeliest to 
migrate" is to commit a classical "ecological fallacy" (cf Lipton 1980). First, within the Moroccan "migration 
belts", there is a distinct pattern of spatial differentiation of migration participation, in which relatively opened-
up places with better links to the outside world (e g , infrastructure) participate more intensively in migration. 
Second, within migrant sending communities, it is seldom the poorest who migrate (cf Schiff 1994) 
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Both geographical proximity and colonial bonds between the Rif and Spain can explain this 
spatial pattern. Not unimportantly, many Riffians speak Spanish as a second language instead 
of French, as is the case in central and southern Morocco. Although migration to Spain has 
started to become more diverse in its origins, and now also attracts migrants from central and 
southern Morocco, Riffians and other northerners seem still in the majority (Lopez Garcia 
1999). 
The southwestern Sous region, comprising the Sous valley, the city of Agadir and the 
nearby Anti-Atlas Mountains around the towns of Tiznit and Tafraout, shares with the Rif a 
strong tradition of strong out-migration which goes back to pre-colonial times. Since early 
colonial times, this region has provided labor migrants and soldiers to France. Migration to 
Algeria was far smaller due to the long distances. In contrast to the Rif, migration from the 
Sous has remained overwhelmingly oriented towards France. Much more than Riffians, many 
Soussi have migrated internally, and more than any other ethnic group within Morocco they 
have spread out over virtually the entire country. Known for their strong work ethic and sense 
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of solidarity, Berbers from the Sous are especially active in commerce, and have come to 
dominate retail trade in the majonty of Moroccan towns (cf Fadloullah et al 2000 51) 
The river oases located in the valleys between the High Atlas and Saghro south and 
east of the Atlas mountains form the third principal zone of circular and seasonal migration 
Since the late nineteenth century, these traditional patterns were extended and modified due to 
French colonization of the Maghreb Twentieth century migration from the oases was both 
directed at the cities of Atlantic Morocco (Casablanca, Marrakech, Rabat, Agadir) as well as 
foreign destinations Several southeastern oases—which were located relatively close to 
Algeria—participated in migration to Algeria as of the end of the nineteenth century Some 
oases—mostly located north of the Drâa valley—such as the Dades (Ait Hamza 1988, 
Rijbroek 1997), Todgha (Büchner 1986), and Figuig (Benchenfa and Popp 1990) became 
heavily involved in international migration to Europe as of the 1960s This migration has been 
predominantly onented towards France, although there have also been distinct pockets of 
migration to the Netherlands and Belgium In the relatively peripheral and marginal oases 
located along the Bam mountain south of the Anti-Atlas (De Haas 1998), the mountain oases 
in the Saghro and Anti-Atlas, and the larger Drâa (Mter 1995) and Tafilalt oases, international 
migration is relatively weak compared to other oases 
4.3.2. Spatial diffusion of contemporary international migration 
Although almost every region and town in Morocco has participated in international 
migration over the twentieth century to some extent, the majority of migrants have come from 
the Rif, Sous and the southern oases Moreover, many migrants who migrated abroad from 
towns in fact originated from these rural areas The city was but the first stage in their 
migration careers, from where they "leapfrogged" to Europe Although the more centrally 
located regions and the cities along the Atlantic coast started to participate more intensively in 
the migration to France and other countnes in the second half of the 1960s (Bonnet and 
Bossard 1973), the numbers remained relatively small, and most rural areas outside the 
ancient migration belts continued to mainly focus on internal, rural-to-urban migration 
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, this situation changed, as a diffusion process occurred 
in which the international migration experience spread to regions outside the traditional 
migration belts (Benchenfa 1996) Over the past two decades, several new sending areas have 
emerged (Fadloullah et al 2000 xiv) In particular, the regions around Khemfra, Laârache, 
and the Tadla plain have become firmly integrated within the Mediterranean-European 
migration system, and thereby become focused on specific destinations 
Migration from the region of Khemfra—an agro-pastoral region located in the Middle 
Atlas—used to be largely internal Since the 1970s, this region has increasingly participated 
in migration to France, and more recently to Italy and Spain (Fadloullah et al 2000 51) 
Until the end of the 1970s, migration from the region of Laârache (south of Tangiers) 
was mainly onented towards the regional towns or the big cities on the Atlantic coast such as 
Casablanca and Rabat Since the 1980s, this region has witnessed increasing migration to the 
United Kingdom—not a typical migration destination for Moroccans at all, and a true 
"specialty" of the region This community of about 25,000 people has mainly settled in East 
London (Abu-Haidar 1999 39) Besides the UK, nearby Spain has become in increasingly 
popular destination, besides Italy and France Of the current migrants from this region, one 
third is living in the UK, and 44 percent in Spam (Fadloullah et al 2000 52,99-100) 
From the early days of the protectorate, the Tadla plain south of Khounbga was an 
important provider of internal migrants to the nearby metropolis of Casablanca—Morocco's 
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largest city and the country's economic capital—and to smaller, regional towns, such as Settat 
and Berrechid International migration only really gained ground in the 1980s This region 
has specialized in migration to Italy, where the majority of migrants live Most others have 
migrated to Spain (Costanzo 1999 43, Refass 1999 100) 
4.4. The diffusion of internal migration and micro-urbanization 
Notwithstanding the high levels of international migration from Morocco, there seems no 
doubt that internal migration has remained more important in numerical terms However, 
despite some exceptions, little systematic research has been recently published on internal 
migration Even less than is the case for international migration, few thorough studies and 
reliable data on internal migration are available (Refass 1988 187) Consequently, the 
significance and role of internal migration in broader processes of development remain 
largely unknown 
However, several earlier studies throw some light on the huge significance of rural-to-
urban migration, and the crucial function of internal migration as a precursor to international 
migration (cf Nom 1970, Laghaout 1989) Furthermore, it is possible to make some tentative 
inferences about the significance of internal migration by studying urbanization trends Figure 
4 4 indicates that in the post-independence period, the urban population has increased much 
faster than the rural population, even though birth rates have remained higher in rural regions 
Over the 1990s, Morocco's rural population has stagnated around 12 8 million The urban 
population, on the contrary, has been on a constant increase In 2000, 55 2 percent of the 
Moroccan population were living in an urban environment (cf Fadloullah et al 2000 8,26) 
This differential in rural and urban population growth only partly reflects the effects of 
urban-to-rural migration A closer look at internal migration patterns exemplifies that what is 
happening is more complex than the oft-evoked image of a massive "rural exodus" to the big 
cities on the Atlantic coast (cf Mohr 1986) In fact, the term "rural exodus" is misleading, 
since it conceals increasingly important processes of intra-regional migration and the partial 
urbanization of the rural space Moreover, the term evokes an apocalyptic image of true rural 
depopulation in absolute terms On the contrary, most "rural" regions have witnessed a net 
population increase, mainly due to the growth of small and medium-sized provincial towns 
(cf Koubry 1995) 
On the one hand, the population of all provinces, including the predominantly "rural" 
provinces of the interior, is in fact growing This can be explained by the fact that 
urbanization, de-ruralization, and partial de-agranzation are general processes that are 
occurring within rural Morocco De-agranzation is the process by which "rural" populations 
increasingly gain additional incomes outside the traditional agricultural sectors Previously, 
such livelihood diversification was primarily achieved through migration However, the 
development of numerous centrally located villages into small or medium-sized urban centers 
is increasingly offering non-agricultural employment within the so-called "rural" provinces 
(cf Agoumy 1988, Bemane 1996, 1997, Bounar 1993, El Maoula El Iraki 1999) This 
diffusion of micro- and meso-urbamzation—which has been presumably encouraged by 
decentralization policies (Kagermeier 1989) and significant improvements in road and 
electricity infrastructure over the past two decades—over the so-called "rural" intenor of 
Morocco, has also affected patterns of internal migration (cf Bemane 1996) 
Likewise, an increasing number of internal migrants do not settle in the "traditional" 
destination cities such as Casablanca and Rabat, but in rapidly growing smaller and medium-
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sized towns near to or within the "rural" provinces themselves. Examples of such growth 
poles are Nador, Al Hoceima, Taza in the north, and Agadir and Tiznit in the southwest, and 
Ouarzazate in the south. If we focus more on the regional level, numerous smaller but rapidly 
growing towns have sprouted. Since the 1970s, the growth rates of small and medium-sized 
towns (5,000-50,000) have been larger than those of large cities (in particular over 100,000 
inhabitants) whose relative growth seems to be slowing down. The growth rate is highest in 
towns with 20 to 50,000 inhabitants (Kagermeier 1989:118-9). 
Figure 4.4. Rural and urban population growth Morocco (1900-2000) 
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Source: Direction de la Statistique Maroc, Noin 1970 
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Short-distance internal migrants to such provincial towns are not only attracted by the 
generally better job opportunities, but also by the better services and public infrastructure 
(schools, adequate health care, electricity) available in such towns (cf. Giubilare 1997:45). 
Due to this process of "de-ruralization" and urbanization at the regional level, rural-to-urban 
migrants increasingly remain in the provinces of the interior. 
Definitions of "urban" and "rural" are ambiguous to a certain extent, as this primarily 
reflects the administrative status of a district more than anything else. In Morocco, a 
commune rurale can acquire the status of an urban municipalité with one stroke of the pen of 
the Minister of the Interior. Part of the high urban growth rate is the result of the 
administrative redefinition of previously rural districts which have evolved into truly urban or 
semi-urban areas over the past few decades. However, such urban districts often include 
surrounding villages which are rather rural in character. 
There are important regional differences in rural population growth. In regions with 
relatively favorable conditions for agriculture (e.g., Settat, Laârache), rural populations tend 
to grow, whereas they are growing slowly, stagnating, or, in some cases, even decreasing in 
areas with more unfavorable ecological conditions (e.g., Nador, Khenifra, and Tiznit) 
(Fadloullah et al. 2000:36). In the latter regions, where agriculture offers little prospects, 
more people tend to migrate to the large cities of northern Morocco or to regional towns. 
With regards to southern Morocco, the populations of small oases located along the 
Jebel Bani mountain between Foum El Houssaine and Foum Zguid, as well as oases south of 
the Jebel Saghro mountains, seem to be stagnating compared to the relative growth in oases 
such as the upper Drâa, Dadès, Todgha, and the Tafilalt. The latter oases not only seem less 
marginal in ecological-agricultural terms, but are also endowed with better infrastructure and, 
hence, accessibility. The populations of these less marginal oases seem to be more oriented 
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towards international migration compared to the marginal southwestern oases, which are 
predominantly involved in internal migration Moreover, in the latter areas, relatively 
prosperous and lively economic and/or administrative centers seem to be developing, such as 
Ouarzazate, Zagora, Kelâa Mgouna, Boumalne de Dades, Tinghir, Errachidia, and Erfoud, 
which attract an increasing number of internal migrants from within and outside the regions 
In addition, the increasingly popular tourism in the Presaharan region contributes to the 
economic development of these towns, and in particular Ouarzazate and Erfoud 
Besides a well-educated minority of civil servants and private sector professionals, 
internal migrants tend to work as day laborers in housing construction, the retail or street 
trade, and vanous other service jobs (e g, catering, gardening, parking lot attendants) in 
towns (cf De Haas 1998, El Meskine 1993) Agricultural laborers mostly work in commercial 
agriculture on the western Atlantic coast, the fertile areas around Fes and Meknes, the Sous 
valley, or some regions along the northern coast 
Over the past decades, education has become an increasingly important cause of 
internal migration An increasing number of young Moroccans are studying at universities or 
other higher education establishments This means they have to move to cities, in which they 
often stay after completing their education In remote villages, the absence of nearby 
secondary schools tears many children away from their families, who go to live in urban-
based boarding schools from the age of 12 Such student migration means a very early 
confrontation with the outside world, and is often but the first step m their migration careers 
(De Haas 1995, 1998) 
As with international migration, an increasing number of—single, married, or 
divorced—women migrate alone, thereby breaking with traditional, patriarchal norms 
hindenng female mobility Four main categones of female migrants can be distinguished The 
first group consists of female students at higher education establishments The second group 
consists of professionals working as civil servants (e g, teachers) or working for private 
companies The third group is that of divorced women looking for work in the towns and 
cities The divorce rate in Morocco is high and an increasing number of households are 
female-headed (Hajjarabi 1995 109, see also sections 10 4 1 and 10 4 2) 
The fourth and perhaps the biggest group of internal female migrants is that of young 
domestic workers This generally concerns a less voluntary, often forced forms of migration 
In Morocco, it is common practice among middle and high-class families to engage bonnes as 
nannies and housekeepers The circumstances under which they have to work are often 
arduous Most bonnes are very young One survey indicated that of all domestic workers, 27 
percent are under 10 years and 73 percent are under 12 years (ILO 1996) They are mostly 
recruited by their prospective employers in rural areas, either directly, or through 
intermediaries Some girls are forced to work by poor parents who "sell" their daughters to 
human traffickers The practice of adoptive servitude, in which families adopt young girls 
among poor rural families and use them as indentured domestic servants, is socially accepted 
practice Their salanes tend to be irregular and very low (Hajjarabi 1995 109) 
Although families might treat such domestic child servants fairly or even help them 
with later schooling, such girls are vulnerable to exploitation or sexual abuse Some girls that 
allegedly flee their adoptive families end up in prostitution (News Central Maroc, 24 
December 2001) Adolescent girls are trafficked for sexual exploitation, internally as well as 
to foreign destinations Teenage prostitution has been estimated to involve tens of thousands 
of girls Forced prostitution is prevalent, particularly in cities with large numbers of tourists 
(either those from Western or Arab oil countries) and near towns with large military 
installations (Dept of State 1999) 
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Although about three quarters of Moroccan child workers are female (Dept of State 
1999), poverty also drives young boys away from their families to work on farms, as street 
traders, cigarette vendors, shoe polishers, car washers, parking lot attendants, and so on The 
numerous boys who swarm the streets of Moroccan towns are often without any familial 
support, are vulnerable to exploitation and frequently end up as beggars, in prostitution or in 
delinquency Many boys and girls who have been sent out by their families to work elsewhere 
often hardly receive a penny of the money they earn They can expect their fathers to arrive 
on payday to collect their salaries, leave a small allowance, and return to the village 
(Crawford 2001 23) 
This harsh reality confronts us with the "downside" of migration and development 
The latter forms of more or less forced migration show that not all forms of migration should 
automatically be interpreted as "developmental" In section 2 6, we argued that if people do 
not have the choice not to migrate—that is, if they are forced to move—it is more likely that it 
will perpetuate their poverty instead of expanding their capabilities Their powerless position 
implies that most of the benefits of their labor will accrue to those who are exploiting them 
By exposing them to arduous labor, mental and physical exploitation and depriving them of a 
happy childhood and education, these types of migration are bom out of a situation of 
"unfreedom" and are likely to perpetuate or even deepen the poverty of the migrants 
themselves 
4.5. Migration and remittances as a national development strategy 
4.5.1. Links between migrants and their households 
Originally, Moroccan guestworkers in Europe were expected to return to Morocco In the 
tradition of circular migration, this was not only the expectation of governments, but also the 
intention of most migrants themselves Studies have revealed that the social imagination of 
Moroccan migrants is haunted by the idea of eventual return to their homeland (Boudoudou 
1985), although it has been argued that migrants from rural areas remain more focused on the 
country or ongin than those with an urban background (Van Amersfoort and Van der Wüsten 
1975 48-9) 
However, for many migrants, this expectation of one day returning has turned out to 
be a myth Compared to other immigrant groups, return migration is low among Moroccans, 
who are also in the lead concerning the number of naturalizations in the destination countries 
(Fadloullah et al 2000 56) Whereas a large share of migrants from Morocco has ended up 
staying permanently, return migration has certainly not remained a myth for all migrants 
High net figures of in-migration conceal the fact that each year, tens of thousands of migrants 
actually do return to Morocco Besides "real" returnees, an increasing number of retired and 
unemployed migrants are "commuting" between Europe and Morocco, living for a part of the 
year in both countries 
It seems an implicit assumption of mainstream migration literature that it is mainly 
return migrants who play an important role as development actors While extensive attention 
has been paid to the role of return migrants in development, the role of still-abroad migrants 
has been relatively neglected Because of their physical absence, still-abroad migrants are 
considered less relevant, and, for this reason, have even been excluded from surveys (cf 
Adams 1991) However, there are strong indications that this assumption is largely erroneous, 
and that still-abroad migrants may play an important role in development in migrant sending 
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areas. Many migrants initially leave their families behind. This situation of multi-locality 
might last for many years or even decades. This implies that migrants send remittances back, 
which will increase the potential capability of the household left behind to consume and 
invest in various economic activities, which does not necessarily require the physical 
presence of the migrant or household head. Therefore, migration is likely to affect 
development even in the absence of the migrant him- or herself. Their role in local and 
regional development is therefore less visible, but not necessarily lower, since still-abroad 
migrants in particular are responsible for remittance transfers. The consolidation of 
transnational linkages emphasizes the significance of Diaspora relations for migrant 
households at home and abroad (cf. Connell and Conway 2000). 
Moroccan migrants seem highly attached to their country of origin, which is 
exemplified by their yearly return during the summer holidays, which has gained massive 
proportions". Furthermore, non-return should not be equated with a lack of commitment to 
the origin. The development of means of communication and increasingly easy transport links 
have helped diminish perceived distances (Cammaert 1986). The strong links that exist 
between migrant communities are exemplified by the unexpected high rate of family 
formation (Lievens 1999). Although networks were expected to weaken with the growing up 
of second and third generations, the high popularity of "network mamages" indicates that this 
presumed disintegration has proceeded less rapidly than was once expected (cf. Saa 1998; 
Hooghiemstra 2003). Moreover, the recent occurrence of "genuine", primary labor migration 
to Spain and Italy has created the basis for the development of new Moroccan communities in 
Europe. 
In the same vein as international migration, strong links seem equally characteristic of 
the relationship between internal migrants and their community of origin (Iraki 1995). El 
Meskine (1993) argued that the rural-to-urban takes place in a veritable "espace relationnel", 
corroborating Lucas and Stark's (1985:915) general observation that more and more 
households, constituting a hybrid "peasants-worker" group, straddle both the urban and rural 
sectors in developing countnes. Moreover, feelings of ("class") solidarity among migrants 
from different regions living within the same city tend to be sparse, indicating that they 
remain strongly oriented towards their family and household at the origin for a long time 
(Iraki 1995)12. 
4.5.2. Migration politics and remittance policies 
Throughout the post-independence period, the Moroccan government has actively stimulated 
international out-migration for both political and economic reasons13. International migration 
" A survey conducted in 1975-1976 indicated that about 64 percent of international migrants visit Morocco each 
year (Berrada 1990). More than two decades later, this situation has not changed much According to a recent 
survey, three quarters of the international migrants have visited Morocco at least once in the past two years 
(Fadloullah et al. 2000) Between 15 June and 15 August 1993, 848,000 people and 159,000 cars entered the 
northern harbors of Ceuta, Tangiers, and Melillia (Lopez Garcia 1994). This is excluding arrivals by airplane. In 
2001, about 1.2 million migrants visited Morocco on holiday. 
12
 There are indications that single or divorced migrant workers adjust to city life with greater ease and, hence, 
maintain less intensive contacts with home (Iraki 1995, cf. Choldin 1973) 
13
 Although international migration was stimulated, the opposite was true for internal rural-to-urban migration, 
which was perceived as a threat to political and economic stability The rural "exodus" was perceived to lead to 
the decline of agricultural production and contributing to urban overpopulation. The Moroccan state has 
therefore aimed, largely in vain, at curbing internal migration 
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was seen as a "safety valve" to decrease poverty and, hence, prevent political tensions This 
was also the main reason why Morocco stimulated migration from regions with the reputation 
of being rebellious against the central government This mainly concerned the mountainous 
and/or and regions in the extreme north, south and east of the country, which largely coincide 
with that part of the country which the French called "le Maroc inutile" Throughout 
Morocco's history, the independent tnbes of the interior have remained largely autonomous 
from the makhzen, the state-related and largely urban-based class associated with the sultan's 
power Although these tribes often nominally recognized the (religious) status of the sultan 
for certain periods, they remained largely autonomous in practice and generally refused to pay 
tribute to the sultan It was only under French rule, that the independent tribes of what the 
colonizer called the bled es-siba ("land of dissidence") were "pacified" after a military 
campaign of two decades On the eve of independence in 1956, this pacification was only two 
decades old 
The post-colonial Moroccan state inherited the political-military infrastructure 
installed by the French, which enabled the makhzen to effectively control all the tribes of the 
interior for the first time in history The tribes and their chiefs of the interior—who played an 
important role in the struggle for independence—were sometimes reluctant to submit to the 
sultan's power A combination of political discontent and grinding poverty resulted in several 
insurrections The Moroccan government quickly recognized the possibilities that a migration 
policy could have in terms of relieving tensions by promoting emigration from these 
economically and politically marginal regions, and in particular from the notoriously 
turbulent and underdeveloped Rif region (Reniers 1999 684) 
Besides a political instrument, migration was increasingly seen as a tool for national 
economic development In the 1965-68 Three-Year Plan, the utility of migration was 
primarily seen through the skills and knowledge that migrants were expected to acquire 
through work and education abroad It was expected that this experience would be beneficial 
for national industrial development (Heinemeijer et al 1976 23) Migrants, whose stay abroad 
was considered as temporary, were explicitly seen as innovative agents of development In 
this "developmentallst" era, migrants were seen as actors who would help Morocco in its 
economic take-off The Five-Year Plan 1968-72 largely suppressed the education argument 
and emphasized the quantitative aspects of migration in relieving pressures on the labor 
market and the positive monetary effects of remittances This shift in attention can be 
explained by the increase in unemployment and increasing deficits in the balance of payments 
Morocco witnessed in that period (Heinemeijer et al 1976 23) 
The belief that migrants would be particular actors of change, importing new ideas, 
attitudes, and skills, gradually faded Partly, this was the result of disappointing experiences 
with migration and development programs The Moroccan government has implemented a 
senes of policies, sometime!) in cooperation with "receiving countries" in Europe, in order to 
stimulate the participation of returned migrants in the development process through 
investment-stimulating programs Such programs have generally failed, partly through bad 
implementation, partly due to a lack of commitment among migrants and feelings of distrust 
vis-a-vis government agencies (Fadloullah et al 2000 32, Fellat 1996, Obdeijn 1993) 
Moreover, research seemed to indicate that migrants were not willing to invest in productive 
enterprises, and that most money was spent on housing construction and consumption, 
expenditures that were generally evaluated as negative This contributed to the rising 
pessimism about the utility of migrants in the development of their regions of origin 
With regards to migration and development policies, it seems useful to distinguish 
between policies that aim to stimulate remittance transfers and policies that specifically aim to 
encourage investments by migrants Over the past two decades, the emphasis on remittances 
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as a tool for national macro-economic development has gained increasing emphasis. General 
policies to increase remittance transfers seem to have been relatively more successful than 
specific policies aiming to stimulate investments by migrants, which—following the 
disappointing experiences in the 1970s—were largely abandoned at least until the renewed 
investment-stimulated policies of the 1990s. 
Since the late 1960s, Morocco has encouraged the creation of a network of consulates, 
bank branches (i.e., the Banque Centrale Populaire), and post offices to facilitate the transfer 
of remittances. Since the early 1980s, remittance transfer via banks has progressively replaced 
postal orders as the primary means of money transfer (Refass 1999:98). Since the end of the 
1980s, new monetary policies have been applied in Morocco, involving the lifting of 
restrictions on exchange and on the repatriation of money, which have probably contributed 
to a renewed increase in remittances after a period of relative stagnation (Giubilaro 1997:30). 
Since 1995, migrants have been allowed to open foreign exchange banking accounts with 
Moroccan banks (Fellat 1996:316), which have established an increasing number of foreign 
offices in European cities with sizeable Moroccan communities. Remittance transfers are 
further encouraged through fiscal policies favoring migrants (Refass 1999:98) Moreover, 
currency devaluations have increased the value of remittances and encouraged migrants to 
remit money (Giubilare 1997:30). 
Through the likely effect of these fiscal policies, low inflation, and the absence of 
large black markets for foreign exchange, Morocco has been relatively successful in directing 
remittances through official channels. In neighboring Algeria, for instance, most remittances 
are sent through unofficial "parallel" channels as the official exchange rates do not reflect 
those on the black market (Mezdour 1993). Nevertheless, much money is handed over 
personally and migrants take many goods (e.g., electronics, household appliances, furniture, 
cars, car spare parts, clothes) to Morocco as gifts or as merchandise (Refass 1999:100). It is 
estimated that in Morocco transfers in kind represent one quarter to one third of official 
remittances (Refass 1999:102). Remittances constitute the most direct impact of 
migration, and are a tangible expression of the strong links between migrants and their 
origins. Ever since the 1970s, there have been warnings by scholars and policy makers that 
remittance payments will decrease in the near future. However, these predictions have not so 
far come true, corroborating the general hypothesis that remittance transfers generally do not 
decrease as migration matures. Despite some relapses, remittances have surged from 200 
million dirham (23 million US$) in 1968 to over 18.5 billion dirham (2.1 billion us$) in 1992 
(see figure 4.5). 
Over the 1990s, however, a stagnation has occurred in remittance transfers at levels of 
around 2.3 billion US$. It was often thought and feared that this would herald a future decline 
in remittances. Some researchers explained this by the combined effect of unfavorable 
development perspectives in Morocco and the integration in the host countries of the "second 
generation", which would be less inclined to remit money (Fadloullah et al. 2000:58; 
Mezdour 1993:189). It seemed that the great age of Moroccan migration had ended, and that 
the aging migrant population in northwestern Europe—who either practiced family 
reunification or returned— represented a declining potential in terms of remittances. 
However, contrary to expectation, migration to the classic destination countries has 
persisted at far higher rates than expected after the completion of family reunification, which 
was mainly due to the rise in family formation. Although it might be true that second 
generation might be less inclined to remit, there has been a general underestimation of the 
strength of transnational links between Morocco and the settled migrant communities in 
Europe. Moreover, new and large migrant communities have been established in Spain and 
Italy over the 1990s, which are likely to increase significantly in the coming decades (Carella 
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and Pace 2001), and which are likely to increase the future potential for remittance transfers. 
In 1990, more than two thirds of remittances came from France, 9 percent from the 
Netherlands, and only 4.5 percent from Italy (Berrada 1994). 
Figure 4.S. Total volume of official remittance, ODA, and FDl flows to Morocco (1968-2000) 
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To some extent, the sudden and spectacular surge in remittance transfers, to levels of well 
over 3.5 billion US$ in 2001, seems due to the introduction of the Euro. This may have lead 
migrants to deposit their ready money in Moroccan banks or to convert it into dirhams while 
on holiday in Morocco. However, other Europe-oriented emigration countries such as Tunisia 
and Turkey did not show a similar increase in remittance transfers. Moreover, the volume of 
remittances remained stable in 2002. A study by Müller (1998) demonstrated that whereas 
remittances from classic destination countries such as France and the Netherlands seemed to 
stabilize or decrease in the 1990s, remittance transfers from new southern European 
destination countries showed a steep increase. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the 
increase is the partial effect of the steep increase in remittances from Spain and Italy (partially 
due to legalization programs) and to a lesser extent the Arab oil countries, the USA, and 
Canada, which more than compensated for the relative stagnation in remittances from 
northwestern Europe. 
It is always difficult to predict how migratory, macro-economic, and political 
developments will affect future remittance transfers. However, based on prior experience it 
seems likely that remittances will remain a vital source of income (for Moroccan households) 
and foreign exchange (for the Moroccan state) in the near future. 
Over the 1995-1999 period, Morocco was the sixth largest remittance receiving 
country in the world after India, the Philippines, Mexico, Turkey, and Egypt (Gammeltoft 
2002:10). In 2001, it occupied the fourth place. In per capita terms, Morocco is even the 
largest remittance receiver of these six major labor exporting countries, although smaller 
countries such as Jordan, Yemen, Albania, El Salvador and several island states have higher 
per capita remittance transfers (Buch et al. 2002). 
The macro-economic significance of migrant remittances is considerable. While 
remittances represented 6.4 percent of Morocco's GNP over the 1990s on average (thereby 
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occupying 14' place in the world ranking), remittances represented 20.1 percent of all 
imports in goods and services (Buch et al. 2002). Remittance transfers contribute to income 
growth and poverty alleviation directly and indirectly. Teto (2001) concluded that without 
remittances, the percentage of the Moroccan population living below the poverty line would 
increase from 19.0 to 23.2 percent14. 
For the Moroccan state, remittances are crucial as a source of foreign exchange and 
have become a vital element in sustaining Morocco's balance of payments. Over the past two 
decades the value of remittances has not only proved to be substantially higher than other 
international resource flows such as official development assistance (ODA) and official aid 
and foreign direct investment (FDl), but its relative importance as a foreign exchange resource 
has only increased due to a significant decrease in other capital flows over the 1990s (see 
figure 4.6). 
In 1991, the value of official remittances represented 84.5 percent of the total amount 
of foreign investments, development aid, and private loans received by the country. In 2000, 
the value of remittances was already 16 times higher than these flows, which have all shown 
clear decreasing trends over the final decade of the twentieth century. The many warnings that 
migration researchers have pronounced on the unstable nature of remittances (i.e., that the 
reliance on remittances is a particularly "dangerous" kind of dependency) have not been 
supported by the facts. 
Fluctuations in remittance income are generally inferior to income from other sources 
of foreign exchange, and thus remittances represent the most stable capital inflow over time 
(cf. Giubilaro 1997:31). Foreign direct investments (FDl), for instance, have often been 
referred to as the hope for the nation's future by adherents of the "Washington consensus". 
However, despite a temporary increase in the mid-1990s, FDl is not only far lower, but also 
more volatile than remittance transfers. Whereas official aid flows (ODA) were almost equally 
as high as remittances over the 1970s, their volume lagged behind in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and only represented one fifth of remittances in 2000 (see figure 4.5). The strong 
transnational and transgenerational social bonds between international migrants and "stay-
behinds" explain why remittances were the most reliable and sustainable source of foreign 
exchange over the 1980s and 1990s. 
Figure 4.6 indicates that, from the perspective of the Moroccan state, migrants are to 
be considered as a major "export product". In 2000, remittances represented one quarter of 
total exports of goods and services. Besides tourism and the exportation of phosphates, 
remittances are the most important source of foreign exchange. As figure 4.6 indicates, the 
revenues of remittances dwarfed those of phosphates, Morocco's main primary export 
commodity, throughout the 1980s and 1990s. During the same period, remittances were also 
higher than receipts from agricultural exports, that other pillar of the Moroccan (export) 
economy. Remittances have also remained higher than receipts from the expanding Moroccan 
tourism industry (2.8 billion US$ in 2001). 
H
 In urban environments, this increase would be from 12.0 to 16 6 percent, and in rural environments from 27 2 
to 31.0 percent (Teto 2001). The actual contribution of migration to poverty alleviation is probably higher, as 
only international remittances transferred via official channels are included in such estimates In regions with 
high migration participation rates, the contribution to poverty alleviation can be far higher than these overall 
figures indicate On the basis of a World Bank study on Morocco (Report 11918-MORC, 1994), Schiff 
(1994:15) stressed that because most Moroccan migrants do not belong to the group below the poverty line, 
remittances benefit relatively non-poor households rather than the poorest. This explains why the direct 
contribution of remittances to poverty alleviation is relatively limited However, the indirect contribution of 
remittances to poverty alleviation might be higher through income multiplier effects 
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Figure 4.6. Value of remittances, total exports, total imports, and major export products (1981-2001) 
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From the onset of migration, the Moroccan government has pursued policies in which it 
attempted to maintain a tight control on migrant communities in Europe. The Moroccan state 
explicitly addresses all people of Moroccan descent as its subjects15, and even actively 
discouraged their integration in the receiving countries until the early 1990s (Obdeijn 1993). 
Through a network of Moroccan embassies, consulates, mosques, and associations such as the 
"Amicales", Moroccan migrants were discouraged from organizing themselves in trade 
unions or from participating in the political processes of the countries that were considered as 
their temporary residencies by the Moroccan state. Such integration-discouraging policies 
seemed to serve a double goal. First, the government wanted to prevent Moroccan migrants 
from organizing themselves politically, and thus from becoming a potential factor of political 
opposition "from outside". Second, integration was perceived as endangering the vital 
remittance transfers. 
However, these "repressive" policies were not only increasingly criticized by 
European governments—which perceived them as running counter to their "integration 
policies"—but also seemed to alienate the migrant population from government institutions. 
In the early 1990s, the Moroccan government finally recognized that such policies had more 
or less failed, and had had the important negative consequence of increasing feelings of 
distrust among migrants vis-à-vis Moroccan state institutions, and had probably chased away 
potential investors instead of attracting them. The Moroccan government therefore changed 
course through adopting a more positive attitude towards the integration of Moroccans 
abroad. This shift was influenced by a general change in macro-economic policies that placed 
15
 Moroccan nationality is inalienable. This means that even Moroccans who obtain citizenship of their country 
of settlement cannot relinquish their Moroccan nationality, so that they acquire double nationality. For the 
Moroccan state, each person whose father is Moroccan remains Moroccan until death. In order to stress the 
"Marocanité" of migrants—whether first, second or third generation—they are officially called MR£: Marocains 
Résidant à l'Étranger (Moroccan Residents Abroad). Despite the recent change in policies, the Moroccan 
government maintains its claim that Moroccan nationality is inalienable, and pursues active policies to foster 
links between migrants and their country of origin. 
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a high pnonty on attracting remittances and stimulating migrants' investments as a tool for 
national economic development This also led to a renewed hope in the positive role migrants 
may potentially play in encouraging investment Consequently, migrants were no longer 
approached as indolent remittance senders that should be kept quiet, but increasingly as 
potential businessmen who should be convinced to invest in Morocco, which has 
subsequently been presented as a land "full of opportunities" 
Urged by the fear that the vital remittance transfers and migrants' investments might 
decrease—with potentially disastrous consequences for the national economy—Moroccan 
officials seem to be increasingly aware that policies should be developed in order to create a 
fertile economic, social and political ground for investments by Moroccan migrants and other 
investors There seems to be the increasing recognition that more positive strategies are 
needed—that increase instead of decrease trust—in order to stimulate both remittance 
transfers and investments by migrants In particular among new generations of better educated 
and informed Moroccans, the patronizing attitude of the Moroccan state towards migrants 
seemed to alienate them rather than bind them closer to their country of origin 
There also seems an increasing awareness of the need to reduce obstacles to 
investment, such as the complexity of regulations, problems of corruption, and excessive red 
tape (Kaioua 1999 124-5) The pnonty put in restoring the confidence of migrants in the 
Moroccan state and in convincing migrants to invest in Morocco has probably played an 
important role in a number of recent policy measures to combat corruption among border and 
police officials and among officials in general—who tend to harass migrants and "cream off' 
their wealth (cf Stnjp 1997) At the end of the 1990s, Moroccan television, which is watched 
by Moroccans throughout Europe via satellite, had regular broadcasts on investment 
opportunities, in which successful entrepreneurs and other Moroccans openly discuss 
problems of corruption and bureaucracy that they say are hindering investments Ten years 
earlier, this would have been unthinkable 
In 1990, the Moroccan state established the Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocaim 
Résidant a l'Etranger The aim of this foundation is to foster and reinforce the links between 
Moroccan migrants and Morocco through assisting them in various ways both while in 
Europe and during their summer holidays in Morocco, and to inform and "guide" migrants on 
investment opportunities Examples of its activities are the reduction of the long delays and 
harassment migrants used to experience at the borders in the sea ports of Tangiers and Sebta 
(Ceuta in Spanish) and, to a lesser extent, at the various airports, the retneval of custom 
documents via the internet, and accelerating various administrative procedures 
Moreover, in 2002 the new Moroccan king Mohammed vi announced a series of 
policy measures aimed at easing administrative procedures for obtaining business permits, in 
particular through the creation of so-called "guichet uniques" Obviously, it remains to be 
seen whether these attempts to promote Morocco as a fertile ground for investments targeted 
at the migration Diaspora are successful, both in terms of image building and genuine 
improvements in the general investment conditions In any case, it seems a more positive and 
viable strategy than the policies of the past (cf Leichtman 2002) 
4.6. Morocco as a labor frontier country 
In order to put Moroccan migration into a broader theoretical and geographical perspective, 
and to be better able to predict future migration patterns, it is useful to draw on transitional-
geographical migration theories developed by Zelinsky (1971) and Skeldon (1997) In the 
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past few decades, Morocco has become a typical example of what Skeldon (1997:145) called 
a "labor frontier country" (see section 2.2). Skeldon (1997:52) argued that 
there is a relationship between the level of economic development, state formation and the 
patterns of population mobility. Very generally, we can say that where these are high, an 
integrated migration system exists consisting of global and local movements, whereas where 
they are low the migration systems are not integrated and mainly local 
In his attempt to make a global regionalization for migratory movements, Skeldon (1997:52-
53) distinguished the five following "development tiers": the (1) old and (2) new core 
countries (e.g., Western Europe, North America, Japan) characterized by immigration and 
internal decentralization; (3) the "expanding core" (e.g., eastern China, southern Africa, 
eastern Europe), where we find both immigration and out-migration and internal 
centralization (i.e., urbanization and rural-to-urban migration); (4) the "labor frontier" (e.g., 
Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Mexico, the Philippines, and, until recently, Spain and Italy), which 
are dominated by out-migration and internal centralization; and the so-called (5) "resource 
niche" (e.g., many sub-Saharan countries, parts of central Asia and Middle America), with 
variable, often weaker forms of migration. 
Evidently, Skeldon's regionalization is inspired by, and an adaptation of, Zelinsky's 
(1971) mobility transition theory and also seems in line with the "migration hump" model. 
What all these models have in common is that they suppose a clear, though non-linear 
relationship between economic and demographic development and the occurrence of mass 
international labor migration. The argument is that levels of international out-migration seem 
the highest in labor frontier countries, where an increasing number of young individuals can 
afford the risks and costs associated with international migration and who tend to have 
increasingly high professional, material, and psychological aspirations that are unlikely to be 
fulfilled in their own countries. Moreover, such countries generally have a relatively well-
developed public infrastructure (road, electricity, media, schooling system), which facilitates 
the integration of regions into national and international economic and informational 
networks. 
If we compare African countries, Skeldon's general argument seems valid. Indeed, the 
Maghreb and other North African countries typically show higher levels of development in 
relation to both economic and social standards, and equally tend to show higher rates of out-
migration than most (poorer) countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This shows that, as we have 
argued in chapter 2—and despite all the postmodernist criticism—transitory migration 
theories are remarkably adequate to functionally explain the changing character and function 
of migration over the course of the development process. 
The highest rates of out-migration tend not to occur in the least developed countries, 
but rather in countries that have attained a certain level of development. However, in order to 
explain this, it seems important not to focus only on the material (e.g., income growth, 
technical progress, infrastructure) side of development—as transitory theories tend to do—but 
to broaden our view of how development influences migration by including socio-cultural 
processes. For instance, the rising aspirations and increasing feelings of relative deprivation 
associated with development also explain why people tend to move particularly from this part 
of the world. As Giubilare (1997:29) argued, in general, such development tends to give rise 
to both social and economic changes. "Development" not only provides households and 
individuals with the material means to bear the costs and risks of international migration, but 
also tends to coincide with increasing education and information, which tend to raise 
aspirations. Both increased capabilities (through better access to material and social capital) 
and higher aspirations (cultural capital) tend to reinforce the propensity to migrate. It 
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therefore is not only difficult, but also undesirable, to separate the reciprocal, mutually 
reinforcing social and economic dimensions of migration and development 
Morocco has also a number of demographic characteristics in common with other 
"labor frontier" countries, which seem to provide additional explanatory value to the question 
of why migration propensities are so high Morocco is in full demographic transition, 
witnessing a still rather high but decreasing population growth, with sharply falling birth 
rates, and a steep increase in the number of young adults (Courbage 1996, Sabagh 1997) In 
Morocco, annual rates of population growth reached a peak in the early 1970s, and have 
started to decline since 1982 (Schoorl et al 2000) This decline has mainly been the result of 
decreasing fertility rates (Courbage 1996) Family planning policies, introduced by the 
Moroccan authorities in the 1966, have contributed to a sharp fall in fertility rates, from 
almost 6 in the second half of the 1970s to 3 3 in 1996 (Schoorl et al 2000 43) Except for 
Tunisia, this decrease is sharper than in other North African and Middle Eastern countries 
(Courbage 1994) 
However, as with most demographic processes, the full effects of such declines in 
fertility on population growth are only felt in the longer term Despite declining fertility rates, 
Morocco's population is still overwhelmingly young The number of young adults that are 
entering the labor market each year has increased dramatically Simultaneously, Morocco has 
witnessed a time of economic stagnation since the 1970s In the 1980-90s, public spending 
cuts and general austerity measures following IMF-instigated and "Washington Consensus"-
inspired structural adjustments programs have further hit employment growth The 
combination of these factors has increased unemployment While unemployment rates were 
low in general during the 1960s and 1970s, they started to rise in the following two decades, 
and have stabilized at high levels in the past years In 2001, unemployment was at a level of 
13 0 percent With a rate of 19 5 percent in the same year, urban unemployment was far 
higher than rural unemployment rates (Direction de la Statistique Royaume du Maroc) Rising 
unemployment and austere budget cuts to social programs have led to popular unrest (White 
1999) and have increasingly boosted migration pressure 
Unemployment has severely affected young people under the age of 25 and first-time 
job seekers, women in particular Unemployment has rapidly increased among young 
graduates, who used to enjoy practically guaranteed employment in the public service until 
the early 1980s, but who can now hardly find jobs (Giubilare 1997, Richards 2003, White 
1999) This explains why more and more well-educated Moroccans wish to migrate 
Simultaneously, there has been an increase in "under-employment" (Giubilare 1997) 
In Morocco, the discrepancy between population growth and labor demand growth is 
particularly high For instance, after comparing Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey, 
Giubilare (1997 58) concluded that in the period 1990-1995, the rate of domestic 
absorption—defined as total entries into national employment / total labor supply—was 71 
and 78 percent in the first two countnes, respectively, and 39 and 46 percent in Algeria and 
Morocco, respectively This combination of high demographic growth largely exceeding 
labor demand seems largely responsible for the high and persistent migration pressures 
Both Zelinsky (1971) and Skeldon (1997) suggest that, in general, high population 
growth, concomitant processes of modernization and urbanization, and high international 
migration are processes that tend to occur simultaneously However, this does not suggest that 
high population growth is automatically associated with high international migration 
Although this seems generally the case, population growth is obviously only one component 
of a complex chain of processes (Coleman 1999 486-7) Actual migration pressures are 
mediated by the level of social, political, and economic development which determine to what 
extent expanding populations can build their desired futures within their own country Future 
economic development is always difficult to predict, as it depends on a number of uncertain 
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factors, such as the volume of direct foreign investments, the international political and 
economic state of affairs, internal economic policies, and political stability 
However, even from the most optimistic perspective, pressure on the Moroccan labor 
market is not expected to decrease in the coming years (cf Giubilare 1997 65) It seems 
almost certain that in the years to come Morocco will not be able to offer sufficient 
opportunities of economic integration for the increasing numbers of young people entering 
the labor market Moreover, the economic prospects for Morocco as a whole seem less 
positive than for most other countnes in the southern Mediterranean As Coleman (1999 501) 
argued, it would therefore be erroneous to expect any important reductions in migration from 
the Maghreb in general—and Morocco in particular—to Europe in the short or even medium 
term following the steep decline in fertility 
Persistent economic disparities, in particular the low current and projected level of 
wages and the high level of unemployment, will ensure substantial migration pressures for the 
near future It is therefore generally expected that the propensity to migrate from Morocco 
will remain high for the coming one or two decades at least (Fadloullah et al 2000 xxiii, 
Giubilaro 1997 64) Moreover, the increasing influence of the media and improving 
educational levels will have the likely effect of increasing the socio-cultural incentives (rising 
aspirations, feelings of relative deprivation) to migrate (cf White 1999) In the same vein, it 
can be expected that urbanization and rural-to-urban migration will remain strong (Giubilare 
1997 29), although migration to the largest towns seems to be slowing down and there seems 
to be a certain "decentralizing" shift of migration streams from large cities towards medium-
sized towns 
Communities of Moroccans in Europe are likely to increase in the near future for three 
reasons First, the process of family reunification has started only recently in Spain and Italy 
In the coming decades, this will probably lead to a considerable increase of Moroccan 
communities, as has been the case in northwestern Europe Second, the ongoing process of 
family formation through new marriages by second generation migrants with Moroccan "stay-
behinds" is likely to further increase the ranks of the established migrant communities in 
northwestern Europe Third, unemployment and the general lack of prospects among young 
people will continue to push new migrants abroad, either legally or illegally The existence of 
extensive migrant networks and the long, southern European coastline make these migration 
movements notoriously difficult to control Moreover, as long as a demand for migrant labor 
in particular sectors of the European economy (e g, agriculture, housing construction, 
domestic labor, but also in higher functions in the commercial, IT, medical, or educational 
sectors) remains, people will have a strong economic rationale to take the risks and social, 
economic, and psychological costs of migrating 
Only in the longer term (i e , at least two decades from now) will the current decline in 
fertility rates lead to a considerable decrease in the number of young people entering the labor 
market This may eventually lead to declining international migration, as is predicted by 
transitional models To what extent this will happen, depends on future economic growth and 
political stability, factors which are notoriously difficult to predict However, for the near 
future at least, migration pressures are likely to remain strong In the same vein, remittances, 
even in case of stagnation or future decline, are likely to remain one of the pillars of the 
Moroccan economy in the coming one or two decades Moreover, the increasingly self-
conscious and emancipated migrant communities are likely to remain an crucial factor on 
which Morocco's future social, political, and economic development partly depends 
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4.7. Conclusion 
The present chapter has shown how colonization, the incorporation of Morocco's formerly 
semi-autonomous tribal hinterland into the modem (colonial and Moroccan) state and the 
capitalist economy, urbanization, and the development of infrastructure have allowed the 
evolution of new, intensive, and increasingly complex and reciprocal patterns of internal and 
international migration These radical changes in the political and economic macro-context 
explain how Morocco has become firmly integrated within the Mediterranean-European 
migration system, in which it nowadays occupies a prominent place With about two million 
people of Moroccan descent living in Europe, Moroccans form not only one of largest, but 
also one of the most dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe 
Migrant networks explain why policies aiming to curb migration have had only 
limited or even countervailing effects, and that both internal and international migration has 
continued at high levels over the past decades Increasingly restrictive immigration policies 
have nevertheless had their influence on migration strategies, characterized by an increasing 
reliance on family migration and undocumented migration, as well as a partial shift in the 
geographical orientation of migration, in which Spain and Italy have evolved into the 
pnncipal destination countnes over the 1990s Taking into account demographic and 
economic determinants, and drawing on insights from transitional migration theory, it is 
likely that migration pressures and actual migration from Morocco will remain strong in the 
coming one or two decades 
Over the twentieth century, the Rif, Sous, and southern oases constituted the main 
belts of international out-migration in Morocco Over the past fifteen years, there has, 
however, been a spatial diffusion of Moroccan migration to Europe Many more Moroccan 
regions are now heavily involved in international migration Nowadays, the social, cultural, 
and economic effects of migration are intensely felt in most of Morocco 
Nobody would disagree that migration has fundamentally transformed Moroccan 
society in general and rural areas in particular Migration has become an all-pervasive 
phenomenon, not only fundamentally transforming national, regional, and local economies, 
but also fundamentally affecting the lives, perceptions, and aspirations of both migrants and 
nonmigrants However, there is by no means a consensus as to what extent these changes 
constitute "development", the opposite, or something in between Moreover, acknowledgment 
of the vital role of remittances for the national balance of payments and for national 
economic-political stability in general, offers little insight into the concrete impact of 
migration on development in migrant sending areas 
In the literature, this latter issue has been the subject of widespread controversy, in 
which the pessimistic perspectives have tended to dominate From this viewpoint, remittances 
may help temporarily shore up economies, but do little to alter their fundamental weaknesses 
and promote sustainable development (cf Keely and Tran 1989 524) Whereas some 
researchers have argued that migration has significantly boosted development in migrant 
sending areas, the majority tend to perceive migration as a development-undermining process 
by arguing that it increases dependency on external income and leads to the disintegration of 
regional economies and societies However, the number of recent, theoretically embedded 
empirical studies on the concrete effects of migration on regional development in Morocco 
has remained very limited In the following chapters, we will examine this question in more 
detail through an empmcal study in one of Morocco's many migration regions the Todgha 
valley 

5 
An oasis in a changing world 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a general geographical and historical overview of the Todgha 
valley and to sketch how changes in the macro-political and economic context that occurred 
over the twentieth century have deeply affected this region in southern Morocco. It will first 
draft the ethnic composition of the Todgha valley, thereby showing how spatial settlement 
patterns of the main ethnic groups of the Ait Todoght and Ait 'Atta have been historically 
linked to access to vital water resources, and whereby the upstream-living Ait Todoght have 
monopolized access to river water. Second, the chapter will examine intra-community socio-
ethnic stratification and how this stratification has been linked to the management of the 
irrigation infrastructure. Third, the widely varying ethnic and geographical characteristics of 
the six research villages located throughout the valley will be briefly reviewed. 
Furthermore, the chapter will describe how the integration of this tribal area into the 
colonial and Moroccan state and capitalist economy has led to a radical economic, cultural, 
and social restructuring and reorientation of oasis life. Former economic, social, and political 
systems based on subsistence agriculture, barter between nomads and oasis dwellers, caravan 
trade, and a caste-like hierarchy between ethnic groups living in oases have collapsed. 
Simultaneously, regional integration into the capitalist economy, and the "pacification" of the 
oasis by the modem state, and the concomitant development of social and physical 
infrastructure has boosted population growth, improved wealth, health, education, and access 
to information. 
5.2. Geographical introduction to the Todgha valley' 
The Todgha is an oasis river valley located on the southern slopes of the High Atlas 
Mountains in Morocco. In spite of the arid conditions south of the Atlas climate divide, the 
melt- and rainwater originating from the High Atlas Mountains continuously recharges 
aquifers that, in turn, feed numerous springs and rivers. This explains the existence of a 
concentration of oases south and east of the Atlas in the so-called Presaharan region. Situated 
approximately 170 km east of Ouarzazate and 160 km west of Errachidia, the Todgha is 
located between Morocco's largest oasis regions: the Drâa valley and the Tafilalt. These are 
the two principal catchment basins south of the High Atlas, to which all smaller rivers drain. 
The Todgha is part of the Tafilalt catchment basin. 
' Sections 5 2 and 5 3 heavily draw on information collected by De Haas and El Ghanjou (2000a). 
Map 2. Todgha valley, administrative divisions, and research villages 
Source: Adapted from Büchner (1986) and Naim (1997) 
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For Moroccan standards, the Todgha is a medium-sized river oasis, with a total cultivated 
area of almost forty km in length and varying in width from 100 m near the Gorges du 
Todgha in the upper valley to about 4 km downstream. It is situated at a relatively high 
altitude, between 1,420 m near the sources and 1,100 m in the downstream Ghallil plain. With 
an average annual precipitation of 143 mm in Ait Boujjane (1,340 m), hot dry summers and 
relatively cold winters, the climate is of the cool Saharan type (El Harradji 2000). 
The region in which the Todgha is located comprises three geo-morphological units. 
The mountainous area north of the valley makes up part of the High Atlas, and forms the most 
elevated relief surrounding the Todgha. Located south of the Todgha is the Jebel Saghro, a 
mountain chain which is a continuation of the Anti Atlas. The pre-African fault is the 
depression between these two mountain chains. 
From its sources some twenty kilometers north of the village of Tamtetoucht, the main 
affluent of the Todgha' winds its course steeply through the High Atlas for about forty 
kilometers southwards through a mostly dry river bed, until reaching the steep Gorges du 
Todgha. The canyon reaches here its narrowest point, with rock-faces towering some 300 
meters above the riverbed. At this point is also the main source of the Todgha (Sidi Mhamed 
ou 'Abdellah), whose significant flow is perennial2. At this point, the Todgha starts running 
above ground. The Todgha oasis begins immediately downstream of the gorges, near the 
village of Zaou'ia Sidi 'Abdelali. From here on downstream, while the Todgha follows its 
winding course in a predominantly southeastern direction, the valley becomes gradually 
wider. 
Near Tinghir, the Todgha leaves the High Atlas. At this point, the valley widens after 
which the Todgha continues its course eastward through the plain located in the pre-African 
fault between the mountain chains of the High Atlas and Saghro (see map 2). 
From its sources in the gorges, the ancient oasis of the Todgha stretches out on both 
banks of the nver. Upstream, several dams divert the perennial river water into a complex 
system of irrigation channels that irrigate the permanently cultivated fields. Further 
downstream, the flow of the Todgha gradually decreases, until the stream goes subsurface in 
the lower Todgha. In the lower Todgha3, therefore, traditional khettara4 techniques are 
employed to tap underground water to complement the scarce surface waters. 
Further downstream, east of the ancient oasis, the Ghallil stretches out over an area of 
about ten kilometers on the right bank of the Todgha. This semi-desertic plain, formerly used 
as collective pastureland, has been increasingly colonized for relatively large-scale agriculture 
since the late 1970s. Likewise, numerous smaller agricultural extensions have emerged in 
formerly desert land adjacent to the villages in the lower Todgha. On this newly colonized 
1
 The Todgha has several affluents located north of Tamtetoucht. The main affluent is known as Akka 
n'Taghfist Between Tamtetoucht and the gorges the Todgha is known under the local name Akka 
n'Ighenjaoune 
2
 The average discharge of the Todgha measured at Ait Boujjane (near Tinghir) is 0,7 m3/s Actual levels in the 
upper valley must be higher and is relatively stable throughout the seasons, although inter-annual variations 
depending on precipitation occur. Annual flows are estimated at 11,5 Mm3 at the Ait Boujjane station for a 
surface of 705 km2, to which should be added 9,7 Mm3 which are denved into irrigation channels upstream of 
Ait Boujjane. A flow of 12,4 Mm3 is calculated for Imiter, the downstream tributary of the Todgha near the 
village of Taghia, for a surface of 895 km2 Further downstream, annual flows are estimated at 33,9 Mm3 at 
Ghallil (EI Harradji 2000) 
3
 Throughout this study, a distinction between the lower and upper Todgha will be made. The upper Todgha 
refers to the most elevated and water-rich part of the Todgha northwest of Tinghir. This upstream part is largely 
hemmed in by mountains, and has access to nver water all year round. From here on downstream, water 
becomes increasingly rare (see figure 5 1). The upper Todgha largely coincides with the municipalities of 
Todgha El Oulya and Tinghir, and the lower Todgha those of Todgha Es-Soufla and Taghzout n'Ait Atta. 
4
 The kheltara is an ancient, sophisticated technique consisting of tunnels and shafts enabling the drainage of 
underground water resources for irrigation (see section 8 2 1) 
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agricultural land—and m large parts of the ancient, traditionally water-scarce oasis of the 
lower Todgha—peasants are largely dependent on the use of diesel engines to pump up the 
underground water. 
East of the Tisdafin Mountain (Jebel Asdaf in Arabic), the Ghallil plain comes to an 
end. Conventionally, this landmark is considered as the end of the Todgha valley, although 
geographically it continues its course further eastwards toward the oases of Tinejdad, where 
the Ferkla and Todgha meet to form the Gheris, which, besides the Ziz, is one of the main 
tributaries of the large Tafilalt oasis. 
In 2000, the valley housed approximately 70,000 inhabitants living in 64 villages and 
the booming town of Tinghir. The villages are located on both banks of the Todgha River, 
generally on an elevated spot amidst or directly adjacent to the agricultural fields that belong 
to the village. The typical form of habitat is the ighrem (pi. igherman)5, the traditionally 
fortified oasis village of southern Morocco, characterized by a dense, concentrated adobe 
habitat located within a common, defensive wall. In recent decades, the majority of oasis 
dwellers have left this traditional habitat to settle in new houses in extra-mums extensions, 
which has contributed to the rapid demise of these traditional, fortress-like villages. 
Box 1. Toponomy and founding myths of Todgha and Tinghir 
The inhabitants of the Todgha have their own legends on their origins. The most common 
legend is that of an ancestor called Aâd, who, once upon a time, came to live in the valley. 
Aâd had two children, a girl, Touda, and a boy, Chedad. Before the death of their father, 
Aâd divided the greater valley between his children The upstream part was granted to his 
daughter and the downstream part to his son. These names were corrupted to become part of 
the names Tinejdad ('belongs to Chedad') and Todgha ('belongs to Touda'). 
Others believe that "Todgha" (its official Arabic name) or "Todoght" (its name in 
Tamazight Berber) is related to the term tadrut or tudrt, which means "life" in Tamazight 
Berber. This would refer to the Todgha river, which is literally the source of life for the 
valley's inhabitants. The Todgha valley is also known as "the valley of Tinghir", which is 
the name of the administrative center of the valley. 
The name "Tinghir" is composed of tin, which means "belonging to", and ighir, 
which has the double meaning of shoulder and mountain. This name allegedly refers to the 
strategically located mountain dominating Tinghir and the lower Todgha, on which the 
former qasbah of pasha El Glaoui is located. The old ighrem of Tinghir is located at the foot 
of this mountain. 
5.3. Ethnic strife and spatial segregation 
5.3.1. Oases as ethnic crossroads 
The Todgha has been an ethnic crossroads for many centuries. This applies to oases in 
Morocco and the Maghreb in general, located as they are on the geographical and historical 
crossroads between sub-Saharan and northern Africa. Its perennial sources, its agricultural 
resources, and its location on an ancient trading route have all given a certain economic and 
strategic importance to the Todgha valley. Although the traditional livelihoods of oasis 
dwellers were primarily based on subsistence agriculture, limited seasonal and circular 
migration, barter with nomad tribes, and long-distance trade formed sources of additional 
In Arabic, the name for ighrem is qsar (pi. qsur) 
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income In particular, exchanges with nomads allowed sedentary oasis populations to 
diversify their diet 
The age-old struggle for dominance of the valley and the resulting armed conflicts 
between ethnic groups are reflected in the diverse ethnic composition of the valley Given the 
rarity of water resources in this and environment, population groups have fought for control 
over the source of the Todgha as well as the agricultural land irrigated by this water The 
contemporary settlement pattern of the different ethnic groups should therefore be explained 
in the light of this historical struggle for the control of these vital and scarce resources 
The population of the Todgha is composed of two principal ethnic groups living in 
distinct parts of the valley the Ait Todoght in the upper Todgha and the Ait 'Atta in the lower 
Todgha These two ethnic groups live in neatly segregated zones of the valley Internally, 
however, the Ait Todoght and Ait 'Atta are far from homogenous entities, and are subdivided 
into numerous ethnic and territorial groups Nevertheless, at the valley level, the main 
antagonism has been between these two major groups Although the Ait Todoght and Ait 
'Atta speak largely identical versions of Tamazight Berber, they have distinct ethnic 
identities, which is reflected in a taboo on intermarriage between these groups In the lower 
Todgha especially, tensions between the Ait Todoght and the Ait 'Atta are still intense, and 
regularly result in open hostility and violent conflicts, particularly concerning the control and 
division of land and water resources 
Figure 5 1 depicts how the spatial settlement patterns of ethnic groups coincides with 
the relative claims they have on land and water resources There is a clear association 
between ethnic affiliation and access to agricultural resources Whereas the Ait Todoght live 
in the water-abundant but narrow and land-scarce upper and central parts of the valley, the Ait 
'Atta are concentrated in the open, land-abundant, but traditionally water-scarce, lower 
Todgha 
5.3.2. The Ait Todoght, children of the valley 
The upper and middle parts of the Todgha, the water-rich heart of the valley, are inhabited by 
the Ait Todoght6, literally meaning "children (or people) of the Todgha" From Ighir in the 
upper Todgha until Ait El Meskine some sixteen km further downstream, the Ait Todoght 
control much of the water and the fertile parts of the valley The six most upstream villages of 
the valley located near the gorges are part of the Ait Tizgui Affiliated as they are to ethnic 
groups living in the surrounding High Atlas, they are considered as Ait Todoght neither by 
others nor by themselves7 
The origins of the Ait Todoght are not clear, and almost certainly diverse In spite of 
earlier suggestions that their origins can be traced back to the Maâquil Arab and the Zenata 
Berber tnbes (Spillman 1931 211), it is more likely that the Ait Todoght do not have one 
single origin as such, and are the product of the immigration of diverse ethnic groups over 
many ages, which have all amalgamated into the present Ait Todoght 
Compared to the Ait 'Atta and the other ethnic groups living near to the Todgha, it is 
among the Ait Todoght that the "tribal" dimension is the least strong Rather than forming a 
homogeneous group, the Ait Todoght constitute a patchwork of different population groups 
The Ait Todoght neither share a commonly imagined ancestor, nor have a sense of strong 
tribal unity Their identity is first and foremost determined by the geographical space they 
6
 Ahi Todgha in Arabic 
7
 For practical reasons, however, the Ait Tizgui will be included when speaking of Ait Todoght in the remainder 
of this study 
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share and defend, that is, the Todgha in general and the village in particular. This seems 
reflected in the name of the group, which does not refer to a common ancestor or the like, but 
to a geographical entity8. 
Figure 5.1. Schematic ethnic and resource map of the Todgha valley 
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The Ait Todoght are highly stratified internally, and are made up of several ethnic sub-groups 
who live side by side in distinct territorial units, that is, the igherman. The main dimension of 
internal ethnic stratification is based on complexion. As in most of southern Morocco, a clear 
ethnic distinction exists between the generally light-skinned imazighen (literally, the "free 
ones"), and the generally darker-skinned haratin[0. Although the haratin indeed have a darker 
In Morocco, ethnic groups with a common ancestor and a strong common identity often have names referring 
to a common (imaginary) ancestor. This is the case for the Ait 'Atta, which refers to the myth that all Ait 'Atta 
descend from a historical person called Dadda 'Atta (Hart 1981). In contrast, the name 'Ait Todoght' is 
primarily a reference to a geographical space. As we will see, the territory of the Ait Todoght exactly coincides 
with the land irrigated by the surface waters of the Todgha. 
9
 The term imazighen is also used to indicate North African Berbers in general. 
10
 Haratin is the name under which this ethnic group living in most areas of the southern Maghreb is commonly 
referred to in scientific literature. In order not to create unnecessary confusion, this is also the term that will also 
be used in this study. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that use of this term is taboo (cf. Ensel 1999). 
"Black" southerners themselves do not generally like to be addressed as haratin or "blacks", and generally 
prefer to identify themselves—depending on their mother tongue—as "Berbers" (such as in the Todgha and 
many other Moroccan oases) or Arabs (such as in parts of the Tafilalt and Drâa). In contrast, white inhabitants of 
the Todgha (both Ait Todoght imazighen and AK 'Atta) generally do not consider the haratin as Berbers, as, to 
them, "real Berbemess" is not only linked to language but also to having a white skin, the alleged proof of 
"pure" Berber descent. 
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complexion than imazighen in general, variations in complexion within both groups are high, 
probably reflecting a high degree of ethnic mixing in the past. 
Traditionally, the haratin occupied an inferior position within oasis society and are 
generally looked down on by the imazighen. Both groups generally live side by side within 
the same villages, though spatially segregated in distinct "quarters"" and socially segregated 
in different lineages. There is a general taboo on marriage between white and black lineages. 
Such stratification and segregation between white and black population groups is typical of 
most Moroccan oases. 
In addition to the mixed villages, there are also a number of mono-ethnic villages in 
the Ait Todoght territory, which are uniquely inhabited by either imazighen or haratin. A 
separate sub-group among the Ait Todoght is formed by the two large villages of El Hart 
n'lgurramen (officially known as El Hart Mourabitine) and El Hart Niâamine, which are 
located at Alt Todoght's frontier with Ai't 'Atta territory, and which are uniquely populated by 
haratin. These two villages form a kind of ethnic enclave between the generally mixed 
villages of A'it Todoght of the upper Todgha and the uniquely white Ait 'Atta of the lower 
Todgha. Although the haratin of El Hart are generally considered as being part of the Ait 
Todoght, they form a distinct sub-group, who speak a different Tamazight dialect and who 
generally do not intermarry with other Ait Todoght. 
According to older scientific literature, popular Moroccan knowledge, and local 
traditions among non-Black populations, the haratin are descendants of former slaves 
imported from West Africa through the caravan trade, especially during the reigns of the 
Saadian and Alawite dynasties. This descent is often emphasized by non-haratin as a proof of 
their inferior, humble status. However, in spite of this popular belief, it is more likely that the 
presence of haratin in southern Morocco is very ancient. 
The presence of haratin in the Moroccan oases has been described even before the 
great age of trans-Saharan slave trade, and their presence might actually date back to before 
the arrival of most other population groups in southern Morocco (cf. Ensel 1999; Bellakhdar 
et al. 1993). In this light, the haratin might well be the original Black Berber population of 
southern Morocco12. At a later stage, other ethnic groups—generally tribes with strong (semi-
) nomadic and warrior traditions—gained military control over the oases and often reduced 
the indigenous black population to marginal subsistence farming, sharecropping and, in some 
cases, servitude. 
The ismakhen[i, descendants of slaves that were transported from sub-Saharan Africa 
through the caravan trade, have to be distinguished from the haratin, who—despite their 
generally humble position as small subsistence farmers and sharecroppers—are of free 
descent. Levi-Provencal ( 1927) suggested that, at a later stage, the haratin of El Hart would 
have mixed with escaped slaves from sultan Mulay Ismail's famous black army, although 
there is no convincing evidence for this assertion. It is also known that many haratin of the 
south were enslaved (Ennaji 1999), and that many descendants from slaves might, therefore, 
in fact originate from within Morocco. 
If these hypotheses are correct, it is also likely that the haratin of the Todgha formed 
an ancient population of the Todgha valley, but were marginalized by population groups that 
" In mixed villages, the haratin generally live in a central quarter of the ighrem The dominant imazighen do not 
tolerate their presence near the gates, since this would imply the possibility that the haratin would have to 
defend the ighrem (and thus the imazighen) first in case of an outside attack. Such a situation is perceived as 
dishonorable for the imazighen. 
12
 Like nomadic and other sedentary groups, Moroccan haratin can be either Berber or Arab-speaking. 
Language is a feature of ethnic identity that runs right across the divisions based on complexion and religious 
status. In the Todgha, however, all ethnic groups speak Tamazight Berber 
13
 Singular form ismakh. 'Abid in Arabic (sing 'abd). 
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arrived later. Despite their generally inferior status, the haratin of the Todgha generally do 
not conform to the image of landless slaves or sharecroppers. Most haratin in the Todgha 
possess at least some land and have direct access to the river water resources of the Todgha, 
although generally less so than most Aft Todoght imazighen14. 
Four villages of the A'it Todoght (especially Tinghir, and to a lesser extent Taourirt, 
A'it Ourjdal, and Asfalou) used to have a sizable Jewish population. These communities 
disappeared in the 1950s due to migration to Casablanca, Israel, and France15. Their economic 
role in oases has often been important. Like other ethnic groups, Jews lived in separate 
quarters of the villages, and occupied distinct professional classes, and were, besides 
subsistence farming, especially active as traders, silver-, goldsmiths, and other artisans. 
Religious status is another feature of social and ethnic identity among the A'it Todoght. 
The first group possessing a particular religious status are the igurramen. These are believed 
to descend from a local saint (salih in Arabic, marabut in French), or from families of 
followers close to this salih, which adopted his identity in the course of time. Their (ascribed) 
descent from a holy man endows igurramen with baraka (sacred blessing and miracle-
working ability) and, hence, a religious superiority over ordinary Muslims. Igurramen can be 
imazighen, haratin, or Jewish in origin. This religious status runs right across the 
classification based on complexion. Igurramen can be both black and white. Some villages of 
the Todgha are uniquely inhabited by igurramen^6; sometimes they live as a separate lineage 
in a village of non- igurramen inhabitants. 
Even higher in religious status are the shurfa who claim to be descendants of the 
prophet Muhammad. In the Todgha, shurfa are not numerous, and their social role seems 
relatively limited compared to other regions in Morocco. However, they have played a role as 
fqihs (Coranic teachers), intermedianes in religious affairs and political conflicts as well as 
'aduls (traditional religious notaries). Todgha's shurfa mainly live as separate lineages and in 
distinct quarters in the villages of Ait Zillal, Ait Yaâla, and A'it Mhamed. In contrast to 
igurramen, all shurfa in the Todgha are white. 
5.3.3. The Ait 'Atta of the lower Todgha 
It seems certain that the A'it 'Atta were the last ethnic group to settle in the Todgha valley. In 
his classic study of the Art 'Atta, David Hart (1981:3-16) argued that the origin of this large 
tribal confederation can probably be traced back to the mid-sixteenth century. From their 
heartland in the Saghro Mountains, this semi-nomadic tribe began its conquest of the 
surrounding plains and oases from the seventeenth century onwards. Thanks to their sound 
internal political and military organization the Art 'Atta succeeded in dominating large areas 
of southeastern Morocco, either by direct conquest or by exacting "protection agreements" 
{ra 'aya) from sedentary {haratin or imazighen) oasis dwellers, a process by which they often 
acquired land and settled down in the oases. 
H
 As Moseley (1995) argued, attempts to represent south-Moroccan haratin as property-less ex-slaves are 
denied by the significant intercommunity variations in access to land, water, market opportunities, internal 
stratification, and political power. 
15
 The presence of Jews in southern Morocco dates back more than 2,000 years The Jews of southern Morocco 
are part of the so-called plishtim group They form the most ancient Jewish population group of Morocco, and 
they are believed to have immigrated from Palestine from the sixth century BC onwards (cf Zafrani 1998) 
16
 Zaou'ia Sidi 'Abdelah near the gorges in Tizgui and El Hart n'lgurramen (also known as El Hart Murabitin) in 
the lower Todgha are the most important igurramen villages of the Todgha. The tombs of their ialihs are still the 
center of a yearly agdud 
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Traditionally, the A'it 'Atta—who believe themselves to be descendants of the 40 
grandsons of a historical-mythical person Dadda 'Atta (Hart 1981)—pursued semi-nomadic 
livelihoods combining sedentary settlement and agriculture in oases with transhumant 
livestock keeping, in which men moved with their herds between summer and winter 
pastures17. This is in contrast with the Art Todoght, whose livelihoods are sedentary. 
Internally, the Art 'Atta are divided up into five main socio-political units (khums), 
which, in turn, are further subdivided into numerous clans, subclans, lineages, and 
sublineages (ighsan). Ait 'Atta socio-political organization is segmentary. Although conflicts 
and warfare occurred between contesting lineages, they tended to unite in face of a common 
enemy. It appears that the Art 'Atta settled in the Todgha at a relatively late stage. When the 
first Art 'Atta settled in the Todgha is not completely sure, but based on Hart's description, 
they probably did not settle in the Todgha before 1750-1800. Corresponding with Hart's 
(1981:214-5) general description of Art 'Atta's expansion, oral traditions from both Art 'Atta 
and El Hart report that the settlement of Aft 'Atta at the downstream fringe of the oasis was 
enabled by the conclusion of protection agreements with the villages of El Hart. 
In exchange for protection from attack from hostile ethnic groups (such as the Art 
Morghad, but mainly against other lineages of the Art 'Atta itself18), the haratin of El Hart 
allowed some Art 'Atta lineages to settle at the fringe of the ancient oasis. This enabled them 
to settle in a ring or a crescent-like collection of villages at the water-scarce, land-abundant 
downstream fringe of the ancient, river-irrigated Todgha oasis, more or less encircling and 
"protecting" the villages of El Hart in a spatial pattern resembling a crescent (see figure 5.1). 
By extorting ra'aya from the sedentary Art Todoght, the mighty Ait 'Atta of the 
Saghro have gained some influence in the Todgha over the past two to three centuries as they 
have done in many other oases in southern Morocco. However, in spite of their purported 
ethnic superiority and their reported military strength in southern Morocco over the past 
centuries, Art 'Atta power has remained relatively limited in the Todgha. This is illustrated by 
the fact that the Art 'Atta have never gained access to the surface waters of the Todgha river, 
which has remained a strict Art Todoght prerogative. 
The Art 'Atta only succeeded in settling along the fringes of the traditional oasis. 
Although it is possible that they acquired some Art Todoght territory through protection 
agreements, they were systematically excluded from access to river water. In the lower 
Todgha valley, where the Art 'Atta settled, the river bed of the Todgha is normally dry, and 
the Art 'Atta were not allowed to tap the water from dams located upstream, as the Art 
Todoght villages in the lower Todgha (El Hart, Amzaourou) do. The fact that the Art 'Atta 
only succeeded in settling in the ecologically marginal, water scarce, sections of the valley, 
far from the green heart of the valley dominated by Art Todoght, seems to highlight their 
relatively weak position. 
Hence, the Art 'Atta were obliged to dig laborious khettara systems to tap 
underground water resources in order to irrigate their fields. This was a dangerous work of 
specialists, which they normally let other people do. As the sources of most khettaras are on 
Art Todoght territory, the Art 'Atta themselves were dependent on maintaining good relations 
with their neighbors. 
In contrast to the internally diversified Art Todoght, the Art 'Atta villages are mono-
ethnic white imazighen, with each villages belonging to one particular Art 'Atta sub-lineage, 
the only exception being the presence of some ismakh families. The Art 'Atta tend to consider 
themselves as superior to the Ait Todoght in general and the haratin in particular. Art 'Atta 
generally claim to be "pure whites"—in contrast to the "mingled" Aft Todoght—which they 
17
 In French geography, such livelihoods are known as transhumance. 
" The dominant contesting Ait 'Atta lineages in the lower Todgha are the Aft Isfoul and AU Aïssa Ou Brahim. 
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see as proof of their "pure" Berber descent. The A'it 'Atta also tend to be proud of their 
warrior ethos and tend to consider the sedentary Ait Todoght as a dishonorable people 
"without history"1 . 
In their tum, the A'it Todoght tend to look down on the Ait 'Atta, who they often 
portray as primitive nomads, lacking the "civilization" of the sedentary imazighen. As we will 
see in subsequent chapters, the A'it 'Atta have long dinged to their traditional, largely self-
sufficient pastoral-rural livelihoods and their "glorious past". In comparison, the Art Todoght 
were less isolated both in geographical and in political terms. They were more confronted 
with the outside world and were more prone and able to modify their traditional livelihoods 
by participating in labor migration from the early twentieth century onwards. Their earlier 
incorporation into wider economic and migratory networks explains how they have become 
generally wealthier and more "modernized" than most Art 'Atta, which seems to increase 
their sense of superionty. 
Hart (1981) stated that the general relationship between the Art 'Atta and their haratin 
clients was that, in exchange for their protection, the haratin worked for the A'it 'Atta as 
agricultural workers, well diggers, and sharecroppers. However, according to oral sources 
from both Art 'Atta and haratin, such a relationship has not existed in the Todgha valley. For 
digging their khettaras, for example, the Art 'Atta of the lower Todgha employed—and still 
employ—people from other regions, such as the Drâa (cf. Otte 2000). This further 
corroborates the argument that the south-Moroccan haratin did not universally form a 
property-less class of serfs and slaves, and that—although they occupied a low status in 
general—their relative status in fact varied from oasis to oasis. 
Relations between the Art Todoght and the Ait 'Atta continue to be tense. Relations 
between the Art 'Atta and the haratin of the El Hart villages in particular are openly hostile. 
On this ethnic frontier, mutual resentment is extremely pronounced. Conflicts over land and 
water in particular regularly result in violent clashes (cf. Ait Hamza 2002), suggesting that 
former protection arrangements were neither uncontested nor completely voluntary. As recent 
as 1998, a violent conflict occurred between Tadafelt and the neighboring village of El Hart 
Niâamine (Otte 2000:73). According to inhabitants of El Hart, land was only given to the Art 
'Atta for the duration of the protection. The Art 'Atta, in their turn, do not even consider the 
thought of rendering land to people who they tend to consider as their (former) clients. Even 
nowadays, there is a strict taboo among the Art 'Atta on selling any land to haratin, which is 
considered as a highly dishonorable act. 
5.3.4. Traditional socio-political organization 
Before colonial times, the basic unit of socio-political organization within each ighrem was 
the so-called ighs (pi. ighsari), or the ethnic lineage consisting of a group of extended families 
all sharing one common ancestor. Depending on their population size, most villages comprise 
two to eight ighsan. Each ighs is composed of several extended family groups. Although 
membership of lineages is based on patrilinear descent, Hart (1981) has demonstrated that, 
through a traditional admission procedure, immigrant outsiders could become member of an 
ighs and, hence, the village community. 
The villages in the Todgha are politically independent of each other. The geographical 
"extension" of an ighs is mostly restricted to one village, and rarely composes several 
It is known among the AU 'Atta that a famous Amencan anthropologist, David Hart, wrote a book on them 
(Hart 1981). They tend to see this as proof that they—as opposed to the Ait Todoght—are a "real" people with a 
glorious history. 
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villages. There is no strong inter-village solidarity between ethnic groups sharing the same 
complexion. For example, haratin of different villages do not organize themselves at the 
valley level against imazighen in general. Regardless of their specific ethnic background, 
people primarily identify themselves strongly with the village they inhabit. Especially among 
the Ait Todoght, the notion of identity is strongly territorialized. The village is, thus, after the 
ighs, the second and most important level of socio-political organization. 
Both among the Ait 'Atta and the Ait Todoght, all ighsan within a village jointly make 
up the taqbilt (jema 'a in Arabic) or the traditional village council. More precisely, this is the 
council of village notables, and is normally composed of representatives (ayians) from each 
ighs. Traditional institutions like the taqbilt have sometimes been idealized as strongly 
egalitarian and even as a form of proto-democracy. However, it is important to stress that the 
taqbilt was by no means "democratic", since power was strongly linked to land possession 
and, thus, strongly hereditary. In general, only land- and water-possessing men could become 
ayian in the taqbilt, which was clearly dominated by a limited number of wealthy ighsan. 
These groups with vested interests determined the rules of, for example, new land and water 
divisions, in which the wealthy groups were clearly at an advantage (cf. Otte 2000). The 
traditional oasis system was based on a caste-like ethnic hierarchy in which sharecroppers and 
the landless—often hartani and istnakh—provided the physical labor to maintain the 
irrigation infrastructure and till the fields. Only large land and water-owners could gain the 
political influence to become amghar. 
Each year, the aiyans of a village's taqbilt elect a chief (amghar), who is usually 
responsible for (1) settling conflicts between families and lineages over land, water, and other 
issues; (2) ensuring the maintenance of the irrigation system; (3) collecting contributions for 
collective activities in honor of the village's saint; (4) implementing sanctions and fines; (5) 
allocating so-called habus land (see chapter 8) to villagers willing to cultivate this "religious" 
land; (6) organizing the next amghar election; and (7) representing the village's interests vis-
à-vis other villages (see Otte 2000). In some villages, in addition to a supreme amghar, the 
taqbilt elects each year a special land and water chief (amghar n-tamazirt), who is 
specifically responsible for all agricultural affairs. 
The Aft 'Atta of the lower Todgha lacked an institution encompassing all villages in 
the Todgha, as the villages belong to different sub-lineages within the Ait 'Atta. Although the 
Ait 'Atta did have well-organized political-legal institutions for the tribe as a whole, political 
organization at lower levels went along segmentary rather than territorial lines. Thus, the Ait 
'Atta villages of the lower Todgha only have their "Attaness" in common, and do not feel 
strong bonds with the Ait 'Atta from other Todgha villages if they are not from the same 
lineage. As a consequence, an 'Attawi has closer social and political links with another 
'Attawi from the same lineage living in the Saghro Mountains or the Drâa valley than with an 
'Attawi from another lineage who lives in the village next to him. 
The heterogeneous Ait Todoght equally lacked a strong central organization, although 
their sense of identity is far more territorialized and strongly linked to the Todgha as a 
geographical unit than among the Ait 'Atta. In the absence of central power at the valley 
level, conflicts between villages over, for instance, the control of water and land resources 
were frequent, and occasionally resulted in armed conflicts between villages or groups of 
villages (cf. De Foucauld 1885:222). Despite their internal diversity, the Aft Todoght, as will 
be demonstrated in chapter 8, needed to coordinate irrigation at the valley level, as they use 
water from the same source. Moreover, they had a shared interest in defending their villages, 
fields, and irrigation works against foreign intruders in order to secure their monopoly on the 
abundant and perennial surface waters of the Todgha. 
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Box 2. Collective and bonded labor in traditional oasis society 
The village institution of the taqbilt fulfills a crucial function in traditional oasis agriculture 
in its function as a land and water board as well as a tribunal Tmza is the norm through 
which the taqbilt organized the collective maintenance of the main (collective) irrigation 
channels Moreover, it organized the collective maintenance of the vital irrigation system, 
for which each household was obliged to provide a worker Timiwult is the law of the 
amghar, according to which people who do not participate in collective works are fined 
Nowadays, a fine normally consists of a salary for one worker or the obligation to provide a 
meal for a group of workers 
Before, the date harvest was also collectively controlled The taqbilt decided on 
harvest times and this was done collectively For individual farmers, it was not allowed to 
harvest their dates individually, under threat of punishment Over the past decades the 
support for this system has decreased, and has been abolished in most igherman of the 
Todgha Nowadays, only the necessary maintenance of dams, irrigation channels, and 
khettaras is collectively organized The decline of these collective arrangements are partly 
explained by increasing "individualization" (of households vis-a-vis the village community) 
and the coincident installation of individual water pumps 
Slaverly was a general phenomenon in traditional oasis society that only 
disappeared in the second half of the 20"' century Gulfawas a feudal system of forced labor 
for rulers such as qiad and pashas, which existed well into the 20Ih century Notorious in this 
respect is the forced labor many Todghawis had to do for Pasha Thami Glaoui of Marrakech 
and his family clan, who collaborated with the French and who dominated much of southern 
Morocco during the protectorate On the mountain top near Tinghir (where the current hotel 
Saghro is located) the Glaouis constructed a qasba, which is now ruined Todghawis were 
forced to contribute to the construction of the qasba and to work as servants The elderly 
remember this forced labor as extremely harsh 
Confronted with a common enemy, the different villages of the Ait Todoght united in defense 
of their territory and the sources of the Todgha, protected by the fortress-like habitation of the 
villages supported by a chain of watch-towers (Beaurpere 1931 217, Büchner 1986) In this 
way, the Ait Todoght have been successful in defending the valley's important land and water 
resources against the makhzen and invading tribes, in particular the Ait 'Atta All in all, the 
Ait Todoght have remained relatively independent of "protection" and the exaction of tribute 
by conquenng tribes Reviewing the ethnic map of Morocco, the Todgha indeed appears as a 
rectangular ethnic enclave among the large tnbal confederations of southern Morocco 
5.4. Population characteristics of the research villages 
As we explained in chapter 3, the villages have been selected in such a way that they cover 
the migratory, agricultural-environmental, and socio-ethnic variability in the valley (see table 
5 1) The first research village, Zaouia Sidi 'Abdelah (hereafter Zaouia), is the second-to-last 
upstream village in the Todgha, just downstream of the Gorges du Todgha, in the section 
where the narrow valley is hemmed in by steep mountains Counting approximately 124 
households and 870 inhabitants, Zaouia is a relatively large village Strictly speaking, the 
inhabitants of Zaouia are no Ait Todoght, but belong to the Ait Tizgui, an ethnic group 
affiliated with tribes inhabiting the High Atlas Mountains north of Zaouia Most inhabitants 
of Zaouia are white igurramen The igurramen of Zaouia are believed to descend from a sahh 
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called Sidi 'Abdelali, whose tomb is located in the village. According to local tradition, the 
three ighsan of the village represent the descendants of the three sons of the salih. On the 
mulud, the birthday of the prophet Muhammad, an agdud (pilgrimage) is held in the village. 
Table 5.1. General characteristics of the research villages and the Ghallil plain 
Village 
Zaou'ia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El 
Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ait 
Isfoul 
Ghallil Plain 
Ethnicity 
Ait Tizgui (white igurramen, some 
haratin families) 
Ait Todoght (haratin and imazighen 
lineages) 
Ait Todoght (imazighen, recent 
immigration haratin families) 
Ait Todoght (imazighen lineages only) 
Ait 'Atta (imazighen lineages only) 
Ait 'Atta (imazighen lineages only) 
Ait 'Atta (imazighen). El Hart 
n'Igurramen (haratin) and outsiders 
Municipality 
Todgha El 
Oulya 
Tinghir 
Todgha Es-
Soufla 
Todgha Es-
Soufla 
Taghzout 
Taghzout 
Taghzout 
Popu-
lation 
871 
766 
538 
546 
869 
208 
NA 
House-
holds 
124 
105 
71 
62 
117 
28 
270 
Av. hh 
size 
7.02 
7 30 
7.58 
8.81 
7 43 
7.43 
NA 
Source: Household survey 
Although Zaou'ia is predominantly imazighen, some haratin families inhabit the villages. As 
their number is too small to form a separate ighs, they have been incorporated into the 
imazighen lineages. Nevertheless, they are not considered igurramen, and they do not marry 
with white members of the ighs to which they formally belong. The igurramen from Zaou'ia 
have close historical-religious links with villages in the Saghro and Atlas Mountains, such as 
Tamtetoucht, Alnif, Aft Yahia n'Kerdous, and Taghzout n'Ait Yaâza. Due to their "holy" 
status, the inhabitants of Zaoui'a received agricultural land as religious donations. Out of 
respect for the baraka of the salih Sidi 'Abdelali, this land was donated to his alleged 
descendants. This explains why many households in Zaou'ia possess land in those villages. 
The second research village, Tikoutar, is an Ait Todoght village located near Tinghir. 
With approximately 105 households and 770 inhabitants, Tikoutar is a medium-sized village. 
The population of Tikoutar consists of imazighen and haratin, and is divided into eight mono-
ethnic ighsan. The ethnic cleavage within the village is a continuous source of conflict, and 
the ethnic dimension dominates local politics. Despite these internal problems, the villagers 
perceive themselves as a single unit in case of conflict with neighboring villages. In Zaou'ia 
and Tikoutar, river water is abundant and available all year round enabling lush agriculture 
all-year round, although land is scarce and extremely fragmented. 
The third research village, Ait El Meskine, also an A'it Todoght village, is located in 
the central part of the lower Todgha, on the boundary separating the two haratin villages of 
El Hart and also close to A'it 'Atta territory. With approximately 71 households and 540 
inhabitants, A'it El Meskine is a relatively small village. All four ighsan of the village are 
imazighen. Recently, some haratin of the neighboring El Hart villages joined the ranks of the 
inhabitants of A'it El Meskine to work as sharecropper (akhemmes), agricultural or 
construction workers, which they sometimes combine with guarding the houses of migrant 
families that have left the village. Located downstream, A'it El Meskine historically has 
limited access to river water only in the winter half year. Nowadays, agriculture in this 
relatively wealthy village is therefore exclusively based on motor pumping, in which peasants 
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have invested massively Most plots lay fallow in summer Plot sizes are bigger than in the 
upper valley, and allow for limited mechanization 
The fourth research village, Ikhba, is located next to Ait El Meskine, and counts three 
ighsan, who are imazighen according to the villagers, although there is strong haratin 
influence too Just like in Ait El Meskine, several haratin from El Hart have settled in Ikhba 
Compared to Ait El Meskine, Ikhba is more difficult to access by road, and seems more 
onented towards Tinghir than Ait El Meskine, which is primarily oriented towards Taghzout 
as its commercial center With an approximate number of 62 households and 550 inhabitants, 
Ikhba is somewhat smaller than Ait El Meskine Compared with the adjacent village of Ait El 
Meskine, Ikhba is poorer in socio-economic terms Its agncultural situation is rather 
comparable to that of Ait El Meskine, although peasants have invested less in motor pumping 
Both Ait El Meskine and Ikhba are part of a group of downstream Ait Todoght villages 
named Amzaourou Although formally imazighen, upstream Ait Todoght tend to consider 
them of mixed descent due to alleged haratin influence from neighboring El Hart villages 
This seems true for Ikhba in particular 
The two other research villages are located on Ait 'Atta territory The fifth research 
village, Tadafelt, is located within an isolated spot on the nght bank of the Todgha, along a 
mostly dry tributary of the Todgha—the Asif n'Tadafelt The population of Tadafelt is split 
up into five ighsan, which are all Ait 'Atta Tadafelt is also among the most marginal and 
poorest oases in the Todgha With 117 households and approximately 870 people, it is a 
relatively large village and comparable in size to Zaouia As with all Ait 'Atta villages, 
Tadafelt has no access to river water, and agnculture is largely based on khettara irrigation, 
although some peasants have installed motor pumps in ancient oasis and recently colonized 
land outside the ancient oasis Plots are relatively small and fragmented and do not allow for 
mechanization 
The sixth research village, Ghallil η 'Ait Isfoul, is located north of the paved road at the 
downstream end of the Todgha The small village contains approximately 8 households and 
210 people, living in five different ighsan Formerly based on khettara and flood irrigation, 
the traditional irrigation infrastructure is now heavily degraded The village is in an acute 
water cnsis, and agnculture is only possible by pumping Both Tadafelt and Ghallil 'Ait Isfoul 
are almost uniquely imazighen 
As a new agncultural colonization zone, settlement patterns on the Ghallil plain are 
entirely different from the traditional oasis Igherman or other forms of concentrated village 
settlements are lacking here, as settlers live scattered over the plain next to their agncultural 
plots In 2000, about 270 households were living on the plain Their origins are highly 
diverse About one third of all settlers originate from El Hart n'Igurramen, 5 percent are Ait 
'Atta from Ait Aissa Ou Brahim, and another 5 percent came from other Ait Todoght villages 
About one half are Ait 'Atta from the Saghro mountains, and 7 percent originate from other 
places outside the Todgha (cf De Haas and El Ghanjou 2000b) 
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5.5. An oasis valley in a changing political-economic context 
5.5.1. Pre-colonial history 
Moroccan oases have historically been important junctions and halting-places in an extensive 
network of trading routes, which linked oases with one another and with more distant areas 
located in and outside present-day Morocco It was, in particular, through the trans-Saharan 
caravan trade—in which salt, gold, and slaves were most important—that intensive contacts 
between southern Morocco and the Sahel zone were fostered The caravan trade linked all the 
important population centers in North and West Africa These age-old contacts have partly 
contributed to the highly diverse population of southern Morocco today 
Until French colonization, the Todgha valley belonged to the so-called bled es-siba 
(see chapter 4 5 2), the part of Morocco's hinterland that was largely controlled by tribes and 
where the state had only marginal political influence (Beaurpere 1931, Büchner 1986, Raclot 
1936) Apart from some short penods in history the Todgha has remained largely 
independent from sultanic state power From their capitals in the west and north of the Atlas 
Mountains, the sultans had difficulties controlling most of the interior of the country 
Although the Todgha remained largely beyond the control of central state power, it was the 
subject of a number of harkas (military campaigns) by the sultans, usually in an effort to gain 
control over trading routes and collect tribute Nevertheless, these harkas never had a lasting 
influence As in the remainder of southern Morocco, nomad or semi-nomadic tribal 
confederations tried to control the oases by extorting ra 'aya (protection) agreements from the 
sedentary populations However, as we have seen, even the rapidly expanding and powerful 
Ait 'Atta did not succeed in gaining total control of the Todgha 
Historical sources indicate that the ighrem of Tmghir, which is centrally located in the 
Todgha valley, used to be one of the more important trade centers of the central Moroccan 
Presahara, at least until the end of the nineteenth century (De Foucauld 1885 224, Beaurpere 
1931, Hams 1895 313 cited in Büchner 1986 129) Tmghir was located along the trading 
route that ran through the pre-Afhcan fault between the High Atlas and the Saghro mountains, 
and which linked the Tafilalt—one of Morocco's most important oasis areas and the region of 
ongm of the current 'Alawite dynasty—with the imperial city of Marrakech, which was much 
frequented by caravans Immediately west of Tmghir, this route crossed the Todgha River at 
the same location as the bridge where the paved road currently crosses the valley 
The independence of the Ait Todoght—who neither belonged to, nor were allied to, 
any of the large contesting tribal confederations (e g , Ait 'Atta, Ait Sedrat, Ait Yafelmane, 
Ait Morghad) dominating the Presahara—boosted trade and made Tmghir the commercial 
center of not only the Todgha, but also of parts of the Saghro and High Atlas mountains 
surrounding the valley The suq (market) of Tmghir had the status of ethnically neutral 
temtory, and local market law forbade people to fight or take up arms (cf Ubach and Rackow 
1923 128-134 cited in Büchner 1986 132) This all contributed to the attraction of Tmghir as 
a market place 
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Box 3. Marabutic founding myths 
Marabutism is a central characteristic of Maghrebi and West-African popular Islam. The tombs 
of marabuts or salihs, which are located all over the Todgha valley, used to be venerated by the 
village's populations. Nevertheless, this practice is declining now under the influence of 
orthodox and modernist Islam. Besides the village salihs, some salihs have a regional 
importance, and are the subject of an annual agdud, which attract thousands or tens of 
thousands of pilgrims. Many igherman have founding myths in which the village's sahh plays 
a central role as either the alleged founder of the ighrem or as a person who endowed the 
ighrem with his baraka (divine benediction). The founding myth of Ait El Meskine illustrates 
the latter case. It also shows how crucial water is in the lives of oasis dwellers. 
When Sidi Mohammed El Meskine arrived in Ait El Meskine the ighrem existed 
already. Although he did not found the ighrem, it now bears his name. Before coming 
to Ait El Meskine he lived Ait Aritane, another village in the valley One of his 
daughters was so beautiful that the young villagers climbed to the top of the mountain 
near the village in order to watch his daughter in the courtyard of his house. Therefore, 
he decided to go to a place where there were no mountains nearby, so that his daughter 
would not be annoyed. He chose Ait El Meskine because of its location in the middle of 
the plain. 
Sidi Mohammed El Meskine was a shepherd until the end of his life. He had a 
great knowledge of Islam and encouraged villagers to practice the religion. Moreover, 
as several events attest, he possessed baraka. For example, shepherds usually feared the 
wolves, as they preyed on their flocks. Yet Sidi Mohammed El Meskine did his prayers 
without guarding his flock and, in fact, the wolves actually came to guard his flock 
while he was praying! This was the first sign of his baraka. 
One day, he took a stick and hit the dry soil. Instantly, water welled up from 
the ground, and continued to flow—villagers are still able to indicate the exact place of 
this event The creation of this well was the second sign of his baraka. However, this 
abundant source of water in this desert valley aroused the jealousy of inhabitants of the 
large neighboring igherman of El Hart n'lgurramen and Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim, who 
took up arms to conquer the well. In order to repel this danger, Sidi Mohammed El 
Meskine stroked the top of the well with the flat of his hand. The water immediately 
stopped, but it continued to flow under the ground, as it has continued to do so ever 
since. This was the third sign of the exceptional baraka of Sidi Mohammed El Meskine 
Thanks to the benediction of God and the intervention of Sidi Mohammed El Meskine, people 
believe, Ait El Meskine has shallow and abundant groundwater. Previously, this water was 
extracted through the use of the aghrur. These days, people use water pumps. Even during the 
great drought of the 1980s, when large parts of the Todgha suffered from a lack of water, water 
was abundant in Ait El Meskine. In many Todgha villages, the tradition of the agdud has 
largely disappeared. However, in Ait El Meskine this tradition is still alive. Villagers say that 
the respect for this tradition is the very reason why in Ait El Meskine there is still abundant 
groundwater, while other igherman suffer from falling water tables and the "death" of wells and 
khet taras. 
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5.5.2. Incorporation into the colonial state and administrative reforms 
The signing of the Fes treaty in 1912 marked the formal beginning of the French and Spanish 
occupation of Morocco. Whereas Spain gained control over the northern Rif area, France 
gained control over most of the rest of the territory including the southern oases. However, it 
took two decades of bloody war to defeat the numerous inland tribes, who did not intend to 
respect the treaty signed by the sultan, thus rebelling against central power. Resistance was at 
its fiercest in the northern Rif mountains and southern oasis and desert areas, and it was only 
in the 1930s that the colonial powers gained effective control over these zones. 
In January 1931, the French conquered Agdz in the upper Drâa valley after many 
years of military stalemate. This was an important advance, as in this way they made an 
important breach in the "Atlas front". In the same year, the colonial army advanced from 
Ouarzazate and Ksar-es-Souk (present-day Errachidia) in the direction of Todgha, and 
occupied the valley on the 18lh and 19th November 1931, without meeting any significant 
resistance (Büchner 1986). In January 1932, the French army conquered Zagora in the Drâa 
valley. However, the A'ft 'Atta were the last Moroccan tribe to resist the French. Some Ait 
'Atta of the lower Todgha left their villages after French occupation of the valley, and moved 
to the Saghro Mountains to join other Ait 'Atta in their struggle. In the Bougafer war of 1933, 
the Ait 'Atta were eventually defeated in their native Saghro mountains. 
Following the conquest of the Todgha and the surrounding areas, the French rapidly 
established a modem administrative structure by creating a Bureau des Affaires indigènes, 
which fell under the authority of a French officer. The colonial authority created the Annexe 
de Tinghir, an administrative unit comprising the Ait Todoght and Ait 'Atta, and largely 
comprising the Todgha. An unpaved road was constructed which crossed the Presahara in a 
southwestern-northeastern direction (the current paved road P32), linking Tinghir to 
Ouarzazate and Errachidia, with further connections to Marrakech and Meknes. The location 
of the road more or less coincided with the course of the old caravan trading route between 
the Tafilalt and Marrakech. Equally, a road was constructed running through the upper 
Todgha between Tinghir and the Gorges du Todgha near Zaouia. 
Shortly after French conquest, the colonial authority established services such as a 
post office, a tribunal, a primary school, and a health clinic in Tinghir. The choice of Tinghir 
as an administrative center had important implications, as it strengthened its position as the 
center of the valley and further boosted its growth (Büchner 1986). It also clearly put at an 
advantage villages located close to Tinghir or along the newly constructed roads, which then 
had better access to work, public amenities, and schooling located in Tinghir. Elements of the 
ancient Ait Todoght elite of Tinghir became associated with the colonial authority. Hence, the 
Ait Todoght profited most from the new economic opportunities offered by the colonial 
presence, the incorporation of the Todgha into the capitalist economy, and migration. The Ait 
'Atta not only had an anti-colonial and rebellious reputation, but most of their villages were 
also relatively isolated compared to the Ait Todoght. 
The colonial authority tried to reinforce the traditional commercial position of Tinghir, 
which had been suffering from the colonial conquest. Probably in the late 1930s, a new 
market place was created (the current "old suq"). The ancient elite as well as many of 
Tinghir's Jews exploited the commercial opportunities of Tinghir's favorable location and its 
new position as an administrative center. They capitalized on new developments, and 
established new businesses outside the old ighrem in a newly established quarter (Büchner 
1986:134). 
Colonial rule meant a definite end to the political autonomy of the valley and its 
incorporation into a central state. With this "pacification", the siba period came to an end. 
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Central state institutions and representatives began to hold effective power and enforce formal 
state law This had fundamental implications for traditional socio-political organization (see 
also chapter 10) After independence in 1956, the administrative structures established by the 
French remained largely intact The area was firmly incorporated into the structure of the 
central Moroccan state under the crown of the 'Alawite king—who inherited the 
administrative and military infrastructure established by the French, and who now had all the 
tribes of the interior under firm and permanent control for the first time in history 
Nevertheless, and partly under influence of sustained population growth, the territory 
of the Todgha underwent two administrative reforms after independence Following an 
administrative reform in 1958, the territory of the Todgha municipality was administratively 
split up into two so-called communes rurales ("rural municipalities")—one for the Ait 
Todoght and one for the Ait 'Atta—which were governed by a state-appointed qaid 
(administrator) governing a so-called qaidat Administratively, each municipality was 
subdivided into so-called fractions (administrative sub-districts) These administrative 
subdivisions were established by the French and were—except for some minor changes— 
largely maintained in the post-colonial era A fraction generally comprises a group of 
villages Each fraction is headed by a shikh The shikh in turn supervises several mqaddemin, 
who are appointed chiefs responsible for one to three villages 
Although a fraction is an administrative unit in the first place, the geographical 
delimitation of fractions generally followed existing ethnic boundaries In order to prevent 
unnecessary conflicts, & fraction never comprises two distinct ethnic groups According to 
this principle, the Ait Tizgui villages—including Zaouia—in the most upstream part of the 
valley have their own administrative fraction Going further downstream, the following Ait 
Todoght fractions have been defined Ait Snane, Ait Igourtane, Tinghir, Tagoumast, Afanour, 
Amzaourou, and El Hart In the same vein, the Ait 'Atta territory was subdivided into the 
fractions of Taghzout, Ait Aissa Ou Brahim, and Achdad 
In 1992, the administrative situation changed for the second time since independence 
In that year, Tinghir received the status of municipalité ("urban municipality"), which was a 
recognition of its rapid development into a town over the post-independence period The rest 
of the Todgha was split into three communes rurales Map 2 displays current administrative 
divisions In the upper Todgha, the commune rurale of Todgha El Oulya (literally meaning 
"upper Todgha") compnses the fractions of Ait Tizgui and Ait Snane The research village of 
Zaouia is part of this administrative unit The newly created municipalité of Tinghir not only 
compnses the actual urban center, but also the surrounding fractions of Igourtane, Afanour, 
and Tagoumast Villages located in these fractions, such as Tikoutar, are increasingly 
integrated into the urban economy of Tinghir The expanding town is beginning to absorb 
villages that previously lay beyond its outskirts 
Downstream of Tinghir, the commune rurale of Todgha Es-Soufla (literally meaning 
lower Todgha) was created, compnsing the villages of the El Hart, Ait M'hamed, and the 
Amzaourou fractions Both Ait El Meskine and Ikhba fall under Todgha Es-Soufla The 
already existing commune rurale of Taghzout n'Ait 'Atta, which governs all Ait 'Atta 
villages, was extended with the villages of Achdad, Tadafelt, and Taghia, which were 
formerly part of non-Todgha administrative units Both Tadafelt and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul are 
part of Taghzout n'Ait 'Atta The Ghallil plain falls under the joint authority of the shiukh of 
Todgha Es-Soufla and Taghzout n'Ait 'Atta, as both Ait Todoght and Ait 'Atta have recently 
settled in this agncultural frontier zone 
The three communes rurales remain under the authonty of one single qaid, and the 
municipalité of Tinghir is governed by a state-appointed pasha The colonial sub-division in 
fractions was largely maintained The offices of the qaid and pasha are located in the qaidat 
in Tinghir, which is the former Bureau des Affaires Indigenes, a large compound where the 
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forces auxiliaires are equally quartered. Each municipality has an elected council (the modem 
jema 'a) and a president (rais), although these councils have only limited power compared to 
the qaid and pasha. The latter are—on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior—responsible for 
the "security" of the Todgha and their inhabitants. 
The traditional village councils were left intact as such, but lost most of their 
jurisdiction through the imposition of the state's administrative and legal structures. The 
taqbilt and amghar are allowed to regulate internal village and agricultural affairs as long as 
this does not provoke conflict, political unrest, or affect more general interests. As a local 
civil servant stated: 
As long as the relations between the villagers in the valley are good and the village can solve 
their problems internally, there is no need for the government to interfere in their affairs. Then, 
there is peace in the valley. Only if the relations between villagers are bad and the villages 
cannot solve their problems, the government will interfere and take over the duties and 
responsibilities of the amghar and aiyans (Otte 2000:110) 
The taqbilt is "tolerated" as long as it works well and conflicts do not escalate out of control. 
Nevertheless, it now lacks any formal status and its status among villagers is declining. The 
moqaddem now represents state power in the village, and has become mightier than the 
traditional amghar, who lacks any formal power basis. The presence of the moqaddem—the 
"eyes and ears" of the qaid and pasha—is the very symbol of the loss of local political 
autonomy. The qaid, pasha, and modem municipal council decide on all important affairs. In 
case of conflict, people can now take matters to court if they do not agree with the decisions 
made by the taqbilt or amghar. As we will see, the incorporation of the Todgha into the 
political and legal infrastructure of the colonial and Moroccan state has gradually undermined 
the functioning of traditional village institutions, with sometimes negative consequences for 
traditional oasis agriculture. 
5.6. Regional development and spatial differentiation 
5.6.1. Population growth and the expansion of Tinghir 
The Todgha valley and especially its center Tinghir have witnessed high population growth 
over the twentieth century. Rough estimations dating back from 1885 and 1931, assess the 
total population of the valley at 14,300 and 18,216 people, respectively. From 1952 on, 
however, there are more accurate data. As figure 5.2 clearly shows, the initially slow growth 
has accelerated since the late 1950s. Between 1952 (20,258 inhabitants) and 1971, when the 
population reached 30,000 people, there was an increase of almost 9,500 people. That is, 
almost 50 percent growth in twenty years. 
In the 1980s and the 1990s, the population growth seems to have further accelerated, 
as the next 50 percent increase was reached only 11 years later, in 1982, to increase further to 
61,713 in 1994. Based on the growth rate between 1982 and 1994, the total population 
reached an estimated 70,000 in 200020. This means that, from 1952 to 1994, the population of 
20
 Supposing linear growth, the population has reached 70,000 in 2000, and will reach 85,000 in 2010, and 
100,000 in 2020. If we take the different growth rates of the four communities separately into account, 
population estimates are even higher, which can be explained by the rapid growth of populous Tinghir. 
Considering the rapidly falling birth rates in Morocco, growth might also slow down in the longer term, 
although this also depends on the future evolution of in- and out-migration, which is difficult to predict. 
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the Todgha has tripled. This spectacular population growth seems primarily due to the 
combined effect of high birth rates and rapidly falling mortality rates due to improved 
hygiene, nutrition, and medical care. Taking account of the significant out-migration from the 
Todgha over the past decades, one would not have expected such high population growth. 
However, this ignores the fact that the Todgha, and Tinghir in particular, has also become a 
destination for internal migrants21. 
Figure 5.2. Population development of the Todgha and municipalities, 1885-1994 
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Despite the demise of traditional commercial networks (exchange between nomads and 
sedentary populations, long distance and trans-Saharan trade), Tinghir has retained and 
reinforced its position as a regional trading center in modem-day Morocco. Between 1952 
and 1994, the actual urban center grew from 3,000 to 13,000 inhabitants. The entire 
municipality, including the villages that (virtually) became amalgamated with Tinghir, 
counted over 30,000 inhabitants in 1994 and—based on the ongoing construction of new 
quarters since then—was probably near 40,000 around the year 2000. It serves about 70,000 
Todghawis and an unknown number of people in the wider surroundings. 
This rapidly growing desert town serves as a commercial interface between its 
hinterland (Todgha, Saghro, adjacent sections of the High Atlas) and the large cities of 
western Morocco. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the weekly market (on 
Monday) of Tinghir has witnessed a rapid growth, and had to be moved twice to a larger 
place (Büchner 1986). Currently, Tinghir boasts one of the biggest markets of the Presaharan 
region. Monday is a very busy day in Tinghir, when a large part of the population of the entire 
valley and surrounding regions (Tamtetoucht and Ait Hani in the High Atlas, Alt 'Atta 
villages of the Saghro) visit its weekly market. 
In the following chapter, we will further analyze processes of in- and out-migration. 
Besides official census data, data from the municipality of Tinghir have been used. The figures include the 
population of the entire valley, that is, the actual municipalities of Todgha El Oulya, Todgha Es-Soufla, 
Taghzout n'Ait 'Atta, and the municipality of Tinghir. 
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Besides the weekly market, the number of handicraft shops, coffeehouses, small 
restaurants, grocery shops, butchers, and other commercial enterprises has been growing 
rapidly. Its commercial functions—combined with the presence of many banks and a small 
hospital—makes Tinghir one of the more important central places in the Presahara. At the 
commercial level, it can compete with other regional centers such as Ouarzazate, Zagora, 
Errachidia, and Erfoud (cf. Büchner 1986). In contrast to its commercial functions, Tinghir's 
location is marginal in administrative terms. The Todgha valley falls under the authority of 
the Annexe de Boumalne, which itself falls under the authority of the Province of Ouarzazate. 
The Todgha is located in the eastern extremity of this Province, 169 km east of its capital, 
Ouarzazate. This is a major inconvenience for many people, since many administrative 
services are only found in Ouarzazate, requiring a two to three hours bus or taxi drive. 
5.6.2. Development of infrastructure and transport links 
In the early 1970s, the main road linking Tinghir to Ouarzazate and Errachidia (P32) was 
paved, as was the road between Tinghir and the Todgha gorges (road 6902). This meant a 
further opening up of the Todgha to western Morocco. At the valley level, it also entailed a 
radical improvement of the accessibility of many villages within the Todgha located near the 
two paved roads, that is, the villages around Tinghir (in particular the cluster around Afanour 
on the other bank of the Todgha), the upper Todgha (in particular on the right bank where 
most of the road is located), as well as the A'it 'Atta villages located along the P32 to Tincjdad 
and Tabsebest (A'it Aïssa Ou Brahim, Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, and Tabsebest). However, many 
villages in the lower Todgha can still only be reached via dirt tracks. Especially the Ait 'Atta 
villages on the right bank of the Todgha, such as Tadafelt, remained relatively isolated. 
Shared taxis operate between Tinghir and regional towns such as Ouarzazate, 
Boumalne, Errachidia, and even Marrakech. Since the liberalization of the Moroccan 
transport sector in the mid-1990s, the number of bus companies linking Tinghir with other 
parts of Morocco—for prices lower than that of the CTM state bus company—has dramatically 
increased. It is now possible to take direct buses to major Moroccan towns on a mostly daily 
basis. There are even a number of bus companies which maintain direct bus routes between 
the Todgha and major migration destinations such as Montpellier and Pans. 
The urban center of Tinghir is becoming increasingly physically linked with 
surrounding villages (notably Taourirt, A'it Boujjane, Tikoutar, Tagoumast, and Afanour). 
More and more Todghawis work, trade, and meet other people in Tinghir. Intra-valley 
transport between Tinghir and the numerous villages is provided by an extensive network of 
shared taxis and privately operated delivery vans, locally known as transits (derived from 
their Ford Transit prototype) which operate on a "fill-up-and-go" basis. There are daily 
transport links to Tinghir from virtually all surrounding villages. Transport between Tinghir 
and villages located in the surrounding High Atlas and Saghro mountains is maintained by 
trucks and pick-ups, which regularly commute between Tinghir and its hinterland. 
The development of road infrastructure and the radically improved semi-public 
transport links have radically improved the accessibility of the Todgha from western 
Morocco, decreased transaction costs and further embedded the Todgha within wider 
economic networks. This has also further facilitated labor migration and other forms of 
mobility, and has boosted tourism by Moroccans and foreigners to the scenic upper Todgha 
and its gorges. 
At the valley level, the development of road infrastructure seems to have increased the 
already growing orientation of the villages towards Tinghir, further strengthening its position 
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as Todgha's administrative and commercial center. In comparison to the Alt Todoght, most 
Ait 'Atta villages have remained politically and economically marginalized since their 
defeat against the French and the gradual demise of their predominantly semi-nomadic 
livelihoods. Moreover, they became relatively isolated in infrastructural terms, as the newly 
constructed roads bypassed most Alt 'Atta villages, with the exception of the villages of the 
Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim fraction as well as Ghallil n'Aït Isfoul. For basic administrative 
services, markets, schooling, health care, and so on, the Ait 'Atta have to travel to Tinghir 
over largely unpaved roads. 
This situation only improved in the late 1980s and 1990s, when the state established a 
market place—where the Thursday weekly market is held—some administrative services, a 
post office, and a secondary school (collège) at an empty area near to the ancient village of 
Taghzout. This "New Taghzout" is located on the ethnic frontier between Alt 'Atta and the El 
Hart villages (see map 2). These interventions have boosted the development of Taghzout into 
a modest, secondary commercial and administrative center, and the proximity of the new 
facilities have decreased the relative isolation of the Aft 'Atta and other lower Todgha 
villages. The semi-urban structures of Taghzout seem to be growing together with those of 
Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim, which is another growing Ait 'Atta center located along the paved road 
to Errachidia2'1. 
5.6.3. Public amenities, sanitary facilities, and the educational revolution 
In 1994, 58.5 percent of all Todgha households received electricity, either through a direct 
connection to the state network, or through a connection to a village generator (see table 5.2). 
In the late 1990s, a large-scale state-dependent electrification schedule (PERG—Programme 
d'Electrification Rurale) was implemented in the Todgha valley. This led to the electrification 
of the entire upper Todgha in 1998, and of almost the entire lower Todgha in 1999 and 2000. 
All research villages are now connected to the national electricity grid. 
Table 5.2 shows that access to drinking water is mostly limited to Tinghir and the 
villages in its immediate surroundings. The research villages primarily rely on private or 
collective wells as a source of drinking water. Concerning sanitary facilities, table 5.2 
demonstrates that, in 1994, the municipality of Tinghir witnessed the highest spread of in-
house lavatories, showers, and baths, whereas Taghzout had the worst facilities. 
Looking at the presence of these facilities in the research villages in 1998 (see table 
5.3), we can witness the same general patterns25. The Aft 'Atta villages of Tadafelt and 
Ghallil n'Aït Isfoul have the worst in-house sanitary facilities. Aft El Meskine scores highest 
on these variables. For instance, 97 percent of the households in this village have a lavatory 
compared to 51 percent in Tadafelt. The comparison of tables 5.2 and 5.3 suggest that the 
The Ail 'Atta have been relatively marginalized in three respects: (1) Agricultural, as they have been 
historically excluded from access to surface water resources from the Todgha; (2) Political, as they had a 
rebellious reputation and were therefore often distrusted by the makhzen Moreover, in order to accentuate their 
Malus aparte, they were allowed to maintain some of their traditional judicial structures after independence 
(Hart 1981; Otte 2000); (3) Infrastructural, as the paved roads bypass most Ait 'Atta villages, although Alt 'Atta 
living in the Saghro are far more isolated than in the Todgha. In combination with their cultural pnde, "inward-
looking" attitude, and distrust of the outside world, this seems to explain why the Ait 'Atta have remained 
relatively isolated 
The local authonty plans to construct a new road linking Tinghir to Taghzout via the right bank of the lower 
Todgha and to construct a second bridge over the Todgha near Tamasint. 
Companson between tables 5 2 and 5.3 shows that the spatial variability in the survey data largely reflects that 
of official data available at the municipal level This indicates a fairly high criterion validity (see section 3.4 3) 
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number of households having basic sanitary facilities has increased over time, although this 
hypothesis cannot be solidly confirmed with these data. 
Table S.2. Public amenities and sanitary facilities in the municipalities of the Todgha (1994) 
Municipality Percentage of households with facility 
Electricity Drinking water Bath and shower Lavatory 
Todgha El Oulya 36 1 0.5 10.9 416 
Tinghir 73 6 48.6 30 9 65 4 
Todgha Es-Soufla 50.1 1.2 20 6 40 4 
Taghzout n'Ait 'Atta 37/7 Lì 9A 34.0 
Total 58 5 25^4 22.9 52 1 
Source: Own calculation based on the 1994 national census 
Table 5.3. Sanitary facilities in the research villages (1999) 
Village Municipality Percentage of households possessing item 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghalhl n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
Oulya 
Tinghir 
Soufla 
Soufla 
Taghzout 
Taghzout 
Lavatory 
72 4 
70 5 
97 2 
69.4 
51.3 
55.2 
69.2 
Shower 
26.8 
39.4 
55.7 
13.9 
13.7 
17.2 
28 0 
Pnvate 
well 
24.4 
85 7 
87 3 
87 3 
30.8 
69 0 
58 1 
Electric 
26 
pump 17.1 
413 
4.3 
13.9 
8.6 
10.3 
17.5 
Motor 
pump 
0.8 
8.6 
80.3 
37 5 
198 
24.1 
24 0 
η 
124 
105 
71 
62 
117 
28 
507 
Source: Household survey 
For modem medical services, the Todghawis largely rely on Tinghir, where a small public 
hospital, private doctors, dentists, and several pharmacies are located. Most people who can 
afford to prefer to visit private doctors, who have a better reputation than those in the public 
health services. As the hospital is small, underequipped, and understaffed, it is only 
appropriate for simple standard treatments. For more complex treatment and major surgery, 
people are dependent on the public hospitals and private clinics in Ouarzazate, Goulmima, 
Errachidia, and western Morocco. 
The first primary schools in the Todgha were established during colonial times in 
Tinghir and a small number of villages. Since then, the number of primary schools has 
increased steadily. Nowadays, there is a primary school within, or in the direct vicinity of, 
almost any village. The extension of the schooling infrastructure has contributed to the 
increasing generalization of primary education over the past few decades. 
Until the late 1970s, there was no secondary school in the Todgha valley. This meant 
that pupils had to stay at public boarding schools (internats) in Boumalne de Dadès or 
Errachidia to attend secondary school. In 1977, the first secondary school, Zaïd ou Hmed was 
established in the new Hay Bougafer quarter at the eastern fringe of Tinghir. It comprised a 
collège (lower secondary school), a lycée (upper secondary school), and a boarding school for 
pupils from distant villages. In 1984, 1988, 1997, and 2000 new secondary schools were 
opened in Taghzout, Afanour (north of Tinghir), A'it Oujjana (upper Todgha), and Tinghir, 
respectively (see table 5.4). This has enabled a dramatic improvement of educational levels 
amongst the youngest generations, and also, increasingly, among girls27. 
Small electnc pumps are generally installed at family compounds for pumping dnnking water from wells. 
Diesel motor pumps are mostly installed for irrigation, but the pumped water is α/ço used for domestic purposes 
Many households that possess a water pump store water in small, concrete "water towers", in order to maintain 
pressure on in-house water supply systems 
7
 For an analysis of the relationship between education and migration, see chapter 9 
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Table 5.4. Years of establishment of secondary schools in the Todgha valley (2000) 
Year 
1977 
1984 
1988 
1997 
2000 
Location 
Tinghir 
Taghzoul 
Afanour 
Ait Oujjana 
Tinghir 
Name of school 
Zaid ou Hmed 
Moulay 'Abdellah ben Housain 
Sidi Mohammed Ben 'Abdellah 
Brahim Benou El Adham 
Salah ou Din El Ayoubi 
Level 
Since 2000 only collège 
Collège and lycée 
Collège and lycée 
Collège and lycée 
Collège and lycée 
Source: Délégation de l'Enseignement Secondaire Ouarzazate 
5.6.4. Inter-village differentiation in isolation and wealth 
Notwithstanding the general trend towards the opening up of the Todgha region as a whole 
vis-à-vis the outside world, important intra-valley differences remain with regards to the 
relative isolation of the different villages. Table 5.5 summarizes the distances from the 
research villages to the paved road, secondary schools, markets and Tinghir, where most 
services and facilities are located. On the basis of these distances, an "isolation index" has 
been calculated28. Scores above zero indicate an above average isolation; scores below zero a 
below average isolation. The data reveal that Tikoutar is by far the least isolated village, due 
to its close proximity to Tinghir—the valley's center—and paved roads. Second in place is 
Ait El Meskine. Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, Ikhba, and Zaou'ia are relatively more isolated. 
Tikoutar is at a walking distance from Tinghir, and this village in particular seems to 
becoming increasingly integrated into Tinghir's urban economy. Located in the upstream 
extremity of the valley, Zaou'ia appears to be marginally located at first sight, which seems to 
be corroborated by its second highest place in the isolation index. However, it should also be 
noted that the village's proximity to the touristy Gorges du Todgha gives it some distinct 
economic advantages. The daily stream of tourists to the canyon landscape has contributed to 
the development of a small-scale "tourist industry", which has created some local 
employment opportunities in the small hotels and restaurants located in and close to the 
Gorges. 
Table 5.5. Approximate distance to services, facilities, and isolation index, by village 
Village (km) 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul 
Second. school 
8 
1 
3 
4 
4 
6 
Paved road 
0 
1 
2 
5 
75 
2 
Market 
14 
4.5 
3 
4 
4 
6 
Tinghir 
12 
25 
12 
13 
26 
17 
Isolation index 
0.24 
-0.91 
-0 43 
0.16 
0.85 
0.10 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
Tadafelt is clearly the most isolated research village, which is due to its difficult accessibility 
via unpaved roads. It should also be noted that Ait El Meskine, Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, and 
Ikhba, would score slightly higher—and Tadafelt far higher—on the isolation index if 
distances to the "market" from these lower Todgha villages were not calculated vis-à-vis the 
relatively small weekly market in Taghzout, but to the valley's main market in Tinghir, and 
that Zaou'ia and Tikoutar would score far lower. In other words, the establishment of the new 
The isolation index has been calculated as follows. All values in kms have been converted into standard z-
scores Per village, the mean z-score was calculated. In this, the variable 'distance to paved road' has been given 
a double weighting, regarding the importance of this factor for costs and time of transport. The scores indicate 
how many standard deviation units a case is above or below the mean (cf. Heinemeijer et al 1976:103). 
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center in Taghzout has decreased the relative isolation of lower Todgha villages as compared 
to two decades ago. 
In order to measure intra-valley spatial differences in relative wealth and living 
conditions, an index of "wealth indicators" was calculated at the household level (see table 
5.6). The data show that the Ait 'Atta villages of Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul and—particularly— 
Tadafelt are worst off. The upper Todgha village of Zaou'ia scores just above average, 
whereas households in the centrally located villages of Tikoutar and Ikhba are relatively well 
equipped. Ait El Meskine seems the wealthiest village. Although the number of cases is too 
small to make sound statistical inferences, it seems that the isolated villages also tend to be 
less wealthy than the centrally located villages. 
Table 5.6. Index of wealth indicators at household level by village 
Village 
Zaou'ia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n' 
Total 
Ait Isfoul 
0-1 
28.2 
22.1 
28 
177 
46 2 
46.4 
27 3 
Scores on 
2-3 
25.8 
24 0 
23 9 
43 5 
34 2 
214 
29 1 
index of wealth indicators on household level29 
4-5 
14.5 
18.3 
23 9 
16 1 
12 8 
10.7 
162 
> 6 
31.5 
35.6 
49 3 
22.6 
6.8 
21.4 
27 5 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 
3 84 
451 
5 53 
3 76 
201 
2 96 
3 73 
η 
124 
104 
71 
62 
117 
28 
506 
Source: Household survey 
5.6.5. The media revolution 
During the last decade of the twentieth century, the Todgha valley has gone through a 
veritable "media revolution", which has meant increasingly easy and relatively cheap access 
to communication devices and national and international media. Electrification, decreased 
prices30, and increased wealth has increasingly facilitated the use of televisions, videos, and 
so on. Figure 5.3 illustrates the rapid diffusion of communication devices in the Todgha. For 
instance, while only 10 percent of all surveyed households possessed a television in the early 
1980s, this was the case for about 80 percent of all households in 1999. Since the mid-1990s, 
satellite dishes have mushroomed throughout the valley, exposing an increasing share of 
households to an unprecedented range of Arab and Western television stations. From almost 
zero in 1990, more than 40 percent of all households possessed such a satellite dish in 1999. 
In recent years, the ONTP, the national telecommunications organization, has been 
extending the fixed telephone network. Almost the entire Todgha El Oulya, Tinghir, and 
central parts of Taghzout and Todgha Es-Soufla now have access to fixed telephone services, 
which only used to be available in Tinghir and a number of villages along paved roads. 
Although most households have no private telephones, téléboutiques (privately run 
callcentres) can now be found at several places in the upper Todgha on the road from the 
gorges to Tinghir, as well as in A'it Aïssa Ou Brahim and Taghzout. 
29
 This index has been calculated on the basis of the household survey data with regards to the possession of 
durable consumer goods electric or motor pump, drinking water, telephone, television, video, satellite dish, 
refrigerator, food processor, washing-machine, electronic iron, water heater, bicycle, moped, car, and delivery 
van (transit). Each item in possession was counted as a score of 1, each item not in possession as a score of 0 
The index is the sum of all scores. 
30
 Prices of consumer electronics have fallen due to increasing smuggling from the Spanish enclaves of Melillia 
and Ceuta in the North, as well as the large-scale trade in second hand goods from Europe, largely driven by 
migrants. Luxury consumer goods and household appliances are also brought from Europe as presents. 
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Figure S.3. Diffusion of telephones, televisions, videos, and satellite dishes in the research villages 
G Telephone 
• Television 
E3 Video 
Ξ Satellite dish 
< 1975 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 
Source: Household survey 
With the introduction of cheap cellular phones by a private telecommunications company 
(Méditel) and the ONTP, wireless telephony also became accessible for large sections of the 
Moroccan population in 1999 and 2000. In parallel, a network of GSM transmitters was 
established in the Todgha valley, reaching almost full coverage in 2001. Telephony has 
become increasingly widespread among the local population and even relatively poor families 
now possess cellular phones31. In 1999 and 2000, the first internet cafés were set up in 
Tinghir. 
5.7. Conclusion 
French colonization and the concomitant incorporation of the Todgha valley into the political-
economic context of the modem state and the capitalist economy, radically improved 
transport links with the outside world and fundamentally altered the economic context of the 
Todgha valley at the macro-level. On the one hand, this has entailed the end of tribal 
autonomy and the demise of traditional economic systems and nomad-peasant trade relations. 
Moreover, the dramatic population increase has further decreased the already limited carrying 
capacity of traditional oasis agriculture. These processes have played a role in undermining 
traditional livelihoods, which were predominantly based on subsistence agriculture. On the 
other hand, these political-economic transformations have also created new livelihood 
opportunities within, but in particular outside, the valley through migration. 
Just like the development of road infrastructure and transport facilities, the increasing 
access to schooling and various media seems part of a broader process in which the valley is 
becoming increasingly integrated into wider social, cultural, economic, and political 
structures, both at the national and international level. Through schooling and the "media 
revolution", Todghawis have become increasingly exposed to the outside world and, hence, to 
other lifestyles, standards of living, cultures, and role models. We will see that whereas 
infrastructural development and increased opportunities of wage labor in other parts of the 
country and abroad increased the opportunities for labor migration, these more socio-cultural 
Cellular phones did not appear as an item in the questionnaires, as they were introduced massively only as of 
1999. 
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changes "mobilized" the mindsets of people, increasing their aspirations and their actual 
propensity to migrate. 
Compared to surrounding areas, the Todgha oasis valley has a relatively well-
developed infrastructure and public amenities. Especially in the late 1980s and 1990s, the 
relatively marginal parts of the valley have been increasingly opened up, with an almost 
completed electrification, an expanding drinking water system and extensive telephone 
network, and the establishment of a market and administrative services in Taghzout. Over the 
past decades, the number of primary and secondary schools has rapidly expanded and spread 
over the valley. In the 1990s, a veritable media revolution took place. Road connections and 
transport facilities to destinations outside the Todgha have also been improved in the past 
decades. Nevertheless, significant intra-valley differences have remained concerning the 
isolation and availability of public amenities. Especially the Ait 'Atta villages in the lower 
Todgha seem relatively isolated and deprived of public amenities. 
As we will see in the following chapter, these processes have culminated in the 
increasing importance of labor migration from, within, and to the Todgha. Traditional 
migration patterns have been drastically modified, extended, and partly replaced with new 
forms of "modem" migration. We will also explore whether there is an association between 
the level of development at the local level and the occurrence and intensity of migration. 

6 
The Todgha mobility transition 
6.1. Introduction 
Within the framework of the information given in chapters 4 and 5 on the structural 
transformations that set a wholly new development context, in which new and extended forms 
of Moroccan migration could emerge over the twentieth century (research question 1 a), this 
chapter will first describe the evolution of migration patterns from, within, and to the Todgha 
valley over the twentieth century (research question 1 b) Besides describing general, valley-
wide trends on the basis of secondary data, it will provide more details on (shifting) migration 
destinations, the characteristics of migrants, and the selectivity of migration on the basis of 
the household survey conducted in the six research villages As migrants are rarely 
representative of their communities of origin, it is important to pay attention to migration 
selectivity in order to come to valid judgments on migration impacts (research question 1 c) 
Whereas subsequent chapters will elaborate extensively on the recursive effects of 
migration on development in the Todgha (represented BY arrow (d) in figure 2 4), this 
chapter will specifically look at the other side or direction of the migration-development 
interaction How have general processes of development enabled, shaped, or constrained 
particular forms of migration (see arrows (b), (c), and, indirectly, (a) in figure 2 4)'7 What 
changing structural factors at the macro and micro level have enabled migration patterns to 
occur and how and to what extent do such factors explain their evolution over time (research 
question 1 d)9 Therefore, based on the theoretical framework elaborated in chapter 2, we will 
perceive migration as a constituent part of the development process in a larger sense In this 
perspective, we will try to explain changes in migration patterns from modifications of the 
development context in the Todgha, Morocco, and at the destination 
Besides the general development context, research question 1 d also pertains to the 
way migration has created "intermediary structures" such as networks (cf Doomemik et al 
1997 67-68, Van Amersfoort 1998), and how these structures have affected migration 
patterns over the past decades in terms of numbers, destinations, and selectivity Under 
conditions of increasingly restrictive immigration policies, social capital in the form of 
migrant networks are a crucial resource through which people gain access to foreign 
employment Bearing this in mind, we will specifically look at how kinship ties determine 
people's propensity to migrate, and to what extent this entails inequality in access to internal 
and international migration 
Through analyzing whether and to what extent intra-valley spatial differentiation in 
the isolation and "development" of the different research villages has influenced the level of 
involvement in different types of labor migration, we aim to assess to what extent transitional 
migration theories (see section 2 2) were right in arguing that it is not absolute poverty, but 
rather development that breeds migration In fact, it is an attempt to assess whether 
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transitional macro-models of the "mobility transition" (Zelinsky 1971) can be applied at the 
regional scale. In this, we aim to examine how the different types of internal and international 
out-migration, immigration, and intra-valley migration interact over time or over the course of 
the development process. Our hypothesis is that integration into the state and the capitalist 
economy as well as infrastructural improvements (see chapter 5) have enlarged the 
capabilities and increased the willingness of many oasis dwellers to migrate internally and 
abroad. If this holds true, one can expect that relatively isolated and impoverished villages or 
ethnic groups will exhibit a lower or postponed ("lagged") propensity to migrate. 
6.2. Regional integration and transforming migration patterns 
6.2.1. Pre-colonial migration 
There is a tendency to see the present time as the "age of migration" (cf. Castles and Miller 
1993), and to perceive "traditional" peasant societies as static and unchanging, in which 
population movements were rare. However, historical research has indicated that many pre-
modem societies have, in fact, been highly mobile (cf. De Haan 2000; Skeldon 1997:7-8). This 
certainly applies to oases. Instead of being isolated islands in desert seas, they used to be firmly 
integrated within long distance trade networks. As contact zones between the Mediterranean and 
tropical African world, oases have witnessed strong population movements, either through 
slavery, conquest, or more voluntary forms of migration. 
Due to their vital agricultural and commercial function, oases attracted people from near 
and far. A quick look at the ethnic composition of oases demonstrates that they are the very 
products of migration. Diverse population groups originating from North Africa, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the Arabian peninsula (haratin, ismakhen, imazighen, Jews, and Arabs) have been 
known to settle down in oases, where they either still form distinct endogamous population 
groups or amalgamated within settled populations, as has probably happened with the Ait 
Todoght1. In the Todgha, the last important pre-modem migration movement towards the oasis 
was that of the pastoralist Art 'Atta, who descended from their heartland in the Saghro mountains 
to settle in the lower Todgha from the late eighteenth century onward. In fact, this migration 
wave has continued until the present time, as A'it 'Atta from the Saghro are still settling as 
"frontier farmers" in the Ghallil plain or in the new neighborhoods of Tinghir. 
Besides being poles of attraction, oases have also been emigration regions since ancient 
times. Historical sources indicate that migration from the Todgha valley did exist in earlier 
centuries. Throughout southern Morocco, the Art Todoght were known as specialists in the 
digging and maintenance of khettara imgation systems (Monts de Savasse 1950:6, cited in 
Büchner 1986:111). There is evidence that people from the Todgha worked as specialists on the 
khettara systems of Marrakech at least from the Almohad period (1140-1269), where they 
probably were organized in a guild and lived in a distinct neighborhood (Deverdun 1956:87). 
Berque (1954:149, cited in Büchner 1986:111) mentions the employment of Ait Todoght as 
khettara diggers in a village in the western High Atlas. The Art Todoght were also known as 
specialists in the construction of traditional adobe buildings (igherman and qasbat) in other 
regions (Büchner 1986). 
The position of Tinghir as a market place on the (caravan) trading route between the 
Tafilalt oasis region and Marrakech gave rise to a local class of ambulant traders, who 
1
 Also in the case of apparently homogeneous tribes such as the Ait 'Atta, it is known that they are, in fact, a 
conglomerate of different tribes, who united into one confederation in the mid-sixteenth century (Hart 1981) 
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operated as far as the Moulouya region in northeastern Morocco (Büchner 1986:112). It is 
also likely that the Ait Todoght worked as harvest workers in more humid regions—which is 
another pre-colonial form of seasonal migration—although there are no historical sources to 
prove this. The existence of such ancient migration patterns indicates that pre-colonial 
livelihoods were not exclusively based on agriculture. Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume 
that subsistence agriculture used to be the (one and only) pillar of traditional oasis 
livelihoods, and that other sources of income (barter, trade, migration) were only of secondary 
importance. 
6.2.2. Internal and international migration under colonial rule 
Although the French did not gain effective control over the Todgha until 1931, colonization 
of North Africa had started to influence migration patterns far before. The occupation of 
neighboring Algeria in 1830—one century earlier—and the growth of industrial activities and 
establishment of farms by French colons (settlers), created an increasing demand for laborers, 
especially in the region of Oran and Sidi Belabes. This created new migration flows to 
Algeria not only from the northern Rif mountains, but also from the oases located in southeast 
Morocco. The Todgha started to participate in this migration from at least the turn of the 
twentieth century, and probably even before (Büchner 1986:113). 
Migration to Algeria was the first type of "international labor migration"2 from the 
Todgha, which brought many Todghawis into contact with the French well before the 
establishment of colonial rule in the valley. It either concerned seasonal migration by 
agricultural laborers or circular migration by young men, who used to return to their families 
after a period that varied from a couple of years to several decades. Algeria remained the 
principal destination for Todgha's international migrants until the 1950s. However, migration 
towards Algeria came entirely to an end with Algerian independence in 1962. A distinct form 
of permanent out-migration was the departure of almost the entire Jewish community of the 
Ait Todoght, which counted at least 150 households, in the 1940s and the 1950s to Israel and 
other destinations (see also section 4.2.3). 
New forms of internal rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration evolved following 
the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912. Initially, the new forms of migration 
were an extension and intensification of older patterns of seasonal and circular migration. 
However, migration gradually tended to become more long-term and migrants tended to 
migrate further away and, increasingly, abroad. In colonial times, two forms of internal 
migration prevailed. The first was seasonal migration to agricultural areas in northern and 
western Morocco, such as the Moulouya, the Middle Atlas, the Gharb, the Tadla, and 
Doukkala. In 1954, an estimated 1,300 Todghawis, or 6.4 percent of the total population, 
participated in this type of seasonal migration. Like Algerian migration, this in fact concerned 
a continuation of older, pre-colonial migration patterns, which were, however, intensified due 
to the increased demand for agricultural labor at the modem farms established by colons. 
The second type of internal migration was the movement to the cities located on the 
Atlantic coast, notably Casablanca and Rabat. This region increasingly developed into the 
industrial and urban heartland of modernizing Morocco, which attracted an increasing number 
2
 The case of Algerian migration clearly demonstrates that the distinction between internal and international 
migration can be arbitrary. In geographical, historical, and cultural terms, eastern oases such as Tinghir are 
closer to some western parts of Algeria than to western Morocco, and in pre-colonial times, official state borders 
did not exist, which made it fairly easy to travel. On the other hand, Algerian migration can be considered as the 
first type of migration that brought the Todghawi into contact with the capitalist economy and the phenomenon 
of wage labor and which was eventually the springboard for migration to Europe. 
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of migrants. Modem rural-to-urban labor migration started in the early 1940s, and rapidly 
increased afterwards. More than seasonal migration, this rural-to-urban migration was a 
deviation from pre-colonial migration patterns. In comparison to seasonal migration, this 
migration was relatively long-term, with most migrants settling on a semi-permanent basis in 
new quarters or slums of the swelling cities. From the Todgha, rural-to-urban migration was 
particularly directed at Rabat-Salé3. Migrants from the Todgha tended to settle in certain 
quarters. Significant concentrations of Todghawis can be found in (former) slums, but also in 
currently upgraded popular quarters such as Takkadoum and Yacoub El Mansour in Rabat 
and Tabriquet in Salé (Büchner 1986:108-9). 
This geographical clustering of migration flows between the Todgha and particular 
urban areas seems in line with the premises of migration system theory. The presence of 
established Todgha communities in these quarters, led subsequent migrants to also settle in 
these quarters where community members could offer them practical and moral support. It is 
a continuation of an older North African migration pattern of almost organized migratory 
flows from particular villages to particular cities, in which entire districts or craft occupation 
in a city could be dominated by permanent migrants from particular regions (cf. Mabogunje 
1970:13-4). 
What was new was that an increasing number of such rural-to-urban migrants ended 
up settling permanently in the cities, thereby breaking with traditional patterns of 
predominantly circular migration. The transfer of family members to the city generally marks 
such a shift from circular to permanent migration. In this way, an increasing number of 
households were entirely "lifted up" from the Todgha. As we will see, this (predominantly) 
rural-to-urban migration further increased in the post-colonial era, to the detriment of 
historically rooted seasonal migration of harvest workers. 
On the eve of independence in 1954, an estimated 1,326 Todgha migrants were 
staying in Algeria, representing 6.6 percent of the total population of the Todgha. Only 22 
migrants (0.1 percent) worked in France. An estimated 1,294 Todghawis, representing 6.4 
percent of the total population, participated in seasonal migration. About 1,108 people 
representing 5.5 percent were involved in circular and more permanent forms of internal 
migration to the coastal cities (Büchner 1986). In sum, 18.5 percent (3,750 people) of the total 
population were involved in some kind of migration. This is almost equal to the total number 
of 3,804 households enumerated in the 1952 census. We can therefore safely state that back in 
the 1950s, a sizable proportion of the households in the Todgha were already affected by 
migration. This confirms that labor migration is by no means a very recent phenomenon. 
6.3. International migration in the post-independence era 
6.3.1. The "Golden Age" of international migration 
The late 1960s were characterized by a revolutionary shift in previous patterns of 
international migration. Remunerative labor migration to France and, to a lesser extent, other 
northwestern European countries, became accessible to an increasingly large number of 
Todghawis. This period marked the beginning of an era in which migration to Europe would 
increasingly dominate the valley in social, cultural, and economic terms. 
Salé and Morocco's capital Rabat are two cities located at the southern and northern side of the Bou Regreg 
nver However, they form one, integrated metropolitan system and are therefore mentioned together. 
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Until the mid-1960s, international migration to Europe (i.e., France) was of a limited 
character, both before and after Moroccan independence in 1956. The first Todghawi who 
went to France were soldiers recruited into the French army. Dozens, or maybe even 
hundreds, fought in the Second World War on the European fronts. Between 1948 and 1952, 
about twenty Ait Todoght were recruited to work in the coalmines of the French northern 
departments of Nord and Moselle. Some of these early migrant workers left to work in the 
automobile industry (D'Achon 1952). A second wave of migration to France occurred after 
Algerian independence in 1962. The departure of virtually all colons led to a rapid economic 
downturn and disappearing employment opportunities for Moroccan workers. The conditions 
for Moroccan workers further deteriorated following the 1963 border war between Morocco 
and Algeria. Although most migrants returned to Morocco, several Todghawis were invited 
by their employers to work in France (Büchner 1986:120). Others went from Algeria to 
France on their own initiative, where most found work in the construction sector, industry, or 
agriculture. 
In a way, Algeria was the platform from which early Aft Todoght labor migrants 
"leapfrogged" to France. This Algerian-French migration heralded the later boom in 
international migration of the late 1960s and early 1970s, in which the Todgha took full part. 
The combined effect of Algerian independence and the economic boom in Europe caused a 
radical reorientation of international migration patterns, which became almost exclusively 
oriented towards France and—in a later stage—other European countries. 
From the early 1960s French recruitment agencies had started to directly recruit so-
called "guestworkers" in the Todgha valley. Workers were primarily selected on their health 
and physical strength. According to respondents who participated in these selections, 
speaking French or having a diploma were grounds for rejecting prospective workers. 
European employers generally preferred illiterate, docile employees, since educated workers 
were seen as potential troublemakers or trade union activists. 
Official recruitment by companies or recruitment agencies was only important in the 
starting phase of this European migration boom. However, an increasing number of labor 
migrants began leaving for Europe on their own initiative. Many "network migrants" acquired 
labor contracts through family or friends who already worked in France. Migrant networks 
equally facilitated housing and access to other facilities for newcomers. Moreover, an 
increasing number of "adventurers" went on their own initiative on a tourist visa without 
already having secured a job. The high demand for unskilled laborers in Europe and the loose 
immigration policies meant most of these "anarchic" migrants succeeded in finding jobs and 
obtaining residence permits. 
Table 6.1 offers further insight into the decreasing importance of direct employer 
recruitment. Among the surveyed migrants who departed in the 1960s, more than half left 
through direct labor recruitment. In the 1970s, this share dropped to 16 percent. In the same 
penod, the percentage that acquired a labor contract through family and friends rose from 42 
to 72 percent. With rising unemployment in northwestern Europe and increasingly restrictive 
policies largely preventing the inflow of new labor migrants, the percentage of migrants who 
did not have concrete prospects to work (i.e., a labor contract) before leaving rose to over 60 
percent after 1980. Most recent labor migrants have entered Europe through network or 
undocumented migration. 
Between 1954 and 1975, the number of Todghawis working in France rose from 22 to 
2,504, representing 7.4 percent of the valley's entire population (see table 6.2). The most 
important departure took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a peak in the period 
1968-1970. This migration boom marked the definitive incorporation of the Todgha valley 
into the Mediterranean-European migration system. Table 6.2 indicates, however, a marked 
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spatial differentiation in migration participation, with the fractions of Ait Snane (13.4 
percent) and Amzaourou (11.6 percent) participating most intensively in international 
migration, and the Art 'Atta exhibiting the lowest participation rates. Tinghir's low 
participation rate (4.1 percent) can probably be explained by the fact that the urban center of 
Tinghir is a destination for intra-valley and regional migration itself. Consequently, an 
increasing share of its population consists of immigrants from within and outside the valley. 
Table 6.1. Mode of recruitment of international migrants by period of departure 
Year of departure 
<1960 
1960-1969 
1970-1979 
1980-1989 
1990-1999 
Total 
Source: Household 
Direct recruitment 
survey 
Table 6.2. International migrants 
Municipality 
Todgha El Oulya 
Tinghir 
Todgha Es-Soufla 
Taghzout n'Ait Atta 
Total Todgha 
12.5 
52.5 
16.4 
0.0 
0 0 
18.0 
Labor contracts 
12.5 
42 4 
72.1 
39 1 
35.4 
46.4 
Without contract 
75.0 
5 1 
11.5 
60 9 
64.6 
35 6 
as percentage of the total population (1954-1998) 
FraUion 1 group offractioni 
Tizgui 
Ait Snane 
Igourtane 
Tinghir 
Tagoumast 
Amzaourou 
El Hart 
Taghzout n' Ait Atta 
1954 
7 25 
8 35 
6.86 
6.23 
8 95 
13.23 
5 02 
1 94 
6.55 
1975 
9.24 
13.39 
9 68 
4.09 
8.65 
11.64 
5.38 
4 53 
7.41 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
1982 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6 66 
η 
8 
59 
61 
23 
82 
227 
1998 
5 61 
681 
-
-
-
6.56 
2 98 
8 57 
6.02 
Sources: Own calculations based on qaidat Tinghir; Büchner 1986; National Censuses 1971,1982,19944 
"-" = not available. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, most labor migrants settled in France. Nevertheless, a smaller number 
of Todghawis migrated to other countries and to the Netherlands in particular. Some villages, 
like Ait El Meskine, have a relatively high number of emigrants in the Netherlands. Some of 
these initially were internal migrants staying in Morocco's big cities, where they made use of 
official Dutch labor recruitment. In this case, internal migration served as a "springboard" for 
"leapfrogging" international migrants. Others migrated from France to the Netherlands and 
other European countries. A minority obtained labor contracts for Libya and Middle Eastern 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq) in Rabat (Büchner 1986:120). However, the latter form of 
migration was generally seen as a secondary option, since salaries were lower and social and 
legal circumstances for migrants relatively poor. 
The migration boom appeared to come to an abrupt end in the mid-1970s. In the 
aftermath of the 1973 Oil Crisis, countries in northwestern Europe drastically changed their 
immigration policies. Economic recession and growing unemployment explain why labor 
As the estimates of the total number of international migrants from 1975 and 1998 date from non-census years, 
the percentages have been calculated on the basis of inter- and extrapolated census data Growth rates per 
fraction were not available. Since population growth rates in the different fractions differ, this may have created 
some inaccuracy 
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recruitment quickly ceased. From then on, regulations for obtaining visa and residence 
permits became increasingly restrictive5. 
6.3.2. The unforeseen persistence of international migration 
With the end of official labor recruitment and the gradual tightening of immigration 
requirements, the possibilities for legal labor migration to northwestern Europe dropped 
drastically after the mid-1970s. However, in contrast to expectations, this did not lead to the 
end of migration to Europe. First, there was a huge increase in family reunification, which 
started in the late 1970s and which gained massive ground in the 1980s. The decision to settle 
permanently generally coincided with family reunification, which entailed the departure of 
the worker's entire family from the valley. The process of family reunification was largely 
complete towards the end of the 1980s. With family reunification, migrants cut their most 
intensive ties with the valley, and more or less "disappeared" from the valley. 
Figure 6.1 displays the years of departure and return of all international migrants 
among the surveyed population6. It shows that the 1965-1974 decade was indeed a "Golden 
Age" of international migration. It also shows that international labor migration witnessed a 
steep decline immediately afterwards. Relatively few new international labor migrants left in 
the 1975-1989 period. This period was clearly dominated by family reunification. 
The drop in labor-migration in the 1980s, which is clearly visible in figure 6.1, exactly 
coincided with the period when family migration peaked. Labor migration participation rates 
for all Ait Todoght decreased between 1975 and 1998 (see also table 6.2). Through family 
reunification, many migrants and their families departed definitively from the valley. The 
definite departure of many migrants and family reunification seems to explain why migration 
participation in the upper and middle Todgha has declined7. The figure equally shows that 
most international returnees returned in the 1990s, during which return migrants started to 
approach retirement. However, the figure probably underestimates considerable return 
migration over the 1980s, since return migrants tend to be in their fifties and sixties, and 
many among them will therefore already be deceased. 
5
 In 1976, however, the Dutch government recruited 48 migrants from the Todgha (Büchner 1986'124). This 
was the last known official labor recruitment in the Todgha 
6
 Migrants who have reunified their families in Europe or have died are not included in the survey As they have 
effectively "disappeared" from the oasis, it is neither possible to estimate their exact number, nor to obtain 
precise data on their migration history The presented data are therefore almost certainly biased towards recent 
migrants, and probably underrepresent migrants who left in the 1960-70s. Consequently, figure 6.1 should not 
be interpreted as a precise estimation of migration rates in the displayed 5-year periods, but rather as an attempt 
to detect major trends or "shocks" in migration. Supposing constant migration rates over the past decades, one 
would have expected a gradually rising line due to the "disappearance" of older migrants through family 
reunification and death Against this expectation, the figure shows a very steep decrease in the 1975-1984, 
which makes it probable that indeed few new international labor migrants left during this period In contrast, 
after 1984, labor migration seems on the increase again, which is mainly the effect of the departure of new 
primary labor migrants to Spain and Italy 
7
 It is important to note that there are no data on yearly migration rates. The migration statistics of the qaidat of 
Tinghir count the number of male migrants residing abroad who have left their families behind. Those who 
transferred their family to Europe normally disappear from the statistics. The majority of the Ait Todoght 
"Golden Age" migrants have currently (almost) reached the age of retirement. Consequently, the number of first 
generation migrants who work in France without their families is rapidly decreasing. The same statistic 
"invisibility" problem applies to Todghawi who participated in family formation As they are reunited with their 
partners in Europe, they will also disappear from the statistics These processes partly explain the decline in the 
number of international migrants in the official migration statistics. These days, people do continue to leave each 
year, but this happens in a more or less hidden way, and remains invisible in statistics. 
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Figure 6.1. Year of departure and return of "primary" international labor migrants8 
• Departure 
D Return 
<1960 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995-
1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 
year 
Source: Household survey 
However, notwithstanding a certain decline, international labor migration did not come to a 
virtual stop after the Oil Crisis, as was generally expected at that time. Between 1975 and 
1989, labor migrants continued to move abroad. In several ways, the expectations that 
international migration would be a temporary phenomenon (cf. Büchner 1986) were not 
realized. Even more surprising was the unexpected revival of international labor migration 
that occurred in the 1990s. 
Although formal labor recruitment came to an end after the mid-1970s, the Todghawis 
managed to adopt alternative strategies to migrate abroad. Several factors seem to explain the 
persistence of international labor migration. First, some migrants applied a migration strategy 
which has been referred to in the literature as "relay migration" (cf. Arizpe 1981). In this 
case, the migrant does not decide to reunify his entire household (i.e., his wife and children) 
at the destination, but to let only one or two unmarried sons come over before their age of 
legal adulthood9 in what can be called "partial family reunification". These sons then take 
over their father's function as the migrant breadwinner after his remigration. In this way, the 
household maintains its "stake" in the international migration market. By passing the baton 
(i.e., the right to residency and work in Europe) from father to son, a new generation of labor 
migrants can be created via legal ways. 
As soon as such relay migrants marry a girl (relay migrants are typically men) from 
the Todgha and found their own family, a new migration household is created. By marrying a 
migrant, spouses also become potential migrants. This points to family formation as the 
second factor explaining the persistence of migration from the Todgha. This is the migration 
following the conclusion of new marriages of nonmigrants with migrants or, increasingly, 
8
 "Primary" labor migrants are migrants who obtained their residence permit on the legal basis of their work. 
Although people who migrate through networks claim residence permits on the legal basis of family 
reunification or formation often intend to work. It is therefore important not to artificially distinguish labor and 
family migrants. Such labor migrants "in disguise" can therefore be labeled as "secondary" labor migrants. 
However, family reunification normally implies the total disappearance of the household from the Todgha, 
which means that such households cannot be interviewed. Furthermore, the distinction between primary and 
secondary migration is useful in the sense that primary labor migrants are more likely to settle in new 
destinations and to be the creators of new migrant communities abroad, whereas secondary migrants tend to 
follow the beaten track. Thus, in a way, the occurrence of primary migration is an indication of the degree to 
which new future potentials for network migration are created. 
'' Adult children generally do not have the right to immigrate to European countries on the legal basis of family 
reunification. 
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migrants' children residing in Europe Complying with an ancient tradition of endogamous 
marriages, spouses tend to be members of the same community, ighs, or family Since family 
reunification of the first generation primary labor migrants was virtually complete by the late 
1980s, family formation became the dominant form of family migration to northwest Europe 
in the 1990s 
Although family formation often implies rapid migration of the spouse to Europe, this 
is not necessarily the case, especially if the nonmigrant spouse is female If the spouse and 
children remain behind, this implies the creation of a new migration household in the Todgha 
Nevertheless, in case of recent family formation, most tend to follow their spouses rather 
quickly (i e , within five to ten years) after marriage This contrasts with earlier circular and 
international migration, in which the members of the migrant's households often stayed 
behind for several decades Another novelty is that it is not only women, but also men who 
now migrate in the context of family formation, as both migrants' daughters and sons tend to 
marry with partners m Morocco 
Family migration has become virtually the only way to enter north-west European 
countnes (i e, France, Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany) legally Access to legal 
residency and thus to relatively well-remunerated work has increasingly become the 
prerogative of migrants' children This has coincided with a considerable rise in bnde-pnces 
Although this practice seems to be declining now, many migrants wish to give their daughters 
to nonmigrants in mamage Although migrants' sons are generally freer in choosing their 
spouse, many end up marrying a girl from their village of origin too, under strong social 
pressure from their family and communities of origin 
Material motives, in fact, play an important role too in explaining why many 
Todghawis aspire to marry a migrant Both relay migration and family formation are 
migration strategies based on kinship Nevertheless, it is often difficult to clearly distinguish 
family and labor migration, as family migration is also a means to gain access to the European 
labor market and social security systems Especially if the "family migrant" remits money 
back to his family, he or she has become a de facto labor migrant 
Besides relay migration and an increasing reliance on family formation—which are 
both manifestations of network effects—there are two other factors that explain the relative 
persistence of international migration, that is, the increasing importance of undocumented 
migration and the diversification of migration destinations In this process, Italy and Spain 
have emerged as new, relatively easy-to-enter destinations attracting many new primary labor 
migrants, in particular among the Ait 'Atta 
6.3.3. Intra-valley differentiation in international migration patterns 
The most remarkable development of the past three decades has been the increasing 
involvement of the Ait 'Atta in international migration (see table 6 2) Over the same penod, 
the migration participation rate among Ait Todoght has started to decline At the turn of the 
twenty-first century, the Ait 'Atta villages had the highest percentage (8 6) of labor migrants 
abroad This is almost double the 1975 rate10 Whereas the Ait Todoght have largely relied on 
family migration, most recent primary labor migrants are Ait 'Atta Due to the delayed nature 
of Ait 'Atta migration, they have had to adopt different migration strategies, as the legal 
conditions for migration to northwestern Europe changed drastically as was noted above The 
10
 Actual figures might even be higher, as the numerous undocumented migrants among the Ait 'Atta do not 
appear in official statistics, as long as they are not legalized 
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restrictive immigration policies of traditional destination countries such as France and the 
Netherlands have made it difficult for prospective migrants lacking access to established 
migrant networks to enter these countries legally. 
It is striking that undocumented migration is predominantly an Aft 'Atta affair. 
Moreover, there has been an increasing popularity of southern European countries (Spain and 
Italy in particular) as new migration destinations. Although most new labor migrants seem to 
enter southern Europe overstayed after having entered these countries on a tourist visa, many 
have eventually succeeded in obtaining residence papers. The series of legalization programs 
in Spain and Italy seem to encourage others to leave for Europe. Although most 
undocumented migrants seem to go to southern Europe, a minority migrate to north-west 
European countries. 
Table 6.3 shows the period of departure of international migrants from the research 
villages. It clearly shows that Ait El Meskine has the oldest involvement in international 
migration. Sixty percent of all surveyed migrants left the oasis before the 1970s. In Tikoutar 
and Ikhba, most migrants left in the 1970-1989 period. In the more isolated villages of Zaouïa 
and Tadafelt, the majority of the surveyed migrants left in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the 
migration histories of the latter two villages are quite different. Whereas Zaouïa had already 
participated in the first wave of migration to Europe, the Aft 'Atta village of Tadafelt hardly 
participated in international migration before the 1970s. 
Table 6.3. Period of departure of international migrants by village 
Village 
Zaou'ia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
Correlation with isolation index 
Corr. with distance to Tinghir 
Before 1970 
33.9 
34.5 
60.0 
32.0 
24 
50 0 
33 8 
-0 62« 
-0 512 
Period of 
1970-1989 
23.7 
49.1 
15.6 
44.0 
23.8 
50 0 
31.2 
-0 303 
-0 347 
departure 
Since 1990 
42.4 
16.4 
24.4 
24.0 
73.8 
-
35.0 
0.665 
0.601 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
η 
59 
55 
45 
25 
42 
8 
234 
Source: Household survey (C=0.466**) 
Complying with the general pattern for the Aft 'Atta, Tadafelt has only started to participate 
intensively in international migration in the past two decades. About three-quarters of the 
surveyed migrants left in the 1990s alone. Migration figures from Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul do not 
conform to this pattern: it started to participate early in international migration. Although the 
historical reasons for this are not clear, the fact that Ghallil n'A'ft Isfoul is less isolated than 
Tadafelt might have played a role in facilitating access of the villagers to labor recruitment 
campaigns held in Tinghir. The comparison between tables 5.5 and 6.3 reveals that there is no 
one-to-one correspondence between the degree of isolation and maturity of migration, 
although peripheral villages of Zaouïa and Tadafelt tend to have relatively recent migration 
histories. 
Nevertheless, if we calculate the correlation between the isolation index developed in 
chapter 5 with the relative timing of migration, we see that with increasing isolation, villages 
have become involved in international migration at a relatively late stage. Nevertheless, the 
correlation is insignificant due to the low case-load. The correlation ratios with the variable 
"distance to Tinghir" (one of the four components of the isolation index) are almost identical 
to that of the isolation index. 
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6.3.4. New strategies, new destinations 
Table 6.4 illustrates how international migration flows from the research villages have shifted 
in geographical orientation over the final two decades of the twentieth century. In the 1960-
1980 period, France attracted over 90 percent of all surveyed migrants. Attracting only 3-5 
percent of all migrants, the Netherlands was the second most important destination, while 
southern Europe hardly played a role at all. In the 1980s, the proportion of migrants residing 
in France fell to 63 percent. In the same period, Italy and Spain jointly attracted around 
twenty percent of all migrants. This percentage further rose in the 1990s. While migration to 
Italy decreased in relative importance, migration to Spain boomed, accounting for one third of 
all new departures. At the end of the 1990s, some migrants even went to Portugal. Figure 6.2 
gives an overview of similar shifts in international migration patterns on valley level. 
Table 6.4. Destination of current and returned international labor migrants by period of departure 
Country 
France 
Netherlands 
Spam 
Italy 
Portugal 
Other European 
Algeria 
Arab oil countries 
Total 
η 
<1960 
12.5 
-
-
-
-
-
87 5 
-
100 
8 
1960-1969 
91.5 
34 
1.7 
-
-
-
34 
-
100 
59 
Penod of departure 
1970-1979 
91 8 
4 9 
-
-
-
16 
1 6 
-
100 
61 
(%) 
1980-1989 
62 5 
-
8.3 
12.5 
-
-
-
16.7 
100 
24 
1990-1998 
22 0 
17 1 
32.9 
73 
4 9 
37 
-
12.2 
100 
82 
Total 
61 5 
8.1 
12 8 
38 
1 7 
1 7 
4 3 
6.0 
100 
234 
Source: Household survey (C=0.733**) 
Together, southern European countries attracted about 45 percent of all surveyed migrants in 
the final decade of the twentieth century. In the same period, migration to the Arab oil 
countries attracted 12 percent of the surveyed migrant population. After having diminished in 
the 1980s, labor migration to the Netherlands revived in the 1990s, accounting for 17 percent 
of all surveyed migrants. This growing spatial diversification and orientation towards other 
countries led to a dramatic fall in labor migration to France, which was the destination of only 
22 percent of all migrants in the 1990s. With this, it lost the position of primary migration 
destination, which it had held since 1962. 
The increasing migration to southern European countries seems strongly related to the 
easy immigration regulations—at least until the mid-1990s—in comparison to northwestern 
Europe and the high demand for unskilled labor in agricultural, construction and other 
sectors. However, it is more difficult to explain why migration to France fell while migration 
to the Netherlands revived. Several respondents explained this by the more advantageous 
economic situation and relatively low unemployment in the Netherlands. In comparison to 
"Fransa" and other destination countries, "Hoolanda" is generally perceived as the wealthiest 
country with the best social security system and is therefore the most attractive destination in 
material terms, which compensates for the fact that it is also the most distant destination. 
Table 6.5 reveals the destinations of current international migrants in the research 
villages. The table clearly shows that the villages with the oldest and strongest international 
migration history are predominantly oriented towards France. The table also shows that the 
Ait 'Atta villages have hardly participated in migration to Algeria and the Arab oil countries. 
Zaouïa contains the highest proportion of migrants to the Netherlands, and Ikhba is the most 
involved in migration to the Arab oil countries. Compared to other villages, Tadafelt shows 
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the most deviant migration patterns. 55 percent of current labor migrants from Tadafelt live 
and work in Spain, 14 percent in Italy, and 10 percent in Portugal, compared to only 17 
percent in France. This seems to confirm the earlier observation that recent migration to 
southern Europe is predominantly an Ait 'Atta affair. 
Figure 6.2. Country of residence of international labor migrants from the Todgha valley (1954-1999)" 
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Source: Household survey and own calculations based on 1952 and 1971 national censuses, French army's 
archives in Paris-Vincennes cited in Büchner (1986:117) 
Table 6.5. Destination country of currently abroad and returned migrants by village 
Village 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil η 
Total 
Ait Isfoul 
France 
48.3 
76.8 
93.3 
68.0 
16.7 
87.5 
61.4 
Nether-
Lands 
25.0 
0.0 
2.2 
4.0 
4.S 
0.0 
S.I 
Spain 
1.7 
7.1 
0.0 
4.0 
54.8 
12.5 
12.7 
Italy 
0.0 
3.6 
0.0 
4.0 
14.3 
0.0 
3.8 
Country (%) 
Portu­
gal 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
9.5 
0.0 
1.7 
Other 
Europe 
5.0 
1.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.7 
Algeria 
10.0 
7.1 
2.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4.7 
Arab 
Gulf 
10.0 
3.6 
2,2 
20.0 
0.0 
0.0 
5.9 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
η 
60 
56 
45 
25 
42 
S 
236 
Source: Household survey (C=0.670**) 
Within France, migrants from the Todgha are concentrated within a small number of cities. 
The Paris region is the primary destination, attracting one third of all migrants to France. 
For the total number of migrants in 1998, the relative distribution per destination was not available from 
official figures, and has been derived from the household survey. As the household survey does not pretend to 
be fully representative of the entire valley (see section 3.4.3), it should be considered as a rough estimate, which 
aims to detect the main trends in migration—i.e., the growing importance of countries outside France as new 
destinations—instead of pretending to give an exact, numerical assessment. 
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Minor destinations in northern and central France are Strasbourg, Nancy, and Blois. However, 
two thirds of all Todgha migrants live in southern France. The second most important 
destinations are Montpellier and Nice, which both attract almost one quarter of all migrants'2. 
Toulon accounts for 8 percent of all migrants, and Lyon, Nîmes each for 2-3 percent of all 
migrants to France. Other destinations in the south include Cannes, Saint-Tropez, Marseilles, 
Grenoble, and Toulouse. 
The surveyed villages are generally "specialized" in migration towards one or two 
European cities. The majority of migrants from Zaou'ia stay in Paris and its suburbs, whereas 
the majority of the migrants from other villages stay in southern France. The tendency 
towards southern cities such as Montpellier and Nice is particularly strong among the Ait 
'Atta villages of Tadafelt and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul. Within the Netherlands, most migrants 
have settled in Amsterdam and its suburbs. A small concentration of migrants from Ait El 
Meskine can be found in the Amsterdam suburb of Diemen. Some Ait 'Atta migrants from 
Tadafelt, however, have settled in the town of Alkmaar13. 
It is less clear where recent migrants to Spain, Portugal, and Italy have settled, as 
many migrants have not settled down in one particular place, or because their interviewed 
relatives did not know where they exactly lived. However, within Spain, most migrants seem 
to go the agricultural areas in Catalonia (in or around the cities of Barcelona and Girona), but 
recently also to "cashcropping areas" in Andalusia around places like El Ejido. In Italy, most 
seem to go to the southern agricultural areas (Mezzogiorno). In Portugal, most seems to find 
employment in construction work in Lisbon and also Porto. 
In order to detect differences in "migration stage" between villages, table 6.6 analyzes 
the relative "recentness" of participation in international migration. The table confirms that 
migration from Tadafelt is relatively recent compared to other villages, with an average 
length of stay abroad of 8 years. Ait El Meskine and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul seem to have the 
oldest migration history. In both villages, more than 40 percent of all currently abroad and 
returned migrants have stayed at least 30 years abroad. Table 6.6 again confirms the 
intermediate positions of Tikoutar and Ikhba, and that Zaou'ia has the second highest 
proportion of recent migrants after Tadafelt. Furthermore, it is sinking that Ghallil n'Ait 
Isfoul has not sent international migrants in recent years. The reason for this is not clear. 
Table 6.6. Length of stay abroad of current and returned international migrants 
Village 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
0-4 
36.2 
16.7 
13.3 
40 
35 7 
0.0 
22.5 
5-9 
155 
185 
11 1 
24 0 
38 1 
0.0 
19.9 
Length 
10-19 
10.3 
14 8 
44 
24.0 
14.3 
28.6 
13 0 
of stay 
20-29 
25.9 
37.0 
24 4 
24 0 
11.9 
28.6 
25 5 
in years (%) 
>30 
12 1 
130 
46 7 
24 0 
00 
42.9 
19 0 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
13 8 
174 
23 6 
19 1 
79 
25 9 
16.4 
η 
58 
54 
45 
25 
42 
7 
231 
Source: Household survey (C=0.483**; η=0.445**) 
The village level data reflect general migration patterns in the valley, with relatively centrally 
located and Ait Todoght villages intensively participating in early migration to Algeria and 
France, and isolated villages—of which Tadafelt is a typical example—showing a recent 
12
 For the Todgha as a whole, Montpellier and, to a lesser extent, Nice are the most important destinations 
During the summer holiday season, this it is easy to observe as Tinghir abounds with cars carrying license plates 
from those regions. 
13
 Tadafelti wenl to Alkmaar to work in the local milk factory. 
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increase in migration to new destinations in southern Europe. More in general, we can witness 
a diversification of migration strategies (relay migration, family formation, undocumented 
migration) and migration destinations over the past two decades of the twentieth century, in 
which France has lost its former dominant position as the principal destination for new labor 
migrants. However, due to significant migration in the "Golden Age" of migration, France 
remains the prime country of residence of currently abroad and family migrants. 
6.3.5. General overview 
Figure 6.3 shows the evolution of the number of primary labor migrants from the entire 
Todgha valley residing abroad (i.e., migrant stocks) over the second half of the twentieth 
century. It clearly shows that after Algerian independence, international migration decreased 
for a while, before rapidly increasing again in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The combined 
effects of relay migration, family formation, and undocumented labor migration to traditional 
and new destination countries explain why international labor migration did not come to a 
virtual end after the 1973 Oil Crisis, and even showed a certain intensification in the 1990s 
due to the increasing involvement of Ait 'Atta in migration to Spain, Italy, and other 
countries. 
The figure shows that the number of migrants has been constantly increasing since the 
international migration boom in the late 1960s. If we look at the number of labor migrants 
abroad as a percentage of the total population, we see that this has only slightly decreased 
since the 1970s. In fact, throughout the second half of the twentieth century, labor migration 
has remained remarkably persistent. According to official statistics, international labor 
migrants accounted for 6.0 percent of the total population of the Todgha in 199814. Thus, 
although labor migration among the Alt Todoght has decreased due to their increasing 
reliance on family reunification and family formation, this effect has been largely 
counterbalanced by the sharp rise in international migration to new destinations among Aft 
'Atta. 
Figure 6.3. Absolute and relative number of international labor migrants (1954-1998) 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Sources: Own calculations based on qaidat Tmghir; Büchner 1986; National Censuses 1971,1982,1994 
It should be noted that the actual migration participation rates for the whole valley are possibly lower than this 
estimation, as data for the center of Tinghir were not available for 1998. The estimated migration participation 
rate for Tinghir in 1998 has been derived from the migration participation rate among the entire Ait Todoght. 
However, it is likely that the participation rate in international migration in Tinghir has decreased more rapidly 
than in the other fractions, as Tinghir is an immigration destination. 
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6.4. Internal migration 
6.4.1. The generalization and diversification of internal migration 
Notwithstanding the international migration boom in the second half of the twentieth century, 
internal migration has continued to play an important role. As with international migration, 
however, there have been changes in the nature of internal migration and migration 
destinations. First, the importance of seasonal migration of agricultural laborers (mainly 
harvest workers) fell drastically in the decades after independence. Between 1954 and 1975, 
the share of Todghawis participating in seasonal migration dropped from 6.4 to 0.7 percent of 
the total population. In the same period, the relatively long-term rural-to-urban migration to 
cities dropped from 5.5 to 3.4 percent, but remained almost stable in absolute numbers 
(Büchner 1986). The relative decrease is possibly related to exceptionally high and accessible 
international migration in that period, which might have siphoned off many potential internal 
migrants. 
No secondary, valley-wide data are available on the evolution of internal migration 
between 1975 and 2000. In 1999, internal migrants represented 7.7 percent of the surveyed 
population. Although we should remain prudent about using the village data to make valley 
level generalizations, this possibly indicates that internal migration has remained important in 
the post-independence period, and has possibly even increased in recent decades. Internal 
migration has become a common experience for most young men—and, increasingly, 
women—and has become the rule rather than the exception. Less than one third of households 
(29.4 percent) have never participated in internal migration, and many households contain 
several current or returned internal migrants. Besides a diversification of internal migration 
motives—with education playing an increasingly important role—there has also been a 
diversification in migration destinations. 
Table 6.7 shows the destinations of current and returned internal migrants in the 
research villages, and indicates that the large cities in western and southwestern Morocco 
attract about fifty percent of all migrants. Although Rabat-Salé is the most important 
destination with about 15 percent, it is striking that Casablanca and the southwestern cities of 
Marrakech and Agadir also attract considerable numbers of migrants. Compared to the period 
before 1970, these southwestern cities have grown in importance as migration destinations. 
Furthermore, migration to nearby destinations within the Province of Ouarzazate 
(notably the rapidly expanding town of Ouarzazate, the provincial capital) and Errachidia has 
recently increased. The proportion of current migrants within southern Morocco ( 16 percent) 
has almost doubled as compared to returned migrants. The main reason for this increase 
seems to be the rapid development of various smaller and medium-sized towns within the 
Presaharan region. These include oasis centers which are more or less comparable to Tinghir, 
such as Ouarzazate, Zagora, Kelâa M'Gouna, Boumalne de Dadès, Tinejdad, Errachidia, and 
Erfoud. This process of micro- and meso-urbamzation in southern Morocco (see section 4.4) 
has created non-agricultural employment opportunities, notably in the construction and 
service sectors. 
The Middle Atlas has traditionally been an established destination for seasonal harvest 
workers, construction workers, and well diggers from the Todgha. The relative proximity of 
this relatively humid region probably plays an important role in this historical preference. 
Moreover, the Todghawis feel ethnically and culturally close to the Middle Atlas. For 
instance, they both speak similar versions of Tamazight Berber. Although important ethnic 
differences remain, the Middle Atlas is generally considered as far less "strange" than 
Map 3. Principal international and internal destinations of the surveyed population (in % of all migrants) 
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western, predominantly Arab, Morocco, which is literally perceived as "another world", 
especially among older generations. 
Table 6.7. Main destinations of current and returned internal migrants 
Destination 
Casablanca 
Rabat-Salé 
Marrakech 
Agadir 
Other west-Morocco 
West Morocco 
Province of Ouaivarate 
Errachidia 
Other south-Morocco 
South Morocco 
Itinerant 
Internal migrants (%) 
Current Return All 
97 
18.4 
15.3 
10.8 
1.4 
55 6 
9.4 
2.4 
38 
15 6 
4.9 
39 
132 
11.2 
132 
4 6 
46 1 
4.6 
1.3 
2.6 
86 
66 
77 
166 
13 9 
11.6 
2.5 
52.3 
77 
2.0 
3.4 
13 2 
55 
Destination 
Boumia 
Aghbala 
Azaghar 
other Middle Atlas 
Middle Atlas 
Fes/Meknes 
Nador 
Tétouan 
Bcrkane 
other north Morocco 
North Morocco 
Total 
η 
Internal 
Current 
3 1 
1 0 
0 7 
3 1 
8.0 
1 4 
69 
38 
1.0 
2.8 
16.0 
100 0 
288 
migrants ( 
Return 
1.3 
3.3 
33 
9.2 
17 1 
13 
4 6 
6.6 
4 6 
4.6 
21 7 
100 0 
152 
%) 
All 
25 
1 8 
1 6 
52 
;/ ; 
1.4 
6.1 
4 8 
2 3 
34 
18 0 
100 0 
440 
Source: Household survey 
However, there has been a decrease of migration towards the Middle Atlas since the 1950s 
(Büchner 1986). This seems to be corroborated by the fact that whereas 17 percent of the 
returned internal migrants went to the Middle Atlas, this is the case for only 8 percent of 
current migrants. The main explanation for the declining importance of migration to the 
Middle Atlas seems to be the decreasing need for harvest workers due to agricultural 
mechanization and the more rapid economic development in the cities of western and 
northern Morocco. It seems that migrants who do not intend to migrate far away now 
generally prefer to migrate to the urban centers within the provinces of Ouarzazate and 
Errachidia, where they can find employment too. The northern cities of Fes and Meknes 
attract only a few migrants from the Todgha. 
In addition to the traditional destinations in the Middle Atlas and at the Atlantic coast, 
the boomtowns of the Rif region have also become increasingly important destinations. 
Towns such as Nador, Berkane, Al Hoceima, and Tétouan, which are located in or around the 
Rif Mountains, attract around 18 percent of all internal migrants. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
migration to these cities was negligible. Migration to the northern cities is a recent 
phenomenon, and can principally be explained by the extremely rapid growth of these cities. 
In particular, the construction boom has created a high labor demand, which has attracted 
people from more distant regions since the 1970s. Interestingly, the growth of these cities has 
been propelled by the investments of international migrants from the Rif (cf. Berriane 1996, 
1997). In this way, investments by international migrants who left the region have generated a 
counterflow of internal migrants to the region. 
It should be stressed that not all internal migrants have a fixed destination when they 
leave. Although migrants generally know their destination on departure—generally a place 
where they already know family or friends who can help them—they might change plans in 
case they cannot find suitable work or experience other problems there. However, most 
eventually settle, at least temporarily, in one particular town. Nevertheless, there remains a 
category of truly itinerant migrants, especially ambulant traders. Although such itinerant 
migrants probably used to be rather numerous, they currently represent only about 5 percent 
of all internal migrants. 
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Table 6.8 shows the historical evolution of internal migration from the research 
villages. Besides confirming the general trends described above, it shows more clearly that 
the most important recent shifts are the declining importance of migration to the Middle Atlas 
and the increased importance of migration to Marrakech and Agadir. One third of all migrants 
who left between 1995 and 1999 went to these southwestern cities, whereas Casablanca, 
Rabat, and Salé have remained relatively stable, attracting about one quarter of all migrants. 
Table 6.8. Destinations of internal migrants by year of departure 
Penod 
<1980 
1980-1989 
1990-1994 
1995-1998 
Total 
Casablanca/ 
Rabat/Sale 
20.0 
31.3 
21.7 
27.3 
25.8 
Marrakech 
and Agadir 
8.9 
188 
42 5 
33.3 
29.9 
Destination 
South 
Morocco 
15 6 
104 
92 
19 3 
13.9 
(%) 
Middle 
Atlas 
33.3 
20 8 
33 
53 
11.4 
North 
Morocco 
22 2 
188 
23 3 
14 7 
190 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
η 
45 
96 
120 
150 
411 
Source: Household survey (C=0.375**) 
6.4.2. Intra-valley differentiation in internal migration patterns 
As table 6.9 indicates, there are significant differences between the research villages 
concerning the spatial orientation of migration. Zaou'ia distinguishes itself from other villages 
by its strong migration orientation to regions north of the Todgha, that is, the Middle Atlas 
and the cities in northern Morocco. It is also the only village with a sizable migrant 
population in Fes and Meknes. Possible explanations for this preference might be the 
historical function of Zaouïa as a religious-marabutic center and its close links with tribes 
living in the Middle and High Atlas mountains. Also in geographical terms, Zaouïa is located 
in the Atlas rather than in the southern Presahara. During the yearly pilgrimage, pilgrims 
coming from the Atlas used to visit Zaouïa to venerate the the saint Sidi 'Abdelali. What also 
seems to play a role is that the igurramen of Zaouïa possess land in those areas, which they 
originally received as religious donations. 
Internal migrants from Tikoutar are concentrated in Marrakech and Agadir. No less 
than two thirds of all internal migrants from Ait El Meskine live in Rabat/Salé. Despite its 
proximity to the latter village, only 18 percent of migrants from Ikhba live in Rabat-Salé. 
Ikhba has the highest concentration of migrants working in northern Morocco. Internal 
migration from Tadafelt is predominantly oriented to the southern part of the country, with 40 
of all migrants working in Marrakech and Agadir and no less than 26 percent in the provinces 
of Errachidia and Ouarzazate. Only 7 percent of all migrants from Tadafelt work in the 
Middle Atlas or northern Morocco. Of all the research sites, internal migrants from Tadafelt 
tend to travel the least far. Migrants from Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, in contrast, tend to work in 
Rabat. 
For many migrants, internal migration functions as a precursor to international 
migration. International migrants tend to migrate within Morocco before going abroad. 
Interviews and conversations revealed that youngsters aiming to enter Europe illegally via 
Spain—and lacking money or network contacts to access alternative ways to migrate—often 
leave their homes to work in the towns or the agricultural plains of the North as day laborers. 
They do so with the explicit aim of saving enough money to pay smugglers for the "illegal" 
crossing of the Mediterranean. Others try to obtain work or tourist visas legally with 
European embassies and consulates in large cities. 
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Table 6.9. Destination of current internal migrants by village 
Village 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghalhl n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
Source: Household 
Casablanca/R 
abat/Salé 
14 1 
26.7 
66.7 
175 
27.0 
58 3 
29.6 
survey (C=0.53i 
Marrakech 
and 
I**) 
Agadir 
12.5 
40 0 
23.1 
32 5 
40.4 
83 
28.8 
Destination 
South 
Morocco 
18.8 
133 
5.1 
5.0 
25.8 
167 
16.4 
(%) 
Middle Atlas 
21.9 
67 
26 
5.0 
3.4 
8.3 
84 
North 
Morocco 
32 8 
13.3 
2.6 
40 0 
34 
8.3 
16.8 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
η 
64 
30 
39 
40 
89 
12 
274 
6.4.3. The recent rise of student migration 
Another, and relatively new form of internal migration, is the increasing number of young 
Todghawis studying in the big cities of Morocco, most notably in Marrakech and Agadir1. 
This form of migration played a minor role before 1980, and only started to gain momentum 
after the first secondary school in Tinghir—which was established in 1977—started to turn 
out certified pupils. However, it was only after the establishment of several new secondary 
schools and the generalization of education in the 1990s that student migration really gained 
ground. The household survey indicated that virtually nobody above 40 had migrated 
internally with the primary objective being to study. For the 35-39 year olds, 3 percent had 
left the Todgha to study. About 5 percent of the 30-34 year old internal migrants are studying, 
while this is the case for about 22 percent of the 25-29 year olds, and 38 percent of the 20-24 
year olds! Although student migration is predominantly internal, each year some succeed, 
against all odds, in enrolling at French, Dutch, and sometimes German universities. As higher 
education enrollment has become one of the scarce means with which to obtain residence 
permits, some prospective labor migrants seem to revert to this strategy in order to enter 
Europe. 
One could argue at length as to whether to consider student migration as "true" 
migration. However, this debate seems less interesting than to acknowledge the increasing 
significance of this type of mobility as well as the fact that student migration is often closely 
interwoven with, and ftinctionally related to, internal and international labor migration. First, 
several international migrants who have not opted for family reunification and left their 
household members in Morocco send their sons to university m order to build a better future 
in Morocco (for further analysis, see section 9.5). Second, it frequently happens that two or 
three brothers working as internal labor migrants in town enable their younger brother(s) to 
continue their studies in the same town in which they are working. 
Third, student migration often evolves into labor migration. Besides the fact that some 
students work part-time or during summer holidays, most students end up working or looking 
for work in the towns or cities as the employment possibilities for highly educated people in 
the Todgha are limited. Moreover, the experience of moving to and living in a big city for 
several years has a fundamental impact on tastes, perceptions, and aspirations, which makes it 
difficult to readapt to living in the Todgha. Student migration can therefore be seen as the first 
Admission procedures for Moroccan universities and other institutions for higher education tend to place 
students as closely as possible to their region of origin. Consequently, most students from the Todgha study in 
Marrakech and Agadir. Some attend the teacher training college in Ouarzazate, and a minority study in other 
towns such as Rabat 
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step towards long-term labor migration, since most do not return definitely, and end up 
staying in towns or moving abroad. 
The recent rise of student migration is a good example of how development and 
migration can be reciprocally and positively correlated. The incorporation of the Todgha into 
the modem state and the concomitant development of an education infrastructure has not only 
contributed to changes in mentality and rising aspirations among younger generations, but the 
establishment of secondary schools has also created an increasing demand for subsequent 
higher education. Therefore, improved education—which is highly "developmental" beyond 
any doubt—seems to have increased both the aspirations and capabilities of people to 
migrate. This seems in line with transitional migration theory discussed in chapter 2, which 
predicts that social and economic development, in its initial stages, tends to lead to an 
increase of out-migration instead of the reverse. 
One of the reasons for extending the number of schools in rural areas is to prevent 
young pupils and entire families from moving to urban areas, in the context of the national 
policy to slow down the exode rurale. In the short-term, the establishment of schools may 
indeed help to stem the tendency of people to migrate to the regional towns in order to allow 
the primary and secondary education of children within the household. However, in the longer 
term, the effects of better education seem to increase migration both indirectly (socio-cultural 
change) and directly (the search for higher education and qualified jobs). Whether and why 
this should actually be considered as a negative development—as seems to be the dominant 
opinion among policy makers—is quite a different matter. 
6.5. Significance of internal and international migration in the 
research villages 
Table 6.10 reveals to what extent the surveyed villages have been involved in internal and 
international migration. At first sight, percentages might appear quite low with international 
migrants, international return migrants and internal migrants representing 3.9, 2.3, and 7.7 
percent of the total population, respectively. However, these migrants form 11.4, 3.6, and 22.0 
percent of the active male population (age 16-65), respectively. Another 11.0 percent are 
returned internal migrants. The fact that nearly half of the total active male population has 
been involved in some kind of migration gives a taste of the all-pervasive character of this 
phenomenon in the Todgha. 
Table 6.10 reveals that the villages of Aft El Meskine and Tadafelt are the most 
heavily involved in current international migration, with around 14 percent of the active male 
population staying abroad. All other villages have around 9-10 percent of their active 
population working abroad. However, if we look at international return migrants, inter-village 
differences become more clear-cut. Tikoutar, Zaouia, and Ait El Meskine have the highest 
proportion (i.e., 4 to 6 percent) of returnees. The same figures are around 1-2 percent for the 
other villages. For Tadafelt, this probably reflects the relatively recent character of 
international migration in this Ait 'Atta village. For Ikhba and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul these low 
percentages are more difficult to explain. It might be the combined effect of the relatively 
lower migration from these villages (Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul in particular) and a relatively strong 
tendency among returnees to resettle in Tinghir or in places within or outside the Todgha. 
If we add up current and returned international migrants, it becomes evident that Ait 
El Meskine has participated most intensively in international migration. Zaouia, Tikoutar, and 
Tadafelt have exhibited lower, but comparable levels of participation in international 
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migration. It is important to note that the first two villages have older migration traditions 
than Tadafelt, which counts many men who recently migrated to Spain and other destinations, 
and very few return migrants. Ikhba and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul have participated less heavily m 
international migration. 
Table 6.10. Migrants as percentage of the total and active male population, by village 
Village % of total population and (males between 16-65 year) 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
r. isolation index 
r. distance to Tinghir 
Internationa 
1 
3 4 (10.0) 
3.8 (9.7) 
5.4 (14.8) 
3.3 (9.9) 
4.3 (13.5) 
3.4 (8.6) 
3.9 (11.4) 
-0196' 
0100* 
Returnees 
3.4 
3.6 
30 
1.3 
0.6 
0.5 
23 
(4.6) 
(5.8) 
(3.7) 
(1.9) 
(1.9) 
(1.4) 
(3.6) 
-0 695' 
-0 798' 
All internat 
6.9 (14.6) 
7 4 (15.5) 
84 (185) 
4.6 (11 8) 
4.8 (15.4) 
3.8 (10.0) 
62 (15 0) 
-0 642' 
-0 603' 
Internal 
8.9 (23.9) 
4 3 (11.7) 
7 3 (19 6) 
7 3 (22.4) 
10.5 (34.0) 
5.8 (14 3) 
7 7 (22 0) 
0 857* 
0 777' 
Total 
15.8 
11.7 
15.7 
11.9 
153 
9 6 
139 
(38 5) 
(27.2) 
(38 1) 
(34 2) 
(49 4) 
(24 3) 
(37 0) 
0 269' 
0 229' 
η 
870 
768 
537 
547 
869 
208 
3,799 
Source: Household survey (C=0.374**) 
The correlation ratios between the isolation index and the relative occurrence of several types of 
migration reveals a strongly negative relationship between the isolation index and the level of 
return migration. If we interpret return migration as an indicator of relatively "mature" migration, 
this corresponds with the findings derived from table 6.3. A relatively high level of isolation has 
generally retarded involvement in international migration. Furthermore, the positive correlation 
between the isolation factor and the occurrence of internal migration suggests that villages that 
have participated less in international migration have concentrated relatively heavily on internal 
migration. Nevertheless, as we will see, international and international migration are not 
negatively correlated and, in particular in the longer term, tend to form "communicating vessels". 
Comparing the data at the village level with the official migration statistics from 1998 
presented in table 6.10, we see that the data do not always correspond. This might be partially 
the result of the non-random nature of the village sample or due to differences in data 
collection and household definitions2. Whereas 6.0 percent of the total population stayed 
abroad in 1998, according to official statistics, this is 3.9 percent of the total population of the 
surveyed villages. However, if we include 2.3 percent of returned international migrants, this 
share increases to 6.2 percent. 
However, the intra-valley spatial differentiation in migration participation detected in 
both data sets is similar. While Ait Todoght villages such as Ait El Meskine, Ikhba, Zaouïa, 
Tikoutar, but also Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, reached the height of their "international migration 
cycle" in the 1970s, Tadafelt only became significantly involved in international migration 
after 1980. With this, it clearly followed the general pattern of isolated Ait 'Atta villages, 
whose populations started to explore migration paths in (southern) Europe only relatively 
recently. Put in the terminology of transitional migration models, Tadafelt entered its "early 
adopters" phase of its "mobility transition" only recently, which is possibly related to the 
relative poverty and isolation that characterizes this village. 
2
 In collecting information for official migration statistics, no strict and a generally "looser" household definition 
seems to be used The mqaddemm and shiukh—who often have little if any formal education—themselves draw 
up lists of households and migrants in their villages It seems that these lists tend to comprise a number of 
households that have departed from the valley altogether, due to family reunification, which have not been 
included in the survey for this research. Nor have international return migrants been separately recorded from 
current migrants. This might also explain the higher migration participation rates found in official statistics. 
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Looking at internal migration, we see this is even more clear-cut than for international 
migration. With one third of all active men living and working outside the village, Tadafelt is 
most involved in internal migration. Zaou'fa and Ikhba both score relatively highly with about 
one quarter of the active male population having migrated internally. Aft El Meskine, Ghallil 
n'A'it Isfoul and, in particular, Tikoutar are far less involved in internal migration. Tikoutar is 
the only village where international migrants exceed the number of internal migrants. This 
might be related to the fact that Tikoutar is at a walking distance from Tinghir. Many 
villagers work in Tinghir, and do not need to migrate in order to find a job. Due to this 
proximity, the advantages of living in Tinghir are less evident than for inhabitants of more 
distant villages. 
Considering the total number of migrants, we see that Tadafelt is currently the most 
heavily involved in migration. In contrast to other villages, migration, and international 
migration in particular, is of a predominantly recent character in this village. Zaou'ia and A'it 
El Meskine are the second most involved in migration, the main difference being that Zaou'ia 
counts a relatively large number of internal migrants and that A'it El Meskine has intensively 
participated in international migration. Ikhba equally has a relatively old tradition of 
international migration, but has participated less than A'it El Meskine, and is more active in 
internal migration. Tikoutar and Ghallil n'A'it Isfoul score lowest, which is mainly due to their 
low involvement in internal migration. 
It is important to observe that internal and international migration are not negatively 
correlated. Villages, lineages, and households with many international migrants do not 
contain proportionally lower percentages of internal migrants, and vice versa3. Moreover, 
adopting a temporal perspective, both types of migration seem positively related. To a certain 
extent, they even form "communicating vessels". Especially in the longer term, internal and 
international migration seem to be positively rather than negatively correlated. 
First, internal and international migration seem to be part of the general process in 
which regions are integrated into broader economic and political contexts. Second, both forms 
of migration often reinforce each other over time. The very process of internal migration 
tends to facilitate subsequent international migration in material, mental and informational 
terms. Internal migration often functions as a first stage and precursor to international 
migration. We have seen that many international migrants first moved to the coastal cities of 
Morocco, from where they "leapfrogged" to Europe. Although such migrants have been 
enumerated as "international migrants", they were internal migrants before. Conversely, 
international migration may lead to internal migration through its effects on family relocation, 
student migration, and urban-based investments (see chapter 9). This corroborates the 
theoretical notion that internal and international migration are part of the same general 
development process that has increased mobility. 
At the village level (n=6), the (insignificant) correlation ratio between current internal and international 
migrants is 0 17. However, the low absolute number of villages should make us extremely cautious. At the level 
of the lineage (ighs, n=35), the (non significant) correlation between internal and total international migrants is 
0 05 At the household level, the correlation between the number of internal and international migrants is -0.13, 
and is significant at the 0.01 level. This slightly negative correlation probably reflects the distinct place of 
internal and international migration within the household lifecycle In fact, international migrants tend to start 
their "migration career" as internal migrants 
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6.6. Activities, migration duration, and return migration 
6.6.1. Activities of internal and international migrants 
There is a remarkable degree of stability in the activity patterns of migrants over the past 
decades. Table 6.11 shows the professions of internal migrants from the Todgha in 1954. As 
we can see, almost 40 percent of internal seasonal migrants worked as construction workers, 
either in traditional adobe architecture or in the modem construction sector. In the same year, 
10 percent gained their living as street or ambulant traders. The phosphate industry in 
Khouribga attracted 6 percent of the migrants. The remaining 34 percent mainly worked in 
the service-oriented sector in the big cities, notably Rabat. About 10 percent of the non-
seasonal migrants were working as agricultural laborers, sharecroppers, khettara, and well 
diggers, mainly in the rural plains of western Morocco. 
Table 6.11. Professions of internal, non-seasonal migrants from the Todgha (1954) 
Traditional sector % Modem sector % 
Well diggers 2.2 
Adobe bnck layers 19.0 
Other traditional crafts 1 6 
Akhemmes (sharecropper) 5 7 
Ambulant trade 9 7 
Fqih (religious teacher) 0 3 
Water earner 0.2 
Phosphate industry Khouribga 6 0 
Construction workers 19 6 
Agricultural laborers for colons 2 4 
Diverse (Rabat m particular) 33 2 
Total 38 7 
429 
61 3 
679 
Source: French army's archives in Paris-Vincennes cited in Büchner (1986:116) 
Almost four decades later, the surveyed internal migrants m the research villages were still 
predominantly working in construction and diverse jobs in the informal service sector 
(guards, domestic servants, gardeners, catering, and so on). As table 6.12 demonstrates, 
workers in these sectors account for over 50 percent of all surveyed internal migrants. The 
overwhelming majority of internal migrants do semi- and unskilled work in the informal 
sector and they tend to earn irregular wages of between 40 and 70 dirham4 per day. 
An importance difference with the 1950s is the number of migrants who primarily 
migrate for education purposes. Accounting for 22 percent of all internal migrants, they form 
the second internal migrant category. A relatively wealthy and highly skilled "elite" 
comprising teachers, other civil servants, and private-sector professionals form a third 
category of internal migrants. Representing only 7 percent of all internal migrants5, they 
enjoy relatively stable jobs and eam higher salaries compared to other internal migrants, who 
mostly survive on the basis of uncertain and badly paid jobs in the informal sector. 
International migrants, even more than nonmigrants and internal migrants, tend to be 
concentrated in the construction industry, in which more than half of them are working. 
About 15 percent work in agriculture (particularly those working in Spain and Italy), and 14 
percent in diverse service jobs. However, important differences exist according to the 
In 1999, the average value of 1 us$ was equal to 9 8 dirham 
5
 Civil servants and professional workers only represent 2 percent of the surveyed active nonmigrant population 
This seems to reflect the low demand for such personnel in Todgha's economy, which is primarily oriented 
towards semi- and unskilled jobs. However, the survey is not representative in the sense that it has not surveyed 
urban households living in Tinghir town. It might well be that there is a greater proportion of professional 
workers or civil servants among its population. 
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destination country. Among French migrants, 60 percent work in construction, whereas no 
one in the Netherlands is working in this sector, where migrants are more oriented towards 
the service sector. Half of all southern European migrants work in agriculture, and almost all 
others in the construction sector. Migrants to Libya and Saudi-Arabia, finally, predominantly 
work in services and construction. 
Table 6.12. Current primary activity of males (16-65) by migration status (1999) 
Primary activity 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Civil serv/professional 
Service sector 
Student 
Other 
Not working 
Total 
η 
Nonmigrant 
16.2 
13.7 
9.1 
9.6 
1.1 
15 5 
24 0 
1 3 
95 
100 0 
613 
Current 
Internal 
5.0 
27.9 
6.5 
5.7 
6.9 
24 4 
22 1 
0 0 
1 5 
100 0 
262 
Migration status (%) 
Current 
International 
14.7 
51.5 
1.5 
6.6 
0.0 
14.0 
2.9 
0 0 
88 
100 0 
136 
Returned 
internal 
98 
25 6 
68 
75 
75 
18.8 
3.0 
08 
20.3 
100.0 
133 
Returned 
international 
14.0 
25.6 
14.0 
2.3 
0.0 
4.7 
0.0 
23 
37 2 
100.0 
43 
Total 
12.7 
22 9 
7.6 
7.9 
2.9 
17.3 
17.9 
0.8 
9 9 
100.0 
1,187 
Source: Household survey (C=0.442**) 
Among the surveyed international migrant population, no one is working as a civil servant or 
professional worker, reflecting their generally low education or, in case of recent migration to 
southern Europe, "illegal" status. Migrants working in the "classic" destination countries such 
as France and the Netherlands often have relatively well paid and stable jobs, and those 
migrants without a job (9 percent) tend to receive social security benefits. Nevertheless, 
recent, often undocumented migrants m southern Europe generally live and work under more 
difficult circumstances, although payment is still superior to what they could have earned in 
Morocco. 
Construction was and remains the most typical occupation of migrant workers from 
the Todgha, although a shift from traditional to modem construction has occurred. The first 
explanation for this pattern seems to be the high demand for high semi- and unskilled labor in 
the construction sector, which has been booming at a rapid rate ever since the colonial era. 
Yet, the orientation towards the building industry might also be partly attributed to the 
historical specialization of Todghawis in traditional adobe construction (cf. Büchner 1986). 
Table 6.13 reveals the activity patterns of current internal migrants, differentiating 
between destination regions. It confirms that over half of all migrants to northern Morocco are 
primarily active in the construction industry of the booming migrant towns in this region. The 
declining share of migrants to the Middle Atlas are primarily active in agriculture 
(sharecroppers, agricultural workers, or on own land), reflecting traditional patterns of 
seasonal migration to this region. Migrants within southern Morocco form a very diverse 
group, in which service sector workers, students, and traders dominate. Furthermore, the table 
reveals that half of all migrants to Marrakech and Agadir are students, whereas most others 
work in the service sector and construction. The large coastal cities of Casablanca and Rabat-
Salé form the only destination with a relatively large share ( 10 percent) of civil servants and 
professional workers. Other migrants to this region are primarily active in the service or 
construction sectors. 
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Table 6.13. Primary activity of current internal migrants (all ages) by migration destination 
Primary activity Destination (%) 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Civil si profess. 
Service sector 
Student 
Other 
Not working 
Total 
η 
Source: Household 
Casablanca/ Marrakech and South Morocco 
Rabat/Sale 
25 
23 8 
25 
5.0 
10.0 
33 8 
150 
50 
2.5 
100.0 
80 
survey (C=0.585**) 
Agadir 
1 3 
27 8 
0.0 
38 
38 
127 
49.4 
0.0 
1.3 
100 0 
79 
6.7 
11.1 
15.6 
2.2 
89 
33 3 
20.0 
0.0 
2.2 
100.0 
45 
Middle Atlas North Morocco 
30.4 
13.0 
8.7 
8.7 
4.3 
8.7 
8.7 
8.7 
8.7 
100.0 
23 
22 
54 3 
4.3 
10.9 
2.2 
23 9 
22 
0.0 
0 0 
100 0 
46 
Total 
5 1 
27 1 
48 
55 
62 
23 8 
23 1 
2.2 
22 
100 0 
273 
6.6.2. Length of stay and migration duration 
Internal migration generally involves less risks and costs than international migration. Internal 
migration also allows for a far greater deal of flexibility than international migration. Some 
internal migrants remain away for years, others return several months per year. This mainly 
depends on the availability of jobs. Most internal migrants work in the informal sector, and 
their jobs are generally of the irregular type. 
In traditional seasonal migration, which persisted in the colonial era, migrants stayed 
in the Todgha during agricultural peak seasons (harvest of dates and other fruits as well as 
ploughing in autumn, and cereal harvest, threshing, and date pollination in spring). Outside 
this period, they looked for work in the large-scale cereal-growing areas of the western fringe 
of the Middle Atlas or in the Moulouya Plain. Nevertheless, this seasonal migration seems to 
have lost almost complete ground to more long-term, rural-to-urban migration. Table 6.14 
displays the number of months that migrants have stayed away over the last 12 months (for 
current migrants) or during the last year of migration (for returned migrants). 
Although internal migrants tend to come back for longer periods per year, their 
average stay outside the Todgha is 8 months, and less than one third stay away for less than 6 
months. Reasons to return can be unemployment, social obligations, or other economic 
activities at home, notably in agriculture. Among international migrants, the mean number of 
months they stay abroad annually is somewhat inferior to 10. This figure is lower than 
expected, as summer holidays generally last between 4 and 8 weeks, and certainly not all 
migrants return each year. 
The high average stay in Morocco can be explained by the long period spent in 
Morocco by a category of relatively aged international migrants who still officially reside 
abroad, but who no longer work. This group of unemployed, disabled, or retired migrants 
generally lives on social security benefits, and some of them tend to commute between 
Europe and Morocco, where they stay for longer periods. Some of these truly "transnational 
commuters" are active in trade activities in which they bring consumer goods or cars from 
Europe, and take back from the Todgha local products such as olive oil. Other migrants give 
people rides back to Europe or smuggle undocumented migrants across the Gibraltar Strait in 
their transits. 
M a p 4. I m m i g r a t i o n and intra-valley m i g r a t i o n 
(Gorges) 
Short-distance relocation of residence 
(towards roads and urban centres) 
* φ Villages 
ATLAS MOUNTAINS 
Tamtetoucht, Ait Hani, etc. 
-Zaouia 
Inmigration 
Tinejdad, Errachidia, 
Northern Morocco 
2,5 km 
I 
Tiliouine 
SAGHRO MOUNTAINS (Alt ATTA) • 
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Although numerous international migrants gain an additional income by trading goods and 
transporting people during summer holiday, this has become a veritable way of life for 
some—generally older—migrants. A number of transits commute between the Todgha and 
Montpellier on a weekly basis'. 
Table 6.14. Number of months of absence during last year of migration 
Return migrant type 
Internal migrant 
International migrant 
Returned internal migrant 
Returned international migrant 
Total 
0-3 
10.6 
3.3 
9.1 
3.4 
7.8 
Absence in 
4-6 
19.2 
6.0 
15.2 
8.0 
14.0 
months dunng last year 
7-9 10-12 
38.4 31.8 
14.7 76.0 
33.9 41 8 
17.2 71.3 
29.5 48.7 
of migration (%) 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
Mean 
7.8 
98 
80 
9 6 
8.5 
« 
292 
150 
165 
H7 
694 
Source: Household survey (C=0.354**; η=0.313**) 
Notwithstanding the predominantly non-seasonal character of contemporary migration, the 
total duration of internal migration tends to be relatively short compared to international 
migration. Table 6.15 shows that over half of returned internal migrants have returned within 
six years of departure. The number of internal migrants who stay more than 19 years in 
another town or city without reunifying their families is limited to about 10 percent. Lengths 
of stay vary considerably and can be very irregular, and principally depend on whether and 
for what period work is found. Just like international migration, access to relatively stable 
employment may eventually lead to family reunification, that is, the transfer of the entire 
household to town. 
The average stay of international migrants is generally much longer. Over 70 percent 
of the international return migrants stayed more than 7 years abroad, and the average stay 
abroad lasts 18 years. Those who return earlier are generally migrants to Arab oil countries 
and undocumented migrants to southern Europe who were either expelled or did not find 
satisfactory employment. 
Table 6.15. Total migration duration of internal and international migrants 
Migrant type 
Current internal migrant 
internal without students 
Current inlemalional migrant 
Returned internal migrant 
without students 
Returned international migrant 
Total 
0-3 
37.5 
34 8 
17.4 
24.7 
29 5 
13.4 
27 2 
4-6 
179 
12 4 
17.4 
32 0 
17 1 
14.6 
20.6 
Total length of stay (c 
7-18 
36 5 
42 4 
22 8 
30.7 
36.2 
195 
30.0 
>19 
8 1 
10 5 
42 3 
127 
17.1 
52 4 
22.2 
54) 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 
75 
«5 
157 
82 
94 
177 
10 8 
η 
285 
210 
149 
150 
105 
82 
666 
Source: Household survey (C=0.413**; η=0.403**). 
6.6.3. Return migration 
Figure 6.4 displays the age on return of internal and international return migrants. The age 
profile of internal return migrants is clearly far younger than that of their international 
1
 Such "commuters" seem to be primarily migrants living in southern France The relatively short distance from 
Morocco to Mediterranean cities such as Montpellier and Nice (e.g., about one day's travel from Gibraltar 
compared to at least two days to northern France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) might partly explain this 
phenomenon. 
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counterparts. While the mean age of all return migrants is 38, it is 32 for internal returnees 
and 48 for international returnees. However, if we take the mode as measure of central 
tendency, we come out at the 25-29 and 60-64 age categories, respectively, as the typical age 
on return. This confirms that internal and international migration occupy distinct places in the 
household life cycle (see section 7.3.1). It is not possible to make a precise assessment of the 
proportion of internal and international migrants who eventually return, since we do not know 
the number of migrants who have entirely left the Todgha due to family reunification. These 
migrants have literally gone out of sight. 
Figure 6.4. Age on return of internal and international return migrants 
15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70-
19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 
age 
Source: Household survey (η=0.502**) 
For Morocco as a whole, the majority of international migrants to Europe have eventually 
reunified their families at the destination. This also seems to be the case for the Todgha. 
Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of international migrants has not decided to reunify 
their families and have eventually returned. They make up 3.6 percent of the total research 
population. In addition, we must mention a substantial group of semi-returnees or 
"transnational commuters", especially in France, who were described in the previous section. 
Two thirds of the current returnees returned in the 1990s (see also figure 6.1). However, early 
return migration has probably been much higher than the tables indicate due to the death of 
earlier returnees. Nevertheless, there seems to be a recent increase, which corresponds with 
the aging of the first generation migrants who left to Europe during the migration boom of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Three decades after the Oil Crisis, the first generation of European migrants is 
approaching the age of (pre-) retirement. Those who reunified their families in Europe 
generally do not return, not in the least because their children (who were mostly raised and 
educated in Europe) and spouses (who generally enjoy more rights and "freedoms" abroad) 
often oppose the idea. The limited social and economic opportunities in Morocco and the 
integration of migrants' children in Western European society explain why the expectation of 
return has turned into a myth for most migrants. However, the minority who did not decide to 
Despite the fact that the "integration" of Moroccans is seen as problematic by many Europeans, it should not 
be ignored that, in Moroccan eyes, migrants" children have become westernized to a large degree. The 
overwhelming majority of the "second generation" youth, who generally speak better French or Dutch than 
Berber or Arabic, feel so alienated from everyday Moroccan society that they cannot imagine living in Morocco. 
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transfer their families during the family reunification wave in the 1980s, returned in the late 
1980s and 1990s. Early return migrants generally came from Algeria, and ten percent of 
recent returnees have worked in Libya and, to a lesser extent, Saudi-Arabia. Migrants to Arab 
oil countries are generally not allowed to stay and work on temporary contracts. 
6.7. Immigration, intra-valley migration, and demographic effects 
6.7.1. The Todgha and Tinghir as migration destinations 
In the preceding sections, we have seen that out-migration to both internal and international 
destinations has been a constant feature of the Todgha valley over the twentieth century. 
However, it is important to observe that people are not only leaving the region, but that the 
Todgha has also become an increasingly important destination for migrants from other 
regions. Furthermore, there are distinct patterns of intra-valley migration linked to spatially 
differentiated economic and infrastructural development across the valley. 
The concentration of services, public amenities, and economic activities in Tinghir has 
attracted an increasing number of people from outside the Todgha. These immigrants 
generally settle down in the new quarters southwest of central Tinghir (e.g., Bougafer, Wafa, 
Tichka). Recently, the semi-urban cluster around Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim and Taghzout has 
developed into a secondary destination, in particular for A'it 'Atta from outside the Todgha. 
The majority of these immigrants seem to be Ait 'Atta from the Saghro Mountains 
south of Tinghir (e.g., Ait El Farsi, Alnif, Ikniouen). The migration or "descent" of the Ait 
'Atta from the Saghro mountains to the Todgha valley has deep historical roots, and the Aft 
'Atta immigration is in fact a continuation of a historical migration wave that started several 
centunes ago (see section 6.2.1). Increasing numbers of Ait 'Atta from the Saghro are now 
settling in the new quarters of Tinghir—which almost form Ait 'Atta enclaves in Ait Todoght 
territory—in the semi-urban cluster of Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim and Taghzout, or as agricultural 
pioneers in the Ghallil plain. Non-Ait 'Atta immigrants tend to come from the High or Middle 
Atlas (notably Ait Hani, Tamtetoucht, Imilchil, Rich, and Midelt) or from other oases such as 
Tinejdad, the Tafilalt, and the Drâa valley. Although their origins are diverse, the majority of 
immigrants speak Tamazight Berber, which facilitates their integration in the Todgha. This 
ethnic affiliation might well be one of the reasons why they choose the Todgha as their 
destination, in the same vein as Todghawis show a historical preference to migrate to 
Tamazight-speaking areas in the Middle Atlas. 
Most immigrants are unskilled or low skilled and tend to work in the same sectors as 
nonmigrant Todghawis (i.e., construction, informal service sector, small manufacturing 
industries, and so on). However, among the newcomers are also prostitutes (mainly from the 
Middle Atlas), beggars, and a category of street kids who gain their marginal living as 
shoepolishers and cigarette vendors (mainly from the Drâa valley), and young men working 
as tourist touts. The relatively educated professionals working as civil servants, 
schoolteachers, gendarmes, and in other highly skilled jobs (such as the engineers working in 
the nearby mine of Imiter) make up an entirely different category of immigrants. Often 
coming from western Morocco and speaking Arabic, they tend to form separate communities 
of berraniyin ("outsiders") in the Todgha displaying relatively urban and "modem" lifestyles 
in this rather conservative society. 
A minority of immigrants do not settle in Tinghir, but in or around some of the 
villages. These are often ex-nomads from relatively distant regions such as Aghbala, 
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Tazzarine, and the Drâa. The immigrants often work for relatively wealthy villagers—among 
whom many international migrants—as agricultural laborers, well diggers, and guards. In 
some villages, such as Zaou'ia in the upper Todgha and Boutaghat in the lower Todgha, 
immigrants have settled in the ancient, small, but relatively cheap ighrem habitat, which have 
been largely abandoned by their original inhabitants. Such re-occupation of igherman by 
relatively poor immigrants is also taking place in the historical center of Tinghir. 
Besides migration from other areas to Tinghir, processes of intra-valley migration are 
further contributing to the urban growth of Tinghir and, to a lesser extent, the Taghzout-A'ft 
Aïssa Ou Brahim cluster. The availability of public amenities and the employment 
opportunities attract people from more isolated villages to Tinghir, with its construction 
activities, various services (shops, restaurants, coffeehouses, hotels, téléboutiques), 
automobile repair shops, and the numerous workshops of carpenters and welders. Many 
villagers earn an additional income in Tinghir. 
In villages located near Tinghir or along paved roads, such as Tikoutar, workers tend 
to commute between the villages and Tinghir. This is increasingly turning the villages around 
Tinghir into "dormitory villages", where most adult men are absent during daytime. People 
who live in more distant villages, such as Zaou'ia or Tadafelt, tend to stay overnight in 
Tinghir, obliging them to stay with family, rent an apartment, or construct a house. In the 
longer term, this often leads to the permanent settlement of the migrants and their households 
in Tinghir. Besides employment, living in Tinghir has several other advantages, such as the 
concentration of shops and markets and the presence of banks, administrative services, water 
and sewage systems, secondary schools, medical services, and direct road connections to 
Errachidia and Ouarzazate. 
6.7.2. Immigration, intra-valley migration, and population growth 
Unfortunately, there are no valley-wide empirical data available on immigration and intra-
valley migration. Nevertheless, on the basis of an analysis of spatially differentiated 
population growth within the Todgha, we can at least formulate tentative conclusions on the 
direction and magnitude of these migration flows, and the extent to which out-migration has 
affected population growth. In section 5.6.1, we saw that the population of the Todgha valley 
more than tripled over the second half of the twentieth century. It seems that these high 
growth rates cannot be attributed to natural increase only. In particular because the Todgha 
has been a region of out-migration too, the fact that the valley shows an above-average 
growth can only be explained by a significant counterflow of immigrants. 
Between 1982 and 1994, the mean annual population growth of the Todgha was 2.8 
percent, as compared to 2.2 percent for the entire Province of Ouarzazate (1.1 percent in rural 
areas, 9.2 percent in urban areas). Table 6.16 highlights the significant intra-valley differences 
in population growth. Although all four municipalities doubled their populations at least 
between 1952 and 1994, the municipalities of Tinghir and Taghzout have shown far higher 
growth rates than Todgha El Oulya and Todgha Es-Soufla. The two latter municipalities 
reached the peak of their population growth, and have witnessed a slowing down in 
population growth since 1982, especially in Todgha El-Oulya, where the population has 
virtually stagnated. 
The high population growth of Tinghir and Taghzout should primarily be seen in the 
light of the attraction of the urban and semi-urban centers located in these municipalities for 
migrants from relatively remote villages within and outside the Todgha. Between 1982 and 
1994, the growth of the municipality of Tinghir was 230 percent, and given its sheer size, the 
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rapid urban growth of Tinghir contributed most in absolute numbers to the total population 
increase. With more than 30,000 inhabitants in 1994, the municipality of Tinghir accounts for 
half of the population of the entire Todgha3. 
Table 6.16. Population growth in the municipalities of the Todgha (1952-2000) 
Municipality Year 
Todgha El Oulya 
Tinghir 
Todgha Es-Soufla 
Taghzout n'Ait Atta 
1952 
2,804 
9,226 
4,976 
3,252 
1971 
3,774 
14,498 
7,054 
6,091 
1982 
5,686 
18,247 
11,686 
8,481 
1994 
5,953 
30,471 
13,594 
11,695 
2000 (projected) 
6,087 
36,583 
14,548 
13,302 
% incr. 1982-
1994 
112 30 
230 27 
173.19 
259 62 
Total Population 20,258 31,417 44,100 61,713 70,520 204.64 
Sources: Own calculations based on national Censuses 1971,1982,1994; and Büchner 1986 
An even more spectacular growth has been realized in Taghzout n'A'it Atta, with an increase 
of 260 percent in 42 years. This population growth cannot only be explained by the 
development of the semi-urban cluster around Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim-Taghzout, but also by the 
agricultural colonization of the Ghallil plain, which has entailed immigration of A'it Todoght 
and Art 'Atta from the Saghro. Moreover, the highest fertility levels in the Todgha are found 
among the Ait 'Atta (see table 6.17). 
Todgha El Oulya and Todgha Es-Soufla, on the contrary, are characterized by 
stagnating population growth, in particular since 1982. Migration to these rural municipalities 
is very limited, and the natural growth seems to be largely counterbalanced by migration to 
Tinghir and destinations outside the valley. The phenomenon of almost zero growth in 
Todgha El Oulya can probably also be explained by the combined effects of relatively low 
fertility, the lack of space for house construction, and the high land prices in this narrow part 
of the valley. This has stimulated people to construct new houses in Tinghir or other locations 
in the lower Todgha. 
An analysis of the population growth at the village-level reveals the following general 
trend: The closer to Tinghir, the more rapid the population growth. The slowest growers arc 
Tizgui and the more marginal Ait 'Atta villages, such as Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul and Taghia. The 
most rapid grower is the actual urban center of Tinghir (312 percent between 1952 and 1994). 
In the 1982-1994 period, the differences in growth between different parts of the valley have 
become more pronounced than before. "Rural" areas such as Tizgui, Art Snane, and 
Amzaourou witnessed almost zero or negative growth, compared to mean annual growth rates 
of 16.0 percent for Tinghir center and 6.6 percent for Taghzout. This clearly reflects national 
patterns of slowing rural growth, accelerating urban growth and, in particular, the process of 
"micro-urbanization" of the rural space (see section 4.4). 
Over the past century, immigration, emigration, and intra-valley migration have 
occurred simultaneously, and this has contributed to the rather spectacular growth rates of the 
3
 It should be noted that the municipality of Tinghir also comprises neighboring villages, which are being 
"swallowed" more and more by expanding Tinghir These villages account for more than half of the population 
of Tinghir. 
* Administrative divisions have changed over time. In this table, we have used the current administrative 
boundaries Data from older censuses were available at the village or at least the fraction level It was therefore 
possible to recalculate these data on the basis of current administrative divisions. Although the villages of 
Achdad, Tadafelt and Taghia belonged to other, non-Todgha, municipalities during the 1971 (1,523 people) and 
1982 (1,965 people) censuses, their population in these years has been included in order to properly assess 
population growth Population estimates for 2000 have been based on extrapolations based on the 1992-1984 
population growth rates within each municipality. 
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municipality of Tinghir. At the valley level, immigration has at least kept equal pace with out-
migration over the past half century. In conclusion, with half of the population living in urban 
or semi-urban environments, and the function of Tinghir as "migration interface", it would 
not be appropriate anymore to refer to the Todgha as a typically "rural" region or as a region 
of out-migration only. 
6.7.3. Demographic transition and migration 
The population of the Todgha is predominantly young. According to the 1994 census (see 
table 6.17), about 44 percent of the total population were under 15 years old. However, the 
population of the lower Todgha municipalities of Todgha Es-Soufla and, in particular, 
Taghzout n'Ait Atta is clearly younger than in the upper Todgha. In the same vein, the 
approximate fertility rates are significantly higher at levels of around 6 children per woman, 
compared to 3.5 in the upper Todgha communities. From this spatial gradient in fertility 
levels, it can be hypothesized that the demographic transition is relatively less advanced in the 
poorer, isolated, and generally "less developed" lower Todgha as compared to the upper 
Todgha. 
Throughout Morocco, birth rates drastically fell in the final two decades of the 
twentieth century, and the country continues to be in full demographic transition (see section 
4.6). The age pyramid of the entire surveyed population indicates a rapid drop in birth rates 
over the past decade (figure 6.5). This confirms that the demographic transition has also 
affected the Todgha, which corroborates empirical evidence from other regions in Morocco 
(cf. De Haas 1998; Taouil 2001). 
Table 6.17. General demographic characteristics of the Todgha (1994) 
Municipality 
Population 
Households 
Mean household size 
Age i true ture 
< 15 year 
15-59 year 
>60 year 
Fertility (children per woman) 
Todgha El 
Oulya 
5,953 
819 
7.27 
38.3 
53.1 
8.6 
3.52 
Tinghir 
30,471 
4380 
6 96 
43 1 
50 8 
6.1 
3.85 
Todgha Es-
souffla 
13,594 
1735 
7.84 
47.3 
45.6 
7.1 
5.29 
Taghzout 
n'Ait Atta 
11,695 
1606 
7.28 
47 9 
44.8 
73 
6.16 
Total 
61,713 
8540 
7.23 
445 
48.7 
68 
4.57 
Source: Own calculations based on the 1994 national census; qaidat Tinghir 
A comparison of data from the 1994 census (table 6.17) and the 1999 household survey (table 
6.18) seems to give additional evidence of a progressing demographic transition, although we 
should remain prudent in comparing two different research populations. In 1999, 34 percent 
of the surveyed population were under 15 years old, as compared to 44 percent for the entire 
valley in 1994. Whereas in 1994, well over 40 percent of the population were under 15 years 
old in all municipalities except for Todgha El Oulya, this proportion was less 40 percent in all 
surveyed villages in 1999—even including Tadafelt. Simultaneously, the number of young 
adults has significantly increased over the 1990s. 
Table 6.18 also reveals that villages with the most ancient international migration 
traditions (Ait El Meskine and Tikoutar in particular) tend to exhibit the oldest age profiles, 
that is, seem more advanced in their demographic transition. This seems to corroborate 
transitional migration theory and Zelinsky's mobility transition theory in particular, which 
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makes a direct connection between the "vital" and demographic transition and the occurrence 
of particular forms of migration. However, we do not know exactly to what extent the 
relatively old age profile is also the effect of sustained out-migration and family reunification 
in particular, which generally implies the departure of families with young children. 
Table 6.18. Age structure of research villages including labor migrants (1999) 
Village 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafell 
Ghallil η Ait Isfoul 
<15 year 
33.5 
31.1 
28.9 
37.0 
39.4 
30.4 
15-59 year 
55.8 
59.5 
64.6 
57.1 
52.8 
63.8 
Aue p-oup 
>60 
Co) 
year 
10.7 
9.4 
6.5 
5.9 
7.X 
5.8 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
η 
871 
766 
537 
5-16 
HÖH 
207 
Total 34.0 57.7 100.0 3,795 
Source: Household survey 
Figure 6.S. Age pyramid of research population and labor migration (1999) 
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The age pyramid in figure 6.5 reveals that a large part of the adult male population is absent 
due to labor migration. It displays the typical age structure of regions of heavy out-migration, 
which are generally characterized by a population structure in which women and children 
dominate. It also shows that labor migration is largely reserved for men. Most women who 
migrate do so in the context of family reunification, and disappear from the statistics since 
"departed households" have not been included in the survey. Reflecting a national trend, the 
age pyramid also seems to indicate a rapidly decreasing birth rate over the 1990s, 
Within the Moroccan context, it has been argued that the massive out-migration of 
young people and subsequent family migration may cause a considerable slow down in 
demographic growth at the regional and local level (Kerbout 1990). Nevertheless, the oft-used 
term "rural exodus" is clearly misleading in the case of the Todgha. Like most "rural" areas in 
Morocco, the Todgha has witnessed a net population increase over the past century. As the 
previous section indicated, permanent out-migration (largely through family reunification or 
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formation at the destination) has been counterbalanced by natural population growth, return 
migration, and immigration 
6.8. Who migrates? The selectivity of migration 
6.8.1. Introduction 
As was argued in chapter 2, the question of migration selectivity is of fundamental importance 
to any analysis of migration and development In order to assess the impact of migration, it is 
important to know whether and to what extent migration is a selective process, and to what 
extent this selectivity has changed over time Migrants are rarely representative of their 
communities of origin Both within the international and Moroccan context, it is commonly 
assumed that migrants form the "most motivated, most dynamic and youngest" (Lahlou 
1996 331) sections of the population of origin Thus, according to this hypothesis, male, 
single individuals between 20 and 35 years of age have the highest propensity to migrate both 
internally and internationally (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998 113, Hearing and Van der Erf 
2001, Lipton 1980) Individuals with higher education exhibit a higher migration probability 
in internal migration For international labor migration from rural areas, insignificant or 
significantly negative selection effects are found (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998) 
Based on the assumption that a certain threshold of wealth is generally required to 
bear the risks and opportunity costs of migration, both internal and international migrants do 
not tend to come from the poorest households measured in terms of land possession and 
income prior to migration (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998, Ghatak and Levine 1994, Hearing 
and Van der Erf 2001) Moreover, there is growing awareness that access to migrant networks 
is an essential factor in internal and, particularly, international migration decisions (Bauer and 
Zimmermann 1998, Hearing and Van der Erf 2001 7) It has been often presumed that 
migration becomes less selective over time due to network effects, although selectivity might 
increase again in the "late adopters stage" of migration (Jones 1999) 
In this section, we will assess whether actual migration from the surveyed villages 
complies with the above-mentioned hypotheses on selectivity First, we will examine the 
extent to which tribal affiliation and membership of a particular ighs (the ethnic lineage at 
village level) affects migration participation Second, we will analyze to what extent 
migration has been selective concerning gender, age, and education Third, we will see how 
"traditional wealth", as reflected by land possession pnor to migration, has affected the 
participation of individuals in internal as well as international migration 
6.8.2. From nomads to migrants: The Ait 'Atta mobility transition 
Migration from the Todgha is charactenzed by a strong ethnic differentiation, whereby, until 
recently, the Ait Todoght have participated far more intensively than the Ait 'Atta in both 
internal and international migration Members of this semi-nomadic tribe hardly participated 
in Algerian migration The Ait Todoght were predominantly involved in the migration boom 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s Although they partly caught up in the 1970s, it was only in 
the 1980s and 1990s that the Ait 'Atta started to participate more intensively in international 
migration 
The Todgha Mobility Transition 191 
Table 6.2 already indicated that the Ait Todoght participated most intensively in 
migration to Algeria. In 1954, the mean migration participation rate for the Ait Todoght was 
8.2 percent, with percentages varying from 6.2 percent for Tinghir and 13.2 percent for the 
Amzaourou fraction. In contrast to these relatively high figures is the low migration 
participation among the Ait 'Atta, with only 1.9 percent migrants in Algeria, and no migrants 
in France at all. In the following two decades, the Ait 'Atta caught up to a certain extent, with 
their participation rate rising to 4.5 percent in 1975, compared to 8.5 percent among the Ait 
Todoght (excluding El Hart) . The less isolated villages along the main road, such as Ait 
Ai'ssa Ou Brahim and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, in particular accounted for this increase. Only few 
people from more remote Ait 'Atta villages (such as Tadafelt) migrated abroad. 
The survey data seem to confirm this image. Figure 6.6 shows the period of departure 
of intemational migrants within the research population, differentiated for the main ethnic 
groups of imazighen and haratin (both within the Ait Todoght) as well as the Ait 'Atta6. First, 
the figure exemplifies that imazighen and, to a lesser extent, haratin, migrated relatively 
early, and that 78 percent of the surveyed Ait 'Atta migrants moved abroad after 1985. 
Figure 6.6. Year of departure of international migrants within main ethnic groups 
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Source: Household survey (Tl(year of departure dependent)=0.326**) 
The differences between Ait Todoght and Ait 'Atta become more significant if we analyze 
this at the household level. Figure 6.7 displays the year of departure of the first international 
migrant within all the households participating in intemational migration. In this way, we 
exclude network and intergenerational (relay) migrants and focus on the year in which 
households first became involved in intemational migration. It confirms that imazighen 
exhibit the most mature intemational migration history and that the Ait 'Atta migration boom 
is comparatively recent. 
Generally, the same partem seems to hold for intemal migration. In 1954, only 0.7 and 
2.7 percent of the Ait 'Atta participated in seasonal and rural-to-urban migration, 
respectively, compared to 7.6 and 6.5 percent of the Ait Todoght (see table 6.19). Therefore, 
both intemal and intemational migration were low among the Ait 'Atta. This further 
corroborates the hypothesis that intemal and intemational out-migration constitute 
"communicating vessels", in particular in the longer term. Instead of being negatively 
5
 To calculate these percentages, the numbers of migrants were divided by interpolated population figures, based 
on the mean annual growth rate between the 1971 and 1982 censuses. 
6
 These percentages have been calculated through dividing the number of migrants by the interpolated 
population figures of the class medians (1960, 1968, 1979, and 1989). 
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correlated, both forms of migration seem positively correlated, and part of the same 
development process leading to a general increase in mobility. 
Figure 6.7. Year of departure of first international migrant within main ethnic groups 
<1965 1965-1971 1972-1985 1986-1999 
Source: Household survey; Tl(date of first departure dependent)=0.478**) 
Table 6.19. Participation in internal migration by ethnic group (1954 and 1975) 
Ethnic group Seasonal (harvest) worker Long term rural-urban 
1954 1975 1954 1975 
AitTodoght 7.61 0.70 6.52 3.37 
Ait 'Atta (^68 (^ 61 ^68 3.31 
Total 639 O;^ SAI 3.36 
Source: Büchner 1986 
In 1975, participation in internal migration was almost equal between the two groups. This 
was in the time before international migration gained momentum among the Ait 'Atta, and 
this might support the hypothesis that internal migration is often a precursor to international 
migration. This illustrates the importance of adopting a "temporal" perspective in migration 
analysis. The data from the household survey presented in figure 6.8 equally point to the 
relatively late participation of Ait 'Atta in internal migration, although the association 
between ethnicity and year of departure is less strong compared to international migration. 
In contrast to the Ait 'Atta, the Ait Todoght started to participate in both internal and 
international migration at an early stage. As we have seen, it is only since the 1980s that the 
Ait 'Atta have caught up, and now seem to participate even more intensively in labor 
migration than other groups. The low number of international return migrants7 also indicates 
that Ait 'Atta migration is still in the build-up phase or, in Jones' (1999) terms, the "early 
adopters" stage of its migration cycle. This confirms the general image that the Ait 'Atta are 
at an earlier phase of their "migration transition" and are currently experiencing a "migration 
hump" (cf. Martin and Taylor 1996), with many people leaving and few return-migrants. 
Furthermore, the Ait Todoght and Ait 'Atta have developed rather distinct migration 
itineraries, with the Ait Todoght focusing on destinations in northwestern Europe and the Ait 
'Atta focusing on "new" destinations in southern Europe. 
The question is now how to explain this inter-ethnic difference in migration history. 
First, it seems that there is some kind of relationship between the relative isolation of most 
Ait 'Atta and their "lagged" participation in contemporary forms of labor migration. As has 
7
 International return migrants represent 0.6 percent of the total population among the Ait Atta, against 3.5 and 
2.1 .percent among haratin and imazighen, respectively. 
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been argued before, most Ait 'Atta remained relatively isolated compared to most Ait 
Todoght, which "opened up" to the outside world earlier (see chapter 5). It seems that the 
infrastructurally and politically marginalized Ait 'Atta held on longer to their traditional semi-
nomadic livelihoods. 
Figure 6.8. Year of departure of internal migrants within main ethnic groups 
Source: Household survey (Tl(year of departure dependent)=0.176**) 
Second, as Monsaingeon (1947:1) argued, the stronger tribal cohesion and inward orientation 
among the Ait 'Atta might partly explain their low propensity to participate in "modem" labor 
migration. What might have played a role too is the hostile attitude of many Ait 'Atta towards 
non-Art 'Atta in general, and the colonial state and Moroccan makhzen in particular. Third, 
the generally low level of development and high incidence of poverty probably played an 
important role in explaining the initially low migration participation among Art 'Atta. This 
would be in line with the argument of transitional models presented in chapter 2 that the 
relationship between poverty and migration is non-linear, and that a certain level of social and 
economic development is generally required to migrate. Before the 1970s, most Ait 'Atta 
seemed too poor and too isolated to migrate. 
This sustains the idea that the poorest most isolated are not prone to migrate, but those 
with access to certain material resources, information, and political power. In the same vein, 
areas that are isolated in infrastructural terms do not exhibit the highest migration rates. From 
this, it can be hypothesized that the Ait Todoght were in a relatively advanced position in 
contrast to most Ait 'Atta. 
From Zelinsky's (1971:230-1) perspective of the "mobility transition" (see section 
2.2), one could argue that, until the late 1970s, most Art 'Atta were still in the phase of the 
"pre-modem traditional society", and most Art Todoght in the phase of "early transitional 
society". In terms of Martin and Taylor (1996), the Ait 'Atta are in an earlier phase of their 
"migration hump". However, as has been argued in chapter 2, the fundamental weakness of 
Zelinsky's model seems to be the assumption that pre-modem traditional societies were non-
mobile. Certainly among the semi-nomadic Art 'Atta, mobility has always been a constituent 
part of their livelihoods. However, as has also been argued in chapter 2, there is a 
fundamental distinction between traditional types of migration and present-day forms of 
migration based on wage labor and remittances, which are strongly linked to the process of 
modernization and capitalist expansion. 
Thus, what the Art 'Atta are experiencing is the transition from a pre-modem form of 
mobility {transhumance, settlement, and resettlement through tribal warfare and conquest) to 
a strikingly different form of mobility—labor migration—which is a modernist phenomenon 
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per se In this sense, Zelinsky's model—in a modified form—still seems to have considerable 
analytical strength in interpreting and understanding the incorporation of traditional peasant 
societies into modem (internal and international) migration systems Zelinsky's model and 
related transitional approaches can help to comprehend the spatially and ethnically 
differentiated evolution of migration in the Todgha In this perspective, the Ait Todoght of the 
upper and middle Todgha were incorporated into modem migration systems at an earlier stage 
than the Ait 'Atta of the lower Todgha 
6.8.3. Kinship and the unequal access to migrant networks 
We have seen that by differentiating on ethnic background, patterns of migration vary 
considerably This points to the importance of networks in migration The vast majority of 
prospective migrants already know someone at the destination Consequently, the 
"coincidental" destination of pioneer migrants from a particular community tends to 
determine to a great extent the destination of later "chain" migrants In a predominantly tribal 
area such as the Todgha, people tend to gain access to migration networks kinship bonds This 
is not only the case at the tribal level (e g, the strongly differentiated migration patterns of 
Ait 'Atta and Ait Todoght), but also at the level of the lineage and extended family 
It seems primarily the presence of migrants within the extended family and, to a lesser 
extent, the lineage and village, which determines the chances of prospective migrants to 
migrate successfully Migration networks seem especially crucial for international migration, 
which involves increasingly higher costs and risks due to the increasingly restrictive 
European immigration policies As social organization and trust is mainly based on kinship 
ties, it is also the main channel for obtaining assistance in obtaining residence papers, 
housing, and work Moreover, migrants, including their children, tend to prefer to marry 
partners within their own extended family or the own ethnic lineage 
It is therefore not surprising that the data analysis reveals a high differentiation in 
migration participation between different lineages (ighsan, see chapter 4) within the same 
village Some (extended families within) lineages are far more heavily involved in migration 
than others are, and migrants from the same lineage tend to be concentrated in specific 
destinations Especially for international migration, the participation rates per lineage are 
widely diverging For instance, whereas both in Ait El Meskine and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, only 
two lineages account for more than one third of all villagers working abroad, five lineages do 
not count any international migrants at all Out of the 35 different lineages within the villages, 
only 7 comprise more than 50 percent of all current international migrants 
In figure 6 9, Lorenz curves have been drawn They show the distribution of 
international migrants at the lineage level, differentiating between migrants who left before 
and since 1980 The figure shows the degree of inequality of the frequency distributions of 
the cumulative percentages of the total population of all lineages (x-axis) plotted against the 
cumulative percentage of all international migrants (y-axis) The graph clearly shows that the 
relative distribution of international migrants over lineages is unequal Only four (out of 35) 
lineages representing 6 percent of the total population account for more than 21 percent of all 
the international migrants who have left since 1980 On the other hand, 14 lineages 
representing 17 percent of the population do not contain any international migrants at all, and 
the 50 percent of the population concentrated in the "migration-poor" lineages account for 
only 15 percent of all international migrants 
On the basis of network theory, one would predict the increasing diffusion of 
international migration participation over the past few decades However, the figure shows 
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that the distribution of international migration participation measured at the lineage level did 
not become less unequal after 1980. For migration before 1980, the Gini index is 0.463, for 
migration after 1980 the Gini index is 0.471. Thus, inequality in access to international 
migration has not decreased. The "international migration capital" has apparently remained 
concentrated within certain lineages. The importance of such kinship networks has become 
even more important due to the increasing legal barriers to migration. 
Figure 6.9. Lorenz curves for participation in international migration at lineage (ighs) level before and 
since 1980 
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Although kinship networks are of great help in migrating, they also tend to be exclusionary. 
This points to the so-called "downside of social capital", put forward by Portes and Landolt 
(1996) to criticize uncritical and fashionable applications of the concept of social capital as a 
"key to success and development". As the authors argue, popular views now portray social 
capital as wholly beneficial with no significant downside, and thereby naively assume that 
social capital can resolve the classic dilemmas of collective action. However, social capital 
also has possible negative implications. Membership of a community brings demands for 
conformity, which may be asphyxiating to the individual spirit, and tight social networks and 
obligations may undermine economic initiatives through pressing social obligations to 
support family and community members. However, for the present analysis the most relevant 
"downside" of social capital is that "the same strong ties that help members of a group often 
enable to exclude outsiders" (Portes and Landolt 1996:3). 
In the arena of migration research, social capital in the form of access to migrant 
networks tends to be invariably seen as an unmixed blessing facilitating the migration of more 
and more community members. However, such reasoning not only becomes circular as 
migration seems to go on ad infinitum (Massey et al. 1998:48, see section 2.3.3), but also 
ignores internal socio-ethnic differentiation within migrant sending communities. In the 
Todgha, migration networks may be to the benefit of people belonging to lineages and 
extended families containing international migrants, but they also entail the exclusion of those 
outside these groups. The predominantly kinship-based access to migrant networks implies 
that although current migrants may indeed act as "bridgeheads" for prospective migrants 
within the same family and lineage, they also act as "gatekeepers", who are unwilling to assist 
non-kin or only agree to do so in return for a high (bride) price (see section 2.3.3.). 
before 1980 
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Moreover, lineages—and extended families within them—tend to keep the "migration 
capital" within their own group through endogamous mamage8 Thus, kinship-based access to 
migrant networks also leads to inequality in access to such networks This also explains why 
the supposed "diffusion" of migration over village communities—as predicted by migration 
network theory and transitional models—remained largely limited to particular lineages and 
extended families within them who monopolize access to international migration systems 
6.8.4. Gender, age, and migration 
The desire to emigrate is no longer only the reserve of men, but it has also contaminated more 
and more young females who, regarding the state of fragmentation of the majonty of families, 
and the atmosphere surrounding the current debate on the feminine condition, no longer 
hesitate to go abroad (translation from Fadloullah et al 2000 95) 
As this quotation illustrates, independent labor migration by women is highly frowned upon 
by large sections of Moroccan society Until recently, independent migration by women— 
except for a limited number of students to France and some other countries—was very 
limited However, over the 1990s, female migration was no longer exclusively a corollary of 
male migration Although the vast majority of women still migrate within the scope of family 
reunification or formation, one seventh of the Moroccan women surveyed by Fadloullah et al 
(2000 95) migrated because of work 
The proportion of independent female migrants from Morocco seems to be on the nse, 
both internally and internationally (Fadloullah et al 2000, Hnaka 1999, Refass 1990 225) 
The majonty of these independent female migrants seem to be single or divorced (Costanzo 
1999, Hnaka 1999) This is a remarkable development, as Moroccan women have to 
overcome important economic, social, and cultural obstacles to migrate on their own This is 
possibly related to the increasing education of women and their partial social and economic 
emancipation in Moroccan society 
Until recently, virtually all labor migrants from the Todgha were men Women were 
generally not allowed to migrate independently, and only migrated in the context of family 
migration However, recently a small but increasing number of women have been 
participating in internal labor migration Independently migrated women make up 3 percent of 
all the surveyed internal migrants (see table 6 20), but the actual number is probably higher 
due to underreporting Although internal migrant women work as civil servants or 
schoolteachers, most work in unskilled industrial or service sector jobs in the towns and 
cities Moreover, with the improving education of women, an equally small but increasing 
number of female student migrants left the valley over the 1990s 
Some respondents reported that one of their daughters worked as a domestic servant in 
the large cities Such migration of domestic servants is a widespread phenomenon in Morocco 
(see chapter 4) Nevertheless, sending unmamed daughters away to work in this occupation is 
generally considered hshuma (shameful), which may have caused considerable 
underreporting—so the actual number of female labor migrants may be higher Nor do we 
know the number of divorced or widowed women that have entirely left the Todgha with or 
without their children 
As in Morocco in general, the number of independent female labor migrants from the 
Todgha seems to be increasing Independent international labor migration by women is still a 
Endogamous mamage—within the lineage—is still the dominant form of mamage in the Todgha, although 
' simultaneous exchange" of mamage partners between members of different lineages also occurs 
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rare phenomenon in the Todgha. The 8.5 percent of international migrant women reported in 
table 6.20 are either students, or migrants' children who recently married nonmigrant men, 
who had not yet joined their spouses in Europe. 
Table 6.20. Gender and independent migration participation 
Migration status 
Internal migrant 
International migrant 
Male 
97.2 
91.5 
Female 
2.8 
8.5 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
η 
282 
165 
Source: Household survey 
Migrants all over the world tend to be predominantly young. The migrants of the Todgha are 
no exception to this rule, although there are differences according to migration type and 
period of departure. Figure 6.10 demonstrates how the average age on departure of migrants 
(above 15 years) has evolved throughout the post-colonial era. The data reveal that internal 
migrants have generally migrated at a significantly lower age (23.3 on average) than 
international migrants (27.4 on average). This can be explained by the fact that the economic, 
social, and legal obstacles to internal migration are relatively low, and this is in line with the 
assumption that internal migration often precedes the "leapfrogging" to international 
destinations. 
However, one notable exception to this pattern occurred over the 1960s and the early 
1970s, when internal migrants tended to be older than international migrants. This might 
possibly be explained by the fact that this was the period of direct labor recruitment, which 
made it relatively easy to migrate directly from the Todgha abroad. Moreover, the exceptional 
circumstances of the shortage of unskilled labor in Europe and permissive immigration 
regulations (residence papers were easy to obtain) probably lowered the costs and risks of 
migration to such an extent that migration became accessible for broad sections of the 
population. 
Figure 6.10. Average age on departure of internal and international migrants by decade 
<1960 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 
Source: Household survey Cntage on departure dependent)=0.222**) 
From figure 6.10 and table 6.21, we can infer that the average age on departure of 
international migrants has remained remarkably stable over the past decades at levels of 
between 27 and 28 years. Nevertheless, there have been some changes in the internal age 
distribution. The proportion of international migrants under 20 years old has slightly 
increased in recent years, largely to the detriment of the 20-29 age group. Almost fifty percent 
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of all international migrants were in their twenties on departure, and only 7 percent were older 
than 40 This corroborates earlier observations by Refass (1995 208), who stated that more 
than half of the international migrants from Morocco were between 20 and 29 years old 
However, the mean age on departure has hardly changed over time and the differences are 
insignificant This seems not to be in line with observations by Fadloullah et al (2000 xv,74) 
who argued that recent international migrants from Morocco tend to depart at a younger age 
than before 
Table 6.21. Age on departure of international labor migrants by period of departure 
Age on 
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
>45 
Total 
η 
Mean 
departure 
Before 1970 
13 
11 5 
24 4 
24 4 
167 
11 5 
9 0 
13 
100 0 
78 
27 9 
Pen od 
1970-1989 
14 
11 1 
29 2 
194 
22 2 
13 9 
14 
14 
100 0 
72 
27 3 
Since 1990 
5 1 
152 
165 
25 3 
177 
127 
5 1 
25 
100 0 
79 
27 3 
Total 
2 6 
12 7 
23 1 
23 1 
188 
127 
52 
17 
100 0 
229 
27 5 
Source: Household survey (nfage on departure dependent)=0.037I) 
Table 6 22 shows that the average age on departure for internal migrants has significantly 
decreased from 32 in the 1960s to 23 in the 1970s and 1980s, after which it has remained 
stable However, figure 6 10 (in section 6 8 4) already revealed that the age on departure 
before the 1960s was at the same level as now Thus, it seems that this increase in average age 
on departure in the 1960s was temporary The relatively easy access to international migration 
in the late 1960s migration boom, which temporarily absorbed a large number of migrants, 
might possibly explain this temporary increase in the age of departing internal migrants If 
this hypothesis is correct, only the relatively older lacked the aspirations and energy to move 
abroad 
Table 6.22. Age on departure of internal migrants by period of departure 
Age on 
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-39 
>40 
Total 
η 
Mean 
departure 
Before 1970 
2 9 
11 8 
147 
176 
147 
38 2 
100 0 
34 
31 8 
Period of departure 
1970-1989 
118 
23 6 
31 5 
157 
4 7 
126 
100 0 
127 
23 1 
Since 1990 
4 0 
35 8 
36 1 
109 
73 
58 
100 0 
274 
22 5 
Total 
62 
30 3 
33 1 
12 9 
7 1 
10 3 
100 0 
435 
23 3 
Source: Household survey (n(age on departure dependent)=0.278**) 
Looking at the current age of migrants (table 6 23), we can see that the average age of current 
international migrants is 41 years as compared to 30 years among internal migrants This 
highly significant difference is far more clear-cut than the 4 years age difference on 
departure, and reflects the fact that international migrants tend to stay away for much longer 
periods One third of current internal migrants are between 20 and 24 years old, and more 
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than 65 percent are between 20 and 25 years old, while more than 50 percent of international 
migrants are over 40 years old. 
Table 6.23. Current age of current international and internal migrants 
Age group Migrants (%) 
Internal International Total 
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
>60 
1,7 
6.6 
35.8 
17.7 
15.6 
7.3 
3.8 
4.9 
1.4 
0.7 
4.5 
1.3 
2.7 
10.1 
12.1 
10.1 
5.4 
14.1 
10.7 
16.8 
11.4 
5.4 
1.6 
5.3 
27.0 
15.8 
13.7 
6.6 
7.3 
6.9 
6.6 
4.1 
4.S 
Total 
η 
100.0 
288 
100.0 
149 
100.0 
437 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
29.8 
12.3 
40.9 
13.1 
33.6 
13.7 
Source: Household survey (ri(age dependent)=0.385**) 
Figure 6.11 illustrates the high incidence of migration among Todghawi men. All the age 
cohorts between 20 and 70 contain more than 50 percent current or returned migrants. It 
equally confirms that young men are mainly involved in internal migration compared to 
relatively older men, who are more involved in international migration. These data also 
appear to suggest that there is a persistent, but decreasing participation in international 
migration among younger generations. Since people tend to migrate abroad in their late 
twenties, it is not very useful to compare the 20-29 cohorts with older cohorts. Nevertheless, 
also when comparing the 30-39 cohorts with older cohorts, the differences in international 
migration participation remain too large to be explained by age alone. 
Figure 6.11. Age and migration participation of men 
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The decreased participation in international labor migration can be explained by the 
increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe and the increasing reliance on family 
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migration among the Aft Todoght. The increased costs and risks of international migration 
explain why relatively more people remain "stuck" in internal migration, being unable to 
make the move to Europe, or to "leapfrog" abroad from the towns and cities. Nevertheless, 
the data also reveal that the overall tendency to migrate (internally or internationally) has not 
decreased, and has remained constant at levels of around 60 percent. 
6.8.5. Educational selectivity of migration 
It is generally assumed that the better educated are more prone to migrate. Table 6.24 indeed 
seems to suggest that internal migrants are better educated than nonmigrants, and that 
international migrants, returnees in particular, are the worst educated: About 41 percent of 
international and 72 percent of international returnees have never received any formal 
education. 
Table 6.24. Educational level by migration status of men older than IS years 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
International 
Returned internal 
Returned international 
Immigrant 
Total 
No 
education 
20 9 
15 8 
26.8 
14.6 
46 9 
7 1 
21.2 
Corame 
school 
4.5 
2.2 
14.5 
6.0 
22 2 
14 3 
6.4 
Primary 
31.8 
30.8 
42.0 
32.5 
24.7 
214 
32.2 
Educational level (%) 
Lower 
sec. 
26.2 
15.8 
72 
166 
37 
21.4 
195 
Higher 
sec 
16.0 
33 
65 
4 0 
1.2 
14.3 
10.1 
Higher 
0.6 
32 2 
2 9 
26 5 
1 2 
21.4 
106 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
Mean9 
1 34 
201 
0 88 
1.83 
0.41 
1.93 
1 44 
η 
664 
273 
138 
151 
81 
14 
1.321 
Source: Household survey (C=0.493**; η(1ενεΙ dependent)=0.341**) 
Internal migrants are also significantly better educated that nonmigrants. However, education 
is a partially endogenous variable, as increasing numbers of Todghawis migrate to the cities 
in order to follow higher education. In order to analyze the selectivity of labor migration 
exclusively, table 6.25 lists education per migration group excluding students. It appears that 
the differences between internal migrants and nonmigrants and measures of association 
decrease, but that there remain significant differences, in particular in higher education. 
Whereas 1 percent of nonmigrants have followed higher education, this is the case for 
11 percent of internal migrants. This can be explained by the fact that most higher educated 
people cannot find jobs in the Todgha, and therefore tend to migrate internally. This further 
underlines the difficulty of separating education and labor migration; all higher educated 
internal migrants were initially student migrants. Internal migration tends to be positively 
selective for education, although this mainly pertains to a relatively small group of civil 
servants and higher educated professional workers. International migrants in particular tend to 
be older than nonmigrants and internal migrants. In order to analyze whether international 
migration is indeed negatively selective for education, it is of course necessary to control for 
age, since older people tend to be less educated than younger generations. 
9
 The mean level of education is calculated by attributing values to different levels of education, ranging from 0 
for "no or Coranic" to 4 for higher education. 
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Table 6.25. Educational level by migration status of men older than IS years, excluding students and ex-
student migrants 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
International 
Returned internal 
Returned international 
Immigrant 
Total 
No 
education 
27 1 
20.7 
27 6 
20.6 
46.9 
9.1 
26 6 
Coranic 
school 
58 
30 
14 9 
84 
22.2 
182 
8 1 
Primary 
39.8 
41.4 
43 3 
44.9 
24.7 
27 3 
39.8 
Educational level 
Lower 
sec. 
22 4 
20 7 
6.7 
196 
37 
182 
183 
Higher 
sec 
4.1 
30 
6 0 
3.7 
1.2 
91 
39 
(%) 
Higher 
0.8 
11.3 
1 5 
2.8 
12 
18.2 
3.3 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100 0 
Mean 
1 00 
137 
081 
1 07 
0.41 
1 64 
1 01 
η 
513 
203 
134 
107 
81 
11 
1,049 
Source: Household survey (0=0.355**; η(1ενβ1 dependent)=0.252**) 
Table 6.26 indicates that, when controlling for age, the initial differences largely vanish. 
Within the age group of 60 years and older, 89 percent of internal and international migrants 
have never attended school, compared to 98 percent among nonmigrants. Within the 45-59 
age group, it seems to be the internal migrants who are worst educated, with 50 percent never 
having attended school. The 30-44 year age group is the first cohort m which a substantial 
proportion of men have attended more than primary school only. Within this category, 
differences between migrant categories become somewhat more clear-cut. About 30 percent 
of international migrants have never attended school, compared to about 20 percent both 
among nonmigrant and internal migrant men. Furthermore, 33 percent of internal migrants 
(excluding students) have attended at least lower secondary school, compared to about 20 
percent among nonmigrants and international migrants. But again, differences remain small 
and insignificant. 
The 15-29 age group is the only cohort in which international migrants are 
significantly better educated than nonmigrants. Compared to internal migrants, international 
migrants seem concentrated in secondary education, and internal migrants in higher 
education. Nevertheless, also in this cohort, internal migrants—even when excluding 
students—form the best educated group. 
Looking at the relationship between the period of departure and education (see table 
6.27), we can see that international migrants who left before 1970 tend to be slightly better 
educated than internal migrants, although the difference is insignificant. On the contrary, 
among those who left between 1970 and 1989, internal migrants tended to be clearly better 
educated than international migrants. Whereas only 28 percent of internal migrants had never 
attended primary school, this was the case for 46 percent of international migrants. In the 
same vein, about 23 percent of the internal migrants had attended secondary school or higher, 
compared to only 4 percent among international migrants. Among those who have migrated 
since 1990, the differences have become far smaller, although the proportion of international 
migrants that has never attended school is still higher than among internal migrants. 
Thus, when controlling for age, international migration is hardly selective for 
education. With the possible exception of the youngest generation, we cannot say that 
international migrants are better educated than nonmigrants. Although it is true that the 
education of international migrants has dramatically improved over recent decades, this seems 
Ex-student migrants are internal return migrants who migrated internally with the main motive of obtaining 
better education, and who have not worked People who initially migrated to study, but who are now working 
outside the Todgha, have in fact become labor migrants over time, and have been included in the table as labor 
migrants. 
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to merely reflect a general improvement in schooling among Todghawi men". Internal 
migration, however, is positively selective for education. 
Table 6.26. Educational level by migration status of men older than IS years, without students and ex-
students, within age groups 
Age group 
15-29 
30-44 
45-59 
>60 
Total 
Migration 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
International 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
International 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
International 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
International 
Total 
Source: Household survey13 
Table 6.27. 
ex-student: 
Period of 
departure 
Noor 
Corame 
7.1 
9.5 
6.5 
7.8 
22.8 
18.3 
30.2 
22.3 
58.8 
50.0 
58 9 
57 4 
97 6 
88 2 
89 7 
93 1 
34 7 
Primary 
43.1 
42.9 
48.4 
43 4 
56.9 
49.2 
50.9 
52.7 
40 0 
50 0 
41 1 
42 1 
24 
11 8 
103 
69 
39 8 
Educational level (% 
Lower 
sec. 
43 1 
34.1 
29 0 
39 1 
11 4 
167 
5.7 
125 
00 
00 
0.0 
0 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
18.3 
Educational level by migration destination of 
i, by period of departure 
Migration 
Before 1970 Internal 
1970-1989 
Since 1990 
Total 
International 
Total 
Internal 
International 
Total 
Internal 
International 
Total 
No or 
Corame 
82.1 
78.2 
79.2 
27.7 
45.7 
35 4 
167 
27 7 
197 
37.1 
Primary 
17.9 
21.8 
20.8 
48.9 
50.0 
49 4 
43 1 
40 0 
42 3 
40.1 
Higher 
sec. 
63 
32 
12.9 
5.8 
57 
50 
94 
6.1 
0 0 
00 
0.0 
0 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.9 
) 
Higher 
0.4 
10.3 
3.2 
3.8 
33 
10.8 
3.8 
6.4 
1 3 
0 0 
0 0 
0 5 
0 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 0 
33 
men older than IS years 
Educational level (%) 
Lower 
sec. 
00 
00 
0.0 
18 1 
2.9 
11.6 
25 3 
15.4 
22.6 
14.3 
Higher 
sec. 
0.0 
0 0 
0.0 
32 
0.0 
1.8 
34 
138 
6.3 
3.5 
Higher 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2.1 
1.4 
1.8 
11.5 
3.1 
92 
4.9 
Total 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
Mean 
1 50 
1 62 
1.58 
1.54 
1 10 
141 
106 
122 
0 45 
0 50 
041 
044 
0.02 
0.12 
0.10 
0.07 
1.01 
η 
239 
126 
31 
396 
123 
120 
53 
296 
80 
30 
73 
183 
82 
34 
58 
174 
;, excluding students and 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
Mean 
0.18 
0 22 
0.21 
103 
061 
0 85 
1.50 
1.25 
143 
0 99 
η 
28 
78 
106 
94 
70 
164 
174 
65 
239 
509 
Source: Household survey 
Educational levels among women are very low compared to men. The gender gap in education and its relation 
with migration will be discussed in section 9.5.4. 
12
 In order to have sufficient case-loads, current and returned migrants within both migration types have been 
grouped into one category, and immigrants have been categonzed as nonmigranls. 
u 
Age category 
Contingency CoefT. 
15-29 
0.262** 
30-44 
0.214' 
45-59 
0.108' 
>60 
0.165' 
14 
Age category Before 1970 1970-1989 Since 1990 
Contingency Coeff. 0 043' 0 281** 0.257** 
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This conclusion for the Todgha valley seems to be in line with earlier research in other parts 
of Morocco. For instance, Heinemeijer et al. (1976:90) found that international migrants from 
the Rif and Sous regions tended to be only marginally better educated than nonmigrants. 
Other studies seem to suggest that recent international migrants are better educated 
then before (Costanzo 1999), and that Morocco is increasingly witnessing a "brain drain" of 
its most educated citizens (Hnaka 1999:159-65). Unfortunately, many such observations are 
general impressions that are not based on a systematic comparison between migrant and 
nonmigrant groups. Although there is no doubt that the mean level of education among 
Moroccan migrants has significantly increased over the in past decades (Refass 1995:209), 
this seems to be primarily the result of a general increase in education in Morocco, not of a 
change in selectivity. 
The patterns found in the Todgha seem to reflect a more general Moroccan pattern. A 
recent study conducted in the regions of Nador, Tiznit, Khenifra, Laârache, and Settat 
revealed that even though recent migrants tended to be better educated than "older" migrants, 
migrants generally have the same level of education as nonmigrants (Fadloullah et ai. 
2000:xvi, 83). However, their analysis did not control for age. Interestingly, Morocco seems 
to deviate from patterns found in other migrant sending countries (e.g., Egypt, Turkey, and 
Ghana), where international migrants indeed tend to be better educated than nonmigrants 
(Schoorle/a/. 2000:xvi)15. 
This non-selective character of international migration is possibly related to the fact 
that Moroccan international labor migrants predominantly work in low-skilled jobs. As we 
have seen, possessing a certain level of education or French language skills were even 
grounds for recruiters to reject prospective migrants during the period of direct labor 
recruitment. Moreover, at the time it was generally easier and more attractive for higher 
educated Moroccan youngsters to obtain stable, relatively well-paid government jobs in 
Morocco. However, this cannot explain why current international migrants are only slightly 
better educated. What might play a role is that the likelihood of migration seems to be 
increasingly determined by access to migration networks and other factors such as material 
wealth, and that education only plays a secondary role in determining the actual possibility to 
migrate abroad. 
There seems to be no prior empirical evidence on the educational selectivity of 
internal migration in Morocco. This study revealed that internal migration is positively 
selective for education. However, it should be noted that internal migrants are a very diverse 
group, consisting of both professional workers and lowly skilled manual workers. 
6.8.6. Migration and household wealth 
In line with education, it is commonly hypothesized that migrants tend not to originate from 
the poorest households, due to the risks and opportunity costs associated with migration. 
Thus, according to this hypothesis, migrants predominantly originate from upper lower or 
middle sections within sending societies1 . In order to evaluate whether this is also the case in 
15
 Schoorl et al (2000) came to the interesting observation that in the Senegalese and Moroccan study areas, 
where educational levels are lower than in the other countries studied, international migrants and nonmigranls 
are equally less-educated, whereas in Ghana and Egypt, where general educational levels are higher, 
international migrants tended to be better educated than nonmigrants 
16
 Schoorl et al (2000) suggested that international migrants from Morocco, and recent migrants in particular, 
tend to be from relatively wealthy households—although no empirical evidence was given for this. A recent 
econometric study on the effects of migration on income growth and distribution in Morocco as a whole 
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the Todgha valley, it is necessary to choose an indicator for household wealth before 
migration. Adams (1989:50) argued that the best proxy for this seems to be land possession, 
since land tends to be positively correlated with overall household economic status in rural 
societies. In oases, the socio-economic status and influence of households used to be largely 
determined by their access to local agricultural resources17. Therefore, we took land 
possession before migration as a rough indicator of household wealth before migration. 
Without any doubt, the significance of land possession as an indicator of household 
wealth has decreased over the past decades through the diversification of oasis livelihoods 
that has involved increasing income from non-agricultural and migratory (remittance) 
activities. Nevertheless, it was practically impossible to assess household income prior to 
migration, which means that there is no good, reliable alternative for land possession. 
Moreover, land possession remains an important status symbol, and a true "honorable" 
Todghawi is expected to possess land as the very symbol of belonging to the region. Since 
landlessness is considered as "shameful", and is an indicator of extreme poverty, it still seems 
valid as a general indicator of household wealth to a certain degree. 
Table 6.28 demonstrates that the incidence of landlessness is 22 percent among 
nonmigrant households and 19 percent among internal migrant households, compared to only 
4 and 2 percent among international and returned migrant households. This pattern is 
generally repeated within the research villages. It is only in Tadafelt that we find a certain 
deviation from these patterns, with 11 percent of international migrants coming from 
households without land. However, this rather seems to reflect the higher incidence of 
landlessness in this village in general of about 33 percent among nonmigrants and internal 
migrants. Only a few international migrants are from landless households. This confirms the 
hypothesis that the poorest groups within communities are generally not able to migrate. 
Table 6.28. Landlessness before migration by household migration status, by village 
Household migration 
status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
International 
Returned international 
Total 
Zaouia 
26 2 
184 
40.0 
0.0 
4.8 
17.1 
Proportion 
Tikoutar 
4 7 
77 
0 0 
0.0 
0 0 
29 
of households without land before 
Ait El 
Meskine 
38 9 
11 1 
00 
00 
0.0 
11 3 
Ikhba 
174 
0.0 
20.0 
7.7 
0.0 
100 
Tadafelt 
34.4 
32 6 
0 0 
11.1 
0.0 
25 0 
migration (%) 
Ghalhl n' 
Ait Isfoul 
15.4 
00 
00 
0.0 
0.0 
7.4 
Total 
21.6 
189 
8 1 
4 0 
1 5 
13 8 
η 
171 
127 
37 
101 
65 
502 
Source: Household survey' 
Table 6.29 analyses the association between household migration status and the land 
possessed by the household of origin before migration. Since the mean size of agricultural 
holdings differs significantly between the villages, a land possession index has been 
calculated . It shows that there is a positive and significant association between land 
concluded that the middle and higher income classes profited relatively more from remittances than the poorest 
groups (Telo 2001) 
In the Todgha, both land and water are important However, as the possession of water rights is generally 
linked to the possession of land, we can confine our analysis to land possession 
'* For a definition of household categories, see section 7.2 
" In order to make the data comparable at an inter-village level, the absolute size of the agricultural holding has 
been converted to standard z-scores at the village level The scores indicate how many standard deviation units a 
case is above or below the mean Scores above zero indicate an above average isolation, scores below zero a 
below average isolation "Low" means a below average score, "middle" an around average score, and "high" an 
above average score, all measured at the village level. 
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possession and participation in international migration. In contrast to education, internal 
migrant households score lower on mean land possession than nonmigrant households, 
although the difference is insignificant. In order to gain more insight into the significance of 
differences between group means, a multiple comparison test (using the Bonferroni 
procedure) was performed, which found that internal migrants score significantly lower than 
current and returned international migrant households. All other differences are insignificant. 
Thus, the main dividing line is clearly between internal and international migration. 
Table 6.29. Land possession before migration by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
International 
Returned international 
Total 
Low 
42.7 
37.0 
27.0 
19.8 
21.5 
32.7 
Land possession (before migration) index 
Middle 
29.8 
38.6 
27.0 
31.7 
35.4 
32.9 
High 
27 5 
24.4 
45.9 
48 5 
43 1 
34.3 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
(%) 
η 
171 
127 
Ì7 
101 
65 
501 
Mean z-score 
-0.066 
-0 180 
0 103 
0.220 
0 305 
0 023 
Source: Household survey (C=0.241**; η=0.183**) 
Table 6.30 examines whether there have been changes in selectivity on land possession prior 
to migration over the past decades20. The data presented in the table seem to indicate that 
selectivity for land possession has slightly decreased over time. This would corroborate the 
hypothesis that migration becomes less selective for wealth due to network effects, besides 
the fact that land possession has become less important as an indicator of household wealth. 
However, the association is weak and insignificant. Likewise, the Bonferroni multiple 
comparison test found no significant differences between any of the groups' means. 
Table 6.30. Land possession of household before migration by period of departure of international 
migrants 
Migration status 
until 1964 
1965-1971 
1972-1985 
since 1986 
Total 
Low 
31.3 
34.7 
38.6 
23.1 
32.3 
Land possession 
Middle 
21 9 
36.7 
31.8 
38 5 
32 9 
(before migration) index (%) 
High 
46.9 
28.6 
29.5 
38.5 
34 8 
Total η 
100 0 32 
100 0 53 
100.0 44 
100.0 42 
100 0 171 
Mean z-score 
0 532 
0.248 
0.198 
0.196 
0 275 
Source: Household survey (€=0.185·; η ^ . η ο ' ) 
This analysis corroborates the common hypothesis that international migrants are typically 
not from the poorest (i.e., landless), but from relatively wealthy households, although the 
differences are not particularly large. Landlessness, in particular, is negatively associated with 
participation in international migration. This is in contrast with earlier research done in the 
Moroccan Rif and Sous regions (Heinemeijer et al. 1976:90), which concluded that 
international migrant workers were not from a particular—poor or wealthy—section of the 
population. However, the analysis showed that internal migration is not selective for mean 
land possession before migration. This is likely to be related to the high risks and opportunity 
2 0
 In order to do this analysis, z-values have been recoded again based on the frequency distribution of this 
variable within the group of (current and returned) international migrants. Hence, the categories in tables 6.29 
and 6.30 are not comparable. 
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costs associated with international migration, which are higher than for internal migration, 
and have increased over the past decades due to increasingly restrictive immigration policies 
in Europe Materially poor people lacking access to migrant networks can, therefore, 
generally not afford to migrate abroad 
6.9. Discussion and conclusion 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Todgha valley has been progressively integrated 
into the modem capitalist economy through its incorporation into the colonial and Moroccan 
state and the concomitant development of infrastructure This has enabled an increasing 
proportion of its population to work in Morocco's developing coastal cities as well as in 
foreign countries These structural transformations have created a wholly new development 
context in which the character of pre-modem seasonal and circular migration patterns were 
fundamentally transformed and in which new and extended forms of labor migration could 
emerge 
It is not possible to understand or describe the evolution and selectivity of migration 
patterns from, within, and to the Todgha valley over the twentieth century without taking into 
account the broader development context at the regional and national level The analysis 
confirmed our hypothesis that migration is not only a factor affecting development, but 
primarily an outgrowth and constituent part of the development process itself The patterns 
and relationships found largely comply with the hypotheses of transitional migration models 
inspired by Zelinsky's mobility transition theory (see section 2 2) 
The "mobility transition" of the Todgha started at the end of the nineteenth century, 
when an increasing number of Todghawis started to migrate to neighboring Algeria, which 
had become a French colony in 1830 This first form of "modem" migration associated with 
capitalist development and colonization was, in fact, an extension of earlier forms of seasonal 
and circular migration within Morocco Algeria remained the most important "foreign" 
migration destination up to the 1950s With formal the establishment of the French 
protectorate over Morocco in 1912, rural-to-urban migration from the Todgha to the coastal 
cities—in particular Rabat—rapidly gained ground, leading to the demise of traditional 
patterns of circular and seasonal migration 
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the combined effect of Algerian independence and 
the economic boom in Europe caused a radical reorientation of international migration, which 
was overwhelmingly oriented towards France, with a particular emphasis on the cities of 
Montpellier, Nice, and Pans Countnes such as the Netherlands and Belgium also attracted a 
limited number of migrants For the Todgha, this was the ventable "Golden Age" of 
migration, in which many people migrated, and laid the foundations for a large Diaspora in 
Europe This migration boom marked the definitive incorporation of the Todgha valley into 
the Mediterranean-European migration system 
The 1973 Oil Crisis heralded an era of increasingly restrictive immigration policies in 
Europe However, this did not lead to the expected dramatic decrease in international 
migration The 1980s and 1990s were charactenzed by a diversification of migration 
strategies as well as destinations The Todghawi expatnate networks have played a 
facilitating role in perpetuating migration from the valley to France, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium through family reunification and family formation Migrant networks are important 
channels that give access to the European employment market and social security systems In 
addition, there has also been a considerable increase in undocumented migration and a shift 
towards new migration destinations in southern Europe, in particular Spain 
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Meanwhile, internal migration has remained important. It seems even more important 
than some decades ago, as the costs and risks of migrating internationally have increased. 
Internal migration has been facilitated by major improvements of road infrastructure and 
means of transport, as well as by the increasing number of young Todghawis following higher 
education in the large cities. Internal migrants typically work in the construction or (informal) 
service jobs. There is also a distinct, relatively wealthy and educated "elite" of internal 
migrants that includes students, civil servants, and private-sector professionals. In addition to 
the traditional destinations on the Atlantic coast (e.g., Rabat, Casablanca), the boomtowns of 
the Rif (e.g., Nador, Tétouan, Berkane), the southern cities of Marrakech and Agadir and 
destinations within the Presaharan region have all become increasingly important. In both 
internal and international migration we have witnessed the increasing diversification in 
destinations, strategies (legal, undocumented, network), and official motives (work, family, 
study). 
Labor migrants from the Todgha tend to be young and male. Internal migrants are 
clearly younger and tend to stay away for shorter periods than international migrants. In 
contrast to the common hypotheses in the migration literature, international migrants from the 
Todgha are not better educated than nonmigrants of the same age. Internal migrants tend to be 
the best educated. On the other hand, international migrants tend to come from relatively 
"wealthy" households—measured in terms of land possession before migration—whereas 
both nonmigrants and internal migrants score on a lower level. 
International migration is primarily accessible for people with access to largely 
kinship-based migrant networks. Moreover, a basic level of wealth is increasingly needed to 
move abroad—for instance, to pay for bride prices, the increasingly complex, costly, and 
uncertain visa application procedures, or sums to be paid to smugglers to cross the Strait of 
Gibraltar. Education does not seem to play an important discriminatory role here. Although 
internal migration requires less costs and risks, and is hardly selective for household wealth, 
network connections seem to play an important facilitating role too in determining the 
likelihood of internal migration and destinations. 
Besides a small (business) elite, which does not see the need to migrate, most 
nonmigrants tend to be from relatively poor and badly educated sections of the communities 
of origin. This corroborates the hypothesis derived from transitional migration theory that a 
certain threshold of wealth or development is necessary for migration to take place, since this 
provides the prospective migrant with the capabilities to bear the risks and opportunity costs 
of migration. Migration is a prerogative rather than a last resort. The poorest—in terms of 
access to material, human and social capital—are forced to stay as they simply cannot afford 
the costs and risks associated with migration. 
The analysis has shown that village communities tend to "specialize" in particular 
migration destinations both within Morocco and abroad. Even neighboring villages (i.e., 
Ikhba and Ait El Meskine) witness very different migration patterns. This is in line with 
migration network theory and migration systems theory, which state that migration between 
particular places tends to reinforce itself once migration communities have been established at 
the destination. Therefore, migration flows tend to be strongly geographically clustered. 
Apparently, such clustering occurs at different levels. Whereas the Todgha valley as a whole 
is "specialized" in certain destinations (e.g. Rabat, Agadir, Montpellier, Nice, and 
Amsterdam), there are patterns of sub-specialization and "micro migration systems" at village 
and lineage level. 
On the other hand, the analysis revealed the inherently dynamic nature of migration 
systems. Due to economic-geographical and political changes at the macro-level, migration 
from the Todgha has seen strong shifts in spatial orientation. This points to the inherent 
weaknesses of migration systems and network theories, which tend to ignore (1) external, 
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structural factors both at the migration origin and destination as well as (2) the internal 
dynamics of networks and exclusionary dimensions of social capital. Such factors may 
counteract the tendencies that are supposed to lead to increasing migration and decreasing 
selectivity through networks (see chapter 2). 
Changes in the legal and economic-geographical context at the macro-level (e.g., 
changing immigration policies, accelerated development of new boomtowns such as Nador 
and Agadir, or economic growth in south-European countries) can lead to the (partial) 
breakdown of established migration systems and interrupt the circular logic of "migration— 
declining risks and opportunity costs—more migration". This explains why migration does 
not always tend to progressive geographical clustering and well may deviate from established 
patterns. What we have seen in the Todgha over the past two decades is, in fact, a growing 
diversification in both internal and international migration destinations. The diversification of 
international migration destinations seems to be the combined effect of economic 
development in southern European countries (Spain, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, Portugal) 
and the increasingly restrictive immigration policies pursued by the "classic" destination 
countries in northwestern Europe, which have increased the costs and risks of international 
migration. For internal migration, this seems primarily due to the process of micro-
urbanization of the rural space, the rapid rise of new boomtowns in the Rif and within the 
Presaharan region itself (Ouarzazate, Errachidia), as well as the accelerated development of 
Marrakech and Agadir. Internal migration seems to react relatively quickly to the creation of 
such new labor markets, since internal migration is far less constrained by political and legal 
factors. 
Notwithstanding the proven existence of patterns of geographical clustering of 
migration flows and the importance of migration networks in this process, there are 
countervailing forces at play that stimulate migrants to move to new destinations if the 
perceived advantages (i.e., less risks and financial and psychological costs) of knowing 
families and friends at the destination are lower than the perceived advantages (i.e., higher 
chance of finding work, higher wages) of trying one's luck in relatively unknown places. 
Logically, it is especially groups such as the Ait 'Atta that lack an established tradition of 
international migration and who therefore generally lack access to large, established migrant 
networks, who are more prone to migrate to new destinations. The recent movement of Ait 
'Atta to Spain illustrates this other, more volatile and unpredictable side of migration. 
The existence of social ties between migrants and "stay-behinds" reduces the financial 
and psychological costs as well as risks of migrating. Networks are of vital importance in 
perpetuating migration to Europe and the "bride migration"—which often constitutes labor 
migration "in disguise"—largely explains the persistent influx of new migrants to the 
classical destination countries in northwestern Europe. On the other hand, the common 
hypothesis that migration tends to become less selective over time in terms of household 
wealth or ethnic affiliation due to the growing importance of network effects, is not sustained 
by the survey data. This seems related to the limited extent to which migration has spread 
over communities across the boundaries of extended families and lineages (ighsan) involved 
in international migration. Instead of the diffusion and decreasing selectivity of international 
migration, as assumed by migrant network theory, there is persistent selectivity of 
international migration, in which groups lacking access to kinship-based migrant networks are 
largely excluded. 
Some other recent studies have equally pointed to the existence of such exclusion 
mechanisms in stressing that migrants are actually hesitant and restrictive in offering 
"network support" to people back home, especially when it concerns non-relatives (cf. Strijp 
1997; Zorlu 2000:956). Moreover, network assistance is generally not "free-of-charge". In 
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case of marriage migration, for instance, there is literally an increasingly high (e.g., bride) 
price to be paid. 
There is only poor diffusion of the migration experience across the boundaries of 
socio-ethnic groups, that is, the extended families and the lineages that contain them. 
Although non-kin community members and friends may occasionally play a role in providing 
"migration assistance" too, kinship networks are still the basis of social organization and 
mutual trust as well as a source of information and help for migrants. Kinship-based 
migration networks are also dominant in determining the choice of destination. This 
phenomenon is reinforced by the traditional preference for endogamous marriage, through 
which "migration capital" remains within the same group. 
Therefore, migration networks can be to the advantage of people belonging to the 
same extended family or lineage, but seem to be exclusionary for people not belonging to 
such groups. This, clearly, is an example of one of the "downsides" of social capital (cf. 
Portes and Landolt 1996). Those who are excluded from kinship-based migrant networks and 
lack financial resources may find increasingly high obstacles to migrating in their way. Here, 
the constraints of the increasingly restrictive immigration policies on the European side and 
the exclusionary character of migrant networks clearly counteract the migration enabling 
forces of network formation. 
In sharp contrast with the popular image of rural depopulation, migration from, 
towards, and within the valley is occurring simultaneously. Within the research villages, 
natural population growth rates have been partially offset by the emigration of entire 
households as a consequence of family reunification. Despite this, the population in most 
villages more than doubled between 1952 and 1994, and the population of the Todgha valley 
as a whole has more than tripled over the past half century. It is important to stress that the 
Todgha is no longer only a region of departure for internal and international migrants, but has 
also become a destination for internal migrants. Moreover, processes of intra-valley migration 
have contributed to the process of urban clustering within the Todgha valley. The growth has 
been highest in Tinghir, whose urban center is now one of the fastest growing in Morocco's 
southeast, attracting people not only from villages within the valley but also from more 
marginal and poorer regions in the south. 
The coexistence of migration towards the Todgha, intra-valley migration, and the 
persistence of migration from the valley to Morocco's economic heartland as well as Europe, 
highlights the fundamental complexity of contemporary migration systems. It is, therefore, 
not possible to classify regions such as the Todgha as either "emigration" or "immigration" 
regions. They are both. 
Schemes dividing regions, countries and the world into (peripheral) sending and 
(central) destination areas generally do not reflect the complex, multi-layered spatial reality of 
migration systems. Moreover, such classifications typically change with the geographical 
scale of analysis. Whereas the Todgha may be the "penphery" vis-à-vis Europe and large 
cities located in the North and West, it is, in a sense, a "core" area or "migration interface" for 
internal migrants from other, more isolated, and marginal areas such as the Saghro and the 
High Atlas. At the intra-valley level, Tinghir, Taghzout-A'it Aïssa Ou Brahim, and the Ghallil 
plain are attracting people, whereas smaller and relatively remote villages are mainly sending 
people. Moreover, important counterflows exist in the form of return migration from and 
towards the valley. 
Moreover, towns such as Tinghir play a role as migration junctions. Many migrants do 
not directly migrate to their eventual destination. Migration often follow a "leapfrogging" 
pattern, in which rural migrants first move from their village to smaller towns such as Tinghir. 
The professional experience, education, practical knowledge, social contacts, and financial 
resources they can acquire in such towns then potentially enable them to subsequently 
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migrate towards larger Moroccan cities or Europe Moreover, such a first stage also confronts 
migrants with other lifestyles and higher standards of living, which might affect their feelings 
of relative deprivation and increase their own aspirations of gaining a better living elsewhere 
Therefore, it makes little sense to explain migration between particular areas by a set of static 
"pushes" and "pulls", not only because push and pull factors are generally mirrored in each 
other (see section 2 1 3), but also because such explanations tend to ignore that needs are not 
constant, but determined by people's perceptions and aspirations Push-pull models typically 
fail to explain how a region can both send and receive migrants, and why migrants return 
The present analysis seems to confirm our central hypothesis derived from transitional 
migration theory that a certain level of development rather than absolute poverty breeds 
internal and international labor migration Integration into the state and the capitalist economy 
as well as infrastructural improvements enlarged the capabilities and increased the desire of 
many oasis dwellers to migrate internally and abroad Interestingly, the analysis of intra-
valley differentiation in migration patterns highlighted that relatively "traditional", isolated, 
and impoverished villages and ethnic groups (Ait 'Atta in particular) exhibited far lower and 
delayed propensities to participate in wage labor migration Therefore, to a certain extent, 
transitional macro-models of the "mobility transition" type (Zelinsky 1971 ) might indeed be 
applicable on a regional scale 
Migration can be seen as a function of (1) the individual capability to migrate both in 
terms of access to material (e g , money, land) and human (e g , knowledge, skills) capital, (2) 
the socio-culturally determined aspirations to migrate, which are influenced by factors such 
as relative deprivation, awareness of opportunities elsewhere, access to schooling, and media 
exposure, and (3) the institutional framework facilitating or constraining migration, such as 
networks, immigration regulations, and the employment situation, at both the origin and the 
destination The fundamental point is that both the capabilities and aspirations to migrate are 
positively influenced by development—at least in its initial stages The importance of both 
material and non-material factors in determining people's propensity to migrate demonstrates 
that we should see development within a "capabilities" perspective 
Transitional models are right in assuming that "development" processes of technical 
progress, increases in wealth, and the incorporation of regions in wider political-economic 
networks, lead, certainly in the initial phases of such development, to a general increase in 
mobility and out-migration In later stages of regional-economic development (as predicted 
by Zelinsky at the country-level), migration patterns tend to grow more complex, and that is 
what we are starting to witness in the Todgha Instead of a sustained rural exodus—as 
predicted by cumulative causation, dependency, and push-pull theory—processes of 
economic development in the region are also attracting people from other regions The weak 
point of both static and transitional migration models is that they largely ignore how 
perceptions and knowledge not only influence the capabilities, but also the aspirations to 
migrate, which are generally boosted through decreasing isolation, improved education, and 
increasing exposure to the outside (capitalist) world Only by considering differences in 
aspirations, can we explain why some people leave the Todgha while, simultaneously, others 
move in 
In net terms, migration has not "creamed off' the valley's population due to the 
countervailing effect of migration into the valley Out-migration has not put an absolute 
"labor drain" on the Todgha, at least at the valley level Apparently, there are forces at work 
that simultaneously "push" some people to leave the valley as much as "pull" other people to 
move to the valley The simultaneous occurrence of emigration and immigration from and 
towards the Todgha can be explained by regional differences in access to social, human, and 
material resources or "capitals" enabling people to migrate, as well as (spatial) differences in 
aspiration levels Both migration from and to the valley are part of the same general process 
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of development. In the same vein, we have concluded that internal and international out-
migration are not negatively correlated phenomena, but rather tend to be "communicating 
vessels" in the longer term, since they are part of the same development process leading—in 
its social, cultural, and economic dimensions—to a general increase in mobility . 

7 
Household livelihoods, migration, 
remittances, and wealth 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter analyzed the historical evolution of migration pattems from, to, and 
within the Todgha valley in general and the research villages in particular, as well as the 
selectivity of this migration on ethnic, age, gender, and wealth characteristics (research 
question 1). Now that we have gained more insight into the structural, developmental origins 
of migration, the remaining chapters will focus on the recursive impacts of migration on 
development in the Todgha (arrow (d) in figure 2.4). This chapter will analyze the role that 
labor migration has played in changing the livelihoods of oasis households as well as the 
direct impact of migration on household income levels and structure, wealth, and living 
conditions (research question 2). This analysis will enable us to test the NELM-derivcd 
hypotheses presented in chapter 2 that labor migration is a household livelihood strategy to 
(1) minimize and spread income risks and (2) gain access to higher earnings streams. 
Up to now, the primary unit of analysis was the individual migrant. However, in order 
to study the impact of migration on development, we have to consider the wider socio-
economic and institutional environment in which migration processes take place. In chapters 
2 and 3, we argued that South-North labor migration should be conceived as part of broader 
household livelihood strategies and, hence, the result of a decision-making process at the 
household rather than the individual level (see sections 2.5.1 and 3.2.1). Therefore, the 
household will be the central unit of analysis in our study of the effects of migration on 
livelihoods, remittances, investments, and socio-economic development in the Todgha valley. 
In order to facilitate such an analysis, we will start by developing a household migration 
typology in section 7.2 (research question 2.a). Five household migration categories will be 
defined, which serve as a basis for the analysis in this and the remaining chapters. 
In order to come to a better understanding of the role of internal and international 
migration in household livelihoods, section 7.3 distinguishes ideal-typical "migration 
trajectories" that internal and international migrants tend to follow within the household life 
cycle (research question 2.b). By analyzing the role of individual migrants within a broader 
household context, and by putting it into the temporal perspective of the household life cycle, 
we will better comprehend the behavior of individual migrants in terms of household 
livelihood strategies. Section 7.4 will elaborate on the direct effect of migration and 
remittances on other livelihood activities (research question 2.c) as well as income levels and 
structure (research question 2.d). Section 7.5 analyzes the direct impact migration has had on 
household wealth and living conditions (research question 2.e). The section will equally 
examine the extent to which inter-village differences in living conditions and wealth can be 
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explained by factors other than migration participation, like temporal aspects (e.g., migration 
stage), the indirect economic spread effects of migration and remittances, and locational 
factors (research question 2.f). 
7.2. Household migration typology 
The survey was designed to include migrant and nonmigrant households. In order to analyze 
the impact of migration, a comparison between nonmigrant and different types of migrant 
households is essential. As there are several ways in which households can be involved in 
migration, the basic migrant/nonmigrant dichotomy is overly simplistic. After all, households 
can contain current as well as returned, internal, and international migrants, at the same time. 
On the other hand, it is important to limit the number of categories in order to allow 
meaningful statistical analysis. 
Unequivocal definitions of household and household membership have been used in 
order to determine whether migrants are part of households. In general, migrants, either 
mamed or unmarried, living on their own without having established their own households at 
the destination, have been considered part of the household of origin. For a detailed definition 
of household and household membership of migrants, see appendix 1. 
Table 7.1 summarizes the migratory composition of all the surveyed households based 
on the migratory status of the living individuals they contain. It demonstrates that the majority 
of households are, or have been involved in, either form of migration. Only 29 percent of all 
households have never participated in any kind of migration. Another 10 percent of all 
households only contain returned internal migrants. Households that currently contain internal 
migrants represent 27 percent of the population. Households that contain at least one current 
international migrant account for 21 percent, and 13 percent of the households contain 
returned international migrants. Among all households, about 12 percent contain several types 
(e.g., internal and international) migrants. 
Table 7.1. Household migration categories based on migration participation of members 
Household migration categories 
η % 
Never migrated 
Returned internal 
Current internal 
Current international 
Current internal and current international 
Current and returned international 
Returned international 
Current internal and returned international 
149 
51 
137 
71 
25 
9 
40 
25 
29 4 
10 1 
27 0 
140 
4 9 
1.8 
7 9 
4 9 
Total 507 100.0 
Source: Household survey 
In order to reduce the number of household categories, we have classified these households 
following the general rule that international migrants take precedence over internal migrants, 
and current migrants take precedence over returned migrants. Households containing both 
internal and international migrants were considered as international migrant households. The 
rationale for applying this rule is the assumption that international migration has a more 
significant socio-economic impact than internal migration. 
Households containing both current international migrants and returnees were 
classified as current international migrant households. The fact of currently having migrants 
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abroad means that the household maintains its stake in the international migration market, 
which is associated with an orientation towards Europe and the high propensity to family 
migration. The perspective of households that contain only returned international migrants 
seems rather different, in the sense that they are expected to be more oriented towards 
Morocco. 
It was also decided to classify households that only contain returned internal migrants 
as nonmigrant household, as returned internal migrants generally do not receive remittances. 
In contrast, the fact that returned international migrants generally do receive considerable 
amounts of remittances—due to their pension claims and access to European social security 
systems—was a reason to include them as a distinct category. An additional theoretical reason 
for doing so is to test the common assertion in the migration literature that returned migrants 
play a particularly important role in local development, more than still-abroad migrants. 
In this way, four basic household categories have been identified: (1) Nonmigrant 
households, which have never been involved in international migration and are not currently 
involved in internal migration, were classified as nonmigrant households; (2) Current internal 
migrant households (to be referred to as internal migrant households) contain members 
currently living outside the Todgha, but exclusively within Morocco; (3) Current 
international migrant households have at least one member of the household currently living 
and working abroad; (4) Returned international migrant households contain at least one 
member who has been involved in international migration but who has subsequently returned 
home, and do not contain current international migrants. 
This basic classification was further refined by treating households with international 
migrants who had left less than one year ago as nonmigrant households. Furthermore, the 
preliminary analysis revealed the existence of households that are not directly involved in 
international migration, but which have close family members working in Europe. Migrants 
often financially support such family members, sometimes aimed at helping them set up their 
own enterprises. This mostly concerns the brothers (sometimes parents) of the international 
migrants, who have established their independent nuclear households, but who are financially 
supported by their kin abroad. In one fifth of the cases, this concerns widows of deceased 
international migrants who still receive social security benefits or pensions from Europe. 
These households have been classified as (5) indirect international migrant households. The 
distinction of this category will better allow us to study the effects of migration on households 
that are not involved in migration themselves. Inclusion of this category is also a recognition 
of the links that many "disappeared" migrant households still maintain with family members 
in the Todgha valley. These five categories will be used as a reference for migration impact 
analysis. 
Table 7.2 shows the relative distribution of the five household migration categories 
across the six research villages. It shows that one third of all surveyed households are 
nonmigrant, one quarter internal migrant, 8 percent indirect international migrant, one fifth 
international migrant, and 13 percent returned international migrant. In sum, two thirds of all 
the surveyed households are involved in some type of migration, and 40 percent are involved 
in international migration. These data reveal the pervasiveness of migration in the Todgha 
valley. It also shows the relevance of household level analysis. Whereas "only" 14 percent of 
the surveyed population consist of internal, international or returned international migrants 
(see section 6.5), these forms of migration have directly or indirectly affected 66 percent of 
the surveyed households! 
Notwithstanding the generally high prevalence of migration, there are significant 
inter-village differences in household migration participation. The spatial differentiation 
revealed through the individual-level analysis in chapter 6 is generally reflected at the 
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household level. Again, Ait El Meskine—with 60 percent of all households involved in 
international migration—is clearly the most migration-influenced village within the sample. 
After Ait El Meskine, Tikoutar is the second most international migration-affected oasis, 
followed by Ikhba, Zaouia, Tadafelt, and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, respectively. 
Table 7.2. Migration participation at the household level by research village 
Village Household migration status (%) 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
Non 
34 7 
41.9 
25.4 
38 7 
28.2 
46.4 
34 5 
Current 
internal 
30 6 
124 
12.7 
22.6 
39.3 
25.0 
25 0 
Indirect 
international 
4.0 
95 
127 
9.7 
5 1 
71 
75 
Current 
international 
137 
18 1 
29 6 
21 0 
23 1 
17.9 
20 1 
Returned Total 
international 
169 
18 1 
19.7 
8.1 
4.3 
3.6 
12 8 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
η 
124 
105 
71 
62 
117 
28 
507 
Source: Household survey 
The data furthermore confirm that upper and middle Todgha villages tend to have more 
ancient international migration patterns (see chapter 6), reflected in the high percentage of 
returned international migrant households. Tadafelt has a low number of international 
returnees, reflecting the relatively recent character of international migration. More than other 
villages, Tadafelt and Zaouia are oriented towards internal migration. Furthermore, Tikoutar 
has a relatively high proportion of nonmigrant households. As has been argued in chapter 6, 
this can possibly be explained by Tikoutar's proximity to Tinghir, where many "commuting" 
oasis dwellers work. 
In contrast to the analysis of individuals' participation in migration (aggregated at the 
village and lineage level) presented in chapter 6, the household level analysis seems to 
suggest that internal and international migration are inversely proportionally related 
phenomena: Villages with many internal migrant households tend to contain few international 
migrant households, and vice versa. However, this impression is deceptive, since internal 
migrants exist within international migrant households, and many international migrants were 
internal migrants before migration. The negative association found between internal and 
international migrant households is therefore largely the result of the very definition of 
household categories in which international migration takes precedence over internal 
migrants. Almost 30 percent of current and returned international migrant households 
(representing 9.8 percent of all households, see table 7.1) comprise current internal migrants. 
Moreover, internal and international migration tend to be functionally related over time (see 
also section 6.5). As will be further demonstrated in the following sections, internal migration 
is often the precursor to international migration, and international migration may, in tum, be 
the cause of internal migration. 
7.3. Household life cycle, migration strategies, and migration 
trajectories 
7.3.1. Migration trajectories and the household life cycle 
The data presented in chapter 6 indicated that, in the longer term, internal and international 
migration tend to be positively correlated "communicating vessels". Both forms of migration 
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tend to occupy distinct places within the household life cycle. The latter assumption seems to 
be corroborated by the fact that two thirds of internal migrants are unmarried, compared to 
only one fifth of all international migrants (see table 7.3). Considering the position of 
migrants within the household (see table 7.4), 49 percent of international migrants are 
household heads themselves, whereas 69 percent of internal migrants are the son of the 
household head, and only 18 percent the head himself. Furthermore, in section 6.6.3, we saw 
that the average age on return is 32 for internal returnees and 48 for international returnees, 
and that the modes were in the 25-29 and 60-64 age categories, respectively. 
Table 7.3. Marital status of current internal and international migrants 
Migrants Marital status (%) 
Single Mamed Divorced Widowed Total n_ 
Internal 63 7 33.6 2.1 0 7 100 0 292 
International 200 780 ^ 0 0 0 100 0 150 
Total 48^9 486 2^ 0 0 5 100.0 442 
Source: Household survey (C=0.391**) 
Table 7.4. Position within household by migration status of individuals above 15 years 
Relation to 
household 
head 
Head 
Spouse 
Child 
Child in-law 
Brother/sister 
Grandchild 
Other 
Total 
η 
Nonmigrants 
145 
24 8 
39.1 
80 
38 
2 1 
77 
100 0 
1,741 
Internal 
186 
00 
70 0 
1.1 
68 
21 
14 
100 0 
280 
Migrants (%) 
Returned 
internal 
37.0 
2 4 
47 9 
0 0 
9.7 
0.0 
3 0 
100.0 
165 
International 
50.0 
0 0 
32 9 
3.4 
10.3 
0.0 
3.4 
100.0 
146 
Returned 
international 
75 9 
23 
11 5 
00 
57 
00 
4 6 
100 0 
87 
Total 
20 9 
18 1 
41 9 
6 1 
50 
1 7 
63 
100 0 
2,419 
Source: Household survey (C=0.437**) 
Figure 7.1 is an ideal-typical graphical representation of the different migration trajectories or 
"migration careers" that households can pursue. The underlying assumption is that these 
trajectories are linked to the different phases of the household life cycle. 
At Ti, the household consists of young parents with young children. At a later stage, 
T2, there is more room for income diversification and migration with the growing number of 
adults in the household. The typical internal migrant is the grown-up son who moves to town 
(arrow a in figure 7.1) to gain additional family income. On average, this migration lasts 7 to 
9 years (see section 6.6.2). Doing often irregular, badly paid work in the cities is generally 
considered as a temporary stage, upon which to go further or return. 
The critical age at which internal migrants and their households decide what to do 
afterwards lies somewhere around the age of 30, which more or less represents the threshold 
between T2 and T3. This is the age of marriage for men and the age of return for the majonty 
of return migrants. The ultimate ambition of most internal migrants is to gain access to 
international migration through saving enough money either to obtain a passport, a visa, and 
other paperwork, or to cross the Gibraltar Strait illegally, or through "network marriages". 
Normally, and certainly nowadays, considerable financial resources are needed to fulfill the 
dream of going abroad for those lacking access to "social migration capital". In chapter 6, we 
saw that, against all odds, each year many Todghawis succeed in "leapfrogging" (arrow c) to 
Europe, legally or illegally. 
Figure 7.1. Ideal-typical household migration trajectories within the household life cycle 
international 
migrant 
Origin 
Internal 
Abroad 
Individual mobility ^ ^ ^ Household mobility ••••*· Remittances 
Separated household status Reunified household 
status 
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Others move directly to Europe {arrow b). In the 1960s and early 1970s, such direct 
international migration was achieved through direct recruitment, the procurement of labor 
contracts through family or community members, or spontaneous migration. Nowadays, such 
direct migration is achieved either through marriage migration (family formation) or through 
undocumented migration. Nevertheless, as such migration often involves rather high costs, 
such migrants tend to be relatively old compared to internal migrants—and often have already 
migrated internally. 
Internal migrants who do not migrate abroad, but who have succeeded in finding more 
or less stable employment in towns and cities, may go on to live separated from their newly 
married spouses, but generally end up transferring their wife and children {arrow d) after 
suitable housing has been found. In this case, the entire household functionally disappears 
from the oasis. If internal migrants do not succeed in migrating overseas or finding stable 
employment in the towns or cities, many return to the Todgha {arrow e). This moment of 
return migration generally more or less coincides with marriage. Nowadays, the typical age of 
marriage for men lies between 25 and 35 (see figure 7.2). The money saved during migration 
often serves to pay for the bride price, festivities, and other costs associated with marriage. In 
line with ancient traditions of circular migration, many internal migrants return to set up their 
own families. However, they may migrate again for longer or shorter periods if not enough 
money can be earned locally. However, staying away from one's family is generally 
considered as undesirable, and the proportion of internal migrants above 40 years is very 
limited. When their own children grow up, the cycle of migration may start again. 
Figure 7.2. Proportion of men and women who are or have been married hy 5-year age group 
loo 
g 40 
S5 30 
-Men 
-Women 
Source: Household survey 
International migrants tend to stay away much longer than internal migrants. Whereas 
returned international migrants stayed away 18 years on average, this is 8 years for returned 
internal migrants (see chapter 6). Although migrants typically move abroad with the intention 
of coming back, most international migrants tend to stay away for (almost) their entire 
working age (T2 and T3), provided that a permanent residence status has been acquired at the 
destination. Once they have accepted the de facto permanent or long-term character of 
migration, many international migrants tend to reunify their families in Europe {arrow f). This 
family reunification moment generally lies 5 to 15 years after the initial separation, and 
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entails the factual disappearance of the household from the oasis1. However, households that 
settled in Europe often fulfill a function in enabling "stay-behinds" to migrate through 
marriage migration, which is partially a form of labor migration "in disguise". 
Despite the magnitude of family reunification, a considerable proportion of Todgha 
migrants have continued to live in Europe alone, while maintaining their families in Morocco 
via remittance transfers. There are several reasons for not reunifying families at the 
destination. Most respondents said that they feared that their wives and children would 
become too "westernized" and lose their religious faith in Europe. Many migrants also argued 
that—back in the 1970s and 1980s, when migrants were confronted with rising 
unemployment and racism in Europe—they estimated that their children would have a better 
future in Morocco in the expectation that higher education would procure them secure, civil-
servant jobs. However, other reasons might play an important role behind this official, 
socially acceptable discourse. Failure to fulfill the legal (i.e., status as a permanent resident) 
and financial (i.e., sufficient income) conditions for family reunification also seem important 
reasons, which most migrants are, however, not willing to admit. Other, more personal 
reasons opposing family reunification are marital conflict or estrangement, divorce, or 
marriage to a second wife in Europe or Morocco. 
Long-term international migrants who do not cut ties with the household of origin 
typically return towards the end of their working age, at T4, in their fifties or early sixties, to 
form returned international migration households (arrow h). Subsequently, their children may 
start the cycle again (arrow 1). Some migrants return far earlier, often with the intention to 
invest their money in their own enterprises (see chapter 9). Most of the international migrants 
who left in the late 1960s and early 1970s migration boom had either reunified their families 
or returned home at the turn of the century. However, classic distinctions between permanent 
and return migration are becoming increasingly blurred. We have witnessed the emergence of 
transnational Todgha communities that maintain intensive contacts with either side of the 
Mediterranean. As we have seen in section 6.6.2, a sizable number of retired and unemployed 
migrants are "commuting" between Europe and the Todgha, living for a part of the year in 
each place. They often combine this commuting with commercial activities. 
As indicated in section 6.3.2, some migrants have opted for the strategy of "relay 
migration", in which only one or two sons move to Europe in order to maintain the family's 
stake in the international migration market. Finally, some international migrants decide to 
relocate their households from their village to Tinghir or towns elsewhere in Morocco while 
abroad or upon their return (arrow g). As will be further argued in section 9.2.5, such 
relocation is often a flight from asphyxiating social pressures to share remittance-derived 
financial wealth with family and community members and the conflicts this often entails 
between migrants' wives and the extended family. 
In conclusion, internal and international migration seem to fulfill distinct functions in 
the household life cycle. Internal migration tends to function as a (potential) precursor to 
international migration. The presented patterns of migration trajectories demonstrate that 
internal and international migration are complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than 
mutually exclusive phenomena, as internal migration may shape the mental, social, and 
material conditions for international migration. 
Therefore, "disappeared" households do not appear in the survey Besides the practical impossibility of 
interviewing such households, family reunification implies an explicit choice to live in Europe, and generally 
coincides with cutting the most intensive ties with the region of origin Nevertheless, even many "reunified" 
migrants might support family members who are not part of the households. Therefore, the category of "indirect 
international migrant households" has been distinguished (see section 7 2) Although migrants' children living in 
Europe rarely return to settle in the Todgha or elsewhere in Morocco, they often tend to marry with "stay-
behinds" (see sections 4 2 5 and 6 8 3) 
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7.3.2. Migration and household composition 
Table 7.5 reveals that households with international migrants tend to be larger than other 
households. Current international migrant households count 9 people on average, and 57 
percent of all households within this group are larger than 7 people. The smallest households 
are nonmigrant households, with only 29 percent of households exceeding 7 people, and an 
average household size of 6.22. Internal and indirect international migrant households score 
on almost average levels. These results seem in line with evidence from other parts of 
Morocco that international migrants tend to originate from relatively large households (Dc 
Haas 1995; Fadloullah et al. 2000:63; Heinemeijer et al. 1976). 
Table 7.S. Household size by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
1-5 
37.7 
24 6 
31 6 
11 8 
20 0 
26 5 
6-7 
33 1 
27 0 
184 
314 
24 6 
29 1 
Householc 
8-9 
17 1 
22 2 
26 3 
27 5 
32 3 
23 1 
1 size (%)3 
>10 
12.0 
26.2 
23.7 
29 4 
23 1 
21 3 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
« 
175 
126 
38 
102 
65 
506 
Mean 
62 
78 
76 
9.0 
8.0 
75 
Source: Household survey (C=0.269**; η=0.283**) 
Table 7.6 demonstrates that only 15 percent of nonmigrant households are of the extended, 
polynuclear type, compared to 28 percent for internal and indirect international migrant 
households, and around 43 percent of international migrant households4. It is important to 
note that there is a general tendency towards the nuclearization of households in Morocco, in 
particular among the youngest generations (see also sections 9.2.2. and 9.2.5). Therefore, the 
higher incidence of nuclear families among internal and nonmigrant families might also be 
the result of the generally younger age of the parents in such households. If we control for the 
age of the head of the households, we indeed see that "older" households tend to contain more 
nuclei (see table 7.6). However, the current and returned international migrant households 
remain significantly larger on average, except for "old" returned international migrant 
households. 
Two hypotheses can be formulated to explain the high prevalence of relatively large, 
extended households among migrants. A first factor seems to be the higher tendency among 
migrants to maintain extended family structures in order to guarantee the "safety" of their 
wife and children, who are given in custody to the migrant's parents and/or brothers. If this 
hypothesis is correct, migration is the cause—rather than the result—of a large and extended 
family structure. 
The second, alternative hypothesis is that migrants tend to come from families which 
are relatively "mature", since most migrants are young adults (sons of the household head) 
and therefore from families which are at a more advanced stage in their life cycle. On the 
2
 The multiple companson of group means (using the Bonferrom procedure) revealed that nonmigrant 
households are significantly smaller than internal, as well as current and returned international migrant, 
households. Other mean group differences are insignificant. 
3
 The variable household size includes the migrant. 
4
 The multiple comparison of group means (using the Bonferrom procedure) revealed that nonmigrant 
households have a significantly smaller number of nuclei on average than current and returned international 
migrant households Other mean group differences are insignificant. 
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basis of his migration research in the Moroccan Rif region, De Mas (1990a) established a link 
between the "household life cycle" and the occurrence of migration. De Mas argued that the 
number of adults in the household primarily determined the likelihood of international 
migration. In general, households in a rather advanced stage of their life cycle (i.e., those with 
adult sons old enough to work outdoors) were most likely to be involved in various economic 
sectors, including migration. In Agadir-Tissint, an oasis in the Province of Tata, De Haas 
(1995) equally found that migrant households contain comparatively large numbers of adults. 
From this, it can be hypothesized that with the increase of the number of adults, the 
household is better able to spread income risks and to afford (i.e., share) the high costs and 
risks of migration. Furthermore, households involved in internal migration, which generally 
implies less costs and risks, tend to be smaller and "younger" than international migrant 
households. Nonmigrant households tend to be the smallest. 
Table 7.6. Nuclear and extended household structure by household migration status 
Migration status Number of nuclel, within household (%) 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
1 
85 1 
72.2 
73.7 
58.8 
55 4 
2 
12.1 
183 
21.1 
22.5 
33.8 
3 
23 
79 
53 
14.7 
10.8 
/>4 
06 
1 6 
00 
3.9 
00 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
Age household head 
< 45 45-59 
1 09 113 
1 20 1 24 
1 13 1 16 
1 50 144 
1.50 146 
>60 
140 
1 77 
173 
2 07 
1 59 
Total 
1 18 
140 
132 
1 65 
1 55 
η 
174 
126 
38 
102 
65 
Total 719 19.2 7 5 14 100 0 119 128 167 139 505 
Source: Household survey (C=0.295**; η=0.251** (within categories: < 45: 0.307; 45-59: 0.224; Ì 60: 
0.258)) 
The empirical evidence from this survey seems to confirm this hypothesis. Table 7.7 shows 
that the age of the household head—which is taken as a first proxy for the household life 
cycle—is the lowest among nonmigrant households. Among migrant households, it is clearly 
the highest among returned international migrants6. Although the mean ages are almost equal 
for current internal and international migrant households, the proportion of household heads 
with an age below 45 is higher among internal migrant households. It should be noted that— 
as has already been indicated in chapter 6—among 49 percent of international migrant 
households, the head is the migrant himself, whereas this is the case for only 18 percent of 
internal migrants. 
Table 7.8 reveals the numbers of adults—which is taken as second proxy for the 
household life cycle—within the household migration categories. It reveals that migrant 
households indeed contain significantly more adults than nonmigrant households, and current 
international migrant households contain significantly more adults than internal migrant 
households . This all seems to confirm the hypothesis that only with the maturing of the 
households is there significant involvement in internal and, in particular, international 
migration. 
For a definition of nucleus, see appendix 1. 
The multiple comparison of group means (using the Bonferrom procedure) revealed that the mean age of the 
household head of returned international migrant households is significantly higher than all other household 
categones All other differences between group mean are insignificant 
The multiple companson of group means (using the Bonferrom procedure) revealed that nonmigrant 
households contain significantly less adults than all other household categones, and that current international 
migrant households contain significantly more adults than internal migrant households. All other differences 
between group mean are insignificant. 
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Table 7.7. Age of the household head by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
Source: Household survey (C= 
<45 
45 1 
24 2 
21 1 
17.8 
92 
27.9 
=0.368**; η= 
Age of the household head (%) 
45-59 
27 7 
41 1 
50 0 
53.5 
20 0 
36.9 
=0.317**) 
>60 
27 2 
34 7 
28 9 
28 7 
70 8 
35.1 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Table 7.8. Number of adults within household by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
Number of people 
1-2 
36.6 
11.9 
23 7 
8.8 
9.2 
20 4 
3-4 
38 3 
31.0 
21 1 
19.6 
24.6 
29.6 
above 15 years old 
5-6 
183 
33 3 
36 8 
32 4 
38 5 
28 9 
>7 
69 
23 8 
184 
39 2 
27 7 
21 1 
Mean 
49 2 
53 3 
53 0 
53.5 
63.6 
53 2 
, including migrant (%) 
Total 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 
361 
5 14 
4 87 
5.98 
5.43 
4 80 
η 
173 
124 
38 
101 
65 
501 
η 
174 
125 
38 
101 
65 
503 
Source: Household survey (C=0.394**; η=0.389**) 
Thus, nonmigrant households tend to be relatively "young" households that are in the early 
phase of the family life cycle (see Ti in figure 7.1). Therefore, it is likely that part of these 
households will participate in (labor or student) migration in the near future when children 
reach adulthood. Consequently, a nonmigrant household is a potential future migrant 
household. This confirms the notion that the vast majority of the Todghawis were, arc, or will 
be involved in some kind of migration. Therefore, household size, structure, and life cycle 
seem to be determinants of migration, rather than the other way around. Moreover, this 
analysis further corroborates the idea that internal and international migration are 
complementary, mutually reinforcing, processes, which both occur at distinct points within 
the same household life cycle. 
7.4. Livelihood diversification, remittances, and income structure 
7.4.1. Sectoral and spatial livelihood diversification 
Over the twentieth century, oasis households have progressively moved away from 
predominantly agricultural livelihoods to an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and 
sources of income. Stimulated by population growth and increasing aspirations, this 
diversification process has been enabled by the increasing possibilities to gain an additional 
non-agricultural income, initially mainly through migration, but in recent decades 
increasingly within the Todgha valley itself. Following the argument of the new economics of 
labor migration, migration is a household livelihood strategy not only to diversify and spread 
income risks, but also to increase income, which can potentially contribute to better living 
conditions and well-being. In this section, we will analyze to what extent the data from this 
survey support these hypotheses. 
As table 7.9 indicates, only a small minority (6 percent) among all households are 
active in only one economic sector and 1 percent have no economic activity at all. The first 
group mainly consists of exclusively agricultural households, while the latter group consists 
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of either passive receivers of remittances (mainly indirect international migrant households) 
or extremely poor and landless household that have to live on charity. 58 percent of oasis 
household depend on three, four, or even more economic activities simultaneously. 
While the average number of economic activities per household is about three, it tends 
to be higher among internal and, in particular, international migrant households. About 45 
percent of all international migrant households are active in four or more economic sectors8, 
compared to 14 percent among nonmigrants. This is an indication that migrant households do 
not tend to rely solely on remittances and subsequently withdraw from other, local economic 
activities—as has been argued by the "migration pessimists"—but instead tend to continue or 
even extend the number of economic sectors in which they are active. 
Table 7.9. Degree of livelihood diversification by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
0 
1 1 
1 6 
5.3 
0.0 
0.0 
1 2 
Number 
1 
86 
24 
132 
20 
62 
57 
of economic 
2 
47 4 
27 6 
21 1 
30.4 
30 8 
34 9 
activities outside household work 
3 
28 6 
39 4 
21 1 
22.5 
26 2 
29 2 
>4 
143 
29.1 
39.5 
45.1 
36.9 
29 0 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
(%) 
Mean 
251 
3.03 
2.87 
3.36 
3.05 
2 91 
η 
175 
127 
3H 
102 
65 
507 
Source: Household survey (C=0.374**; η=0.270**) 
Looking at the type of economic activities (table 7.10), it is striking that members of current 
international and indirect international migrant households seem to be more frequently 
involved in agriculture than other household types. On the contrary, nonmigrant households 
have the lowest involvement in agriculture. This seems to run counter to the idea that 
international migrant households would become passive remittance receivers and, in general, 
the pessimistic predictions on the impact of migration on agriculture. One third of all 
households are active in the construction sector, and the same percentage in the service sector. 
Construction seems particularly important for current migrant households. 
There is a strong labor division between men and women, in which most adult men 
either work in the expanding non-agricultural sectors in the Todgha, or have migrated outside 
the valley. The quasi totality of women work in the household and agriculture. The de-
agrarization of men's activities seems to have increased the agricultural burden of women, in 
addition to their housekeeping and child-rearing activities9. 
Contemporary oasis livelihoods are increasingly characterized by multi-activity and 
multi-locality, in which we can witness a general diversification and partial de-agrarization of 
activity patterns, especially among young men. This applies both to migrant and nonmigrant 
households, although migrant households tend to have more diversified livelihoods than 
nonmigrant households. From being the main pillar of the oasis economy, agriculture has 
become just one of the many, though still significant, elements of contemporary oasis 
livelihoods. 
This justifies Bebbington's (1999) argument that we need to broaden our view of rural 
livelihoods in the developing world, which can no longer be equated with agrarian livelihoods 
only. In a globalizing world, in which even the most remote regions are becoming 
increasingly linked to the outside world through infrastructure, trade, and migration, rural 
The following sectors have been distinguished' agriculture, agricultural labor, construction, commerce, 
industry, civil servant / professional, and "other" 
For further analysis of gender and migration, see section 10 4 
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economies are also becoming increasingly diversified, and households increasingly draw on a 
variety of local and migratory economic activities. 
Table 7.10. Economic activities by household migration status 
Economic activities Household migration status (%) 
Agriculture10 
Construction 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Civil servant/professional 
Service sector 
nonmigrant 
45 7 
32 6 
18.3 
13 1 
57 
24 0 
internal migrant 
51.2 
51.2 
23.2 
15.2 
11.2 
44.8 
indirect 
international 
78 9 
23.7 
13.2 
53 
2.6 
39.5 
current 
international 
57 8 
67 6 
14.7 
26 5 
20 
40 2 
returned 
international 
47 7 
33 8 
24.6 
24.6 
10.8 
35 4 
175 125 38 102 65 
Source: Household survey 
7.4.2. Migration and remittances 
If migration were a livelihood strategy to diversify and increase the income of the households 
left behind—as we have assumed in chapter 2—we would expect migrants to send 
considerable amounts of remittances back to their households, and that their incomes would 
be substantially higher than those of nonmigrant households. It is notoriously difficult to 
measure remittance transfers. First, many remittances are sent in kind instead of in cash, 
typically in the form of gifts during return". Second, some cash remittances are transferred 
through non-official channels. Third, data collection on remittances seems particularly 
sensitive to underreporting12. Fourth, banks are not willing to give detailed information on 
remittance transfers. 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, the current survey has attempted to measure as 
accurately as possible all cash remittance flows. Nevertheless, taking into account the above-
mentioned pitfalls, the figures presented in tables 7.11 and 7.12 should not be seen as exact 
accounts, but rather as estimates in order to detect general patterns. The data indicate that 
international remittances tend to be far more important than internal remittances in terms of 
their mean contribution to household income. Whereas households involved in international 
migration tend to receive between 2,000 and 3,000 dirham13 per month, internal migrant 
households receive an average of 860 dirham in remittance payments. Table 7.12 reveals that 
10-20 percent of the households without internal migrants nevertheless receive internal 
remittances from non-household members. For the total population, the average household 
received about 1,090 dirham per month in international remittances and 326 dirham in 
internal remittances. 
In sum, total international remittances are three times as important as internal 
remittances in terms of absolute income. Most internal remittances are transferred through 
10
 It should be noted that the figures in table 7.10 mainly represent the activities of men. Most women have 
important agricultural duties, which are seen as an integral part of their household tasks Therefore, most women 
have not reported agriculture as a distinct activity. 
" It is estimated that in Morocco transfers in kind represent one quarter to one third of official remittances 
(Refass 1999). 
12
 Particularly in a Berber region such as the Todgha, people tend to distrust outsiders and might have associated 
this survey with the State's bureaucracy. Notwithstanding all the methodological precautions taken, some 
respondents might have underreported actual earnings and remittance transfers out of fear of tax collectors See 
chapter 3 for further discussion on such reliability issues. 
'
3
 In 1999, the average value of 1 US$ was equal to 9.8 dirham 
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informal channels—many poor households do not have a bank account—whereas most 
international remittances are transferred through formal banking systems. It seems primarily 
due to international migration that all major Moroccan banks have branches in Tinghir (cf. 
Büchner 1986). 
Table 7.11. International remittances by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
Amount of cash international remittances per 
No rem 
100.0 
100 0 
00 
20 
29 7 
63 9 
Source: Household survey (C=0.714 
Table 7.12. Internal remittances by 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
No rem. 
90 6 
31 7 
81.6 
87.3 
87.7 
74.1 
Source: Household survey (C=0.502 
<1400 1400-2100 2100^000 
0.0 
0.0 
55.6 
20 8 
4.7 
8.8 
**; η=0.646' 
0.0 
0.0 
13.9 
30 7 
188 
9.6 
'*) 
0 0 
0.0 
13.9 
26.7 
14.1 
8.2 
household migration status 
Amount of cash internal ι 
<800 
4.7 
20.6 
10.5 
2.0 
77 
9.0 
**;η=0.413' 
800-1199 
1.2 
25 4 
53 
2 9 
1.5 
8.0 
») 
>4000 
emittances | 
>1200 
35 
22 2 
2 6 
78 
3.1 
9 0 
0.0 
0.0 
16.7 
19.8 
32.8 
9.4 
month in dirham (%) 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
0 
0 
1946 
2971 
2721 
1090 
:>er month in dirham (%) 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 
123 
859 
138 
200 
128 
326 
η 
170 
127 
36 
101 
64 
498 
η 
170 
126 
38 
102 
65 
501 
7.4.3. Migration and income structure 
Table 7.13 reveals the income structure of households by showing the most important sources 
of household income per household migration category. The table indicates that the vast 
majority of households have various sources of income outside agriculture, either from 
migration or from local non-economic activities. The number of households that completely 
rely on subsistence agriculture is small (4 percent), and seems to be disappearing, reflecting 
the general tendency towards diversification of economic activities and risk spreading. This 
corroborates the earlier observation that it would be erroneous to consider the Todgha any 
longer as an exclusively rural and agricultural region. 
One quarter of all households live on a combination of local agricultural and non-
agricultural income. Half of all nonmigrant households live on such a combination, and one 
quarter of this group live on non-agricultural income only. In terms of local cash income, non-
agricultural sources of revenue seem dominant. 
Three quarters of internal migrant households live on a combination of internal 
remittances and local sources of income, while remittances seem most important in their 
contribution to total income. All categories of international migrant households tend to live 
primarily on international remittances, although they usually have additional sources of 
income. About 10 percent of international migrant households have simultaneous income 
from international and internal remittances. The remittances received by indirect international 
migrant households tend to be somewhat lower, and other sources of income relatively more 
important, than among current and returned international migrant households. About one 
quarter of returned international migrant households do not receive remittances. This mostly 
concerns migrants to Algeria and the Arab oil countries—who do not enjoy pension or social 
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security rights—or migrants who failed to find work or undocumented migrants who were 
expelled from Europe within a few years. 
Table 7.13. Sources of income by household migration status14 
Sources of monetary income Household migration status (%) 
No source of income from own labor 
Only agricultural 
Agnculture>local non-agncultural 
Agriculture<local non-agricultural 
Only local non-agncultural 
Internal remittances<local 
Internal remittances>local 
Internal and intnl rem.<other sources 
Internal and intnl rem >other sources 
International rem <other sources 
International rem.>other sources 
Total 
η 
Non 
1 8 
12.0 
4 8 
44 0 
27 7 
4.8 
4.8 
00 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
166 
Internal 
0.0 
0.8 
1.6 
210 
8.1 
25.0 
43.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
124 
Indirect 
intnl 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
56 
11 1 
36.1 
47.2 
100.0 
36 
Interna­
tional 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 0 
1.0 
11.0 
15.0 
72.0 
100 0 
100 
Returned 
intnl 
0 0 
0.0 
0 0 
194 
3.2 
32 
1 6 
0 0 
8 1 
11.3 
53.2 
100.0 
62 
Total 
0.6 
4.3 
2.0 
23.0 
11.9 
8.4 
12.9 
0.6 
4.1 
72 
25.0 
100.0 
48X 
Source: Household survey 
Table 7.14 gives an overview of the monthly household income for different migration 
categories. This includes internal and international migrant remittances, locally earned 
salaries, income from renting, and agricultural income15. The table clearly reveals a positive 
association between participation in international migration and household income. Internal 
migrant households earn only slightly higher average incomes than nonmigrants, although the 
proportion of extremely poor households (earning less than 1,000 dirham per month) is far 
higher among nonmigrants. This confirms the hypothesis that, also in the case of internal 
migration, it is not the poorest who migrate, as they cannot afford the risks and costs of 
migrating, although it might also be the partial effect of the income-stabilizing effect of 
income diversification through migration—it is difficult here to disentangle causes and 
effects. 
About 63 percent of nonmigrant and 54 percent of internal migrant households eam 
less than 1,700 dirham per month, whereas this is the case for 25 percent of the indirect 
international migrant households. About 65 percent of international and 72 percent of 
returned international migrant households eam more than 2,600 dirham a month. The average 
income of households directly involved in international migration is more than double that of 
nonmigrant and internal migrant households, a difference that largely reflects the income 
effect of cash remittance transfers. Returned international migrants are a relatively wealthy 
group, as most have built up pension rights in Europe or receive social security benefits. This 
explains why almost half of the households in this group have incomes above 4,500 dirham. 
In general, income inequality is high by all standards with a Gini index of 0.486 at the 
household level. There is a high variation in income within migration categories, which is 
particularly high among nonmigrants (see standard deviations in table 7.14). Although 
H
 The "<" and ">" signs indicate which sources of income is highest 
15
 Subsistence production is not included in these figures, which only include cash income from the sale of 
agricultural produce. In chapter 9, we will give estimates of the market value of all (commercialized and non-
commercialized) agricultural produce, which lie at around one third of the total monetary income. However, it is 
important to note that the inclusion of subsistence production does not decrease but rather increases income 
inequality, as agricultural production levels of international migrant households tend to be higher than those of 
nonmigrant and internal migrant households. 
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nonmigrant households are generally the poorest, it is important to note that even within this 
group almost one fifth earn more than 2,600 dirham. These are generally households 
containing local schoolteachers, other civil servants, and some wealthy businessmen. 
Nevertheless, more than 40 percent of nonmigrant households must live on less than 1,000 
dirham per month. The income distribution of internal migrant households is bipolar, 
indicating that this category is composed of distinctive richer and poorer households. The 
relatively wealthy internal migrant households generally contain migrants working as civil 
servants in other parts of Morocco. 
We have seen that migrant households tend to be larger than nonmigrant households. 
If we calculate the per capita income (see table 7.14), we therefore see that the income ratio 
between international migrant and nonmigrant households drops below 2, and that internal 
migrant households are even poorer than nonmigrant households, though not significantly. 
The daily per capita cash income is 15 dirham or approximately 1.5 US$. Nevertheless, the 
differences between households with and without access to international migration resources 
remain large and highly significant. There is clearly a positive effect of participation in 
international migration on household income. However, such an association is largely absent 
for internal migration. This is possibly linked to the fact that internal migrants generally have 
the same kind of jobs and only tend to eam slightly higher wages than nonmigrants. 
Table 7.14. Total monthly cash household income by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
0-1,000 
37.0 
18.5 
8.3 
3.0 
3.3 
18.9 
1,000-
1,700 
26.7 
33 1 
167 
60 
82 
21 0 
Cash income 
1,700-
2,600 
17.6 
177 
22 2 
26 0 
164 
195 
2,600- > 
4,500 
11 5 
194 
25 0 
29 0 
26.2 
20.0 
: per month in dirham (%) 
4,500 
73 
11 3 
27 8 
36 0 
45 9 
20.6 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 
2,113 
2,399 
3,709 
5,373 
5,080 
3,347 
« 
165 
124 
36 
100 
61 
486 
$/capita 
/day 
1.11 
1.01 
1.60 
1.96 
2 10 
146 
Stand. 
Dev 
1.89 
0.85 
1.29 
1.43 
1.40 
1.52 
Source: Household survey (η=0.349**; Gini-index=0.486) 
If we look at the average income composition for each household category (figure 7.3 and 
table 7.15), we can see that remittances account for 43 percent of the total income of the 
surveyed households. Among households involved in international migration, remittances 
account for 56-59 percent of the total cash income. For internal migrant households, 
remittances represent about one third of their total income. 
It is striking that international migrant households tend to have higher local cash 
earnings than other households, in particular from agriculture. Mean agricultural cash 
incomes of households involved in international migration are about twice as high as in 
nonmigrant households. Indirect international migrant households tend to have a relatively 
high income from leasing land and houses. Internal migrant households, on the contrary, tend 
to have lower local earnings than nonmigrants. 
Table 7.15 also indicates that, on average, agricultural cash income represents only 
about 13 percent of household cash income. This proportion does not show much variation 
across the household categories. Most of the agricultural production is still destined for the 
household's own consumption, and only a small proportion of the harvest is traded. Despite 
the fact that the relative importance of agriculture has drastically decreased due to population 
growth and the rising importance of local non-agricultural activities and migration, we will 
see in the following chapter that agriculture nonetheless still plays a vital role in sustaining 
oasis livelihoods. 
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Figure 7.3. Mean income composition by household migration status 
6,000 
5,000 
D Local salary/business 
G Leasing/renting 
Ξ Agricultural Income 
D Internal remittances 
• International remittances 
Source: Household survey 
Table 7.15. Income composition and income level by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned internation. 
Agriculture 
320 (15.2) 
281 (11.7) 
661 (18.0) 
578 (10.8) 
639 (12.8) 
Mean monthly household cash income in dirham (%) 
Leasing land Other local 
and houses 
194 (9.2) 1,472 (69.8) 
47 (2.0) 1,225 (50.8) 
416 (11.3) 516 (14.0) 
242 (4.5) 1,349 (25.3) 
215 (4.3) 1,276 (25.6) 
Internal 
remittances 
123 (5.8) 
859 (35.6) 
138 (3.8) 
200 (3.7) 
128 (2.6) 
International 
remittances 
0 (0.0) 
0 (0.0) 
1,946 (52.9) 
2,971 (55.6) 
2,721 (54.7) 
Total 
2,113 
2,399 
3,709 
5,373 
5,080 
II 
174 
127 
38 
102 
65 
Total 430(13.0) 186 (5.6) 1,286 (38.8) 326 (9.8) 1,090(32.1 3,347 506 
Source: Household survey 
This analysis leads us to the following conclusions. First, contemporary household 
livelihoods seem increasingly diverse and multi-local. The economy of the valley is becoming 
increasingly open and de-agrarized, and migrant remittances are nowadays a major source of 
income. Second, although remittances are an important source of cash income, they "only" 
represent one third of the total income of the surveyed population. Therefore, the image of the 
Todgha as a region more or less passively relying on migrant remittances—as structuralist 
"migration pessimists" often tend to portray migrant sending areas—seems false. Along with 
remittances, other sources of income have grown in importance too. 
Third, the fact that international migrant households also tend to have higher incomes 
from local sources indicates that migrant households do not tend to retreat from local 
economic sectors, as has been argued by the "migration pessimists". To what extent this 
higher non-migratory income is associated with investments by international migrant 
households will be explored in chapters 8 and 9. 
Nevertheless, the economic situation seems completely different and clearly less rosy 
for internal migrant households, who seem to have lower incomes from other sources than 
nonmigrants. The data point to a fundamental difference in development impacts between 
internal and international migration. Apparently, besides a small category (10-20 percent) of 
households containing civil servants or professional workers, most internal migrant 
households do not succeed in increasing their income through migration. Therefore, only the 
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"risk spreading" argument can theoretically explain their migration. As far as income 
characteristics are concerned, internal migrant households are more analogous to nonmigrant 
households, confirming the earlier observation that the main dividing line is between 
households with and without access to international migration resources. 
7.5. The impact of migration on wealth and living conditions 
The higher incomes of households involved in international migration are mirrored in the 
higher possession rates of luxury consumer goods, such as video recorders, satellite dishes, 
refrigerators, washing-machines, mopeds, bicycles, and so on. An index of wealth indicators 
has been calculated in order to summarize the level of household wealth (for calculation and 
composition of this index, see section 5.6.4). This wealth index can be considered as a 
relatively reliable proxy of household income. Moreover, it seems a better indication of past 
or "accumulated" income than cash income over the last year. 
Table 7.16 shows that the relationship between migration participation and the wealth 
index largely reflects patterns found for household income. Households involved in 
international migration tend to have far higher scores on this index than other households. 
This seems directly related to the generally higher incomes of international migrant 
households. Not surprisingly, there is a significant correlation (r=0.472, significant at the 0.01 
level) between household income and scores on the index of wealth indicators. As was the 
case for income per capita, internal migrant households do not score higher on this index than 
nonmigrant households. They even score slightly lower. 
Table 7.16. Index of wealth indicators by household migration status 
Village 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
0-1 
38.9 
40.2 
18.9 
78 
62 
27 3 
Scores on 
2-3 
33.7 
36.2 
135 
23 5 
20.0 
29 1 
index of wealth indicators 
4-5 
16.0 
134 
21.6 
14.7 
21.5 
16.2 
>6 
114 
102 
45 9 
53 9 
52 3 
27.5 
per household 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
2.51 
2.35 
5.16 
5.75 
5.72 
3 73 
η 
175 
127 
37 
102 
65 
506 
Source: Household survey (η=0.510**) 
Figure 7.4 demonstrates that the general relationship between migration participation and 
household wealth is generally reproduced within the research villages. There is a remarkable 
difference in wealth between household categories, with the major dividing line running 
between households with and without access to international migration resources16. 
Results of Bonferrom multiple comparison of group means for both income and wealth indicators indicated 
significant differences in scores between (1) nonmigrant and internal migrant households on the one hand, and 
(2) current, indirect, and returned international households on the other Within these two groups, differences 
between group means are insignificant This confirms that the new (socio-)economic divide runs between 
households with and without access to international remittances 
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Figure 7.4. Household wealth index by household migration status, by village 
ι 
Meskme Isfoul 
Source: Household survey 
However, it is striking that nonmigrant and internal migrant households tend to score higher 
in villages such as Ait El Meskine and Tikoutar than in other villages in general and the Ait 
'Atta villages in particular. For example, nonmigrants in Ait El Meskine have roughly similar 
scores to international migrants in Tadafelt. In chapter 5 we already found that Ait Todoght 
villages generally had higher scores on this wealth index than Ait 'Atta villages. Apparently, 
the general level of household wealth is higher in some villages than in others, regardless of 
migration participation. This may be possibly related to the indirect positive economic effects 
that sustained participation in international migration may have had on villages as a whole, 
including nonmigrant and internal migrant households. In particular in Tadafelt, international 
migration households tend to score relatively low compared to other villages. This might be 
the result of the more recent character of international migration from this relatively isolated 
Ait 'Atta village. This would comply with the hypothesis that the Hill effects of migration 
seem to fully materialize only after several decades of sustained out-migration. 
Similar to the possession of consumer goods, a strong positive association exists 
between participation in international migration and the general conditions in which 
households live (see table 7.17). For example, almost three-quarters of returned international 
households live in a concrete house and 94 percent have a lavatory in their house, compared 
to only one third and 57 percent of all nonmigrant households, respectively. Likewise, 
international migrant households tend to have access to private drinking water facilities (well 
and pump) far more frequently than other households. 
As for household wealth, an index has been calculated for living conditions18. Figure 
7.5 shows the average scores of household categories on the index of living conditions within 
the research villages. We can see that patterns for the whole population are generally repeated 
within the research villages. Households involved in international migration tend to live in 
better conditions than nonmigrants. The correlation ratios between the index of living 
conditions on the one hand, and household income and wealth index on the other hand, are 
0.398 and 0.761 (both significant at the 0.01 level), respectively. Even when controlling for 
17
 The score of the Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul for returned international migrants is missing, as the case-load was only 
1. In subsequent figures, data on Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul are also missing several times for the same reason. 
18
 In order to calculate this index, each item in possession (mentioned in table 7.17) was counted as a score of 1, 
each item not in possession as a score of 0. The index is the sum of all scores. 
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income, analysis of variance indicates that positive associations remain between household 
migration status and living and wealth indexes, especially in the highest income category19. 
Table 7.17. Living conditions by bousebold migration status 
Migration status Percentage possessing item in house (%) 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Concrete 
house 
35.6 
27.8 
52.6 
62.7 
73.8 
Lavatory 
56.6 
59.1 
78.9 
81.4 
93.8 
Shower 
14.9 
13,4 
37.8 
47.5 
52.3 
Private 
well 
50.6 
43.3 
78.9 
66.7 
78.5 
Electric 
pump 
8.6 
7.1 
26.3 
30.4 
37.5 
Diesel M 
pump 
16.1 
11.8 
47.4 
37.3 
32.3 
;an score 
index 
1.8 
1,6 
3,2 
3.3 
3.7 
Total 45.3 68.6 27.5 57.7 17.7 23.7 2.4 
Source: Household survey (η= 0.487**) 
Figure 7.5. Index of living conditions at household level by household migration status, by village 
• nonmigrant 
U internal 
1 indirect international 
Ο current international 
S returned international 
Zaouia Tikoutar 
Meskine 
Tadafelt Ghallil π'ΛΙ 
Isfoul 
Source: Household survey 
Therefore, variance in both dependent variables cannot be explained by current income levels 
alone. Past income ("accumulated income") and income stability presumably play an 
important role too. From this, it can be hypothesized that it is the fact that international 
migrant households have not only higher but also more stable incomes, which explains why 
they score higher even when controlling for income. Concerning living conditions, significant 
differences remain between villages. Nonmigrant households in villages such as Tikoutar and, 
in particular. Ait El Meskine tend to live in similar or even better conditions than 
international migrant households in Tadafelt. 
In chapter 5, we saw that significant intra-valley differences exist concerning 
habitation, sanitation, and general living conditions. In general, the inhabitants of Tinghir and 
the upper Todgha live in better conditions than the inhabitants of the relatively poor and 
isolated villages of the lower Todgha. In the upstream villages, most houses are concrete, two 
to three storey buildings. In the downstream villages of El Hart and Ait 'Atta, most houses are 
19 
Income 
0-1699 
1700-3749 
>3750 
η wealth index 
.219 
.385 
.474 
η Living cond. index 
.166 
.298 
.491 
Household Livelihoods, Migration, Remittances, and Wealth 233 
adobe constructions In the upper Todgha, houses also tend to be relatively luxurious, often 
having modem hygiene facilities, such as lavatories, showers, and kitchens 
Although households involved in international migration tend to live in better 
conditions, the general level of wealth and living conditions is higher in certain villages, in 
particular Ait El Meskine and Tikoutar These are also the villages with the highest and most 
longstanding participation in international migration It is possible that nonmigrant and 
internal migrant households have indirectly profited from consumption and investments by 
international migrants in the local economy, which may have provided them with 
employment and additional income In line with the premises of the new economics of labor 
migration theory, we can hypothesize that there is a certain diffusiort of migration capital over 
migrant-sending communities as migration matures, which explains why the benefits of 
remittances might partly accrue to other households than those which receive the remittances 
directly 
Ait El Meskine is a particular case, since nonmigrant households have almost equal 
scores to international migrant households This seems partly related to the fact that several 
nonmigrant households guard and live in houses built by international migrants In this 
village, relatively elevated living conditions have become increasingly generalized, which 
might explain why no clear association is found 
Internal migrant households seem to live in roughly equal conditions to nonmigrant 
households In some villages, such as Ait El Meskine and Ikhba, their situation is even clearly 
worse than that of nonmigrants We should be aware of the potentially endogenous character 
of the variables "village" and "household migration status" in determining migration impact 
on wealth and living conditions As the majonty of established international migrants tend to 
come from less isolated and better equipped villages (i e , Ait El Meskine, Tikoutar), the 
apparently high association between migration status on the one hand and wealth and living 
conditions on the other might in fact be explained by economic-geographical factors (i e , 
location of the village) 
If we assume that a certain threshold of wealth and development is necessary for 
migration to occur, the better living conditions and wealth observed in a particular village 
should not automatically be attnbuted to migration After all, within the perspective of 
transitional migration theory, initially higher wealth and development are also one of the very 
causes or enabling conditions of migration Consequently, the higher wealth and living 
conditions of households involved in international migration are not necessarily the exclusive 
results of migration The analysis of migration impact is further complicated by the fact that 
we have no exact data on non-landed wealth and living conditions prior to migration 
Nevertheless, the presented data seem to suggest that there is a clear impact apart from 
initial migration-enabling conditions The positive association between international 
migration participation on the one hand and wealth and living conditions on the other hand, 
are generally repeated at the village level—with the exception of living conditions in Ait El 
Meskine Nevertheless, it is certainly true that the wealth and living conditions in centrally 
located Ait Todoght villages are better than in isolated (predominantly Ait 'Atta) villages 
Although this partly reflects their more central location, it might also be related to the 
recursive effect of investments by international migrants, which might, for example, provide 
local employment and income for fellow, nonmigrant villagers (see chapters 8 and 9) 
In order to analyze the temporal dimension of the impact of migration on wealth and 
living conditions, tables 7 18 and 7 19 display the relationship between the length of the stay 
abroad and household wealth and living conditions The tables clearly demonstrate a strong 
and positive association The longer international migrants stay abroad, the more their 
households back home accumulate consumer goods and the more they tend to live in better 
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conditions with regards to housing and sanitation20. This might also explain why international 
migrant households in Tadafelt, where most international migrants left recently, score 
relatively low on the indexes of wealth and living conditions. Apparently, the largest 
improvement in wealth and living conditions is made in the first two decades of migration. 
Table 7.18. Household wealth by length of stay abroad of international migrants 
Years a 
1-14 
15-28 
>29 
Total 
broad 
0-1 
158 
7.0 
0.0 
78 
Scores on 
2-3 
40.4 
14.0 
11.3 
22 2 
index of wealth indicators per household 
4-5 
24.6 
17.5 
15.1 
192 
> 6 
19.3 
61.4 
73.6 
50 9 
Source: Household survey (η=0.480**; r=0.490**) 
Table 7.19. Living conditions by length of stay abroad of international 
Years a 
1-14 
15-28 
>29 
Total 
broad 
0-1 
35 1 
36 
3.8 
14 5 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
migrants 
Scores on index of household living conditions 
2-3 
45.6 
35.7 
21.2 
34 5 
>4 
19.3 
60 7 
75 0 
50.9 
Mean 
3.6 
6.2 
7.2 
5.6 
Total Mean 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
22 
39 
4.1 
34 
η 
57 
57 
53 
167 
η 
57 
56 
52 
165 
Source: Household survey (η=0.554**; r=0.537**) 
The more pessimistic perspectives on migration and development tend to assume that 
migrants spend most of their money on consumption. In order to test this hypothesis, table 
7.20 displays the association between household migration status and monthly expenditure on 
food, housing, and various public and semi-public services (electricity, water, telephone) per 
month. It shows that migrant households indeed tend to spend more on daily consumption 
than nonmigrants21. 
Table 7.20. Daily consumption expenses by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
0-653 
39 3 
27 8 
189 
88 
94 
24.9 
Monthly expenses on food, 
654-999 
28 9 
22 2 
27 0 
186 
23 4 
24.3 
1,000- S 
1,399 
18.5 
25.4 
27.0 
29.4 
42.2 
26 1 
housing, 
:1,40ο 
13.3 
24.6 
27.0 
43.1 
25.0 
24.7 
and public 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
amenities in dh 
Mean 
837 
1,009 
1,173 
1,388 
1,250 
1,069 
% tot. 
income 
39.6 
42.0 
31 6 
25 8 
24 6 
31.9 
η 
173 
126 
37 
102 
64 
502 
Source: Household survey (η=0.344**) 
Nevertheless, the increase in daily consumption is not very large, and far smaller than the 
increase in income. Poorer, nonmigrant households spend a larger share of their total 
expenditure on daily consumption. Engel's law also seems to apply in this particular context: 
the income elasticity of demand for food and other primary products and services is relatively 
Bonferrom multiple companson of group means revealed that differences between group means for both 
household wealth and living conditions are significant between all "years abroad" categories, with the exception 
of the difference between the 15-28 and >29 categories, which is not significant. 
21
 Bonferrom multiple comparison of group means revealed that nonmigrant households consume significantly 
less than all other categories except for internal migrant households Internal migrant households score 
significantly lower than current international migrant households. All other differences between group mean are 
insignificant 
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low. With rising incomes, the share of expenditure for food and other products actually 
declines. This seems to refute the hypothesis that migrant households overindulge in 
consumption. In subsequent chapters, we will examine how remittance income has effected 
households' investment behavior. 
7.6. "Partir pour rester" 
Over the twentieth century, migration has become an all-pervasive phenomenon in the 
Todgha valley. Nowadays, most Todghawi households have been in some way affected by 
international and internal migration. More than 40 percent of all the surveyed households are 
involved in international migration. 25 percent are involved in internal migration, and several 
households are involved in both types simultaneously. Only one quarter of all households 
have not been affected by some kind of migration. The analysis further corroborated the 
hypothesis that internal and international migration tend to be complementary, mutually 
reinforcing "communicating vessels" rather than mutually exclusive or negatively correlated 
phenomena. Internal migration tends to shape the mental, social, and material conditions for 
international migration. Both types of migration tend to be positively correlated, and tend to 
occupy distinct places within the household life cycle. 
Increasing labor migration has coincided with a general diversification and the 
increasing multi-locality of livelihoods of oasis households. Although agriculture remains 
important as a source of cash and in kind income, its role has changed from being the pillar of 
the oasis economy to today being just one of the various sources of income. Nowadays, there 
are only very few households that base their livelihoods uniquely on agricultural resources. 
Most households rely on three or more sources of income at the same time. Although 
migration has played a pivotal role in the diversification of household livelihoods, this 
diversification should not be seen as the exclusive result of migration. After all, local income 
earning opportunities outside agriculture have increased as well. 
Many prior studies have depicted migrant sending areas as being largely dependent on 
migrant remittances. Some authors have stated that remittance-enabled increases in standards 
of living are therefore "artificial" and create a temporary, and therefore "dangerous", 
dependency on external sources of income. Cumulative causation theory and structuralist 
theoretical perspectives tend to see such dependency on the outside world as detrimental to 
the economy and social cohesion in the regions of origin. 
Nevertheless, for the Todgha, the image of a region more or less passively relying on 
migrant remittances is not matched by empirical findings. There is no one-sided dependence 
on migrant remittances, which "only" represent one third of the entire cash income of the 
surveyed households. Even in this region of heavy participation in international migration, 
local activities are still more important than remittances as a source of income, and local 
employment opportunities in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors have been 
increasing. Moreover, those households involved in international migration tend to have 
higher local, non-migratory revenues than nonmigrants. This goes against the pessimistic 
hypothesis that migration causes the retreat of migrant households from local economies. 
Instead of developing a one-sided dependence on remittances, the Todgha economy is rather 
going through a process of economic diversification, in which migration plays a central, but 
certainly not exclusive, role. 
After almost a century of international migration, the argument that remittances would 
only be "temporary" is difficult to sustain (see also section 4.5.2). Remittances have probably 
been a more reliable and stable source of income than income from local labor and 
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agriculture A future decrease in remittance transfers to the Todgha might occur due to the 
maturing of migration and the ageing of the first generation Europe-bound migrants On the 
other hand, we have seen that new migrants continue to leave, through family migration or to 
new destinations in southern Europe In this way, resident Todghawis firmly keep their stakes 
in the international migration market for the near future at least 
It would also be erroneous to depict migration as the unique cause of livelihood 
diversification Migration is part of a broader strategy by many oasis households to diversify 
and improve their livelihoods Migration should furthermore be seen as an integral part of a 
broader process of the political, infrastructural, economic, and social integration of the 
Todgha valley into national and international systems, and the concomitant increasing flows 
of products (e g , trade), money (e g , remittances), people (migration), and information (e g 
education, the media revolution) between the Todgha and the outside world 
Nevertheless, it is particularly through migration that these mutually reinforcing 
processes associated with "globalization" have materialized and become more concrete for 
the average oasis dweller In many respects, migration has literally brought the Todghawis 
into the modem world, and the modem world to the Todgha The incorporation of the Todgha 
into the modem state and the capitalist economy have fundamentally enlarged the 
opportunities for resident oasis households to diversify and potentially ameliorate their 
livelihoods by having one or more members gain an additional income elsewhere—that is, to 
pursue multi-local livelihoods This central place that migration occupies in the daily lives 
and perceptions of people—migrants, nonmigrants, policy makers, and migration 
researchers—might explain why migration is often seen as a kind of independent "cause" of 
change, instead of a constituent part of broader development processes 
Besides enabling increasing labor migration, processes of "globalization" have also 
increasingly facilitated the flow back of remittance transfers through the development of 
banking and money transfer systems firmly linking Todghawis across Europe to their native 
land (see also section 4 5 2) More in general, the enormous reduction in costs of 
transportation and communication has increasingly facilitated the fostering of close links 
between migrated Todghawis and "stay-behinds" This emergence of transnational Todgha 
communities might explain why so many children of migrated Todghawis tend to marry 
nonmigrant kin "back home", thereby "refreshing" migrant communities and maintaining 
migration systems between the Todgha and cities like Montpellier, Nice, Pans, and 
Amsterdam 
In general, migration seems to have contributed to poverty alleviation and the general 
improvement of living conditions in the valley It would be an illusion to think that the entire 
Todgha population (70,000) could make a decent living out of agriculture alone (cf Büchner 
1986) We should not ignore the fact that—despite an almost universal tendency to 
romanticize the past—in pre-colonial times, large sections of oasis populations used to live in 
abject poverty and sometimes under conditions of physical "unfreedom" For them, the new 
opportunities of the twentieth centuries were a liberation It was particularly through 
migration that many poor households have been increasingly able to spread income risks, 
increase their incomes, and increase their general well-being In many ways, migration has 
enabled many households to stay in the Todgha and to improve their livelihoods in situ 
Labor migration is not so much a thoughtless or desperate flight, but more a deliberate 
move to overcome local social and economic constraints This is why Heinemeijer et al 
(1976) stated that the paradoxical aim of most (Moroccan) migrants is "partir pour rester", to 
migrate in order to enable other household and family members to stay This valuable insight, 
which was in fact a NELM-hypothesis avant-la-lettre, still seems valid Although for many 
migrants the wish to return often turns into a myth, it still seems the intention of most 
migrants to finally return to Morocco During their absence, they tend to foster strong social 
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and financial links with their households of origin, and even when they decide to settle at the 
destination, their commitment towards their families in their village tends to remain high 
The higher prosperity of households involved in international migration is reflected in 
their higher standards of living International migrant households generally live in more 
luxurious houses, more often have basic hygienic facilities such as lavatories, showers, and 
water pumps, and tend to possess more consumer goods such as satellite receivers, TV sets, 
and washing machines, as well as means of transport such as motorbikes and cars The 
absence of significant differences between nonmigrant and internal migrant households with 
regards to standards of living reflect their almost equal average incomes 
The literature tends to disparage the tendency of migrants to purchase consumer goods 
and to construct new, concrete houses Such investments in "status symbols" are generally 
dismissed as "consumptive" and "non-developmental" However, it is not clear on what moral 
basis many researchers seem to contest the legitimacy of such expenses After all, decent 
housing, health, and basic luxury seem universal attributes of basic well-being—for Western 
academics as well as Moroccan oasis dwellers Especially considering the arduous conditions 
in which most oasis households used to live, investments in decent housing, basic sanitation 
and consumer goods seem a logical priority The advantages of spacious houses, lavatories, 
private wells and water pumps, certain household appliances (e g , washing machines, food 
processors, and so on), and means of transport (e g , mopeds) and their contribution to general 
well-being are quite obvious In addition, such facilities are generally seen as decreasing the 
workload (of women in particular) and improving a family's health 
To some, the advantages of TV sets, video recorders and satellite dishes might seem 
less obvious However, instead of morally rejecting the desire to possess such items, it is 
more useful to try to comprehend why people are so eager to purchase these items In a 
society where there is limited freedom of speech, good newspapers are hardly available and 
many people are illiterate, satellite television is the prime source of information about what is 
going on in Morocco and abroad Besides entertaining people, television meets a real need in 
informing people Especially the introduction of satellite television— through which people 
can receive non-censored channels both from the Western and Arab world—in the late 1990s 
has meant a considerable improvement in information provision From a "capabilities 
perspective" (Sen 1999), these migration-induced improvements in general well-being and 
information provision are constituent parts of development 
However, this contribution of migration to livelihood improvement seems mainly 
limited to international migrant households Internal migrant households find themselves in 
the same situation as nonmigrants, and—with the exception of a small group of civil servants 
and private-sector professionals—most internal migrant households have not been able to 
significantly increase incomes through migration Doing irregular, lowly paid jobs, they have 
to survive on a day-to-day basis, leaving their households behind in high financial insecurity 
Internal migrants do not earn more than nonmigrants, and in per capita terms, they even earn 
less 
Nowadays, the main socio-economic dividing line lies between households with and 
without access to international migration resources At first sight, the net result of 
international migration seems to be increasing inequality between these two groups 
Nonmigrant and internal migrant households eam less than half of the cash incomes of 
international migrant households Moreover, in chapter 6, we have already seen that it is 
generally not the poorest who migrate abroad This tendency towards sustained inequality 
between international migration "haves" and "have-nots" seems to be reinforced by the 
largely kinship-based access to migration networks 
From a capabilities perspective on development, such inequality is clearly not 
developmental However, if we enlarge our historical and analytical scope, there are two 
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reasons not to jump to the conclusion that migration has "thus" led to increasing inequality. 
First, traditional oasis society used to be inherently unequal, with its caste-like socio-ethnic 
stratification. Inequality based on access to international migration resources has been partly 
superimposed upon traditional forms of inequality (by birth) based on ethnic affiliation, 
complexion, and land possession. There are no objective, scientific standards to determine 
which form of inequality ("feudal" or "capitalist") was worse. Nevertheless, feudal society in 
its very essence was based on the lack of freedom of large sections of the population, and 
therefore—reasoning from the axioms of the capabilities-perspective—inherently less 
developed. Marx also saw the transition from feudal to capitalist society as a major advance 
and liberation from the chains of bonded labor (cf. Sen 1999:113). 
Second, the fact that internal and nonmigrant households have relatively low incomes 
does not mean that some of the benefits of international migrant remittances do not accrue to 
them through indirect channels. On the one hand, 7.5 percent of all surveyed households do 
not contain migrated members, but receive international remittances on a regular basis. This 
group of indirect migrant households seems particularly sizable in villages with a long-
standing tradition of international migration. On the other hand, it is possible that non-
remittance receiving nonmigrant and internal migrant households have profited indirectly 
from consumption and investments by international migrants. 
The unequivocal relationship between participation in international migration on the 
one hand and income and standards of living on the other is repeated at the village level. 
Nevertheless, nonmigrant and internal migrant households are clearly better off in villages 
such as Tikoutar and Ait El Meskine, which have a much longer history of intensive 
international migration than in a village like Tadafelt, where international migration gained 
momentum only recently. There seems to be circumstantial evidence that nonmigrant and 
internal migrant households reap some of the benefits of international migration. We can 
therefore hypothesize that there is a certain diffusion of migration capital over migrant 
sending communities as migration matures. Other circumstantial evidence that international 
migration has contributed to a general, community, and even valley-wide increase in income 
and employment is the fact that the Todgha itself has become a destination for internal 
migrants. 
Our hypothesis is that the accumulated effects of a century of migration and 
remittance flows have contributed to a general increase in income and economic activities 
through multiplier effects. In the following chapters, we will further analyze whether 
consumption and investments by international migrants have contributed to the diversification 
of the local and regional economy, and whether they have created income earning 
opportunities for nonmigrants, for example in the housing and agricultural sectors. Although 
inequality persists between households with and without access to international migration 
resources in terms of income, wealth, and living conditions, both the direct and indirect 
effects of migration seem to have contributed to poverty alleviation and the general 
improvement of employment, income and living conditions in the research villages and across 
the Todgha valley22. 
Although the aim of this study was not to do an econometric analysis of the effect of international migration 
on income distribution (cf. Adams 1989), this is a desirable exercise for future research in order to test 
hypotheses presented in this section 
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7.7. Conclusion 
Refemng to the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2, we have hypothesized that 
labor migration is a household livelihood strategy in order to (1) minimize and spread income 
risks, (2) gain access to higher earnings streams, and to (3) overcome local (credit and 
insurance) market constraints, which may enable households to invest in productive activities 
and, hence, to improve their livelihoods The analysis in this chapter, which has focused on 
the direct impact of migration on income levels and income structure, wealth and living 
conditions (research question 2), enables us to test the first two hypotheses 
In general, the preceding analysis seems to confirm the first hypothesis Migration has 
become one of the major livelihood strategies used to diversify income and spread income 
nsks Migration seems to be a constituent part, rather than an independent factor, of a broader 
trend towards the diversification of livelihoods of oasis households Risk spreading is both 
achieved through diversification of local activities and migration The aim of risk spreading in 
order to secure and stabilize income can also help to explain why people migrate internally 
This desire to keep several "irons in the fire" explains why people migrate internally, despite 
the often-difficult circumstances in the towns and cities and the only marginally better 
earnings Moreover, internal migration potentially increases the chances of gaining access to 
better paid jobs—which are mainly found in the larger towns and cities—and, in particular, 
the far more lucrative international migration market through "leapfrogging" to Europe Thus, 
internal migration increases the potential for livelihood improvement and the capability to 
gain access to international migration systems 
The second hypothesis, that migration enables households to gain access to higher 
earning streams, only seems to apply to international migration Households involved in 
international migration tend to have far higher incomes than other households This is 
pnmanly through the effect of remittances, although these households also tend to have 
higher local earnings—especially from agriculture—than other households Average incomes 
of internal migrant households are almost equal to those of nonmigrants Nevertheless, the 
percentage of extremely poor households is far higher among nonmigrant households than 
among internal migrant households This seems to sustain the hypothesis that one of the 
reasons to diversify income through migrating is to protect the household against income 
shocks However, this is also the partial effect of the fact that the poorest households are 
simply not able to migrate 
The third hypothesis, that migration enables households to overcome local capital 
constraints in order to invest in agricultural as well as non-agricultural sectors, will be at the 
center of the following two chapters 

8 
Migration and agricultural development 
revisited 
8.1. General introduction to oasis agriculture 
Until French colonization, irrigation agriculture constituted the main source of subsistence for 
the Todghawis. However, due to processes of livelihood diversification, in which migration 
played a pervasive role, the traditional position of oasis agriculture has been challenged. The 
relationship between migration and agricultural development in Morocco has been generally 
evaluated in a negative way, with many arguing that migration has contributed to the demise 
of traditional agriculture in migrant sending areas. The dominant "pessimistic" hypothesis is 
that migration has led to local agricultural labor shortages. Migrant households have, 
therefore, tended to partially or entirely withdraw from agriculture. The absence of many 
able-bodied—migrated—men has led to widespread agricultural neglect and decline or even 
abandonment of agriculture (De Mas 1990; Ferry and Toutain 1990; Kerbout 1990:55). This 
process has been further stimulated by an increasing aversion to small-scale peasant 
agriculture. Such hypotheses seem to fit into the cumulative causation theory and structuralist 
perspectives on migration, which see migration as detrimental to local economic structures. 
Moreover, the few (return) migrants who do invest in agriculture, do so not out of 
rational economic motives such as stabilizing and increasing incomes, but because of the 
strong emotional attachment aging migrants feel towards agriculture. If investments occur, 
this therefore mainly concerns "ritual" (De Mas 1990) or "sentimental" (Bcncherifa 1991) 
agriculture, in which the migrant practices a kind of "hobby farming" (Bencherifa and Popp 
2000:142) without making profits or even making a loss. 
This line of reasoning runs counter to the new economics of labor migration theory, 
which hypothesizes that migration enables migrant households to overcome local market 
constraints and to invest in local agriculture in order to heighten agricultural production, and, 
hence, improve their livelihoods. This chapter will examine to what extent and in what way 
migration has affected the investment behavior of households in the agricultural domain, as 
well as how spatial and temporal differentiation in this behavior can be explained (research 
question 3). Is the NELM hypothesis correct that migrant household tend to exhibit a higher 
propensity to invest than nonmigrant households? Has migration indeed stimulated 
agricultural development or is it rather associated with agricultural decline due to the effects 
of "lost labor" and the passive reliance on remittances? 
Furthermore, this chapter will examine the nature and causes of the more general 
agricultural transformations in the Todgha, thereby focusing on the social and economic role 
of migration in this process of change vis-à-vis other factors of geographical, economic, and 
institutional nature (research question 4). We will thereby pay attention to processes of 
242 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
institutional change both at the valley and village level, the role of the market economy and 
comparative advantages, and technological innovations 
We will try to answer these questions by systematically comparing agricultural 
practices and the agncultural investment behavior of the different household migration 
categones defined in the previous chapter However, in order to comprehend the causes and 
nature of recent agncultural transformations, we will first look at the main charactenstics of 
traditional oasis agriculture 
8.1.1. General characteristics of oasis agriculture 
In the and zones of the Maghreb, population settlements and agriculture have traditionally 
been concentrated in places and regions where water is relatively reliably available, notably 
nver valleys, fums (gorges in mountain chains), and wells Over many centuries, the 
inhabitants of these regions developed sophisticated techniques to capture surface water or to 
extract groundwater, and to exploit these water resources for imgated agriculture In this way, 
oases emerged Oases can be defined as agricultural areas in and environments where 
agriculture is normally not possible without imgation Oases were not only agncultural 
production centers, but also trading centers linking distant regions, with a crucial military and 
political importance, from which several sultanic dynasties originated (De Haas 2001) 
Depending on the specific natural environment in which they are located, the water 
sources they use, and the irrigation techniques employed, three mam oasis types can be 
distinguished river, groundwater, and source oases (De Haas 2001) Most large-scale oasis 
systems are located along perennial or semi-perennial rivers, whose water resources are 
directly tapped for imgation in fields that are normally located on their fertile sediments, 
either on the banks of the rivers, or on alluvial plains or deltas In agncultural terms, such 
river oasis systems are relatively prosperous, thanks to a more or less guaranteed flow of 
water and regularly occurring floods, which bnng down fine sediments to the fields, thereby 
maintaining soil fertility Within Morocco, the largest nver oases are the Drâa and Tafilalt-
Ziz basin in Morocco, but several smaller-scale nver oasis systems exist, including the 
Todgha valley A typical feature of river oases is the existence of a large number of different 
oasis villages, located on the banks of the nverbed, and following the river like a green ribbon 
through the desert land 
Although the general classification distinguishing river, groundwater, and source 
oases seems valid, it should be stressed that in many cases a combination of water gaining 
techniques can be found For example, villages in the relatively water-scarce downstream 
parts of the Todgha compensate for the fact that they have limited or no access to nver water 
by employing additional techniques to extract groundwater, such as khettaras In the second 
half of the twentieth century, motor pumps became increasingly important as a new, 
alternative technique to overcome problems related to water scarcity in the Todgha This 
fundamentally changed the technological basis of oasis agriculture 
Despite the large vanety of oasis types, most traditional oases have a number of 
characteristics in common (De Haas 1998) The maintenance of intricate irrigation systems 
has traditionally demanded high labor inputs while the scarceness of natural resources, high 
population pressure, and the need for diversification and risk-spreading has generally 
necessitated the cultivation of two or even three vegetation layers The upper layer generally 
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consists of the date palm—itself the very symbol and pillar of lowland oasis agriculture1. The 
second layer consists of smaller fruit trees bearing figs, almonds, olives, and pomegranates. 
The third and lowest layer consists of alfalfa (the main fodder crop) and annual crops such as 
cereals (barley, wheat, sorghum) and diverse vegetables. As a result of patterns of land-tenure 
inheritance and high population densities, plots tend to be very small. 
In reality—depending on natural resource availability, the techniques employed, and 
micro-climatic conditions—there is a high diversity of oasis production systems. The above-
mentioned ideal type of triple-layered oasis agriculture is generally found in river oases with 
relatively abundant and reliable water resources (Larbi 1989:18), such as the upper Todgha. 
In ecologically marginal oases, the second layer of fruit trees and sometimes also the third 
layer of annual crops are largely absent. In general, unfavorable natural circumstances, in 
particular pertaining to water supply and soil properties, tend to coincide with a decreasing 
diversity of crops and a lower intensity of agriculture. 
Traditional oasis systems are characterized by a symbiosis between animal husbandry 
and tillage. Animal husbandry is one of the principal elements of traditional oasis agriculture, 
which is dependent on the utilization of manure for the maintenance of soil fertility 
(Tisserand 1990:237). In exchange, the oasis system produces fodder to feed the animals. In 
addition to fodder crops—notably alfalfa—cultivated in all oases, the presence of animals 
also enables peasants to exploit the vegetable products that are not consumed by humans, 
such as plant parts, weeds, and palm leaves. Besides maintaining soil fertility, animals also 
play an important role in transport, water extraction, and ploughing. Thus, animal products 
are an important element in maintaining soil fertility as well as for optimizing biomass uptake 
in the human food chain. Livestock husbandry (milk, meat, eggs) contributes to the 
diversification of the nourishment of oasis populations and provides them with hides and 
wool. The possession of a flock also represents a certain capital and insurance in times of 
environmental stress. 
In all oasis societies, peasants established close links with nomadic tribes living in the 
deserts surrounding them. Nomads and semi-nomads exchanged products with sedentary 
oasis dwellers, thereby complementing their respective livelihoods. Therefore, traditional 
oasis livelihoods were not exclusively based on subsistence agriculture. Besides long-distance 
trans-Saharan trade (which was mainly to the benefit of elite groups), barter played a certain 
economic role. Economic and political interdependency between sedentary oasis populations 
and nomadic tribes was generally strong. Moreover, the latter often extorted protection 
agreements from sedentary populations, forcing them to pay tribute in exchange for defense 
against attacks from other nomadic groups. In the Todgha, such "hostile interdependence" 
existed and still persists between the Ait 'Atta and some groups among the Ait Todoght, such 
as the haratin from the El Hart villages (cf. Otte 2000:31). 
In contrast with what is commonly believed, the distinction between nomadic and 
sedentary life is not very sharp (De Haas and El Ghanjou 2000a). Many oasis dwellers were 
also active in nomadic activities for at least part of the year. The Ait 'Atta are a good example 
of such a semi-nomadic group, whose transhumance livelihoods used to be based on a 
combination of sedentary agriculture and pastoral activities. Moreover, throughout the history 
of the Maghreb, nomadic groups have settled in existent oases or created new ones—as 
happened in the lower Todgha with the settlement of Ait 'Atta—becoming partly or entirely 
sedentary in the process (Ensel 1999; Hart 1981). 
1
 Oases located at high altitudes are a special case as the cold conditions mean date palms—which require a hot 
desert climate—do not thrive. Therefore, oases such as the upper Dadès valley consist only of fruit trees and a 
layer of annual crops (Alt Hamza 1995, Rijbroek 1997) 
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Another general feature of traditional oasis agriculture is the largely collective nature 
of water management, which was regulated by the traditional village council, or taqbilt2 (see 
section 5.3.4). Collective land and water management is the main raison d'être of taqbilts, 
which function as land and water boards responsible for organizing and maintaining irrigation 
systems, the distribution of water among peasants, and enforcing customary law. 
Maintenance of the irrigation system, and the distribution of irrigation water among a 
large number of different individuals, villages, communities, and tribal groups usually living 
together in river basins requires a high degree of "collective" socio-political organization. The 
maintenance of irrigation systems often requires collective action, to which the entire oasis 
community is obliged to contribute (Ouhajjou 1996). The taqbilt was also responsible for 
settling frequent disputes among peasants regarding land and water resources, and to defend 
the collective "resource interests" of the village vis-à-vis other villages. 
A strong ethnic hierarchy was fundamental to the functioning of traditional oasis 
systems (cf. Beaumont 1989:126). Oasis agnculture and maintenance of the agro-hydraulic 
infrastructure tended to be highly labor-intensive and depended on the availability of bonded 
labor (De Haas 1998). This labor was generally provided by slaves, serfs, or ikhmmesen 
(sharecroppers) from ethnically inferior groups such as the haratin or ismakhen (De Haas 
1998; Ensel 1999). The existence of bonded labor provided by slaves or other socially inferior 
groups was a condition for the maintenance of the irrigation systems and the very survival of 
traditional oasis systems (Beaumont 1989:126). 
Labor was organized either on the basis of slavery or through patron-client relations, 
often combined with sharecropping arrangements in which ikhmmesen only received a small 
share of the harvest (usually one fifth) in exchange for their labor. This sharecropping system 
could only exist on the basis of unequal power and labor relations, which were justified by 
ideologies in which certain ethnic groups (e.g., "black" populations) were seen as inferior (cf. 
Ensel 1999). Within traditional oasis society, socially inferior groups were obliged—because 
their livelihood options beyond agriculture were limited—to contribute to the maintenance of 
the irrigation systems and cultivate the fields of the dominant, land-owning classes (cf. 
Teilegen and Wolsink 1992:32). As we have seen in chapter 5, the latter groups also tended to 
dominate the taqbilt village institution. 
8.1.2. Oasis ideal types and oasis myths 
The literature on oasis agriculture often refers to the oasis "ideal type", represented by 
agriculture in three vegetation layers. Cultivation in several vegetation layers is supposed to 
optimize agricultural production on a limited surface with limited water resources. The 
literature on oasis agriculture often presumes a so-called "oasis effect", which refers to a 
subhumid micro-climate created by the two high tree layers, favoring the growth of annual 
crops, by protecting them from the strong radiation, low humidity and high temperatures of 
the Saharan climate (cf. Riou 1990; Larbi 1989). In this way, the oasis would be a rather 
"ideal" agricultural system, optimizing production in this arid environment. 
However, this hypothesis should be seriously called into question, and seems in fact a 
myth (Crossa-Raynaud 1990:319-20). First, the ideal-type of three vegetation layers is 
generally not found in water-scarce oases, such as the lower Todgha. Second, where two or 
three vegetation layers indeed exist, the competition for light, nutrients, and water is 
Taqbilt literally means tribe or clan (from the Arabic qabila) The term is commonly used in Tamazight Berber 
to refer to the ighrem's "council", orjema 'a in Arabic. 
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enormous For instance, empincal research has demonstrated that the planting of alfalfa in a 
date palm grove entails a significant decrease in date yield (Skoun 1990 333) From the 
objective of pure production maximization, traditional oasis agriculture therefore seems 
"irrational" (De Haas 1995) 
Moreover, the wrong starting point of the "oasis effect" hypothesis seems to be the 
climatic conditions prevailing in high summer The extremely harsh summer conditions only 
prevail dunng three or four months of the year The winter half year (October - April)—and 
not the summer—constitutes the main cultivation season for annual crops, especially cereals, 
in most oases In wintertime, the temperatures and light intensity are not extreme at all, and 
shade seriously reduces yields 
Cultivation of a large vanety of crops in several layers should therefore not primarily 
be understood from the perspective of production maximization This should primarily be 
seen in the light of the historical need for self-sufficiency (cf De Haas 1995 39) Although 
long-distance trade and barter played a certain role, oases were, however, obliged to produce 
most of their dietary needs themselves until the twentieth century Cultivating only one or a 
small number of (best-adapted) crops was therefore not possible Crop diversification should 
also be seen in the light of nsk-spreading For example, a monoculture of dates would 
theoretically be more productive in terms of weight and market value than the mixed cultures 
of the traditional oases However, date harvests show large annual vanations depending on 
climatic conditions or the occurrence of plagues 
By cultivating several crops at once and in various periods, the risks of crop failure are 
spread, and the risk of one-sided nutrient depletion decreased In the absence of fertilizers, it 
was also necessary to cultivate fodder crops and hold livestock in order to produce manure 
(De Haas 1998) Alfalfa, the main fodder crop of oases, has the extra advantage of its 
nitrogen-binding, soil-ennching capacities Such crop associations were vital in order to 
maintain the fertility and viability of the traditional oasis system 
In the Todgha, the simultaneous cultivation of three vegetation layers is not the 
prevailing type of crop association Most plots are semi-open, with two layers of vegetation, 
mostly combining date palms or almond trees with alfalfa or cereals On such plots, the tree 
cover is generally not very dense, with the trees mainly located at the fringe of the plots, so 
that we can often hardly speak of a "layer" If many trees are planted on the plots themselves, 
the second layer of annual crops visibly suffers from the lack of light and nutrients Especially 
in the upper Todgha, several zones are densely planted with one layer of mainly olive trees, 
which lack any undergrowth 
The most intensive and yielding agnculture is taking place in open treeless plots, 
which can be found in the whole valley, but especially in the lower Todgha and the recent 
extensions Open plots contain a large vanety of crops, with a domination of alfalfa and 
cereals, but there is also a large variety of vegetables If enough water is available, open fields 
carry two crops per year, typically wheat in the winter half year and maize or vegetables in 
summer Geographical differences in water availability explain why the lush fields of the 
upper Todgha are cultivated all year round and that in the lower Todgha many fields he 
fallow during the dry and hot summer half year 
Map 5. irrigation zones of the Todgha valley 
Irrigation modes: 
j River 
i m pump 
Khettara * · 
Limits between municipalities 
Limits between 'fractions' 
Villages 
Q ^ ^ Q - · Research village 
Paved road 
River 
Source: Adapted from Büchner (1986) 
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8.2. Recent dynamics in water management and irrigation patterns' 
8.2.1. Traditional river and khettara irrigation 
The Todgha river is literally the life source of the valley. Being an agricultural region in an 
arid environment, access to its water has been crucial for survival. In most conflicts between 
ethnic groups, villages and individuals, it is the control over these very water resources, 
which has generally been at stake. Much of the history of the Todgha should be understood in 
light of this continual struggle for water. The valley is characterized by a high spatial 
differentiation in the availability of surface water resources, in which the upstream parts of 
the valley are better endowed than the downstream parts. Two dominant forms of traditional 
water extraction techniques can be found in the valley: (1) River irrigation with the surface 
waters of the Todgha, which is strictly limited to Alt Todoght territory; and (2) khettara 
irrigation in the lower Todgha, on which the Ait 'Atta used to rely completely, and the El 
Hart villages partially (see map 5). 
In the upper and middle parts of the valley, the perennial surface waters of the Todgha 
feed a complex irrigation system, which is composed of dams and irrigation channels (targa 
in Tamazight, pi. teregin2) transporting water over distances of up to twenty kilometers 
further downstream. As we have seen in chapter 5, only the Aft Todoght—including the 
research villages Zaoui'a, Tikoutar, Ikhba, and, until recently, A'it El Meskine—are entitled to 
use and benefit from these surface waters. 
Several dams, which are located at regular distances in the river bed, divert the 
perennial river water into a complex and stratified system of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
channels irrigating the agricultural plots3. The principal irrigation channels originate from one 
of the dams located at several places in the Todgha river bed. In the upper Todgha, most dams 
have been constructed by using natural materials, such as wooden branches, soil, and stones. 
This weak construction makes them vulnerable to damage by floods, but also easy to repair. 
Most irrigation channels are dug into the soil. In the case that concrete is used, it mainly 
concerns some primary irrigation channels and a number of larger dams in the lower Todgha. 
River irrigation is occasionally supplemented by flood irrigation. During each flood, 
all the irrigation channels of the Todgha are opened to capture the flood water which is 
immediately used to irrigate as many fields as possible4. The importance of flood irrigation in 
maintaining soil fertility should not be underestimated, since the flood water contains high 
quantities of sediments. The other side of the coin is that extreme floods can ravage fields and 
villages, and frequently cause the loss of human life. 
The only irrigation technique used in the Todgha, including the khettara zone, is the 
submersion of so-called flood basins (iguemunn). Each plot is divided into small flood basins 
to enable irrigation. The size of these flood basins varies considerably, but does normally not 
exceed 100 square meters. Irrigation generally takes place by submerging—in succession— 
all the plots located along a tertiary irrigation channel. Subsequently, all plots located along 
the channel are irrigated, and so on, until all plots located along all tertiary channels 
depending on a secondary irrigation channel have been irrigated. Subsequently, the "water 
turn" moves on to the following secondary channel. In this way, all sectors of the fields 
1
 Sections 8.2.1-8 2 4 heavily draw on De Haas and El Ghanjou (2000a) 
2
 In Arabic, séguia (pi swagui). 
3
 Pnmary and secondary irrigation channels primarily function to transport water over larger distances From 
these main channels, the water is diverted into smaller tertiary channels, which actually serve to irrigate the 
plots. 
4
 In contrast to regular river imgation, no rotation (nuba) system is used in case of floods 
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belonging to one particular village are irrigated. Thus, the irrigation at the tertiary level 
primarily follows a spatial pattern. This means that water rights (tagurt η waman) are 
generally not individualized to the extent that the water owner has the right to irrigate a plot 
which is located at another spot5. 
Moving downstream, river water becomes gradually less abundant, until the stream 
becomes subsurface in the lower Todgha, where the Ait Todoght are entitled to tap only 
limited amounts of river water from dams located upstream. Whereas villages located in the 
upper Todgha receive river water all year round, villages located in the downstream 
administrative fractions of Amzaourou and El Hart only have the right to tap river water 
during the winter half year. Although the flow of the Todgha is perennial, water needs are far 
higher in the summer season due to the very high temperatures and évapotranspiration during 
summer. Therefore, many fields lie fallow during the summer. 
The Ait 'Atta villages—including the research villages Tadafelt and Ghallil n'Ait 
Isfoul—have been historically deprived by the Ait Todoght from any rights to river water at 
all (see section 5.3.3). Traditionally, so-called ^AeWara-techniques have compensated for this 
water deficit. The khettara (also known as foggara) is an ancient, sophisticated technique, 
which enables the draining of underground water resources for irrigation. Originating from 
ancient Persia, the technique has spread over the Middle East and North Africa and is found 
throughout semi-arid and arid Morocco. The khettara system taps the groundwater table 
through digging a nearly horizontal tunnel from the well to the surface over a long distance. 
At regular distances, vertical shafts are dug that enable access to and maintenance of the 
tunnel (see figure 8.1). 
As the khettara's tunnel is constructed in such a way that it has a flatter gradient than 
the terrain under which it is constructed, the tunnel transporting the water becomes gradually 
shallower until it emerges above-ground after a distance of several kilometers downstream 
from the first shaft, which mostly lies at a depth of 10 to 20 meters (De Haas and El Ghanjou 
2000a). From the khettara's outlet, the water is directly conducted into a system of irrigation 
channels to irrigate the fields, largely analogous to river irrigation. 
Figure 8.1. Structure of a khettara 
Source: Adapted from Lentjes and De Mas (1991) 
It should be noted the organization of the nuha is complex and inherently flexible. Therefore, important local 
exceptions to this rule exist. Moreover, rules are generally more strictly applied in case of high water scarcity. 
For example, "looser" systems often exist in the upstream villages of Ait Tizgui due to the abundance of water. 
Flexibility in water distribution also tends to increase in winter as opposed to summer. 
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The khettaras of the Todgha have been dug in the alluvial plain of the Todgha, exploiting the 
important underflow of the river Khettaras are mainly found in the lower Todgha where most 
villages have no historical rights to surface waters, although some traces of old khettaras have 
been found in the upper Todgha (e g , near Tikoutar) Among the Ait 'Atta, agriculture used 
to be entirely dependent on khettaras until recently The El Hart villages are located in a 
transition zone, as they use both nver (in winter) and khettara water 
8.2.2. The nuba water allocation system and collective water management 
The necessity of sharing the water of one collective source, the Todgha river, among all Ait 
Todoght villages, lineages and individuals, has led to the development of a water distribution 
system based on the so-called nuba, which means water "round", "rotation" or "cycle" 
Among the Ait Todoght, this water division system is organized on three levels At the 
highest (valley) level, the water is divided among the seven admimstrative^/rac/fows of the Ait 
Todoght Each fraction has a predetermined right to a certain number of days within the total 
duration of the valley's nuba, which currently lasts 21 days m summer and 42 days in winter 
Theseyrac/zo«-level water turns are further subdivided between the different villages within 
each administrative fraction This is the second level nuba Within each village, the second 
level nuba is further subdivided between the main ethnic lineages (ighsan) and the plots of 
individual peasants This intra-village distribution system is the third-level nuba 
During the total length of a third level nuba within a village, the right to use the water 
of the river circulates among all peasants entitled to irrigate Water rights (tagurt η woman) 
are measured in time units, and the length of each individual turn is exactly known and, 
nowadays, often documented In the Todgha, land and water rights are "married", which 
means that water rights are generally related to the amount of land possessed by a peasant 
The nuba rotates among all the peasants following a strict order After its completion, the 
cycle repeats itself This water distribution system crucially depends on a certain level of 
agreement and close cooperation between villages and peasants This also makes the nuba 
system vulnerable to conflicts between individual peasants and (groups of) villages 
Since the river irrigation system depends on the good state of the dams, the latter have 
to be maintained frequently At least once per year, and after each flood, collective 
maintenance is obligatory The maintenance of the main irrigation channels is equally the 
subject of collective labor The maintenance of smaller channels and individual plots is the 
responsibility of individual peasants, although labor is frequently pooled Collective labor is 
organized following the general rule that each adult man is obliged to participate, regardless 
of the agricultural property and general wealth of the participants As labor contributions are 
not proportional to agricultural wealth, this rule tends to favor wealthy, large landowners 
Collective labor is organized by the village's taqbilt The collective works are 
organized under the authonty of the amghar, who is elected each year by the lineages' 
representatives within the taqbilt to manage all water and land affairs This "land and water 
chief' supervises the work and divides the tasks between the participants, allocating the heavy 
tasks to the young men and the light tasks to the older men For specific tasks, specialists 
sometimes participate in return for payment People not able or not willing to participate in 
collective labor have to pay the laborer replacing him or he has to prepare a meal for all 
workers The neglect of collective maintenance duties is considered a threat to the unity and 
the collective interests of the entire community, and "free nders" are fined by the amghar 
As is the case with nver irrigation, the management and maintenance of the khettara is 
the responsibility of the taqbilt and the amghar The main difference is that a khettara 
generally belongs to only one village, so that the nuba only comprises one level A higher-
250 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
level nuba between different villages does not exist, which makes the distribution of water 
less complicated. However, the first part of most khettaras—which have a length of several 
kilometers—often crosses the territory of neighboring villages. This necessitates a certain 
level of mutual agreement with such villages, which generally claim so-called "passage 
rights", giving them the right to use part of the khettara water in exchange for the guaranteed 
passage of the water. Similar to river irrigation, the intra-village distribution of the water is 
organized according to a nuba, which is different in each village, according to distribution 
methods, the water flow, and the number of ethnic lineages and people entitled to irrigate6. 
Similar to river irrigation, all people owning water rights are obliged to participate in 
the collective maintenance of the khettara, regardless of the amount of land and water owned. 
Khettaras are more labor-intensive compared to river irrigation systems, which tap readily 
available and relatively abundant surface waters. Digging and maintaining khettaras requires 
a heavy input of labor in exchange for a relatively limited water flow. Intensive maintenance 
is necessary as the accumulation of sediment in the khettara's tunnel quickly lead to a 
decrease and the eventual ceasing of water flows. The maintenance generally consists of 
removing sedimented soil from the khettara and main imgation channels. In other cases, it is 
necessary to extend the khettara in an upstream direction or construct a second tunnel—as has 
been done in Tadafelt—in order to maintain or increase the water flow. 
The Ait 'Atta neither dig nor maintain their own khettaras, which is dangerous work 
requiring a high level of expertise. Apart from the fact that the Aft 'Atta generally have not 
mastered this technique, they also believe it an infenor type of work which should be done by 
subordinate and low-status ethnic groups such as the haratin. Their haratin neighbors living 
in the El Hart villages maintain their own khettaras, but often refuse to work for their Ait 
'Atta neighbors due to the historical hostility between the two groups (see chapter 5). 
Therefore, the Ait 'Atta often employ non-Ait 'Atta specialists to dig and maintain khettaras 
from oases outside the Todgha, such as the Drâa valley. If outsiders are hired for 
maintenance, all water owners are expected to contribute to their payment. 
Both river and khettara irrigation systems are subject to collective regulations 
concerning maintenance and water distribution. Whereas water allocation is more complex in 
the case of river irrigation, since many villages make use of the river water, maintenance of 
khettaras seems more intensive compared to river imgation. As we will see in the following 
sections, the functioning of both river and khettara irrigation systems has undergone 
fundamental change over the second half of the twentieth century. With regards to the main 
causes of these changes, we have to distinguish between (1) the political integration of the 
Todgha into the modem (colonial and Moroccan) state that actively intervened in the nuba at 
the valley level; (2) changes in socio-political relations at the village level emanating from the 
changing livelihoods of oasis households; and (3) the introduction of motor pumps. Before 
describing how the latter developments transformed agriculture in particular in the lower 
Todgha, we will first examine how radical changes in the macro-political context of the 
Todgha affected local water politics and the spatial distribution of entitlements to water 
among the Ait Todoght villages. 
The allocation of water rights was previously based on measurement by the so-called lanast (pi tmassen), 
which refers to a small dish with a tiny hole, which was put in a bucket with water. The time it needed to fill 
with water and to sink, was equal to one tanast (cf Otte 2000). The length of a tanast could differ slightly from 
village to village, but normally lasted between seven and ten minutes. The tanast was particularly useful at night 
and during cloudy days, when use of sundials was not possible Modem clocks have now completely replaced 
the tanast 
Migration and Agricultural Development Revisited 251 
8.2.3. State intervention: the nuba as a political instrument 
When, in the turmoil of colonial conquest, a warlord named qaid Ba Ah arrived with his 
military forces in the Todgha valley in 1919, he punished villages that refused to surrender to 
him by depriving them of access to the Todgha water (De Haas and El Ghanjou 2000a) This 
event demonstrates that the nuba has not been just a "neutral" means to regulate the 
distribution of nver water among the different parts of the valley, but that it has been a vital 
political instrument too 
The existence of several dams along the course of the Todgha and the necessity of 
shanng one single source of water has created constant tensions and occasional violent 
conflicts between the populations living upstream and downstream in the river basin 
Differences in power between villages and ethnic groups seem to have been reflected in 
unequal water allocation among the Ait Todoght villages and the total exclusion of the Ait 
'Atta 
There are several indications that water has been an important instrument for the upper 
Todgha villages to exert political pressure on the downstream villages, and villages did not 
hesitate to use military force to defend their claims on water and arable (i e , irrigable) land 
(cf De Foucauld 1885, Büchner 1986) Local oral traditions abound with accounts of violent 
conflicts and coalitions between villages and groups of villages In the absence of a central 
(state) authority, access to water has probably been the main focus of inter-village struggles 
The group controlling the water sources also controlled the valley Such "water politics" over 
the ever-contested nuba constituted a permanent danger for fragile oasis livelihoods, which 
crucially depended on access to this vital resource 
Colonization heralded an era in which the state superimposed its structures upon 
traditional political institutions This had a clear impact on the organization of the valley's 
nuba The French colonial authonty actively intervened in the division of water In 1942, all 
shiukh (representatives of the administrative fractions) of the Ait Todoght were convened to 
decide, under supervision of the colonial authorities, on a new division of water (De Haas and 
El Ghanjou 2000a) 
The new nuba heralded the beginning of a new era, in which the central political 
power henceforth dominated and "pacified" water politics in the valley In the pre-colomal 
times ofstba, the nuba at the valley level depended on the power balance between villages in 
the upper and the lower parts of the valley As this power balance was constantly shifting, the 
nuba has probably undergone parallel and permanent shifts too However, there has never 
been a central state authonty intervening in this distribution With the direct intervention by 
the French colonial authority, the nuba was formalized and imposed, at the cost of the power 
and autonomy of the villages 
As we have not retrieved any documents concerning the division of water before the 
colonial era, it is not possible to determine the exact nature of the change in the distribution 
imposed by the French According to several informants, however, the new division favored 
the central igherman around Tinghir that had collaborated with the establishment of the 
colonial authonty in the Todgha For example, as of the late 1910s, central igherman such as 
Asfalou, Tinghir, and Afanour were already allied to Thami Glaoui, the pasha of Marrakech, 
who conquered large parts of the South with French military aid The new colonial water 
politics would therefore have favored the igherman that had already established good contacts 
with the new rulers 
The total length of this new nuba was 42 days (see table 8 1) The central villages 
located around Tinghir (i e , the administrative units of Igourtane, Tinghir, Afanour, Ait 
Ouamast, and Ait Mhamed) seem to have profited disproportionately from this new nuba. 
252 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
especially if we take into account the relatively limited size of their agricultural holdings 
compared to the lower Todgha villages. 
After independence in 1956, the (Moroccan) state intervened a second time to 
establish another nuba, which still applies today. The most important change was the creation 
of two seasonal nubas: a summer and a winter nuba. The winter nuba is in force over a period 
of six months between mid-September and mid-March. During this season, all the villages of 
the Ait Todoght receive water. The total duration of the winter nuba is 41 days, that is, almost 
the same length as the colonial nuba. The intra-valley allocation of the winter nuba is largely 
similar to the previous one, thereby clearly disadvantaging the villages of Amazaourou 
(including the research villages Ikhba and Ait El Meskine) and El Hart, while the upstream 
villages of Ait Tizgui (including Zaou'ia) were even granted the right io permanent irrigation. 
Table 8.1. Valley-level nuba before and after independence 
Administrativeyraci/on The colonial nuba (since 
1942) 
Number of days 
Tizgui 2 
Aft Snane 3 
Igourtane 7 
Tinghir & Afanour 6 
Ait Ouamast & Ait Mhamed 6 
Amzaourou 7 
El Hart n'Igurramen 5 
El Hart Niâamine 6 
Total 42 
Post-independence nuba 
Winter nuba (days) Summer nuba (days) 
permanent permanent 
3 5 
7 5 
6 5 
7 7 
7 0 
5 0 
6 0 
41 22 
Source: De Haas and El Ghanjou (2000a) 
However, the most drastic change was the establishment of a summer nuba, which clearly 
favored upstream villages such as Zaou'ia and Tikoutar. The summer nuba is in force from 
mid-March until mid-September, and is almost half as long as the winter nuba, that is, 22 
days. During summer, only the villages in the upper Todgha until Tinghir and the villages of 
the Tagoumast^raci/'o« (Ait Ouamast) receive water. This new nuba meant a doubling of the 
irrigation frequency in summer in the upper Todgha. This allowed for the cultivation of 
almost all agricultural fields in the dry and hot summer, which was probably not possible 
under the previous nuba of 42 days due to high évapotranspiration. 
This new division constituted was without any doubt a deterioration for the 
downstream Amzaourou and El Hart villages, which were now plainly excluded from access 
to river water during six months of the year. For them, it meant that they were forced to keep 
most of their land fallow during summer. Again, the nuba seemed to reflect the power 
relations within the valley, with the villages of the upper Todgha, and especially those around 
Tinghir, increasingly politically dominant, more affluent, and apparently better able to 
influence local authorities. 
Although the new nuba meant a deterioration for the downstream villages, the 
imposition of central state power and "pacification" also marked the end of the great violent 
conflicts between the villages for the control of water. It is the central state, locally 
represented by the qaid, which interferes in case of serious conflict. Notwithstanding this 
relative peace, the post-colonial nuba has remained a contested institution and this escalates 
during periods of drought7. 
Each village closely watches over the correct execution of the nuba, in order to ensure that other villages do 
not receive more than they are entitled to For example, the villages of El Hart send people to camp close to each 
dam in the Todgha during their tum within the nuba, in order to guard the passage of their water from the dams 
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8.2.4. The collective crisis and the decline of khettara irrigation 
In all research villages, the taqbilt and amghar are responsible for the maintenance of the 
irrigation system, the distribution of water and the settlement of conflicts over water or land. 
The imposition of central state power heralded a new era, in which the functioning of these 
traditional institutions was gradually undermined. Although the taqbilt is still responsible for 
the organization of oasis agriculture, the position of this traditional institution has been 
severely weakened. This process cannot only be explained by the imposition of state power, 
but that it has been reinforced by the legal and social-economic emancipation of formerly 
subordinate groups, a process in which migration plays an important role as an avenue of 
upward socio-economic mobility. 
The taqbilt is gradually losing its influence, and its legitimacy is being increasingly 
contested. The amghar, the traditional chief elected annually by the village's taqbilt, has lost 
most of his former power and legitimacy, and his directives are less and less respected. 
Lacking formal power, amghars complain that they lack the status and respect to be able to 
fine people or to settle conflicts between land and water users. Sometimes, such cases are 
brought before the official state's court, thereby totally ignoring traditional institutions (see 
section 10.5). However, as it is generally considered as shameful to revert to the "hostile" 
state institutions to solve problems within the community, many cases are not solved at all. 
Under these circumstances, it has become increasingly difficult to enforce customary 
law (e.g., fining in the case of crop theft, which has become increasingly common) and to 
prevent "free-rider behavior" (e.g., tapping water but not maintaining the irrigation 
infrastructure such as ditches, dams, and khettaras). Conflicts between groups of water users 
frequently reach deadlock situations in which it becomes harder to organize collective labor 
or to collect financial contributions in order to pay laborers for the maintenance of the 
irrigation infrastructure. A decrease in the dependency of oasis dwellers on agriculture 
through migration and general livelihood diversification, as well as a diminishing dependence 
on collective irrigation systems brought on by the recent rise of motor pumping, is further 
reinforcing this tendency towards "de-collectivization". 
This has had fundamental implications for traditional oasis agriculture. The taqbilt and 
amghar are less and less effective in settling disputes between peasants. Through these 
processes, the village community is less and less capable of guaranteeing the maintenance of 
irrigation channels, dams, and other water works. This is leading to the decline of the agro-
hydrological infrastructure, in particular of the laborious khettara irrigation in the lower 
Todgha. As a result of bad maintenance, many khettaras have now run dry, a development 
that further obliges peasants to install water pumps to be able to irrigate. 
Out of a total of 39 khettaras in the valley, 21 have stopped functioning or only 
contain a negligible flow in relatively wet years. Most of the khettaras that are still functional 
have a decreased flow. Nowadays, only some khettaras have important water flows, such as 
Tadafelt's khettara and those of El Hart n'lgurramen, Aggoudime, and Boutaghat. In the 
course of the twentieth century, the khettaras of most other villages suffered from a lack of 
proper maintenance, which has in some case led to the abandonment of agricultural fields— 
which happened in Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul. 
The erosion of the effective power of the taqbilt and the growing autonomy of 
households vis-à-vis these institutions—enabled by livelihood diversification and the 
increased importance of non-agricultural income—have contributed to a worsening collective 
to their fields. It is an endless slmggle against deceit. According to several informants, there have been several 
violent confrontations over this between villages of the lower and upper Todgha over the past decades 
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maintenance of the khettaras. A second factor that might have contributed to the decline of 
the khettaras appears to be the installation of numerous motor pumps as from the 1970s, 
which has caused a lowering of groundwater tables. 
Both factors seem to have played a simultaneous and mutually reinforcing role. With 
the gradual desiccation of the khettaras, the motivation to maintain them will further 
decrease, and motor pumping will be further encouraged. Apart from the question as to what 
extent motor pumping has contributed to the lowering of groundwater tables, the rapid rise of 
motor pumping in the past decades (see following section) and the creation of new 
agricultural extensions have, in any case, decreased the relative importance of khettara 
irrigation, and owners of motor pumps tend to be less motivated to contribute to the 
maintenance of khettaras. 
Conflicts between different ethnic lineages over their contribution to the maintenance 
of the khettara are frequent, and more and more peasants refuse to participate in collective 
works. Migration seems to have played an important role in accelerating the breakdown of 
collective maintenance agreements. Migration in particular has coincided with the increased 
importance of non-agricultural revenues and the concomitant socio-economic emancipation of 
landless and smallholding pesasants and sharecroppers, who constituted the labor basis vital 
to oasis agriculture. In this way, many families belonging to traditionally inferior groups have 
been able to free themselves from absolute social and economic dependence on agriculture 
and, consequently, the obligations traditionally imposed on them by the taqbilt and the 
amghar*. The diversification of livelihoods, combined with the imposition of formal state 
law, have all gradually undermined the functioning of traditional institutions and contributed 
to the concomitant decline of khettaras. 
The labor-intensive khettara irrigation system is more susceptible to bad maintenance 
than river irrigation. In contrast to the khettaras, many river irrigation systems are still 
functioning. Khettaras require intensive labor input in exchange for a meager water flow. In 
comparison, river irrigation is less labor-intensive and rather straightforward, by collecting 
water in relatively large quantities through the construction of dams, which are relatively easy 
to maintain and to restore in case of breakdown. This might partly explain why khettara 
irrigation in the lower Todgha has suffered more from the general "collective maintenance 
crisis" than the river irrigation in the upper Todgha. Furthermore, river irrigation has not 
suffered from motor pumping, which only takes place in the lower Todgha. 
However, this does not mean that the "collective crisis" has not affected agriculture in 
the upstream part of the valley. Migration-related processes of socio-economic change have 
affected oasis agriculture in general. This particularly applies to the process in which oasis 
livelihoods have been transformed in such a way that the "individualistic" socio-economic 
orientation of households increasingly conflicts with the inherently collective nature of 
traditional oasis agriculture, whose spatial structure is still based on former social structures. 
The complex nature of land tenure patterns, characterized by the small size and 
scattered location of plots, adds to the inherently collective nature of traditional oasis 
agriculture. For example, fruit trees and palms planted on small plots can often survive 
without irrigation, as their root systems grow under other, irrigated plots or tap the water 
leaking under the earthen irrigation channels. When the land, and the fruit trees on it, are 
possessed by different people, the agricultural enterprise becomes even more complicated, as 
the owner of the trees benefits from the water used by the land owner to irrigate the annual 
crops on the same plot. Moreover, the presence of high trees on one particular plot might 
It should, however, be noted that it has generally not been the pooresl within these subordinate and low- status 
ethnic groups who migrated 
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hinder the cultivation of annual crops on adjacent plots. This "involution" severely limits the 
scope for individual entrepreneurship within the traditional oasis 
Besides the establishment of a new nuba at the valley level, the active role of the 
Moroccan state in traditional oasis agriculture has been limited. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Moroccan state attempted to stem the decline of the khettaras. With support of the ORMVA 
(Office Régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole), the agricultural extension office in Ouarzazate, 
some of the remaining khettaras were renovated by covering the walls of their tunnels with 
concrete. This has proven to be an effective way of reducing the leakage of water and the 
accumulation of soil in the tunnel. Moreover, this has drastically reduced the requirements for 
maintenance and rendered the vertical shafts—which served to maintain the khettara— 
superfluous. 
In the 1990s, however, the state seemed to largely retreat from such attempts to 
preserve traditional khettaras. Moreover, officials working for local Centers de Mise en 
Valeur Agricole (agricultural extension services) in Tinghir and Taghzout seem to lack the 
financial means and motivation to support peasants. They mainly remain in their offices, and 
peasants actually complain that they almost never see them. The officers seem mainly 
interested in large-scale, "modem" agriculture and tend to disqualify traditional agriculture as 
"no agriculture". Nevertheless, recently, there have been initiatives by newly created village 
associations, which contest the legitimacy of the taqbilt, to restore khettaras by applying for 
aid to the Moroccan government or foreign NGOs (see further section 10.5). 
8.2.5. The rise of motor pumping and the role of migration 
The conditions and technical basis of agricultural production in the traditionally water-scarce 
lower Todgha has radically changed with the rapid introduction of diesel water pumps since 
the mid-1970s. The motor pump was the latest water extraction technique to appear in the 
Todgha. The traditional method of collecting water from wells by the use of human labor or 
animal traction (the so-called aghrur) was laborious and mainly served domestic need and the 
irrigation of relatively small plots. Until the 1970s, virtually no peasants used motor pumps 
for irrigation. They continued to rely on khettara and limited river irrigation. 
This changed as from the mid-1970s, when peasants started to install motor pumps, a 
development that gained further momentum in subsequent decades. Initially, pumps used to 
be mainly installed in the ancient oasis of the lower Todgha to supplement the (increasingly) 
scarce khettara and river water resources. However, besides increasing production in the 
ancient oasis, the introduction of the motor pump technique has also enabled the creation of 
large new agricultural extensions in previously uncultivated land around the Ait 'Atta villages 
and in the alluvial plain of Ghallil (see section 8.3.3). 
As table 8.2 shows, there is a clear upstream-downstream gradient in the use of motor 
pumps. In the upper Todgha, agricultural motor pumps are absent, since river water is 
abundant and new agricultural extensions not possible since all arable land is already 
cultivated9. The motor pumping area begins near to the villages of Taounrt and Tikoutar. 
Most of these upstream pumps were installed in the 1980s, when the valley suffered from a 
long-term drought, which reduced the flow of the Todgha. At the end of the 1990s, most of 
9
 It should be noted that many households in the upper Todgha do own small (electric) motorpumps, which serve 
to pump water for domestic use, but also frequently to irrigate the urtan, gardens located within the family 
compounds, which are rather small but often produce an important quantity of vegetables and fruits for own 
consumption. As houses are generally located at a rather elevated position, nver or khettara water cannot reach 
most houses, which necessitates this small-scale pumping 
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the pumps located upstream of Tinghir were abandoned, as recent years have been relatively 
wet. 
Going downstream from Tinghir, the density of motor pumps increases (see map 5). 
The communes rurales of Todgha Es-Soufla and Taghzout comprise 94 percent of all motor 
pumps and 89 percent of the total surface irrigated by motor pumps. The irrigation in the 
recent extensions and the Ghallil plain (which are all located in Taghzout) is almost uniquely 
based on motor pumping, where about 21 percent of all motor pumps in the Todgha are 
located. Nowadays, approximately 79 percent of all agricultural land in the Todgha is 
principally irrigated by motor pumps. According to official estimates of the CMV Tinghir, in 
1999, the total number of agricultural motor pumps in the Todgha was 1100 (as compared to 
980 in 1996), with a clear concentration in the lower Todgha and the Ghallil plain. 
Table 8.2. Repartition 
Irrigation mode 
Todgha El Oulya 
Tinghir 
Todgha Es-Soufla 
Taghzout & Ghallil 
Total 
of the irrigated 
Number of 
motor pumps 
0 
60 
315 
605 
980 
surface by irrigation modes (1996) 
Area irrigated 
by pumps (ha) 
(1 
2X0 
450 
1,850 
2,580 
% 
0 
56.0 
69.2 
93.9 
78.9 
Area irrigated by 
river or kheltara 
150 
220 
200 
120 
690 
% 
100.0 
44.0 
30.8 
6.1 
21.1 
Total 
area (ha) 
150 
500 
650 
1,970 
3,270 
% 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: CMV Tinghir and CMV Taghzout 1996 
Figure 8.2 shows that the number of motor pumps rapidly increased after 1975. Furthermore, 
the data show that most "collective pumps", which are installed and managed by groups of 
peasants, were installed in the 1975-1984 decade. The vast majority of pumps that were 
installed after 1985 were individually owned. Finally, the pace of installation slowed down in 
the 1995-1999 period, which might indicate a certain "saturation" of motor pumps in the 
traditional oasis. 
Figure 8.2. Installation of motor pumps in research villages by period 
D pri\ate pumps 
• collective 
pumps 
< 1975 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 
period 
to Source: Household survey 
There are two principal causes for the rapid rise of motor pumping in the lower Todgha. The 
first cause seems to be the general water scarcity in this part of the valley. This situation has 
As only data until 1998 were recorded, the number of pumps installed in 1995-1998 has been multiplied by 
1.25 to get en estimate of the total 5-year period. 
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been further aggravated by the establishment of the new post-colonial nuba and the increasing 
malfunctioning of the khettaras. In normal years, traditional water resources were already 
insufficient to irrigate the whole agricultural surface all year round. Especially during 
droughts, widespread crop failure was common. The fact that the 1970s and 1980s were 
characterized by recurring droughts might also have constituted an additional stimulus for 
peasants to look for alternative sources of irrigation water. 
A second, important enabling factor explaining the boom in motor pumping seems to 
be the international migration from the Todgha to European countries, which started to gain 
ground in the late 1960s and 1970s. It seems mainly through the effect of remittances that 
many households could now afford to pay laborers to dig a well" and to buy a diesel pump. 
International migrant households in particular have dug new wells and installed pumps in 
order to increase agricultural production. Table 8.3 shows that 17 and 18 percent of 
nonmigrant and internal migrant households possess a private water pump, compared to 43-47 
percent among all three types of international migrant households. Apparently, it is mainly 
households with access to international migration resources that are able and willing to bear 
the costs and risks of installing agricultural water pumps. 
On average, the cost of installing a water pump (including well-digging) was around 
30,000 dirham (i.e., about 3,000 US$) in the 1990s. Almost all pumps are driven by small 
diesel motors. Based on a diesel price of 5 dirham and a combustion rate of 2.5 liters per hour, 
the hourly operating costs are around 12.5 dirham. Many pump-owning peasants sell water to 
others. Water is sold in time units. In 1999, the price was about 30 dirham per hour. This 
price varies according to the location, season, and precipitation. 
Table 8.3. Possession of pumps by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current International 
Returned international 
Total 
Private pump 
126 
16.5 
44.7 
39.2 
44.6 
25.4 
Possession of 
Collective pumps 
5 1 
2.4 
10.5 
10.8 
77 
6.3 
pumps (%) 
Collective or private12 
16.6 
18.1 
47.4 
43.1 
44 6 
28.2 
η 
175 
127 
38 
102 
65 
507 
Source: Household survey 
Looking at total investments in motor pumps (table 8.4), we see a similar pattern. On average, 
international migrant households have invested far higher amounts in motor pumping than 
nonmigrants and internal migrant households. It is striking that indirect international 
migration households clearly make as equally high investments as other international migrant 
households. One explanation for this may be that "indirect international migrants" are present 
in the Todgha (in contrast to current international migrants) and that they are relatively young 
compared to international return migrants. Indirect migrants often receive remittances from 
migrated family members with the objective of making them financially independent in the 
long run. As they do not participate in international migration themselves, they might be even 
more motivated to develop local economic activities, as the source of remittances might fall 
away. 
It is also striking that return migrants do not invest more than current or indirect 
international migrant households. This runs counter to expectations that it would be 
1
 ' In the Todgha, almost all wells, which may reach depths up to 20 meters, are dug manually 
12
 The percentage of households possessing a private or a collective pump is slightly lower than the sum of the 
two columns to the left due to the fact that some households possess both types of pumps simultaneously. 
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particularly the more "committed" return migrants that would tend to invest. Furthermore, 
internal migrant households invest only slightly and not significantly more than nonmigrant 
households 3. This probably reflects their relatively low and unstable income (see chapter 
7.4), which is more comparable to nonmigrant than to international migrant households. 
Table 8.4. Investments in pumping by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
No 
84.6 
81 9 
57 9 
57 8 
56 9 
73 0 
< 10,000 
40.7 
52 2 
25 0 
25 6 
107 
29 9 
Investments in pumping in dirham 1975-1998 (' 
within investors group 
10-
39,999 
44.4 
30.4 
18.8 
32 6 
39 3 
34.3 
>40,000 
14.8 
17.4 
56 3 
41 9 
50 0 
35 8 
Total Mean 
100.0 19,176 
100.0 19,289 
100.0 33,219 
100.0 32,933 
100.0 31,196 
100 0 27,592 
Mean 
2,959 
3,493 
13,987 
13,884 
13,438 
7,456 
54) 
5% 
trimmed1'' 
1,129 
1,148 
12,127 
9,568 
11,241 
4,646 
η 
175 
127 
38 
102 
65 
507 
Source: Household survey (C=0.333**; η=0.275**) 
Figure 8.3 shows the distribution of motor pumps across the research villages. The figure 
confirms that international migration households exhibit a higher tendency to possess pumps 
than nonmigrant and internal migrant households. However, it also shows that there are 
important inter-village differences, which are primarily related to the extent to which villages 
have access to river and khettara water resources. Both Zaou'ia and Tikoutar have access to 
sufficient river water all year round, and peasants here generally do not need pumps to make 
up for irrigation deficits. The relatively high number of migrants possessing motor pumps in 
Zaou'ia should be explained by the fact that many households have pumps within their family 
compounds for the irrigation oîurtan (small vegetable gardens) and that relatively numerous 
households possess—irrigated—land outside the traditional oasis in other areas. Ikhba only 
has access to river water during the winter nuba. This relative water scarcity explains why 
about half of the indirect and returned international migrant households in Ikhba have 
installed agricultural motor pumps. 
Aït El Meskine appears to be the village with the highest possession rate of motor 
pumps. Even half of nonmigrant households and virtually all international migrant households 
possess motor pumps! In Aït El Meskine, it indeed seems that a certain point of "saturation" 
has been reached, which means that almost all households capable of installing a motor pump, 
have done so. The relative wealth of its inhabitants, the limited access of Aït El Meskine to 
river water, and the shallow water tables can explain this phenomenon. The inhabitants of Ait 
El Meskine have gone so far as to entirely give up their rights to river water. Agriculture in 
this village now entirely depends on pumped water. Nevertheless, particularly in the light of 
increasing diesel prices, villagers now consider reclaiming their historical entitlements to 
river water. 
The results of Bonferroni multiple comparison of group means revealed significant differences between (1) 
nonmigrant and internal migrant households on the one hand, and (2) current, indirect, and returned international 
households on the one hand Within these two main groups, differences between means are insignificant. 
The 5% tnmmed mean (which excludes the 5% largest and 5% smallest values) was calculated because some 
extreme values occurred on this variable Although the trimmed means are clearly lower than the actual means 
(indicating a skewed distribution), the general pattern, with indirect and current international migrant households 
scoring highest, and nonmigrants lowest, has remained. The remarkably lower 5% tnmmed mean among current 
international migrant households reveals the existence of a particularly large extreme value, which is however 
not an outlier. 
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• nonmigrant 
U internal migrant 
• indirect international migrant 
O international migrant 
S returned international migrant 
Source: Household survey (C village*pump= 0.430**) 
As far as the two khettara villages in our sample are concerned, it is striking that Ghallil n'Ait 
Isfoul has the highest pump possession rate after Ait El Meskine. The primary explanation for 
this seems to be that the traditional khettara water source of this village has become entirely 
desiccated. This means—as is the case for Ait El Meskine—that people without motor pumps 
are forced to either buy water from other peasants or to withdraw from agriculture. Tadafelt is 
one of the few villages in the valley where the ancient khettara is still well functioning and 
can meet most agricultural needs. In many respects, Tadafelt is the village where traditional 
khettara-hz&ea oasis agriculture has been best preserved. Also in more general terms, Tadafelt 
is the most "traditional" village in the sample, with a relatively high reliance on agricultural 
sources and a relatively recent migration history. However, the recent establishment of 
agricultural extensions has increased the need for water, especially in summer, and has urged 
some peasants to buy and install pumps. 
In sum, agriculture in the lower Todgha tends to increasingly rely on water pumps, a 
development which has been provoked by the decline of khettaras on the one hand, and the 
creation of recent agricultural extensions on the other, and has been facilitated by the influx of 
international remittances to an important extent. However, the extent to which motor pumps 
are installed not only depends on access to financial resources, but also on the geographical 
location of the villages which largely determine the scope for agricultural extension or 
intensification. Since natural water is scarce in most lower Todgha villages, installing a water 
pump is the only viable option for intensifying agriculture in the same location or extending 
the agricultural surface. In the upstream parts of the valley north of Tinghir, river water is 
generally so abundant that agriculture is possible all year round. Here, land rather than water 
that is the limiting factor. The available agricultural land is already cultivated so intensively 
that there is hardly any possibility for further intensification. 
About 90 percent of all motor pumps have been installed in the ancient oasis, on the 
fields traditionally belonging to the village. It is, in particular, international and returned 
international migration households that tend to install motor pumps in other parts of the 
Todgha (i.e., recent extensions and Ghallil plain, accounting for 5 percent of all pumps) or in 
other regions (mainly in other oases such as Tinejdad, equally accounting for 5 percent of all 
pumps). 
In chapter 2, we discussed the relevance of the temporal dimension in assessing 
migration impacts: the full developmental impacts of migration may take decades to fully 
materialize. Table 8.5 indeed suggests that the effect of migration on motor pumping is of a 
"lagged" nature. Among those households which began participating in international 
Figure 8.3. Possession of pumps by household migration status, by vdlage 
Zaouia Tikoutar MEI Ikhba Tadafelt Ghallil Total 
Meskine n'Ait Isfoul 
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migration less than 15 years ago, only 21 percent have invested in motor pumps, a percentage 
which is only slightly higher than among nonmigrant (15 percent) and internal (18 percent) 
migrant households. This percentage rises to 35 percent for those between 15 and 28 years 
abroad, and further to 70 percent among those more than 28 years abroad. 
Although we should be very prudent with such "temporal reconstruction15", the 
migration stage seems to influence the incidence and amount of investments in pumping. 
Most international migrants only start investing in pumping after more than two decades of 
absence. In addition, the total amount of money invested clearly rises with migration duration. 
This may give additional explanation as to why Ait El Meskine, a village with an ancient 
history of international migration, has far higher pump possession rates than other villages. 
This may also explain why the great boom in water pumping occurred in the 1975-1994 
period, well after the international migration boom of the late 1960s. 
Table 8.5. International migrant households' investments in pumping by length of stay abroad 
Length of stay Investments in pumping in dirham 1975-1998 (%) 
abroad within investors group 
No < 10,000 10-39,999 >40,000 Total Mean Mean 5%tnmmed « 
1-14 78 9 58.3 33 3 8.3 100.0 11,479 2,417 1,170 57 
15-28 64 9 10.0 45 0 45 0 100.0 36,338 12,750 7,976 57 
>29 30 2 13.5 29 7 56 8 100 0 35,284 24,632 22,956 53 
Total 58.7 20 3 34 8 44 9 100 0 31,453 12,995 10,407 167 
Source: Household survey (η=0.355**; r=0.380**) 
In order to examine whether the higher propensity of international migrant households to 
invest in pumping is more than the mere effect of their higher incomes, it seems useful to 
analyze whether international migrant invest more than nonmigrant households within the 
same income categories. Table 8.6 shows that there is no significant association between 
migration and pumping investments in the two lowest income categories. However, in the 
highest income category (above 3,750 dirham per month), we still witness a strong and 
significant association. 
This means that the higher propensity of international migrants to invest in pumping 
cannot only be attributed to the income effect of remittances. Two factors might explain this 
"above-income effect". First, as international migrants have access to European social 
security systems, their incomes tend to be more stable and secure than laborers in Morocco. 
Especially those migrants who have built up pension rights, and therefore have "insured" their 
future income, might make them more prone and less hesitant to take the risk of such 
investments. 
Second, it might be that migrants, partly as a result of their long stay abroad and their 
possible experience with modem management, have more entrepreneurial and risk-taking 
attitudes. However, the latter variable is possibly endogenous due to the selective nature of 
migration. After all, assuming that (international) migrants already tend to have more 
entrepreneurial and risktaking attitudes—apart from factors such as age and education— 
before migration, these attitudes are not or only partly the result of migration. However, this 
cannot explain why indirect international migrant households exhibit similar propensities to 
invest as direct (current and returned) migrant households. Therefore, the first hypothesis that 
the more stable and secure character of international remittance income accounts for the 
higher tendency to invest, seems the more valid. 
By comparing the investment behavior of international migrant households based on the length of the stay 
abroad, we neither can, nor do not claim, to be able to predict how recent migrants will behave and invest in the 
future 
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Table 8.6. Investments in pumping by international migration participation, by household income 
Total 
household 
income 
0-1,699 
1,700-
3,749 
> 3,750 
Migration 
status 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
No 
90.5 
88.0 
90 2 
76.3 
71.3 
73.7 
76.7 
37.4 
50.0 
Investments 
< 10,000 
50 0 
33 3 
47.4 
38 9 
21 7 
29 3 
70 0 
21.1 
28 4 
in pumping ir 
within group ι 
10-39,999 
50 0 
66 7 
52.6 
22 2 
34 8 
29.3 
20 0 
28.1 
26 9 
ι dirham 1975-
of investors 
> 40,000 
00 
0.0 
00 
38 9 
43.5 
41 5 
100 
50.9 
44.8 
•1998 (%) 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
1,090 
2,000 
1,207 
6,700 
8,169 
7,458 
3,143 
21,264 
15,405 
η 
169 
25 
194 
76 
80 
156 
43 
91 
134 
Source: Household survey (7: 0-1699=0.138"; 1700-3749=0.138·; 2 3750=0.704**) 
We can conclude that international migration has enabled households in the relatively water-
scarce lower Todgha to install motor pumps, and, thereby, (1) compensate for the declining 
availability of traditional khettara water (e.g., Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul); (2) intensify agriculture 
by cultivation all-year round on plots which only used to be cultivated during winter due to 
limited river or khettara water availability (e.g., Ait El Meskine, Ikhba); and (3) extend 
agriculture through land reclamation in formerly barren land outside the traditional oases 
(e.g., Tadafelt, Ghallil plain). Migration has clearly enabled households to overcome local 
(environmental and institutional) constraints on agricultural development. Nevertheless, as we 
will see, this uncontrolled boom in pumping also poses a major threat to the sustainability of 
oasis agriculture. 
8.3. Land tenure and investments in land 
8.3.1. Legal status of landed property 
According to official figures, more than 97 percent of the agricultural land in the Todgha 
valley is privately owned (melk) (see table 8.7). Besides land, water is equally the subject of 
private property. In contrast to some other oases, the possession of land is generally coupled 
with the right to irrigate that land17. Land with the habus status is traditionally given, leased, 
or conceded by devout individuals to religious foundations (a mosque, a zawïa, a marabut). 
Nowadays, this "religious land" is administered by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Habus 
land is generally leased to peasants for a fixed amount during five years. Habus plots are 
generally characterized by their extremely small size, and represent merely 2.9 percent of the 
total agricultural surface in the Todgha. 
The traditional system of "land mortgage" (rhan) implies the transfer of land use 
rights to another person during a determined period, in exchange for a pledge in the form of a 
16
 In order to maintain sufficiently high case-loads, nonmigrant and internal migrant households have been 
grouped as "nonmigrant", and indirect, current and returned international migration households as "international 
migrant" 
17
 However, this does not automatically mean that these water nghts are sufficient to irrigate the land In the 
lower Todgha, the traditional nver and khettara water resources are far from adequate and tend to be in decline 
Furthermore, possession of fruit trees (e.g., date palms, olive or almond trees) is not automatically linked to the 
possession of the land on which they grow Consequently, it is possible to buy or sell fruit trees apart from the 
land on which they grow 
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fixed amount of money on which both parties have to agree. For the duration of the rhan, the 
land owner is free to use this money as he likes, but he should return the entire sum after the 
end of the mortgage period. The household survey indicated that only a very small proportion 
of all privately owned land is mortgaged, and that rhan is mainly limited to the upper Todgha. 
What might have distorted this figure, is that peasants tend to hide the fact that they 
mortgaged their land, fearing social criticism. Mortgaging land to another person is usually 
interpreted as an indication of poverty. Most owners who mortgage their land have financial 
problems, and many have actually lost their land, as they were unable to refund the pledge. 
As is the case with mortgaged land, rental of land is rather rare in the Todgha, and is 
mostly limited to the traditional oasis. Rental of land including motor pumps in the modem 
extensions is equally a rare phenomenon. This can be explained by the fact that collective 
water resources are generally not available here, and that each peasant has to dig his own well 
and purchase his own motor pump. Regarding the generally short term of land rental in the 
Todgha, which rarely exceeds one or two years, this is not an attractive option. 
Table 8.7. Legal status of agricultural land (1996) 
Municipality 
Todgha El Oulya 
Tinghir 
Todgha Es-Soufla 
Taghzout n'Ait 'Atta 
Total 
Private 
Surface (ha) 
145 
485 
625 
1,560 
2,815 
% 
96 7 
97 2 
96 2 
97.5 
97 1 
Habits 
Surface (ha) 
5 
15 
25 
40 
85 
% 
33 
28 
38 
25 
29 
Total 
Surface (ha) 
150 
500 
650 
1,600 
2,900 
% 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 
Source: CMV 1996 
8.3.2. Landed property and distribution of the plots 
Before colonization, ownership of arable (i.e., irrigable18) land was the main source of wealth, 
and largely determined the social and economic status of oasis households. Besides its vital 
economic role in maintaining oasis livelihoods, land ownership also has a strong social and 
emotional connotation. It symbolizes membership of the ethnic group, belonging to the 
Todgha, and being an "honorable" person. This might partly explain why many migrants have 
been eager to buy land in the traditional oasis, especially if they were landless. Apart from its 
potential economic value, land purchase symbolizes upward social mobility. On the contrary, 
selling one's land is generally considered as a shameful act and even a betrayal of one's 
ancestors. 
Although neither landlessness nor large-scale landownership are very frequent, land is 
unequally distributed, as table 8.8 indicates. In the commune rurale of Taghzout n'Ait 'Atta 
for example, enterprises smaller than 0.5 hectare represent together only 27 percent of the 
total cultivated surface, but represent 67 percent of all agricultural enterprises. In the same 
commune, enterprises bigger than one hectare represent 59 percent of the total surface, but 
only 16 percent of all enterprises 
There are clear intra-valley geographical differences in the size of the agricultural 
holding. The smallest holdings are generally found in the extreme upstream part of the valley, 
near the gorges. In the commune rurale of Todgha El Oulya, no holding is bigger than 0.5 
hectare. Going downstream, there is a clear gradient in which, with the gradual widening of 
the valley, the mean size of agricultural holdings becomes remarkably bigger. 
Needless to say, in oases, land only has agricultural value if it can be irrigated 
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Table 8.8. Size of agricultural holding by municipality (1996) 
Municipality 
Todgha El Oulya 
Tinghir 
Todgha Es-Soufla 
Taghzout n'Ait Atta 
Total 
< 0 5 
100.0 
67 2 
56 0 
66 7 
67.7 
0.5-1 
0.0 
32.8 
33 6 
17.8 
23 7 
Size of agricultural holdings in 
1-2 
0.0 
0.0 
10.3 
5.9 
4.9 
2-5 
0.0 
0.0 
0 0 
67 
2.6 
>5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.0 
1.2 
hectares 
Total Total surface 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
150 
500 
650 
1500 
2800 
Mean surf 
0 30 
0.42 
0 56 
0 84 
0 60 
η 
500 
1190 
1160 
1800 
4650 
Source: CMV 1996 
Currently, the majority of households in the research villages own land. Only 14 percent of 
the surveyed households do not possess land (see table 8.9). Nevertheless, the percentage of 
landless households varies across villages: from 3 percent in Tikoutar to 25 percent in 
Tadafelt. Although the number of landless households is relatively small, most households 
possess only a very small amount of land, which can be explained by high population 
densities, population growth, and the repeated subdivision of landed property through 
inheritance. The average size of the agricultural holding in the research villages is 0.4 hectare, 
and more than two thirds of all landowning surveyed households own less than this average19. 
In line with the valley-wide data, a comparison of the research villages reveals that 
land is relatively more abundant upstream than downstream. The positive up to downstream 
gradient of land availability is inversely proportional to the predominantly negative gradient 
of river water availability. Therefore, in villages such as Zaou'fa and Tikoutar, lack of land is 
the main constraint on agricultural livelihoods. Moving downstream, water becomes the 
dominant constraint. We will see that this spatial differentiation in water and land availability 
are also important in explaining spatial differences in recent patterns of agricultural change in 
a rather unexpected manner. 
Agricultural holdings—except for those in recent extensions and the Ghalhl—are 
comprised of several small and dispersed plots. In the upper Todgha, we find veritable micro-
plots, generally varying between 100 and 1000 square meters. Again, there exists a clear 
intra-valley gradient, with increasing plot sizes as one goes further downstream. However, the 
plots remain small throughout the valley, and rarely exceed 0.5 hectare. Only in the Ghallil 
and other recent extensions may they measure one hectare or more. 
Table 8.9. Size of agricultural holding in traditional oasis by village 
Village 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghalhl n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
Without land 
17.1 
2.9 
11.3 
9.7 
25.0 
7.1 
13.7 
Size 
0.001-0.049 
80.5 
12.5 
14 
210 
0 0 
0.0 
25.0 
of holding in traditional oasis 
0.05 •0.39 
2.4 
82 7 
29 6 
50 0 
13 8 
28.6 
32 7 
> 0 4 
0.0 
1.9 
57 7 
194 
612 
64 3 
28 6 
(hectare) 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
0.015 
0.133 
0.712 
0.323 
0 745 
1 011 
0.399 
« 
123 
104 
71 
62 
116 
28 
504 
Source: Household survey 
Tables 8.10 and 8.11 show that, for the historical reasons described in section 5.4, half of the 
Zaouia households possess land outside the Todgha. These are generally small, traditional 
holdings in other oases or the Middle Atlas mountains. One quarter of all Aft El Meskine 
" According to official statistics from the CMV (1996), the average holding size for the entire Todgha valley is 
0 6 hectare This difference can be partly explained by the fact that the last figure comprises the relatively large 
farms of the Ghalhl plain. 
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households possess land outside the Todgha. In contrast with Zaou'ia, however, these holdings 
are generally larger than 1 hectare. Most holdings are located in the Middle Atlas. However, 
some households possess land in the Ghallil plain or the Bour Tinejdad, a recent agricultural 
extension east of the Ghallil. One third of all households in Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul possess plots 
outside the traditional oasis, which are mainly located in the Middle Atlas. Land possession 
outside the village territory is limited in the other villages. 
If we examine all the research villages together, land possession outside the traditional 
oasis is rather significant. Two thirds of this land is located in the northern Middle Atlas 
(Aghbala, Azaghar, Boumia, Khenifra), one tenth in the nearby Ghallil or Bour Tinejdad, one 
tenth in other southern regions, and one tenth in eastern Morocco (mainly Moulouya). Since 
the size of these holdings is generally far higher, the total size of land possessed outside the 
ancient oasis by all surveyed households is no less than 181 hectares, which is almost equal to 
the 200 hectares of land possessed in the ancient oasis. In the following sections, we will 
analyze to what extent this is the result of recent land purchases and to what extent migration 
has played an enabling role in this process. 
Table 8.10. Size of agricultural holding outside village territory by village 
Village 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
0 
49 2 
94 3 
74 6 
93.5 
100.0 
64.3 
80.0 
Source: Household survey 
Table 8.11. Total land 
Location land 
Todgha 
Ghallil (Todgha) 
Bour Tinejdad 
Saghro 
Other South 
Middle Atlas 
High Atlas 
East Morocco 
Total 
Surface of land outside 
< 1 ha 
53 6 
0 0 
5 6 
3.2 
0.0 
0.0 
9.4 
> 1 ha 
172 
5.7 
19.7 
3.2 
0.0 
35.7 
10.6 
: village territory (%) 
possession outside village territory by location 
Zaouia 
0.1 
00 
00 
1 1 
112 
27.1 
0.0 
19.0 
58.6 
Tikoutar 
0.0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0.0 
26.5 
0.0 
0.0 
26.5 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
Land outside village territory (ha) 
Ait El 
Meskine 
0.0 
11.3 
3.7 
0.0 
0.0 
35.8 
0.0 
1 1 
51 9 
Ikhba 
2.8 
0 0 
0 0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.8 
Tadafelt 
00 
00 
00 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Mean 
0 474 
0 252 
0 731 
0 061 
0 000 
1429 
0 360 
Ghallil n' 
Ait Isfoul 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
4.0 
6.0 
26.0 
0.0 
0 0 
40.0 
η 
122 
105 
71 
62 
112 
28 
500 
Total 
2 9 
113 
77 
5.1 
17.2 
1164 
00 
20 1 
180.8 
Source: Household survey 
8.3.3. New green frontiers in the desert 
The most significant agricultural development of the final three decades of the twentieth 
century was the extension of oasis agriculture through the reclamation of new agricultural 
land in the desert, which almost exclusively relied on motor pumping. It is striking that many 
peasants prefer to invest in new, until recently barren, areas located outside the traditional 
oasis. In the traditional oasis, plots are generally small and scattered, and the collective, 
community-level organization pertaining to water distribution is increasingly considered as an 
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obstacle to individual agricultural entrepreneurship. This explains why peasants often seem to 
prefer to localize investments in areas outside the traditional oases where constraints such as 
the inflexible collective regulations concerning water allocation, fragmented land property, 
and collective maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure do not play a role. This seems to 
reflect a general pattern throughout the oases of the Maghreb (Bencherifa 1991; 1993; De 
Haas 2001). 
With the boom in pumping there has been a concomitant boom in the creation of 
agricultural extensions in the water-scarce, but land-abundant, lower Todgha. This process 
started in the 1970s but gained further momentum in the 1980s and 1990s. For 
geomorphological reasons, land reclamation has remained limited to the lower Todgha. In the 
upper Todgha, the river terrace of the river is narrow, and hemmed in by steep mountains or, 
in the middle sections of the valley, by high escarpments. All arable land has already been 
cultivated, and reclamation of barren desert land is virtually impossible due to the strong 
geographical relief and the virtual absence of soils. Despite the abundance of water, land 
scarcity poses an almost absolute obstacle to agricultural extension. Within the ancient oasis, 
the fragmentation and complexity of land tenure systems form an obstacle to any kind of 
increase in the scale of agricultural production. To a great extent, this "agricultural 
involution" (cf. Geertz 1963) is an obstacle for people wishing to invest in agriculture. 
Although this lush part of the valley gives the impression of prosperity at first sight, this 
impression is deceiving, as opportunities for agricultural development are very limited in the 
upper Todgha. 
Agriculture is literally "trapped" here, since all the land in the narrow valley has 
already been exploited. Plots are so small that conflicts over the shade given by fruit trees in 
neighboring plots are frequent, often leading to increasing "shade competition". This 
deadlock has pushed ambitious peasants of the upper Todgha to buy land in the Ghallil plain 
or in other regions, especially near to Beni Mellal, the Middle Atlas, Rich, and Tinejdad. In 
these regions, access to relative large surfaces is easier and cheaper, and a certain degree of 
mechanization is possible due to larger plot sizes. In these places, the peasants are not bound 
to collective regulations characterizing traditional oasis agriculture, which are increasingly 
perceived as constraints by individual agricultural entrepreneurs. 
New agricultural extensions can be found in the lower and wider part of the valley, 
where sufficient uncultivated arable land outside the traditional oases is available on the river 
banks. Geographically, this coincides almost exactly with the part of the valley inhabited by 
the Art 'Atta. Until recently, the scarce natural water resources put a severe constraint on 
agriculture, and limited the size of the cultivated surface. Yet the advent of motor pumping 
has enabled peasants of the lower Todgha not only to intensify production in the ancient 
oasis, but also to significantly extend the irrigated agricultural surface since the 1970s. 
Two types of extension can be distinguished. The first type is the relatively small 
extension zone immediately around the villages of the lower Todgha. Almost all the Ait 'Atta 
villages and El Hart Niâamine have reclaimed barren land immediately adjacent to the ancient 
oases. Although the majority of these extensions are directly located on the terraces of the 
Todgha, some villages have located their agricultural extensions on the banks of tributaries of 
the Todgha (Asif n'Taghia, Asif n'Tadafelt). These extensions vary in size between 
approximately 100 and 400 hectares. Several such extensions exist in the research village 
Tadafelt. The second extension type is the more large-scale land reclamation taking place in 
the Ghallil. This plain, which is located east of the ancient oasis on the right bank of the 
Todgha, stretches out over a length of more than 10 kilometers and has a mean width of 4 
kilometers. 
The reclamation of formerly collective land generally follows the following pattern. 
First, a village or a group of villages claims a piece of land. As the status of such land is 
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generally not documented, such claims are often contested by surrounding villages. 
Conflicting claims on collective land often lead to mounting hostility between villages. In 
order not to become involved in feuds, local authorities (i.e., the qaid or pasha) are generally 
hesitant to recognize claims on land, unless agreement has been reached between villages. 
However, negotiations often fail and many conflicts remain unsettled for many years. On 
several occasions, this has resulted in violent confrontations between villages, to which local 
authonties generally respond by putting a (temporary) ban on reclamation. They can thereby 
appeal to the law that all collective land is state property. It is often after many years of 
hostility and difficult negotiations that agreements are reached with other villages, after which 
recognition of these claims can be sought with the local authorities. 
Once a claim of a village has been recognized, the land is divided between the 
different households of the village. United as a village generally is in the phase of the 
delineation of new extensions, the subsequent division among households is often a source of 
conflict, opposing ighsan (lineages) and households, and, increasingly, the ancient elite 
against formerly inferior groups, such as haratin, smallholders, and the landless, who often 
feel disadvantaged. They sometimes accuse village leaders (e.g., the shikh, moqaddem, 
representatives in the municipal council, rich businessmen) of corruption and procuring the 
best located and largest plots for themselves. 
Among the A'it 'Atta, land divisions follow the so-called laguri system, which they 
have historically used when they reclaimed new agricultural land after digging a new 
khettara. The laguri system involves the division of newly reclaimed land into rectangular 
bands, which are allocated to individual households. Until recently, the width of such bands 
was determined by the land each household already owned in the old oasis. This system tends 
to replicate existing inequalities in land property by allocating most new land to large 
landowners. 
This ancient laguri system is increasingly contested by formerly "inferior" groups 
consisting of small landowners and landless people, who used to work as ikhmmesen for large 
landowners. We have seen that landed property has decreased in importance as a prime 
determinant of socio-economic status over the past decades, which is a consequence of the 
livelihood diversification of oasis households in general and (international) migration in 
particular. Traditional elite groups cannot maintain their former position of power vis-à-vis 
smallholders and landless ikhmmesen. 
It is basically the same process of livelihood diversification, migration and 
emancipation that partly explains the "collective crisis" in the maintenance of traditional 
irrigation systems, which is intimately related to fundamental shifts in the local balance of 
power, which also explains why villagers increasingly contest this "inegalitarian" system of 
division based on landed property in the ancient oasis. 
In Tadafelt, for instance, frequent conflicts have ansen concerning the division of 
land, opposing the ancient landed elite and an "opposition" (see section 10.5). The younger 
generations in particular, it seems, support a more egalitarian system of land division, by 
which the width of the bands is determined by the number of (adult) men in the household. 
This system has already been used in the Ghallil plain, and is gaining ground in new 
extension zones around the Ait 'Atta villages. Some people argue for an even more egalitarian 
system that also takes into account the total size of the household, that is, including women. 
Most of the current villages extensions were divided up in the 1970s, although new 
land is still being divided, such as north of the Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim villages and in the 
Tangerfa plain20. Agriculture on newly reclaimed land strongly relies on motorpumping. 
The Tangerfa plain is a new extension zone in the High Atlas piedmont, north of Tinghir This former 
pastureland is being claimed and divided between several Ait 'Atta igherman. 
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However, there are some exceptions to this rule. In Tadafelt, for example, the traditional 
khettara network has been extended, and irrigates part of the new extensions '. Only part of 
the land is actually tilled. Whereas some plots are intensively tilled, others lie fallow or have 
never been touched at all by their owners, who are either not willing or do not have the 
resources to invest in pumping. However, each year more land is put under cultivation. 
8.3.4. Land purchase and the role of migration 
Land in the extension zones is acquired for free. Consequently, most land-owning households 
among the Aft 'Atta and the villages of El Hart have been able to extend their holdings 
without payment. However, households in the more upstream Aft Todoght villages can only 
increase the size of their holdings by purchasing land elsewhere, either from land owners in 
the extension zones, or outside the Todgha. In section 8.2.5, we saw that there was a strong 
association between access to international migration resources and investments in motor 
pumping among the surveyed households. This section will investigate whether there is a 
similar relationship between international migration and land purchase. 
Figure 8.4 shows that land purchase was a limited phenomenon before 1975. Although 
the data are probably biased towards more recent purchases since only current households 
were surveyed, this, however, seems to corroborate the notion that widespread land purchase 
and land reclamation in the Todgha are relatively recent. It was in the late 1970s that the local 
effects of the international migration boom first started to materialize, and that remittances 
enabled increasing numbers of smallholding and sharecropping households to buy land. 
Similar to investments in motor pumping, land purchase gained momentum in the late 1970s 
and 1980s. The incidence of land purchase rose until 1990, but has decreased since then. 
Looking at the total area purchased we can see a more irregular pattern. However, similar to 
investments in motor pumping, we can see a decline in the 1995-1998 period. The reasons for 
this recent decline are not entirely clear. A possible explanation for this is that households 
that participated in the international migration boom in the 1965-1975 period have now 
reached the end of their household life cycle and may therefore be less inclined to invest in 
land. This might also reflect a general tendency among "younger" households to invest in 
non-agricultural economic activities. 
Similar to motor pumping, (mainly current and return) international migration 
households tend to invest more frequently in land purchase than other households (see table 
8.12). More than one quarter of all households involved in international migration have 
purchased agricultural land, compared to less than 10 percent of nonmigrant households. 
Again, there is hardly any difference between nonmigrant and internal migrant households ". 
On the whole, there are clearly less households investing in land purchase (16 percent) than m 
motor pumping (28 percent), but the strength of association is only slightly lower (see table 
8.12). Although the incidence of land purchase is limited, the amounts invested are generally 
larger than is the case for motor pumps, which explains why the average amount invested in 
land purchase (9,800 dirham) for all households is even somewhat larger than for motor 
pumps (8,200 dirham). 
Among the international migration households, retum-migrant households exhibit the 
highest propensity to invest, although current international migrants invest the same amounts 
21
 This is also the case in the village of Boutaghat (cf Benchenfa & El Ghanjou 2001). 
22
 The Bonfenom multiple companson of group means revealed significant differences between (1) nonmigrant 
and internal migrant households on the one hand, and (2) current and returned (but not indirect) international 
households on the other hand All other differences between group means are insignificant. 
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on average and tend to purchase larger areas. This might be an indication that the latter tend 
to invest more outside the traditional oasis. In contrast to motor pumps, indirect international 
migrant households tend to invest less in land purchase than other international migrant 
households. 
Figure 8.4. Temporal allocation of land purchase among surveyed households 
D Number of 
purchasing acts 
• Total surface 
purchased (ha) 
< 1975 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 
period 
Source: Household survey 
Table 8.12. Investments in land purchase by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
No 
91.4 
88.2 
78.4 
74.5 
70.8 
83.6 
Investments in land purchase in dirham 1975-1998 (%) 
within group of investors (* 
<50 
60.0 
80.0 
87.5 
46.2 
36.8 
56.6 
50-100 
33.3 
20.0 
0.0 
19.2 
26.3 
21.7 
>I00 
6.7 
0.0 
12.5 
34.6 
36.8 
21.7 
1000) 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 5%trim 
3,132 316 
2,697 704 
12,176 3,498 
21,912 11,983 
20,962 14,778 
9,773 3,153 
area (hectare) 
Mean 
0.165 
0.101 
0.468 
0.637 
0.406 
0.297 
Sum 
28.8 
12.7 
17.3 
63.7 
26.4 
148.9 
η 
174 
127 
37 
102 
65 
505 
Source: Household survey (C=0.282**; η=0.242**) 
Figure 8.5 shows that there is considerable inter-village variability in the extent to which 
households tend to purchase land. This tendency is clearly the highest in Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul. 
This might be related to the fact that traditional agriculture in this village has suffered heavily 
from water scarcity following the demise of khettara systems. Many villagers have therefore 
purchased land in the Middle Atlas, and around Aghbala in particular. As agriculture in Ait El 
Meskine used to be rather extensive due to their limited claim on river water, and plot sizes 
relatively large and groundwater abundantly available, many peasants chose to intensify and 
modernize production within the ancient oasis by purchasing motorpumps. Others purchased 
land in nearby extension zones, notably in the Middle Atlas (around Azaghar in particular) 
and the Ghallil Plain. 
In Zaouia and Tikoutar, intensification of land use and mechanization are virtually 
impossible due to fragmented land tenure and the fact that all arable land has already been 
cultivated. In the upper Todgha, peasants wishing to invest in agriculture are automatically 
forced to purchase land elsewhere. In the upper Todgha, there is a general preference to buy 
land in the Middle Atlas (notably in Aghbala, Azaghar, Boumia, and Khenifra), where land is 
relatively cheap and the climate more humid, allowing for cultivation of cereals without 
irrigation. Such distant land is generally exploited by ikhmmesen. In Ikhba and Tadafelt, only 
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Todgha are known for their high quality and are sold at relatively high prices Therefore, 
dates seem to be clearly "outperformed" by olives and, increasingly, almonds in terms of 
market value 
Moreover, date cultivation is labor-intensive compared to olives and almonds In order 
to obtain good yields, date palms require a relatively specialized and laborious maintenance, 
which necessitates physically climbing into the palm at least two to three times per year 
(pollinating, yielding, cutting away dead palm leaves) Specialists traditionally do this 
maintenance work, mostly haratin, whose remuneration amounts to ten dirham per ascent, 
plus a part of the annual production of the palm Many of the former ikhmmesen and laborers 
who did such work have migrated or are now unwilling to do such work Moreover, the 
younger generations generally lack the expertise of the older generation in this domain, and 
are increasingly difficult to find Consequently, this labor has become increasingly expensive 
It might be that this has more affected oases with high participation in international migration 
(such as the Todgha) than poorer and less migration-bound oases such as the Drâa and 
Tafilalt 
As m other Moroccan oases, a part of the date palms suffers from the bayoua 
disease In the oasis literature, the bayoud is often presented as the main cause of an alleged 
general decline of oasis agriculture, unrightfully so (cf De Haas 2001) Bayoud is a general 
problem affecting all Moroccan oases including the Drâa and Tafilalt However, bayoud, 
which seems not extremely frequent in the Todgha, cannot explain the decline of the date 
palm in companson with other Moroccan oases, where bayoud occurs as well 
In the Todgha, the date palm is in decline, and suffers from a relative lack of 
maintenance However, even if neglected, most date palms survive on ground water due to 
their extensive root system Most families use the dates for their own consumption and to feed 
their livestock Although some peasants plant improved date palms varieties in the 
agricultural extension zones, more preference is given to the cultivation of olives and, in 
particular, almonds According to official data, between 1980 and 1994, the share of date 
palms as a proportion of the total number of fruit trees in the Todgha decreased from 34 
percent to 28 3 percent (cf De Haas and El Ghanjou 2000a) 
In the lower Todgha, the almond tree has rapidly gained ground over the past few 
decades, mainly at the cost of the date palm The total proportion of almond trees amounts to 
29 percent of all fruit trees, and has shown a steep increase since the 1980s Almonds tend to 
occupy first place in the lower Todgha An important advantage of almond trees is that they 
do not require a highly specialized or laborious maintenance as is the case with dates 
Moreover, they have low water needs compared to olives or dates This makes it an ideal tree 
to combine with extensive motor pumping According to the peasants, three or four irrigations 
per year are already sufficient to guarantee a reasonable harvest What seems equally 
important is that the almonds produced in the Todgha are of a good quality and are traded at 
attractive prices 
Figures 8 12, 8 13, and 8 14 display the incidence of date palms, olive trees, and 
almond trees—Todgha's main tree crops—across household migration categories for each 
village The figures do not point to a clear association between migration and the fruit tree 
cropping patterns inter-household variations in cropping patterns cannot be explained by 
participation in either form of migration 
In summary, there is a clear spatial differentiation in cropping patterns, with alfalfa, 
olive, and other fruit trees dominating the upper Todgha villages of Zaouia and Tikoutar In 
32
 Bayoud is a date palm disease caused by the fungus Fusanum Oxysponum Albedims, leading to the gradual 
desiccation and death of the palm 
Migration and Agricultural Development Revisited 277 
It is furthermore striking that date palms are not numerous here, which is almost certainly 
related to the relatively cool climate in this elevated part of the valley. Dates need excessive 
heat to ripen, explaining their absence in most mountain oases (De Haas 2001). Indeed, 
cropping patterns in Zaou'i'a resemble those of mountain oases such as the Dadès (west of the 
Todgha) rather than the lower Todgha. Moving downstream, the variety in fruit trees 
gradually decreases, and trees like figs largely disappear. Moreover, there is a clear shift from 
olives—which reach their "optimum" level towards the middle parts of the valley such as in 
Tikoutar—to date palms in the lower Todgha. Again, this seems primarily related to climatic 
factors. Almonds prevail in the lower Todgha villages, except for Tadafelt, where date palms 
are equally prevalent. 
The olive tree is the dominant tree crop of the Todgha. According to official 
estimations, the total number of olive trees increased from 72,000 in 1979/80 to 99,000 in 
1996, representing 41.8 percent of all fruit trees under cultivation (De Haas and El Ghanjou 
2000a). In the 1980s, the local agricultural extension office (CMV) held a campaign to 
encourage peasants to plant olive trees. Olives are almost exclusively cultivated for oil 
production. The oil is obtained by using traditional olive presses which are found in almost 
every village, and which work with the use of animals (donkeys or mules). With this method, 
about 2.5 to 3 liters of olive-oil is extracted from one 'abra29 (13 kg) of olives. With the 
electrification of the majority of the villages, several electric presses have been established, 
but most people prefer the olive-oil produced by the traditional presses, as they are believed 
to produce a better quality of oil. The olive trees are hardly maintained and not pruned at all, 
and the trees are generally planted very densely. Especially in the "olive forests" of the upper 
Todgha, yields are low as a result of the light competition between the trees. 
The date palm has a prominent position in traditional oasis agriculture in the lower 
Todgha. Notwithstanding its general presence in the entire valley and its visual dominance 
(due to the height of their tops), the date palm is not the dominant fruit tree, and with a total 
estimated number of 67,000, it only occupies third place after olive and almond trees. 
Traditionally, dates play an important role as staple food and bad quality dates serve as 
animal fodder. Moreover, palm-leaves are used for basket-work and the trunks are used for 
construction of the traditional igherman habitat. In the Todgha, the main date variety is the 
Sa'fr30, and the principal improved varieties are Boufeggous, Oultouakdim, Hafssa, and 
Bouskri. 
Nevertheless, in the lower Todgha, almonds seem to be increasingly "outperforming" 
the date palm. The decline of the date palm in comparison with other crops (especially 
almonds), but also compared to other oasis regions, can partly be explained by the mediocre 
yields and the bad quality of dates. The quality of Todgha dates is relatively low, and cannot 
compete with the superior dates grown in the Tafilalt and Drâa31. Only the best dates are 
sometimes traded, and low quality dates are sold as fodder on the markets of Tinghir and 
Taghzout. Local consumers who can afford it prefer to buy dates from these regions or 
imported dates from Algeria or Tunisia. In contrast, both olive oil and almonds from the 
The 'abra is a local volume measure One 'abra of olives is the equivalent of approximately 13 kg 
0
 Sa'fr comprises all date palms grown from seeds, hence heterogeneous, and is therefore no genuine variety All 
improved date palm varieties are multiplicated by cloning 
31
 The reasons for the low quality are not entirely clear The bad quality and low yields of the Todgha dates are 
partly related to bad maintenance, but a number of bio-physical factors might play a role too, in particular the 
specific climatic conditions in the Todgha. Compared to genuine lowland date palm oases such as the Drâa and 
Tafilalt, the climate of the Todgha, which is located at an altitude of between 1100 and 1420 meters, is relatively 
cold and humid. The frequent night-frost in winter and the early autumn rains tend to be factors that also 
negatively influence date yields In fact, the upper Todgha is located on the very climatic boundary of the date 
production zone 
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downstream parts of the valley. The variety of fruit trees is relatively high in the upper 
Todgha villages of Zaouia and Tikoutar, with olives and almonds dominating. The variety is 
particularly high in Zaouia. Only in this uppermost part of the valley do we find relatively 
large numbers of fig and pomegranate trees. 
Figure 8.9. Incidence of alfalfa by village and household migration category 
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Figure 8.10. Incidence of wheat and harley by village and household migration category 
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Source: Household survey 
Figure 8.11. Prevalence of tree crops by village 
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in particular, Ikhba. In Ghallil η'Alt Isfoul, again, the areas covered by wheat and barley are 
very limited, reflecting the general water crisis in this village. 
Based on written sources (cf. Beaurpère 1931) and according to all informants, wheat 
and barley also used to be prevalent in the upper Todgha, and has gradually disappeared from 
this part of the valley in the past few decades. This development is possibly related to the 
increased importance of animal husbandry, in particular of cattle (see section 8.5), which has 
increased the need for high-quality fodder. Combined with the advent of imported grain on 
local markets and the subsequent drop in grain prices, this has probably increased the 
comparative advantages of cultivating alfalfa as compared to cereals in this water-abundant 
part of the valley. 
In most of the lower Todgha and recent extensions, however, the costs of cultivating 
alfalfa are higher. Moreover, moving downstream, plots become larger. This sometimes even 
allows mechanized ploughing, as is the case in Aft El Meskine and the Ghallil. Therefore, 
compared to the upper Todgha, more economies of scale are possible in this part of the valley. 
Finally, plots tend to be more open and less shaded in the lower Todgha. The combination of 
land tenure structure and seasonal patterns of water availability explain why the comparative 
advantages of cultivating wheat and barley are higher in comparison to alfalfa. 
Maize is the second most important fodder crop in the Todgha. It is a water 
demanding crop that is cultivated during summer Maize is particularly prevalent in Tikoutar, 
where it covers 16 percent of the total cultivated area. Maize covers smaller areas in Ait El 
Meskine (9 percent) and Zaou'ia (5 percent), and is virtually absent in other villages. As was 
the case with alfalfa, maize mainly occurs in locations where (river or pumped) water is 
relatively abundant. 
Besides alfalfa, wheat, barley, and maize, a large variety of vegetables are grown. The 
prevailing vegetables are (in decreasing order of importance): Breadbeans, carrots, onions, 
cabbage2 , rapes (left), tomatoes, potatoes, green peas and green beans. In the lower Todgha 
villages and the Ghallil, some peasants have recently introduced (cash) crops such as 
watermelons and courgettes. Mint, which is used to prepare Moroccan green tea, is grown on 
small plots. 
There is also a clear geographical differentiation in cropping patterns for vegetables 
(see figure 8.8). Vegetables are particularly prevalent in Tikoutar and Aft El Meskine, where 
they cover 21 and 24 percent of all cultivated land. In other villages, this proportion is one 
tenth or less. Vegetables are generally cultivated on small plots or within urtan, often within 
family compounds. Although vegetables cover rather limited areas, they constitute crucial 
elements in subsistence production. Some vegetables, such as breadbeans, are intercropped 
with alfalfa. Cabbage is generally grown in association with other crops such as alfalfa and is 
planted on the edges separating the iguemunn (flood basins). 
Cropping patterns differ little between the household migration categories. Figures 8.9 
and 8.10 reveal no clear relationship between migration and the relative areas covered by 
alfalfa and cereals. The same applies to most vegetables. Furthermore, the figures clearly 
show that there is a clear upstream-downstream gradient in cropping patterns, with alfalfa 
dominating in the upper valley and grains in the lower valley. 
8.4.2. Date palms and fruit trees 
Figure 8.11 reveals a clear geographical differentiation in the prevalence of date palms and 
fruit trees (i.e., the first and second vegetation layers) between the more upstream and 
The only cabbage grown is the local zegzaw vanety used in couscous. 
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wheat in past decades (De Haas and El Ghanjou 2000a) . Alfalfa is a semi-perennial crop, 
which is cultivated 3 to 4 years before alternating it with an annual crop. In order to obtain a 
good harvest, alfalfa needs relatively large amounts of water almost all year round. Therefore, 
the water-abundant upstream parts of the valley are particularly suitable for alfalfa 
cultivation. In the lower Todgha, the surfaces occupied by alfalfa are relatively smaller, as 
irrigation water is generally scarcer here, especially in the summer, which makes it more 
costly to irrigate all year round. 
In general, the prevalence of alfalfa seems strongly related to the availability of 
"natural" surface water during summer. Whereas alfalfa covers 80 and 60 percent of all 
cultivated agricultural land in Zaouia and Tikoutar, respectively, it is one third or less in the 
lower Todgha villages. Interestingly, Tadafelt scores relatively high, which reflects the 
availability of perennial and relatively abundant khettara water sources in this village. The 
water-scarce villages of Ikhba and Ghallil n'Aït Isfoul only have very limited surfaces 
covered by alfalfa. The relatively high prevalence of alfalfa in Ait El Meskine—especially 
among international migrant households—compared to nearby Ikhba can be probably 
explained by the high prevalence of pumps in this migration village/jcrr excellence. 
Figure 8.8. Incidence of alfalfa and annual crops by village 
Zaouia Tikoutar Ail El Meskine Ikhba Tadafelt Ghallil n'Ait 
Isfoul 
Source: Household survey 
Whereas there is a negative upstream-downstream gradient for alfalfa, there is an opposite, 
positive gradient for wheat and barley cultivation. This can principally be explained by the 
fact that water is much scarcer in this part of the valley. Although pumping has enabled 
irrigation all-year-round, the high évapotranspiration in the hot and dry summers causes 
extremely high water losses. In the lower Todgha, consequently, leaving land fallow is 
common practice in the hot and dry summer season, and irrigation is then mostly limited to 
tree crops. Since wheat and barley are grown as winter crops, they are better adapted to the 
conditions prevailing in the downstream part of the valley. Whereas these crops are virtually 
absent in Zaouia and Tikoutar27, they dominate agriculture in Ait El Meskine, Tadafelt, and. 
Alfalfa is one of the most nutritious crops grown for fodder. Alfalfa has the extra advantage of its nitrogen-
binding soil-enriching capacities. The effect of alfalfa on irrigated land is to increase the value per hectare of 
subsequent crops. Crop associations with alfalfa were therefore vital in order to maintain the fertility and 
viability of the traditional oasis system. It is also an excellent honey crop for bees (several oasis peasants possess 
beehives) and is used to prepare the local dish ifnuzen, a kind oi couscous. 
27
 It should be noted, however, that several upper Todgha households cultivate wheat on land bought in the 
Middle Atlas and elsewhere. 
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play a role. Even more land is bought outside the Todgha, notably in the Middle Atlas region, 
where Todghawis have invested in extensive cereal cropping. 
Thanks to the advent of motor pumping, the former desert plains of the lower Todgha 
and Ghallil are now being increasingly put into cultivation, whereas agriculture in the water 
abundant and lush upper Todgha is—paradoxically—stagnant due to high land scarcity. 
Installing a motor pump, digging a well, and purchasing land obviously all involve the 
financial risks many nonmigrant households cannot afford. An important explanatory factor 
seems to be that the incomes of international migrants are not only much higher, but also far 
more stable and secure. After all, international migrant households have direct access to 
European labor markets and social security systems. 
Despite the management crisis suffered by the traditional khettara system, there has 
been no large-scale withdrawal from the land due to water shortages. Migrant remittances 
have enabled many peasants of the lower Todgha to make the transformation to motor 
pumping and even to significantly extend the irrigated agricultural surface of the Todgha. 
Although it is certainly not uniquely migrants who are investing in pumps and land 
purchase, international migrant households clearly exhibit a higher propensity to invest and 
have played an initiating and accelerating role in such developments. This refutes pessimistic-
structuralist theories on migration and development and in particular cumulative causation 
theory, which hypothesize that the negative "backwash" effects of migration tend to 
undermine local economies and lead to the retreat of migrant households from local economic 
activities. The results of the data analysis rather confirm the premises of the new economics 
of labor migration theory that migration is, instead, a strategy to overcome local capital 
constraints on production. Nevertheless, the analysis also showed that the developmental 
impact of migration takes decades to fully materialize. 
8.4. Cropping patterns, agricultural labor, and cultivation methods23 
8.4.1. Alfalfa and annual crops 
Many of today's agricultural practices still follow traditional patterns: they are highly labor-
intensive, have low levels of mechanization, use traditional irrigation methods (i.e., flood 
basin irrigation), and, except for the Ghallil plain, involve a generally reduced scale of 
agricultural production. Extremely small plot sizes, fragmented land tenure, and the 
inherently collective nature of resource management in the traditional oasis partially explain 
the low tendency towards agricultural change in the traditional oasis, especially in the upper 
Todgha. However, the apparently stagnant character of agriculture here does conceal some 
important changes in cropping patterns. Increasing market integration, migration, the 
increased importance of non-agricultural income, and the increasing relevance of comparative 
advantages have led to a decreasing diversification in cropping patterns and the specialization 
in certain crops. 
Figure 8.8 shows the geographical distribution of the most important annual crops in 
the Todgha, which together occupy the "third layer" of traditional oasis agriculture. Alfalfa 
and cereals are clearly the dominant crops. Alfalfa is the main fodder crop grown in the 
Todgha, and it is particularly prevalent in the upper Todgha, where it has largely replaced 
General observations on valley-wide cropping patterns are based on De Haas and El Ghanjou (1998; 2000a) 
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the surrounding plains. In their eyes, settling in the Ghallil and becoming a "true" farmer is a 
big advance, whereas the Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim, just like most Ait Todoght, have set 
themselves higher targets in life than, as they tend to put it, to "plough through the sand". 
In contrast to the Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim of the Todgha, the inhabitants of El Hart 
n'lgurramen tend to have fewer objections to becoming a farmer than the Ait Aïssa Ou 
Brahim, and several haratin families have actually settled in the Ghallil. Other settlers are Ait 
Todoght from the upper Todgha. This explains the ethnically diverse nature of the Ghallil 
population. 
Sources of investment capital are diverse too. Several Ait 'Atta from the Saghro have 
sold their land in their native villages in order to buy land in the Ghallil. Others rely on 
remittances or other sources of income. Only 28 percent of all the surveyed households in the 
Ghallil have been directly or indirectly involved in international migration. This points to the 
important fact that international migrants are not the only ones investing in agriculture. If we 
look at the years in which households settled (see figure 8.7), however, it is striking to see 
that among the households who settled before 1985, about half were involved in international 
migration. In subsequent years, the number of international migrants as a percentage of all 
settlers' households gradually declined. 
Figures 8.6. and 8.7. Year of installation in the Ghallil plain and international migration 
• International 
migrant 
Π Non-migrant 
<1980 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-1 
period 
Source: Ghallil survey by De Haas and El Ghanjou (2000b) 
Apparently, in the early settlement years, international migrant households played a certain 
pioneering role. There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, back in the 
1970s and 1980s, it was particularly international migrants who had enough financial 
resources to make the considerable investments and take the risks involved in starting a new 
agricultural enterprise. Second, it might be related to more entrepreneurial attitudes among 
international migrants, although the latter hypothesis is notoriously difficult to prove. 
8.3.6. Conclusion 
Households with access to international migration resources have a higher propensity to 
invest in land purchase than nonmigrant and internal migrant households. This is more than 
only an income effect, as the association is partly maintained even when controlling for 
income. There is a strong spatial differentiation in the allocation of landed investments. In the 
main, international returned migrant households tend to buy small plots in the oasis. Most 
other households, however, prefer to invest and buy land outside the traditional oasis, where 
the obstacles associated with collective water management and fragmented land tenure do not 
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8.3.5. The pioneering role of migrants: The case of the Ghallil settlers 
Although international migrant households exhibit a higher propensity to invest in agriculture, 
there is also a sizable category consisting of nonmigrant and internal migrant households that 
purchase land and install motor pumps. The colonization of the Ghallil plain allows us to 
further investigate the specific role of migrants and nonmigrants in recent agricultural 
transformation. The land of this alluvial desert plain has been divided among the inhabitants 
of El Hart n'Igurramen (officially known as El Hart Mourabitine) and the three Ait 'Atta 
villages of the Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim fraction (Tloult, Boutaghat, Ighrem Aqdim)24 in the 
1970s (De Haas and El Ghanjou 2000b). 
Since 1975, people have started colonizing this agricultural plain. As the distances to 
the villages of origin are rather big, this has normally implied the transfer of the entire 
household to the Ghallil plain. Instead of the concentrated, fortress-like ighrem habitat that is 
characteristic of traditional oases, houses are constructed directly on the farmland, and are 
therefore located in a dispersed manner over the entire plain. Figure 8.6 shows that 
colonization only gained real momentum in the early 1980s, stagnated in the late 1980s— 
according to the peasants due to a drought which lowered water tables—and then gained new 
momentum in the 1990s. In 2000, an estimated number of 270 households comprising 2020 
people lived in the Ghallil. This new and heterogeneous community of settlers has started to 
develop their own infrastructure of mosques, schools, and so on. 
The mean farm size is 7.8 hectares. Although not all land is always irrigated and 
cultivated, this indicates that the scale of farming is radically different from that in the ancient 
oasis. Most peasants use tractors to plough their land, although traditional irrigation 
techniques (i.e., flood basin irrigation) have remained, with the exception of a single peasant 
using trickle irrigation. The most important crops are wheat, almonds, and various vegetables. 
Although the inhabitants of Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim and El Hart n'Igurramen acquired 
the land for free, only a minority of households have actually cultivated their landed property 
in the Ghallil plain. First, many households lack the resources to dig a well, install a 
motorpump, and build a new house. Second, the risks of failure are rather high. When 
choosing the location of new wells, people rely on dowsers, and are not assisted by the local 
agricultural extension service. In several places, insufficient or no groundwater at all has been 
found. Third, living conditions in the Ghallil are rather harsh. The isolation, the long distances 
to Tinghir, the lack of public infrastructure, and the hot sandstorms make it a rather 
inhospitable environment to live in. Fourth, settling in the Ghallil implies the clear choice of a 
farmer's life, which is difficult to combine with other local economic activities. 
Especially the Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim—who seem the most wealthy group of A'it 'Atta 
in the Todgha due to their early and intensive participation in international migration— 
generally despise the idea of having to move from their villages and become full-time 
farmers. The inability or reluctance to invest explains why many landowners have sold their 
land to settlers from other areas. The majority of these immigrant settlers are Aft 'Atta from 
isolated villages in the Saghro Mountains north of the Ghallil plain. By settling in the Ghallil, 
they are, in fact, perpetuating the age-old descent of the Ait 'Atta from their native Saghro to 
23
 The data presented in section 8.3.5 are based on De Haas and El Ghanjou (2000b) 
24
 This unusual, ethnically mixed land partition pattern can be explained by the former protection agreements 
(ra'aya) between El Hart and different fractions of the Ait 'Atta. The last protectors of El Hart n'Igurramen 
were the Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim In exchange for protection against attacks by other Ait 'Attafracliom, the Ail 
Aissa Ou Brahim could settle in an area immediately north of El Hart n'Igurramen. During the French 
protectorate, both groups claimed the eastern Ghallil plain This eventually led to a partition pattern in which 
both villages acquired half of the territory (De Haas and El Ghanjou 2000b). 
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been bought by the surveyed households since 1975, including 122 hectares outside the 
traditional oasis. Of these 122 hectares, 97 hectares are located outside the Todgha, with an 
emphasis on the Middle Atlas. This implies that two thirds of the total of 181 hectares of 
farmland possessed by the surveyed households outside the traditional oasis, has been bought 
since 1975, predominantly by households involved in international migration. 
Table 8.14 reveals a clear association between migration stage and the incidence and 
amount of money invested in land purchase. As is the case with investments in pumping, the 
impact of migration on land investments is clearly of a "lagged" nature, further corroborating 
the hypothesis that the full impact of migration takes decades to materialize. 
Table 8.14. International migrant households' investments in land by length of stay abroad 
Length ι 
abroad 
1-14 
15-28 
>29 
of stay 
No 
91.2 
73 7 
52 8 
Investments in land purchase in dirham 1975-
within group of investors 
<10,000 10,000-39,999 
80.0 20 0 
53 3 20 0 
28.0 24 0 
> 40,000 
0.0 
26.7 
48.0 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
1998(%) 
Mean 
2,254 
19,018 
45,377 
5%tnm 
307 
8,982 
39,025 
η 
57 
57 
53 
Total 73J 4^2 222 35.6 100 0 21,662 15,556 167 
Source: Household survey (η=0.333**; r=0.318**) 
Table 8.15 examines whether the fact that indirect, current, and international migrant 
households invest more in land purchase is merely an income (i.e., remittance) effect. 
Although within the lowest income category the correlation between international migration 
participation in investments indeed vanishes, international migrant households still tend to 
invest significantly more than nonmigrants in the middle and higher income categories. 
Whereas the percentage of nonmigrant or internal migrant households investing in land 
purchase increases only slightly when incomes rises, this increase is larger among 
international migrant households. This means that the "migration effect" cannot be attributed 
to income effects only. This is possibly related to the same factors of income stability, income 
security and the relatively entrepreneurial attitudes of international migrants, which were 
already mentioned for motor pumping. 
Table 8.1S. Investments in land by international migration participation, by household income 
Total 
household 
income 
0-1699 
1700-3749 
>3750 
Migration _ 
status 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Investments in land purchase in dirham 1975-1998 
within group 
No 
92 9 
96.0 
93.3 
84 2 
71 3 
77 6 
88 1 
72.2 
77.3 
< 50,000 
917 
100.0 
92.3 
75 0 
60 9 
65 7 
20.0 
40.0 
36.7 
of investors 
50,000-
100,000 
8.3 
0.0 
7.7 
167 
21.7 
20.0 
80.0 
16.0 
26.7 
> 100,000 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
8.3 
17.4 
14.3 
0.0 
44.0 
36 7 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
(%) 
Mean 
1,411 
300 
1,268 
4,263 
15,706 
10,131 
6,429 
27,178 
20,576 
Mean 
surface 
0 075 
0 080 
0.076 
0.249 
0515 
0 385 
0 237 
0 550 
0.448 
η 
169 
25 
194 
76 
80 
156 
42 
90 
132 
Source: Household survey (γ: 0-1699=-0.296,; 1700-3749=0.362*;2 3750=0.459*) 
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a few households have invested in land. In Tadafelt, this seems to be the combined result of 
poverty and the presence of new agricultural extensions next to the ancient oasis—where land 
does not have to be bought but is allocated "for free" to households—that can partly be 
irrigated with khettara water. 
Figure 8.5. Percentage of households that purchased land by household migration category and village 
(1975-1998) 
Zaouta Tikoutar Art El Ikhba Tadafelt Ghallil All 
Meskine n'Ai 
Isfoul 
Source: Household survey (C village*land purchase=0.251**) 
Table 8.13 reveals that the majority of international return migrant households tend to buy the 
relatively small plots in the traditional oasis. This is possibly related to the fact that return 
migrants are relatively aged, and, hence, more oriented towards "traditional" oasis agriculture 
than younger migrants. Moreover, there is a category of "hobby farmers" among the retired 
migrants, who take great pleasure and satisfaction in cultivating their oasis gardens. To a 
certain extent, we might indeed call this "sentimental" (Bencherifa 1991) or "ritual" (De Mas 
1990) agriculture, which can primarily be explained by the strong emotional attachment many 
elderly oasis dwellers feel to oasis agriculture. For many return migrants, it symbolizes a 
return to their "roots". However, for most other investors, economic motives play a more 
crucial role. 
Table 8.13. Location of purchased land by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
Total surface (ha) 
location of purchased 
Traditional 
oasis 
27.8 
37.5 
27.3 
45.5 
63.0 
41.2 
27.3 
Recent 
extensions 
5.6 
18.8 
0.0 
9,1 
0.0 
7.1 
6.5 
land 1975-
Ghallil 
11.1 
6.3 
0.0 
9.1 
3.7 
8.2 
18.0 
1998 (% of purchasing acts) 
Outside 
Todgha 
55.6 
37.5 
72.7 
36.4 
33.3 
43.5 
9" / 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
148.9 
η 
18 
16 
II 
33 
27 
85 
Source: Household survey 
Nonmigrants and indirect international migrant households in particular tend to buy large 
plots outside the traditional oasis. On the whole, most land is bought outside the traditional 
oasis. While 41 percent of the purchases are made in the traditional oasis, these represent only 
18 percent (27 hectares) of the total area that has been purchased. In total, 149 hectares have 
• nonmigrant 
U internal migrant 
• indirect international migrant 
D international migrant 
S returned international migrant 
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the lower Todgha villages of Ait El Meskine and Tadafelt, cereals are the dominant annual 
crops, and almonds and date palms are the dominant first and second layer crops. This spatial 
differentiation in cropping patterns should primarily be explained by the diverging local water 
and land availability and—to explain the relatively low numbers of date palms in the upper 
Todgha—climatic factors. 
Figure 8.12. Incidence of date palms by village and household migration category 
• nonrngrant 
H internal 
• indirect international 
O international 
S returned international 
Source: Household survey 
Figure 8.13. Incidence of olive trees by village and household migration category 
Ghallil 
n'Ait bfoul 
• nonmigrant 
u internal 
m indirect international 
D international 
Ξ returned international 
Source: Household survey 
Figure 8.14. Incidence of almond trees by village and household migration category 
Zaouia Tikoutar Ait Β 
Meskine 
• nonmrgrant 
U internal 
• indirect international 
D international 
s returned international 
Source: Household survey 
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In the upper part of the Todgha valley, water is abundant all-year-round but land is 
scarce. Moreover, extremely fragmented land tenure patterns hinder any form of 
mechanization. Alfalfa is the dominant crop in this part of the valley, since water is cheaply33 
and relatively abundantly available. The low costs of production give distinct advantages to 
the cultivation of alfalfa as compared to other crops. Moreover, as we will see, this coincides 
with the growing importance of livestock in the valley. 
Going downstream, water becomes increasingly scarce whereas land becomes 
relatively abundant. Here, water scarcity is partially tackled by motor pumping, allowing 
"vertical" intensification in the ancient oasis or "horizontal" intensification through the 
creation of new extensions. Nevertheless, water losses due to évapotranspiration are high in 
summer, rendering all-year-round cultivation of alfalfa rather costly if water has to be 
pumped. This explains the focus on winter crops such as wheat and barley. Moreover, in the 
lower Todgha, plots are often large enough to allow a certain degree of mechanization. 
Moreover, in this zone almonds are tending to become the dominant tree crop at the expense 
of dates. 
Differences in water availability explain why the fields of the upper Todgha are 
cultivated all year round, and that in the lower Todgha many fields lie fallow in the summer 
half year. In general, fodder crops—mostly alfalfa, but also maize—have increased in 
importance at the cost of cereals, which reflect the increased importance of animal husbandry. 
In the lower Todgha oases, however, subsistence production of cereals is still important. 
In conclusion, the differentiation in cropping patterns is primarily explained by spatial 
variation in climate, land tenure patterns, plot size, and relative water scarcity, and not by 
migration participation. The changes in cropping patterns that have occurred over the past 
decades rather seem to be the result of more general changes, in particular the integration of 
the Todgha into internal and international markets for agricultural products, the introduction 
of motor pumps, and increasing labor costs. Although there are little inter-household 
differences in cropping patterns, table 8.16 shows, however, that international migrant 
households tend to grow a somewhat larger variety of annual crops. Returned migrants, in 
particular, tend to grow a larger variety of vegetables. This seems to corroborate the 
hypothesis that the more aged return migrants cling more to traditional forms of oasis 
agriculture (see section 8.3.4). 
8.4.3. Migration and fallow land 
In the migration and development literature, it has often been hypothesized that migration 
leads to a retreat from agriculture due to the "lost labor effect", which manifests itself in the 
large amount of agricultural land that is left fallow by migrant households. In particular, 
cumulative causation theory presents this "lost labor effect" as one of the main reasons for its 
negative evaluation of the impact of migration on development in migrant sending areas (see 
chapter 2). Table 8.16 indicates that there is no clear association between migration and 
fallow land among the surveyed households. The incidence of fallow land 34 is highest among 
nonmigrants: 15 percent of the landowning nonmigrant households have not cultivated annual 
crops during the last year. With 8 percent of the households not cultivating any annual crops, 
the incidence of fallow land among current (internal and international) migrant households is 
The only "cosls" of obtaining water are the villagers' contributions to the maintenance of the irrigation 
system 
Such fallow land is seldom totally so, since date palms and fruit trees remain on the land. In an oasis context, 
therefore, fallow land is then best defined as that land where there is an absence of annual crops 
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only marginally higher than among indirect international migrant households. It is the lowest 
among international returnees. This seems to contradict the "lost labor" hypothesis. 
Although migration-related abandonment of land sometimes occurs among 
international migrant households, it is generally a limited phenomenon, typically occurring in 
the first years after migration. In general, "stay-behinds" (women in particular) continue 
agriculture. In case of family reunification at the migration destination, most households 
entrust their land to family members (who often form indirect migrant households) or, in 
some cases, ikhmmesen, who continue cultivating the land. 
The incidence of fallow land is highest in Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul—where agriculture 
suffers from acute water shortages—and, to a lesser extent, Ait El Meskine. Since agriculture 
in these two villages entirely depends on pumps, agriculture is relatively capital-intensive 
compared to other villages, where water from natural sources or khettaras is available. This 
also means that water resources are more difficult to access for households lacking sufficient 
means to install pumps. Consequently, the poorest sections of the local population, mostly 
nonmigrant or internal migrant households, are forced to retreat partly or entirely from 
agriculture. A first sign of such de-intensification is the abandonment of annual crops. In Ait 
El Meskine, 18 percent of nonmigrants and 22 percent of internal migrant households do not 
grow annual crops. In Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, these percentages are 91 and 71 percent, 
respectively. 
Therefore, poverty rather than migration seems to be the prime factor forcing (internal 
migrant and nonmigrant) households out of agriculture in villages where water is nowadays 
only accessible through pumping. 
Table 8.16. Number of annual crops by household migration status 
Household migration 
status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
Number of annual 
0 
14.7 
8.0 
63 
79 
32 
9.2 
1-3 
419 
41.0 
37.5 
37.1 
25.4 
37.8 
crops grown 
4-7 
32.6 
43.0 
40.6 
43 8 
47 6 
40.4 
last year 
>8 
109 
8.0 
15.6 
11 2 
23.8 
12 6 
(landowning households) 
Total Mean 
100 0 3.47 
100.0 3.78 
100.0 4.53 
100.0 4.24 
100.0 5.22 
100.0 4.06 
η 
129 
100 
32 
89 
63 
413 
Source: Household survey (η=0.265**; C=0.228*) 
8.4.4. Agricultural equipment and other capital inputs 
Among all the surveyed households, only six (1.2 percent) have purchased a tractor and a 
similar number of households have purchased other heavy agricultural equipment, notably 
threshers. Out of these twelve investors, nine belonged to households involved in 
international migration. Most owners of agricultural equipment gain an additional income 
from renting this equipment to other households, who also use it for threshing cereals— 
traditional threshing methods using animal traction are now rarely used—and for ploughing 
their land35. 
In the upper Todgha villages such as Zaoui'a and Tikoutar, agriculture is hardly 
mechanized. This is due to the extremely small plot sizes and their inaccessibility to 
machines. Moreover, it is impossible to intensify or extend agriculture outside the traditional 
oasis, as all suitable farmland in the narrow upper Todgha has already been intensively used. 
3 5
 The same applies to owners of pumps, who often sell water to other peasants. 
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People wishing to invest heavily in agriculture do so at more distant locations. The only 
peasants using tractors there do so on land they possess outside the Todgha. 
In the lower Todgha, agriculture is generally more mechanized than in the upper 
valley due to the prevalence of motor pumps and the larger plot sizes, which allow for 
mechanical ploughing. Agriculture in Ait El Meskine is more mechanized than in all the other 
research villages. Besides the fact that most households posses a motor pump, the use (either 
through possession or rental) of tractors and other "modem" agricultural equipment is 
common practice in Ait El Meskine. Here, 80 percent of peasants use tractors to plough at 
least part of their fields. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that this mechanization is only 
partial: sowing and harvesting is done manually only with a few exceptions. 
Figure 8.15 clearly reveals an association between participation in international 
migration and the use of agricultural machinery. Furthermore, it is striking that indirect 
international migrant households score highest on the use of both tractors and threshing-
machines. Concerning the use of agricultural inputs like fertilizers—in addition to manure— 
and pesticides (differentiating between herbicides, fungicides, and insecticides), we can 
equally observe their higher use among international migrants. Internal migrant households 
generally score slightly lower than nonmigrant households on most of the mentioned items, 
with the exception of the use of tractors and fertilizers. 
Figure 8.15. Use of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides by household migration status 
Tractor Tresher Fertilizer Herbicides Fungicides Insecticides 
Source: Household survey 
If we look at the tendency to purchase HYV seeds and young date palm offshoots and other 
fruit trees (see figure 8.16), we also see that international migration households tend to score 
far higher than nonmigrant and internal migrant households. Thus, the use of agricultural 
capital inputs seems positively related to international migration participation. In general, 
indirect migrant households tend to score highest. 
In order to shed more light on the geographical differentiation in the use of 
agricultural inputs, figure 8.17 analyses the association between migration participation and 
the use of fertilizers within the research villages. The data illustrate how both general 
geographical and household-specific migratory factors influence agricultural practices. The 
use of fertilizers is limited in the upper Todgha villages of Zaoui'a and Tikoutar, even among 
international migrants, reflecting the largely traditional, small-scale, labor-intensive, and 
capital-extensive character of agriculture in that part of the valley. In the lower Todgha 
villages, the use of fertilizer is clearly more common. It is clearly the highest in Ait El 
Meskine, where—even among nonmigrant and internal migrant households—the majority use 
fertilizers. 
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Figure 8.16. Incidence of purchase HYV seeds and fruit trees by household migration status 
60 
HYV w heat HYV alfalfa Olive trees Date palms Almond trees 
Source: Household survey 
• nonrrigrant 
g internal migrant 
S indirect international 
D international 
Ξ returned international 
Figure 8.17. Use of fertilizers by household migration status and village 
Tlkoutar A* Β 
Mestóne 
• nonrrigrant 
Η internal migrant 
Β indirect international 
Π international 
Ξ returned international 
Source: Household survey 
Thus, although cropping patterns only show little differentiation in relation to household 
migration category, the agricultural practices of households involved in international 
migration tend be more capital-intensive. If we consider the incidence of diverse agricultural 
capital inputs, households involved in international migration score significantly higher (often 
double or more) on almost all categories compared to nonmigrant households. 
Table 8.17 shows that only 19 and 18 percent of indirect and current international 
migration households, respectively, have not purchased one of these inputs over the last year, 
compared to 53 and 45 percent among nonmigrant and internal migrant households, 
respectively. Among international return migrants, this percentage is 36 percent, 
corroborating the hypothesis that this group is more inclined towards traditional oasis 
agriculture. 
When we control for income levels (see table 8.18), however, we see that there is no 
significant "above-income effect", except for the highest income category. If we look at the 
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mean invested sums among investors, we see that, when controlling for income, differences 
largely vanish and that nonmigrant households even score slightly higher. This is largely due 
to the inclusion of international returnees, which have a lower tendency to invest in capital 
inputs within the group of international migrant households. Current and indirect migrant 
households play relatively important roles in "innovative" agricultural development This 
indicated that it would be erroneous to study only households of international returnees, as 
migration impact studies tend to do. 
Table 8.17. Agricultural capital inputs by household migration status 
Household migration 
status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
Yearly capital input (fertilizer, pesticides 
0 <200 200-3999 
52 3 20 1 
45 2 17 5 
189 216 
18 0 22 0 
35.9 18 8 
39 1 19 8 
15.5 
21.4 
27.0 
30.0 
25.0 
22.0 
>4000 
12.1 
159 
32 4 
30.0 
20.3 
192 
, seeds, tree seedlings) m dirham 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 5%tninmed 
1,618 
1,846 
2,520 
3,103 
2,217 
2,115 
781 
1,264 
2,183 
2,703 
1,270 
1,437 
η 
174 
126 
37 
100 
64 
501 
Source: Household survey ^=0.122·; C=0.292**) 
Table 8.18. Agricultural capital inputs by international migration participation, by household income 
Household Migration 
income status 
0-1699 Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
1700-3749 Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
> 3750 Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Yearly capital input (fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, 
0 <200 
50.9 48.2 
40 0 40.0 
49 5 46.9 
46.7 20.0 
26 3 39.0 
36 1 31.3 
42 9 25 0 
159 162 
24 6 18 4 
200-3999 
37 3 
46.7 
38 8 
40.0 
40.7 
40 4 
25.0 
31.1 
29 6 
>4000 
14.5 
133 
143 
40 0 
20.3 
28.3 
50 0 
52 7 
52 0 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
tree seedlings; ) m dirham 
Mean Mn investors 
942 
885 
935 
2,169 
1,704 
1,929 
3,891 
4,103 
4,034 
1,919 
1,475 
1,851 
4,067 
2,310 
3,020 
6,809 
4,879 
5,351 
η 
169 
25 
194 
75 
80 
155 
42 
88 
130 
Source: Household survey (γ 0-1699=0.187'; 1700-3749=0.130,; 2 3750=0.401**) 
Therefore, the conclusion is that, except for the highest income category, the effect of 
migration here is largely an income effect: it is the higher income of international migrant 
households that enables them to invest. International migrant households do not typically 
retreat from agriculture but rather shift to a more intensive type of agriculture in which 
increasing use is made of capital inputs, which they are able to do due to their relatively high 
incomes. With the exception of a small, relatively wealthy group, households without access 
to international migration resources are generally not able to make such investments. 
8.4.5. The demise of sharecropping and the rise of paid labor 
In the upper Todgha, the extremely small plot sizes make any form of mechanization 
impossible. From Tinghir downstream, in the lower Todgha, plots become gradually larger. 
This explains the increasing utilization of tractors, which are mainly used for ploughing. The 
use of tractors is most intensive in the new extensions and the Ghallil plain. Nevertheless, 
even in the extension zones, much of the land is still tilled manually. The only agricultural 
activity that has been almost completely mechanized is the threshing of cereals, which used to 
be done by animals on the villages' threshing places. Each spring, the few threshing machines 
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in the valley, which their owners hire to peasants on an hourly basis, process almost the entire 
grain harvest. 
Thus, besides the introduction of pumps and some machinery, agriculture has 
remained rather labor-intensive. In the literature, the absence of generally young, male, and 
able-bodied migrants is often mentioned as a cause of agricultural decline. However, evidence 
on cropping patterns and the incidence of fallow land seems to contradict that hypothesis for 
our case study. International migrant households seem to have a more intensive agricultural 
practice than nonmigrant and internal migrant households. 
The fundamental weakness of the "lost labor hypothesis" is its static nature, since it 
ignores that (1) other household members may take over agricultural tasks; (2) land can be 
entrusted to ikhmmesen; (3) the counterflow of remittances potentially enables households to 
hire paid laborers; and, last but not least, (4) agriculture can become more capital intensive 
(e.g., through the use of tractors, threshing machines, and pumps) through which similar or 
higher production levels can be achieved by using less labor. 
Figure 8.18 shows that such a substitution of lost family labor indeed occurs. There is 
a strong and significant association between participation in international migration and the 
employment of agricultural laborers (γ=0.436; significance = 0.000). Over half of 
international migrant households have hired agricultural laborers during the last year, 
compared to only one fifth among other households. Figure 8.18 also reveals a less strong but 
still significant association between participation in international migration and the incidence 
of sharecropping (γ=0.216; significance^.027). About one fifth of all international migrant 
households engage ikhmmesen, compared to less than 10 percent among other households. 
Thus, at first sight, "lost family labor" is partly or entirely replaced by non-family 
labor, either through engaging ikhmmesen or through hiring paid laborers. This conforms to 
evidence that wives of international migrants tend to hire laborers for certain, typically 
"male", agricultural tasks (see section 10.4). Wives of internal migrant households, who are 
equally affected by this "lost labor effect", are not able to do so because they lack the 
financial means. Figure 8.18 further confirms that internal migrant households, which hire 
laborers or engage ikhmmesen even less frequently than nonmigrant households, are not able 
to compensate for the lost labor effect. Therefore, the "substitution effect" only applies to 
international migrant households. As we will see in chapter 10, the most direct effect of this 
seems to be a considerable increase in the (agricultural) workload of the wives of internal 
migrants or even that certain agricultural tasks cannot be done anymore. 
Figure 8.18. The tendency to engage agricultural laborers and ikhmmesen by household migration status 
• nonmigrant 
a internal 
• indirect international 
G current international 
^ returned International 
Agricultural Sharecropper Respondent is 
labourer sharecropper 
Source: Household survey 
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However, it is remarkable that indirect and returned international migrant households, where 
there is no "lost labor", contract out work to the same degree as current migrant households It 
then becomes doubtful whether "lost labor" is a major cause of this phenomenon. It rather 
seems that access to international remittances enabled households to give up the agricultural 
duties that are generally considered as heavy, such as ploughing and maintenance of the 
irrigation infrastructure 
Younger, more educated, ambitious household members are generally not willing to 
work in agriculture anymore, an activity which they consider as inferior This growing 
disaffection vis-à-vis agricultural activities among young oasis dwellers seems to explain why 
they prefer to do other work or sometimes even remain unemployed rather than do 
agricultural work This is also a factor obliging households to engage hired laborers or 
ikhmmesen if they want to continue their agricultural activities36 
At first sight, this seems to corroborate the migration pessimists' hypothesis that 
migrants tend to retreat from traditional economic sectors However, disaffection vis-à-vis 
traditional agriculture seems a general development in the Todgha, which is certainly not 
limited to migrant households Moreover, the question is, however, whether this should be 
interpreted as a negative development per se Increasing media exposure, better education, 
and the exposure to the relative wealth of international migrants have all made people set 
higher personal development goals than ever before 
Their perception that their higher aspirations can never be fulfilled through local 
agriculture seems correct As we saw in section 8 3, even if agricultural production in the 
Todgha was sufficient to feed the entire population—which is not the case (cf Büchner 
1986)—people would simply no longer be content with such a basic livelihood From this 
perspective, it is a rational strategy, if people prefer to concentrate on migratory or non-
agncultural local activities, to contract out the most arduous agricultural activities This 
actually allows them even to intensify agriculture, whereas nonmigrant and internal migrant 
households are less able to do so Moreover, the tendency to contract out is to the profit of the 
laborers or ikhmmesen they hire This is one of the examples of how a part of the benefits of 
migrant remittances may accrue to households that are not involved in migration themselves 
The khammessat was the traditional form of sharecropping in which the owner 
supplies the land, the seeds, and the equipment to the akhemmes The akhemmes supplied his 
labor, for which he received one fifth of the yield The khammessat, which used to be the 
predominant mode by which landowners cultivated their fields, has clearly declined over the 
past decades. The number of people willing to work as akhemmes has diminished because of 
increased job opportunities outside the agricultural sector and of the perceived low social 
status of ikhmmesen Livelihood diversification in general and migration in particular has 
offered alternative and more remunerative sources of income for the former ikhmmesen 
Whereas in traditional oasis society, landless and smallholding peasants had no other choice 
to make ends meet than through entering into sharecropping engagements, their upward 
socio-economic mobility has now enabled them to withdraw from this activity 
The profession of akhemmes is generally considered as "dishonorable" and tends to be 
associated with poverty and patron-client relationships Youngsters universally despise the 
idea of being an akhemmes and the remaining ikhmmesen tend to be old This relative scarcity 
of agricultural labor implies that the remaining ikhmmesen have now been able to claim one 
third or even half of the harvest, up from one fifth in the past On average, ikhmmesen now 
receive 41 percent of the harvest (see table 8 19)37 
For return migrants, an additional argument to hire external labor is that they tend to be relatively aged 
However, it should be noted that contracts which included a higher (or smaller) share for the akhemmes also 
existed before 
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Absentee landowners generally prefer to entrust their land to close family members or 
to hire laborers rather than to enter into sharecropping arrangements. This may be because, in 
the absence of clear land title deeds and formal sharecropping contracts, conflicts between 
landowners and ikhmmesen are frequent. This can lead landowners to fear the property claims 
of long-term ikhmmesen working on their land. In the Todgha, paid labor is therefore 
increasingly replacing traditional sharecropping arrangements. 
Traditional forms of khammessat seem to be disappearing, and are increasingly being 
replaced by remunerated agricultural day labor. Laborers are hired on a day-to-day basis for 
specific agricultural tasks, such as ploughing and irrigating, and for "specialist" work, such as 
the digging of new wells, pollinating date palms, and the maintenance of irrigation channels. 
Agricultural laborers are mainly employed during peak seasons, such as for the olive, date 
(fall), and cereal (spring) harvests. 
Besides male workers, international migrants' wives often engage nonmigrant or 
internal migrant woman to cut alfalfa, to pick fruits and to fulfill diverse household tasks (see 
section 10.4). In the traditional oasis, permanently employed agricultural laborers hardly 
exist. Only in the extension zones and the Ghallil do several peasants employ laborers more 
or less permanently, although seldom on a contract basis. Women are generally paid less than 
men, with daily wages varying between 30 and 40 dirham for women 8, and between 40 and 
60 dirham for men. Laborers are often nourished and accommodated if transport to home is 
impossible. 
International migrant households generally prefer to employ nonmigrant community 
members. Besides the fact that they can trust them better, as they say, there is also social 
pressure on migrants to employ community members as an act of "solidarity". Not employing 
community members is criticized as selfish behavior, adding to the religious-moral criticism 
to which migrants are already exposed (see section 10.2). Most laborers come from poorer 
nonmigrant or internal migrant households from within the village. However, increasingly, 
such laborers come from poorer villages or even from outside the Todgha. Coming from 
regions such as Ifre, Taghbalt, Alnif, and the Drâa valley, they mainly settle in the lower 
Todgha, where investments in agricultural extensions have created extra demand for workers. 
Table 8.19. Employment of paid agricultural laborers and ikhmmesen by international migration 
participation, by household income 
Total 
household 
income 
0-1,699 
1,700-
3,749 
> 3,750 
Migration 
status 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
% of households 
Paid Mean daily Days/ 
laborer salary year 
16.7 
20 0 
17 1 
26 3 
56 3 
41 7 
39.5 
67 8 
58.6 
42 9 
49 0 
43 8 
38.0 
45 6 
43.2 
42.6 
448 
44.4 
1 6 
I 8 
1 6 
12.6 
130 
128 
8.6 
32.0 
24.5 
employing agricultural laborer 
Mean yearly 
expenses 
74 
88 
76 
325 
569 
450 
361 
1,358 
1,038 
• of akhemmes 
Share- Share to Respond is 
cropper sharecr (%) sharecropper 
5.9 
16.0 
7.2 
10.5 
163 
135 
16.3 
20.0 
188 
40 
43 
41 
41 
45 
43 
40 
39 
39 
0.6 
00 
05 
39 
0.0 
1 9 
2.3 
0.0 
0.8 
« 
168 
25 
193 
76 
80 
156 
43 
90 
133 
Source: Household survey (ymigration*laborer=0.436**; migration*sharecropper=0.216*. η: 
•nigration*salary=0.221I; migration*expenses=0.228<; migration*share to shareeropper=0.036*) 
Nonmigrant women often work "voluntarily" for international migrants' wives, and are paid in kind by their 
patrons, generally in the form of free meals and agricultural produce (see chapter 10). 
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Table 8.19 examines whether the fact that international migrant households tend to contract 
out certain agricultural tasks is only explained by their relative wealth. It clearly shows that 
the association between access to international migration resources (i.e., remittances) on the 
one hand and the employment of laborers is high within income categories, with the exception 
of the lowest income category. In the highest income category, for instance, 68 percent of 
international migrant households hire laborers, compared to 40 percent among nonmigrants, 
while the mean yearly expenses are four times higher among international migrants. This 
means that the higher income of international migrant households cannot explain their higher 
tendency to employ laborers. On the one hand, this might indeed be a compensation for the 
"lost labor effect" and the fact that most youngsters prefer to study or to work in non-
agricultural sectors. On the other hand, this might be related to the higher propensity of 
migrant households to invest in agriculture. Such investments create an extra demand for 
labor to dig wells, maintain the irrigation infrastructure, irrigate, and till the land. 
The data presented in this section suggest that international migration generally does 
not coincide with a retreat from agriculture, as is assumed by cumulative causation theory. 
The family members left behind continue to assume daily agricultural tasks. Moreover, their 
relatively high incomes enable international migrant households to hire agricultural laborers 
to carry out heavy or typically "male" tasks, or specialist work such as the digging of wells. 
However, most nonmigrant and internal migrant households are not able to do so, due to a 
lack of income required to hire such laborers. This creates an extra workload for "stay-
behinds", and women in particular, and might in certain cases indeed lead to de-
intensification of, or retreat from, agriculture. Again, the impact of different types of 
migration seem to be rather different, with the major border line running between households 
with and without access to international migration resources. 
Although international migration households tend to hire paid agricultural laborers 
more frequently, there are no signs of a major retreat of family labor from agriculture by 
international migrant households. As table 8.19 shows, households only tend to hire laborers 
for a limited number of days per year. Many nonmigrant men combine agricultural work with 
non-agricultural activities, typically construction work. Finally, it should be stressed that 
women form the main labor force of oasis agriculture. Women carry out the vast majority of 
the agricultural tasks (see chapter 10), and it is the widely undervalued female labor which 
has guaranteed the continued existence of oasis systems. 
8.5. Animal husbandry and the role of migration 
One of the main characteristics of animal husbandry in the Todgha is the small size of the 
herds. Table 8.20 shows that the average number of animals per surveyed household is 8. 
Animals are kept in stables located within the family compounds. Sheep represent about 60 
percent of the total livestock, goats 24 percent, and cattle 15 percent. Camels are extremely 
rare among the sedentary oasis population, and are mainly kept by (semi-) nomads. The 
composition of the herds seems to be changing. Between 1994 and 1999, the number of goats 
had decreased by 22 percent, whereas the number of cattle had increased by 17 percent. The 
number of sheep increased slightly, by only 5 percent. In the absence of horses, the donkey is 
the most common draft animal (owned by 18 percent of households), followed by the mule (8 
percent). Donkeys and mules play an important role as transport between the house and the 
sometimes remote plots, and from the village to the market, although their numbers seem to 
be declining due to the increased importance of motorized transport. 
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Table 8.20. Livestock numbers in all research villages (1994 and 1999) 
Animal 
Goats 
Sheep 
All cattle 
local race 
crossbreeds 
graded cattle 
Tolal 
1994 
η 
1,261 
2,325 
539 
471 
16 
52 
4,125 
% 
30.6 
56.4 
13 1 
114 
04 
13 
100 
1999 
η 
976 
2,445 
631 
543 
30 
58 
4,052 
% 
24 1 
60 3 
156 
13 4 
07 
14 
100 
Trend 1994-1999 
-22 6 
+ 52 
+ 17.1 
+ 15.3 
+ 875 
+ 115 
- 1 8 
Per household 
1.9 
48 
1 2 
11 
0.1 
0.1 
7.9 
Source: Household survey 
In the literature on Moroccan oasis agriculture, it has been hypothesized that there is an 
association between migration and the prevalence of alfalfa and animal husbandry (Ait 
Hamza 1995; Benchenfa 1991). Livestock numbers, especially cattle, have significantly 
increased in oases and nowadays peasants are buying more and more exotic, imported cow 
breeds. Two underlying factors seem to have caused this development. First, the presumed 
"feminization" (Bencherifa 1991; Steinmann 1993) of the agricultural work force—itself the 
consequence of migration and the general reorientation of men towards other activities—has 
encouraged animal husbandry. Within the prevailing gendered labor division, domestic 
livestock-breeding is an activity that can be carried out entirely by women and children. 
Women are also allowed to harvest the alfalfa, which serves as fodder. Moreover, alfalfa can 
be left on the same plot for several years, which reduces the need for ploughing—which is a 
typically male task. Secondly, livestock-breeding can be carried out individually, 
independently from the agro-hydrological structures on which traditional agriculture strongly 
depends. Moreover, the reduced size of holdings does not play a constraining role. After all, 
additional fodder can be bought on the market., which is indeed increasingly the case. 
Although the number of cattle indeed seems to be increasing, the question is to what 
extent this is related to migration. We have already seen that international migrant households 
do not tend to cultivate more alfalfa than other households, which casts doubt on the validity 
of the aforementioned hypothesis. Van Rooij (2000:67) equally concluded that there does not 
seem to be a shift towards animal husbandry at the cost of other agricultural activities. In 
order to further test this hypothesis, it is necessary to examine whether there is an association 
between migration and the possession of livestock. Tables 8.21, 8.22 and 8.23 indicate that 
such a relationship hardly seems to exist for the possession of goats and sheep, but that there 
is, indeed, a significant association between migration and the possession of cattle. As with 
most other investment categories, internal migrant households are hardly distinguishable from 
nonmigrant households. 
Traditionally, goats and sheep were predominant in oasis livestocks and cattle were 
relatively rare. The predominant sheep and goat breeds in the oases are more resistant to the 
vagaries of the desert climate than cattle and have relatively low dietary requirements. Goats 
in particular feed on the branches and leaves of the date palm, shrubbery, and domestic refuse 
(cf. De Haas 1998). Keeping sheep and goats entails fewer risks and costs than cattle, which 
are not only expensive to buy, but also more vulnerable to heat and disease and more 
demanding on fodder. This explains why the possession of cattle is traditionally considered as 
a sign of household wealth and an important status symbol. 
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Table 8.21. Number of goats by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
0 
74 9 
62 2 
71.1 
63.7 
84.6 
70 4 
1-3 
160 
24 4 
13.2 
13.7 
10.8 
168 
Number of goats ( 
>4 
9.1 
13.4 
15.8 
22.5 
4 6 
12.8 
%) 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 
2.0 
1.6 
2.3 
3.0 
0 5 
1.9 
π 
175 
127 
38 
102 
65 
507 
Source: Household survey ^=0.062'; C=0.572**) 
Table 8.22. Number of sheep by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
Source: Household survey (T|=0. 
Table 8.23. Number of cattle by 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
0 
62.9 
58.3 
26.3 
26.5 
21.5 
46.4 
0 
13.1 
7.9 
15.8 
4.9 
10 8 
10 1 
1-3 
29.1 
33.1 
18.4 
30 4 
24 6 
29.0 
139*; C=0.432**) 
household migration 
1-2 
24.6 
30.7 
44.7 
52.0 
56.9 
37.3 
Source: Household survey (η=0.320**; C= 
>3 
126 
110 
28.9 
21.6 
21 5 
164 
0.288**) 
Number of 
4-5 
30.3 
33.1 
34.2 
176 
30 8 
28.8 
status 
sheep ι 
>6 
27.4 
26.0 
31.6 
47.1 
33.8 
32 1 
:%) 
Total 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
Number of cattle (%) 
Total ] 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100 0 
Mean 
0 9 
0 9 
20 
1.7 
1.8 
1.2 
Mean 
44 
42 
49 
61 
5.3 
48 
Member co- crossbreeds or 
operative (%) graded cattle(%) 
1.1 
24 
132 
20 
4 6 
30 
3.4 
3.1 
15.8 
8.8 
16.9 
7.1 
η 
175 
127 
38 
102 
65 
507 
η 
175 
127 
38 
102 
65 
507 
Table 8.24 examines the association between access to international migration resources and 
the possession of cattle within income categories. It shows that the initial association found in 
table 8.23 largely vanishes when controlling for income, and only remains significant within 
the highest income category39. The fact that international migration households tend to 
possess more cattle seems mainly to be an effect of their higher income. There is no 
convincing evidence to support the hypothesis of the feminization of oasis agriculture as a 
cause of increasing numbers of cattle. The variance in cattle numbers seems a function of 
income in the first place, and is not correlated with "lost (male) labor". 
Expectedly, there is a strong and significant correlation'10 between household income 
and the number of cattle. However, it is doubtful whether the "lost" male labor effect plays a 
role, since indirect and returned migrants—for whom the "lost labor effect" does not count— 
tend to possess about the same number of cattle as current international migrant households. 
Moreover, internal migrant households only tend to possess a few cattle. This casts further 
doubt on the hypothesis that there is any specific migration effect (i.e., the migration induced 
"feminization" of the agricultural workforce) beyond the income effect on livestock numbers. 
As with other investment categones, this associalion might be explained by the higher stability and secunty of 
remittance income. 
4 0
 r = 0.407 (significant at the 0.01 level) 
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Table 8.24. Possession of cattle by international migration participation, by household income 
Household 
income 
0-1699 
1700-3749 
>3750 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
0 
73 4 
64.0 
72 2 
48.7 
28 8 
38 5 
32 6 
9 9 
17.2 
Number of cattle in possession 
1-2 
22 5 
28 0 
23.2 
32 9 
62.5 
48.1 
34 9 
53 8 
47.8 
>3 
4.1 
8.0 
4.6 
184 
88 
13.5 
32 6 
36 3 
35.1 
(%) 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
0.5 
0.8 
06 
12 
1 4 
1.3 
1 8 
24 
22 
η 
169 
25 
194 
76 
SO 
156 
43 
91 
134 
Source: Household survey (γ: 0-1699=0.229'; 1700-3749=0.151,; ;> 3750=0.283*) 
Meat and dairy products are primarily destined for self-consumption. Milk is often churned to 
produce butter and buttermilk. There is no cheese making tradition. An increasing number of 
peasants trade their livestock and sell dairy products on the growing local (urban) market of 
Tinghir. Most households produce uniquely for self-consumption, with the exception of some 
households who introduced graded cattle (Holstein-Friesian or Tarantaise) with the objective 
of trading dairy products. Most sell the milk directly to the milk co-operation "Halib Imlil" in 
Tinghir, which was created in 1983. Others trade their dairy products directly with the hotels 
and crémeries in the center of Tinghir. 
Only three percent of all the surveyed households are member of the cooperative 
Halib Imlil. Membership is particularly prevalent in Ait El Meskine, where 11 percent of all 
households are member. In Ikhba, Tadafelt, and Ghalhl n'Ait Isfoul, no households are 
members of Halib Imlil. It is striking that members are concentrated within the group of 
indirect migration households, where 13 percent are members, compared to less than 5 
percent in all the other categories. Vans of Halib Imlil collect milk throughout the valley on a 
daily basis. Many households aspire to membership of Halib Imlil, as it assures them a stable 
cash income. Nevertheless, access to membership is restricted, and seems to be a prerogative 
of relatively wealthy (international migrant) households. 
The purchase of graded cattle is linked to international migration, as the relatively 
high, stable and secure income from remittances provides the necessary means to invest in 
livestock. However, there is a remarkable and significant difference between current 
international migrant households (the true absentees) on the one hand and indirect and 
returned international migrant households on the other hand. Table 8.23 indicated that 9 
percent of current international migrant households possess graded cattle or crossbreeds. 
Although this is higher than for nonmigrant and internal migrants (4 percent), the highest 
percentages are found among indirect (16 percent) and returned (17 percent) international 
households. This further refutes the hypothesis that "lost labor" accounts for investments in 
cattle. 
Animal husbandry is practiced in small stables inside houses, except for some large 
freestanding stables in the Ghallil. The cattle, goats, and sheep mainly feed on the fodder 
produced on the household's agricultural plots, that is, alfalfa and, to a lesser extent, maize. 
However, own production is mostly not sufficient and additional fodder is obtained by buying 
straw, hay, and beets, which are mainly imported from western Morocco41. Purchased fodder 
is generally destined for sheep and, in particular, cattle. Also with regards to animal 
41
 Trucks overloaded with bales of hay commute between Morocco's grain growing areas west and north of the 
Atlas and oases such as the Todgha The hay is generally sold on the markets of Tinghir and Taghzoul, although 
some trucks travel between the villages to deliver the hay directly to their customers. 
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husbandry, the importance of the market is increasing. As table 8.25 shows, the majority of 
households buy fodder such as beets, hay, and straw on the market. It also indicates that there 
is a positive, though mostly insignificant42, association between international migration and 
the purchase of fodder. The association is particularly high for international returnees. 
Table 8.25. Expenses on fodder by household migration status 
Household migration 
status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
0 
24 7 
19.8 
11.8 
11.1 
11.7 
< 1,400 
34 3 
28.9 
23.5 
23.3 
16.7 
1,400-4,299 
24.7 
35.5 
29.4 
25.6 
150 
>4,300 
163 
15.7 
35.3 
40.0 
56.7 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 
3,559 
2,949 
5,786 
7,802 
14,859 
5%trimmed 
1,881 
2,048 
5,164 
5,205 
6,888 
η 
166 
121 
34 
90 
60 
Total IjH 278 26.8 27.2 100.0 5,813 3,319 471 
Source: Household survey (η=0.165*; C=0.337**) 
8.6. The economic role of agriculture in oasis livelihoods 
Notwithstanding the increasing importance of non-agricultural income—both locally earned 
and through remittances—agriculture still plays an important role in sustaining household 
livelihoods. The major change over the past decades has been the radical diversification of the 
portfolio of livelihood activities, in which agriculture still plays an important, but no longer 
dominant role. Agricultural produce in the Todgha is still mainly destined for self-
consumption. In particular in the lower Todgha, where holdings are relatively large, many 
households themselves produce an important share of their daily needs of cereals, vegetables, 
and dairy products. 
Figure 8.19 shows that less than 10 percent of households market vegetables and 
grains. However, the marketing of dates and, increasingly, almonds is far more common. 
They are the only two "semi-cash crops" in the Todgha. Especially in many lower Todgha 
villages, such as Ait El Meskine and Tadafelt as well as in the agricultural extension zones 
and Ghallil, agricultural investments often concern new almond plantations, specifically 
oriented towards market production. The figure equally shows that households involved in 
international migration are more inclined to market almonds and dates. However, 
international return migrant households form a notable exception to this rule. This confirms 
the hypothesis that this "older" group is rather onented towards subsistence agriculture, and 
that current and indirect international migrant households in particular also tend to produce 
for the market. 
Younger Todghawis do not share their fathers' ideal of restoring oasis agriculture like 
in the "good old days". On the contrary, they generally despise the idea of becoming full-time 
peasants. Nevertheless, they do see a clear material interest in continuing or intensifying 
agriculture. Most households invest in agriculture with the clear idea to gain benefits from it, 
either in cash or in kind. 
In order to assess the relative importance of agriculture to household livelihoods, table 
8.26 shows the estimated market value of the yearly agricultural produce per household 
migration category. It shows that tree crops (dates, almonds, olives) are more important than 
annual crops, although it should be noted that alfalfa has not been included in the 
The Bonferrom multiple comparison procedure revealed that returned international migrant household spend 
significantly more on fodder than both nonmigrant and internal migrant households All other mean group 
differences are insignificant 
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calculations . Furthermore, there is apparently an association between migration and the 
value of agricultural produce, which is highest among indirect international households. The 
value of their agricultural production is about three times higher than for nonmigrant and 
internal migrant households, which score on almost equally low levels. This is another 
indication that indirect international migrant households in particular aim at increasing 
agricultural production. Again, international returnees score relatively low. 
;ure 8.19. Marketing of agricultural produce by households migration status 
• nonmigrant 
U Internal 
1 indirect International 
D international 
S returned international 
vegetables wheat and 
barley 
dates olives almonds 
Source: Household survey 
Table 8.26. Market value of agricultural produce by household migration category 
Household migration 
status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
1 
Market value agricultural production (% of total income) 
Annual crops 
2,402 
837 
8,469 
3,449 
4,726 
2,800 
0.209* 
% 
6.6 
2.0 
10.0 
4.2 
5.8 
5.0 
Tree crops 
9,410 
10,748 
27,193 
19,458 
11.275 
12,714 
0.187* 
% 
25.8 
25.5 
32.1 
23.7 
13.9 
22.8 
Dairy 
1,564 
1,728 
4,583 
3,103 
4,324 
2,497 
0.223** 
% 
4.3 
4,1 
5.4 
3.,S 
5.3 
4.5 
Total 
13,376 
13,313 
40,244 
26,010 
20,325 
18,011 
% 
36.6 
31.6 
47.5 
31.7 
25.0 
32.4 
Source: Household survey 
If we calculate the market value of all agricultural produce as a percentage of the total cash 
income, we can see that the average market value of the agricultural produce for all surveyed 
43
 The main reason for doing so was that peasants did not know the volume of yearly production, as alfalfa is 
harvested in small quantities on an almost daily basis. To a limited extent, the value of this production is 
reflected in the milk production. The production of meat and wool was also not included in the calculations. 
Therefore, the total market value of harvested annual crops is likely to be higher than indicated here. On the 
other hand, the capital (fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, petrol) and labor costs have not been included in this 
variable, which should therefore not be interpreted as indicating "agricultural profit". 
44
 It should be noted that this is a rough, and probably inaccurate, estimate, all the more because it does not 
include the costs of agricultural inputs in terms of capital and labor. Furthermore, the value of alfalfa production 
is unknown, even though it is the main crop grown in the Todgha. Because of a lack of data on some essential 
agricultural inputs and outputs, it was impossible to calculate reliable net profit rates with the data from the 
household survey. However, the fact that the high and significant differences in agricultural production levels 
across household categories are repeated in all villages, and the fact that there is no association between 
migration participation and the prevalence of alfalfa, indicates that we can safely assume that agricultural 
incomes of households with access to international migration resources tend to be higher. 
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households represents about one third of the total (cash and in kind) household income . The 
proportion of agricultural income as a percentage of total income is lowest among 
international returnees (25 percent), and the highest among indirect international migrants (48 
percent). Among other households, about one third of all income stems from households' own 
agricultural production. 
Thus, the higher cash incomes of international migrant households do not coincide 
with a lower relative importance of agriculture. The relative importance of agriculture 
remains largely stable, and the absolute production levels are clearly higher than for 
households without access to international migration resources. It is important to note that this 
higher productivity cannot only be explained by the fact that agriculture is selective for land 
possession (see section 6.8). The main explanatory factor seems to be that households with 
access to international migration resources exhibit a higher propensity to invest in agriculture. 
Indeed, international migrant households do not so much tend to retreat from agriculture, but 
to invest in land purchase, motor pumps, fertilizers, seeds, fruit trees, in order to increase 
agricultural productivity. 
Although international migrant households tend to have higher agricultural production 
levels, figure 8.20 reveals a high geographical differentiation in agricultural production. 
Zaouïa and Tikoutar have low production levels per household, reflecting the small size of 
agricultural holdings in these villages. Nevertheless, the actual figures are probably higher, as 
alfalfa production is not included in the data. Agricultural holdings in Ikhba are somewhat 
larger, which is reflected in higher production levels. 
Ait El Meskine clearly has the highest production levels, reflecting the larger holding 
sizes and the high investments in agriculture and pumping. Tadafelt's production levels are 
the second highest, which is the combined result of relatively large holdings and the 
availability of relatively abundant khettara water. Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul has very low 
production levels, reflecting the water crisis that struck this village (see also sections 5.4, 
8.2.4, and 8.2.5). Many fields have been abandoned here, although it is mainly international 
migrant households that seem able to till some of their fields in the village or elsewhere. 
Figure 8.20. Monetary value of yearly agricultural production at the household level by international 
migration participation, by village 
60,000 
o 
= 50,000 
Ο 
α 40,000 
"5 30,000 
> 
S 20,000 
ο 10,000 
E 
ΑΛΛ à 
α Nonmigrant 
• kill migrant 
Zaoue Tikoutar AitB 
Meskine 
khba Tadafelt Ghallil n'Ai 
Isfoul 
Total 
Source: Household survey 
Calculated as the sum of the total cash income and the market value of agricultural produce. 
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8.7. Disparate migration impacts, constraints, and the water crisis 
8.7.1. Migration and the propensity to invest in agriculture 
The data presented in this chapter seem to contradict the "migration pessimists'" hypothesis 
that migration contributes to the demise of agriculture in migrant sending areas Instead, 
international migration not only contributes to the continuation of traditional oasis 
agriculture, but also to agricultural intensification within the confines of the ancient oasis 
through the introduction of motor pumps, as well as through the spatial extension of the oasis 
through land reclamation Migrant households play an important and innovative role in these 
developments International migrant households exhibit a higher propensity to invest in oasis 
agriculture than nonmigrant and internal migrant households More than others, households 
with access to remittance income tend to channel financial resources into agriculture not only 
to preserve it, but also, in many cases, to increase its productivity through installing 
motorpumps and buying agricultural land In the same vein, their agricultural practices are 
relatively capital intensive More than other households, international migrants tend to 
possess or hire agricultural machinery, buy fertilizers, pesticides, HYV seeds, fruit trees, and 
animal fodder This clearly contradicts the pessimistic and structuralist hypothesis on the 
relationship between migration and agricultural development 
In the same vein, there has been no indication that the "lost labor effect" that has 
negatively influenced agricultural production in the longer term The counterflow of 
remittances enables current international migrant households to compensate for the so-called 
"lost labor effect" by hiring paid agricultural laborers for typically "male" agricultural tasks 
(e g., tillage, irrigation), maintenance work and well-digging, as well as during agricultural 
peak seasons This reveals a major weakness in cumulative causation theory, which implicitly 
supposes a fixed labor supply within households, and neither takes into account the possibility 
of hiring "external" labor, nor the possibility of any re-allocation of the intra-household 
division of labor 
Interestingly, indirect and returned migrant households—to whom the lost labor effect 
obviously does not apply—exhibit an equal propensity to hire laborers as current migrant 
households. Besides the fact that young household members generally prefer non-agncultural 
activities, this is possibly related to the fact that both groups have invested considerable sums 
in agriculture This has coincided with an increase in the workload involved Moreover, their 
comparative wealth allows them to contract out the most arduous and unpleasant agricultural 
tasks It is, however, important to note that these compensatory mechanisms do not apply to 
internal migrant households, who generally cannot afford to hire laborers In particular for the 
wives of internal migrants, the absence of their husbands implies a clear increase in their 
workload 
Cropping patterns do not differ significantly among the different household categories, 
although international migrant households tend to cultivate a larger array of crops, including 
various vegetables, than nonmigrant and internal migrant households This particularly 
applies to international return migrants, who sometimes tend to cling to traditional forms of 
"sentimental" agriculture 
Whereas the number of goats seems to be decreasing, households tend to possess an 
increasing number of sheep and, in particular, cattle There is a clear association between 
migration and the possession of milk cows those households involved in international 
migration tend to have more cattle than nonmigrants and internal migrants In the literature, 
this phenomenon has been connected to the "feminization" of the agricultural work force due 
to the out-migration of men (Benchenfa 1991, Steinmann 1993) However, this hypothesis 
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does not seem to be valid, as indirect and returned international migrant households have an 
equal or even higher tendency to possess cattle than current international migrant households 
The increasing importance of livestock keeping seems to be a general phenomenon The fact 
that international migrant households m particular are able to keep cattle seems primarily 
related to their relatively high financial wealth 
The empirical evidence from this study contradicts cumulative causation theory and, 
more in general, the pessimistic structuralist views on migration and development Instead of 
draining the Todgha of its productive forces, migration has played an important 
developmental role by enabling agricultural investments 
The data analysis also revealed the importance of the "temporal" dimension in 
assessing the role of migration in development International migrant households are certainly 
not the only investors in agriculture However, they not only exhibit a higher propensity to 
invest, but also seem to play an important pioneering role in introducing new agricultural 
practices International migrant households were among the first to introduce motor pumps in 
the Todgha valley in the 1970s The recent colonization of the Ghalhl plain, which 
transformed Todgha's eastern desert frontier into a new agricultural frontier over the last 25 
years of the twentieth century, sheds more light on the pioneering role international migrant 
households have played International migrant households seem to be important as the early 
adopters of new agricultural techniques and practices Installing a motor pump, digging a 
well, purchasing land and cattle obviously involve costs and the sort of financial risks most 
nonmigrant and internal migrant households cannot initially afford 
Another indication of the relevance of the temporal dimension is that the response of 
agricultural investments to migration appears to be "lagged" Household analysis has 
indicated that most agricultural investments occur after 15 years of migration Indeed, the 
initial effect of international migration might be a partial withdrawal from agriculture, and the 
full impact of migration on agriculture may take two to three decades to fully materialize A 
focus on the short-term effects of international migration might therefore lead to rather 
pessimistic conclusions whereas the relationship between (international) migration and 
agricultural development in the Todgha is clearly positive in the long run 
8.7.2. Factors determining propensities to invest 
It is striking that agricultural investments and capital inputs among internal migrant 
households are comparable to those of nonmigrant households This seems to suggest the act 
of migrating as such does not have a distinct influence on agriculture practices It is not 
migration as such, but rather the access to financial resources that enables households to 
further increase agricultural production In all domains of agriculture, the main dividing line 
runs between households with and without access to remittance income Therefore, the 
primary factor determining the level of agricultural investments and capital inputs is (1) 
access to substantial financial resources, often in the form of remittances Since international 
migrants generally have far higher incomes than internal and nonmigrants, their households 
are better able to make various agricultural investments and hire external labor This 
corroborates the assumption of the new economics of labor migration that international 
migration is a strategy employed to overcome local market constraints, which enables 
households to invest in productive activities and, hence, to improve their livelihoods 
Reasoning within a capabilities perspective on development (see section 2 6), we can 
say that access to international migration resources has expanded the freedoms and 
capabilities of household members by enhancing the substantive choices they have In terms 
of well-being and quality of life, international migration has positively contributed through its 
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effects on decreasing the agricultural and household workload of men and women as well as 
through expanding the freedom of individuals to lead lives they have reason to value. 
International migration potentially frees household members from the obligation to slave from 
early morning until late at night in agriculture and household activities. This decrease in 
workload and increase in free time are valuable in themselves. Moreover, it gives people the 
freedom to concentrate on what they see as more valuable or productive work. 
Moreover, international migration has increased the capabilities of households to 
improve their agricultural livelihoods. Remittances play a crucial role in providing 
households with sufficient investment capital to do so. However, it should be noted that this 
positive remittance effect remains largely limited to international migration. Internal migrant 
households tend to be as poor as most nonmigrants, and are therefore less in a position to 
afford the costs and risks involved in agricultural investments. 
Inter-household differences in agricultural investment levels cannot only be explained 
by income. It is a crucial observation that international migrant households have a higher 
propensity to invest in agriculture even when controlling for income. This implies that there 
are other factors than higher income alone that explain their higher propensity to invest. Two 
factors can possibly explain this "above-income effect". In the literature on migration and 
development, it has often been argued that international migrants have acquired certain (2) 
knowledge, skills, and more business-like attitudes during their stay abroad, and are therefore 
more inclined to invest than nonmigrants. Although such human capital factors might 
possibly be applicable in the case of some individual investors, most international migrants 
are active in lowly skilled jobs, and have little or no experience in running their own 
businesses. In chapter 6, we already saw that international migrants are not better educated 
than nonmigrants. 
However, reasoning from the NELM perspective, it is indeed highly likely that 
international migrants are more prone to invest even when controlling for income, since we 
have hypothesized that one of the very reasons to migrate is "partir pour rester", that is, to 
improve one's livelihood at "home". If investing back home is one of the motives to migrate, 
it is not surprising that the eventual outcomes reflect this. Moreover, the very fact that a 
person migrates is likely to be a manifestation of his of her relatively risk-taking attitude. 
Unfortunately, apart from educational levels, it is difficult to operationalize and 
retrospectively measure variables such as "risk taking attitude at the onset of migration". 
However, such human capital factors cannot explain why indirect international migrants have 
an equal or even slightly higher propensity to invest than current and returned migrants, as 
well as their high agricultural production. This seems to be an argument to reject the 
hypothesis that specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes play a significant role in explaining 
the higher investment levels of the surveyed international migrant households when 
controlling for income. 
An even more crucial factor seems to be that international migrants tend not only to 
have higher but also far more (3) stable and secure incomes than laborers in Morocco, with 
the exception of civil servants. As they have access to European social security systems and 
have generally further "insured" their future income through pension rights, they might also 
be more prone to take the risks involved with such investments. These factors, which are 
rarely mentioned in the theoretical literature on migration and development, probably play an 
important role, all the more so because factors such as risk-aversion and income security are 
known to influence people's economic behavior. We can therefore hypothesize that income 
stability and security explain why international migrants tend to invest more in agriculture 
even when controlling for income. 
The prime determining factor in explaining differences in investment levels is access 
to international migration resources. Within the group of international migration households. 
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general investment levels are roughly comparable However, there are some interesting 
differences between current, indirect, and returned migrants in regard to preferences for 
certain types of agricultural activities and investments Returned international migrant 
households are most onented towards subsistence agriculture of the traditional type, regarding 
their tendency to buy land in the ancient oasis, their tendency to cultivate a high vanety of 
crops, and their relatively low tendency to market crops. The relatively advanced age of 
return migrants and their emotional attachment to oasis agnculture might explain this pattern 
Indirect international migrant households, instead, are generally oriented towards 
relatively modem forms of agnculture outside the traditional oasis, and have a higher 
propensity to market crops such as almonds and dates The value of their agricultural 
production is clearly higher than is the case for current and returned migrants The generally 
(4) younger age and, possibly, the concomitant better education and more "modem" attitudes 
of the heads of these households, as compared to return migrants, might partly explain this 
tendency towards relatively "modem" agriculture 
However, this argument seems equally applicable to current international migrants 
Two other arguments might explain why indirect migrant households are also oriented 
towards relatively "modem" agnculture As they have (5) no direct accesi, to international 
migration themselves, indirect migrant households are possibly more focused on becoming 
financially independent and securing their livelihoods in the Todgha through local 
investments Most "indirect" migrant households receive remittances from close kin and, in 
particular, from the brothers of the household head However, such money flows might easily 
be disturbed, for instance in case of marriage, family reunification, and conflict This means 
that their income is less secure compared to current or returned migrants Investing money in 
one's own productive enterprises is therefore a way to secure one's future and create an 
additional source of income to fall back on 
However, this argument seems to be m conflict with our earlier argument that income 
security increases the propensity to invest What might play a more important role is that (6) 
indirect migrants have the advantage of being present in situ Cunent migrants can be more 
hesitant to make big investments, particularly if they do not know whether they will return 
For indirect migrants, it is more likely that they will stay Some migrants support non-
household family members with the explicit objective of helping them to set up their own 
enterprise 
8.7.3. Contextual factors underlying spatially differentiated investment patterns 
Until now, we have mentioned factors at the household-level which explain differences in 
agncultural (investment) behavior Although the aforementioned factors are likely to 
influence the propensity to invest, certain geographical-contextual factors influence the extent 
to which, and where such investments are made Households do not behave within an 
isotropic surface, and conditions for agricultural investments differ significantly across space 
Intra-valley spatial vanabihty in natural endowments shapes different local contexts for 
agncultural development Spatial variability in the relative scarcity of land and water in 
upstream and downstream parts of the valley play a crucial role in explaining geographically 
vanable investment patterns Besides the unequal spatial distribution of natural resources, 
differences in the institutional environment between the ancient oasis and the agncultural 
extension zones equally play an important role in households' decision-making regarding 
agricultural investments The combination of these factors explains why the water-scarce— 
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but land-abundant—lower Todgha has become a less-constrained and more attractive place 
for agricultural investments. 
In the Todgha, land and water resources are unequally distributed between the 
upstream and downstream parts of the valley. Whereas water is abundant in the upper 
Todgha, land is very scarce. The narrow upper valley is hemmed in between steep mountains, 
all arable land has already been cultivated intensively, and land tenure is extremely 
fragmented. Moreover, constraints set by the "collectivity" of land and water management 
limit the "room to maneuver" for peasants wishing to invest in agriculture. Thus, although 
this lush part of the valley looks an attractive prospect at first sight, the opportunities for 
agricultural development are actually very limited in the upper Todgha. 
In the lower Todgha, the situation is the opposite, with relatively abundant land 
resources but scarce and less accessible water resources. This had led to diverging patterns in 
agricultural development, whereby the introduction of motor pumping has boosted 
agricultural development in the lower Todgha since the mid-1970s. This situation reveals an 
interesting paradox, as the new agricultural developments take place mainly in the lower 
Todgha, which has historically been considered as the most marginal zone in agricultural 
terms. In the lower Todgha, and in particular around the villages of Ait 'Atta, arable land is 
relatively abundant, and water used to constitute the principal limiting factor to agriculture. 
With the introduction of the water pumping technique, however, this limiting factor can now 
be overcome, provided that enough investment capital and groundwater is available. This has 
enabled the intensification (in the traditional oasis) and spatial extension (in recent 
extensions) of agriculture. With the advent of motor pumping techniques, landed resources 
seem to have become the main limiting factor to agriculture in the Todgha. 
Whereas the intensive traditional oasis agriculture of the water-rich upper Todgha is 
stagnant, in the sense that it offers little opportunities for individuals willing to increase 
agricultural production, agricultural development is actually taking place in the lower Todgha 
and especially in the extensions around the villages and in the Ghallil plain. Technological 
innovation in terms of the introduction of motor pumps—in which the Todghawis' increasing 
access to "international migration capital" (i.e., remittances) has played an initiating and 
enabling role—has not only increased the opportunities for increasing agricultural production 
on an individual basis, but has also affected the spatial allocation of agricultural investments. 
These findings reveal that scarcity of water is not an obstacle to agriculture per se, 
provided that water can be pumped and that sufficient land and investment capital is 
available46. However, water scarcity becomes an important limiting factor if water tables are 
too deep to access by digging ordinary wells, or if the underground flows are too limited. This 
increases the costs of pumping, and can subsequently force people to stop cultivating their 
land, as seems to be the case in Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul and some other peripheral villages, such 
as Taghia. Tadafelt is a particular case, as natural khettara water resources are still available 
in relatively abundant quantities. 
Concerning the spatial allocation of landed investments, most land is bought outside 
the traditional oasis. This can not only be explained by fragmented land tenure, but also by 
the social and institutional constraints associated with the "involuted" traditional oasis 
agriculture. Peasants often prefer to localize new investments in new, until recently, barren 
areas outside the traditional oases47, where land is abundantly available in contrast to the 
sometimes extremely fragmented land tenure systems in the old oases, and where constraints 
related to the complex and inflexible collective regulations concerning water allocation and 
Whether water scarcity might even be a kind of incentive to innovative agricultural praclices (cf Boserup 
1965) in oases remains to be confirmed, but this study does not obviate this hypothesis. 
^ This phenomenon seems typical of Moroccan oases (cf. Benchenfa 1991). 
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maintenance of the agricultural infrastructure do not play a constraining role Motor pumping 
allows for a relatively individualized type of agriculture, with no risk of "free-nder behavior", 
and in which individual efforts and investments only accrue to the investor and are not to the 
"benefit of all" In a way, this has freed the peasants from the collective constraints associated 
with nver and khettara imgation, and has enabled peasants even to produce two harvests per 
year 
Particularly in the upper Todgha, the limited scope for individual entrepreneurship in 
the traditional oasis combined with the general scarcity of arable land has pushed peasants to 
invest in other regions However, about 90 percent of all land is bought outside the Todgha, in 
particular in the Middle Atlas region, where more favorable climatic conditions allow for the 
rain-fed cultivation of grains Moreover, institutional obstacles linked to the traditional, 
communal management of highly fragmented land and water resources in traditional oases are 
absent in the Middle Atlas, where land is also far cheaper 
This extra-regional "leakage" of landed investments seems to confirm the structuralist, 
center-penphery and cumulative causation theories that migration tends to increase inter-
regional inequalities However, besides the fact that the Middle Atlas cannot be considered as 
a central region, agriculture in the Middle Atlas is generally rather extensive and most other 
agricultural investments are done in the Todgha Landed investments outside the region 
generally do not coincide with a retreat from intensive local agriculture Only very few 
peasants actually resettle in the Middle Atlas Most investors are absentee landowners, who 
contract the agricultural work out to ikhmmesen or laborers Thus, most of the profits flow 
back to the Todgha 
8.7.4. Migration, pumping competition, and threatened sustainability 
The nse of individualized mechanized pumping seems to undermine people's willingness to 
participate in the maintenance of the traditional agro-hydrological infrastructure and to obey 
customary law Migration has not only affected migrant households, but also the entire 
agricultural constellation through its effect on social and institutional life In chapter 10 we 
will further see how migration, through its emancipatory effects on formerly "subordinate" 
groups, has played an accelerating role in undermining traditional village institutions of the 
taqbilt, which used to function as "land and water boards" The increasing inability to 
guarantee maintenance of collective irrigation systems often led to decreasing water flows in 
the khettaras 
Moreover, pumping can lead to the desiccation of the khettaras and natural springs on 
which the traditional systems rely, thereby further eroding the willingness to maintain these 
systems, and further reinforcing the shift towards motor pumping The increasing reliance on 
pumping has made agriculture more capital intensive in most lower Todgha villages The 
shadow-side of this is that some poor—generally nonmigrant and internal migrant— 
households have become partly or entirely excluded from access to water 
Particularly in those villages where traditional, collectively managed river or khettara 
water resources are no longer available—which is the case in Ait El Meskine and Ghallil 
n'Ait Isfoul—households lacking the financial resources to either install a pump and dig a 
well, or to buy water from pump owners, are forced to withdraw entirely or partially from 
agriculture While "wealthy" international migrant households have been able to intensify 
agriculture, several poor households have thus abandoned agriculture This probably explains 
why the difference m production levels between households with and without access to 
international remittances is relatively high in Ait El Meskine and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul In 
many lower Todgha villages, access to water resources is becoming increasingly concentrated 
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in the hands of the relatively wealthy. The poorest households are thus emerging as losers 
from this water game. 
Therefore, it is poverty rather than migration that forces (internal migrant and 
nonmigrant) households to withdraw from agriculture in villages where water is nowadays 
only accessible through pumping. Their inability to access water and other agricultural means 
of production—not migration—seems to be the prime explanation for the long-term 
abandonment of agricultural land in the lower Todgha. Small-scale abandon does sometimes 
occur through the effects of migration, but it is a limited and mostly temporary phenomenon. 
Large-scale land abandonment through "lost labor" has not been detected. Migrants who are 
not interested in agriculture generally entrust their land to (poorer) family members who often 
form the indirect international migrant households. 
In conclusion, international migration has contributed to increasingly unequal access 
to water resources in the lower Todgha, both through the demise of village institutions 
responsible for the management of the collective irrigation infrastructure and through the 
environmental effects of motonzed pumping. In addition, international migrant households 
have been able to acquire new land both within and outside the Todgha. Thanks to their 
access to the European labor market and social security systems, international migrant 
households have been able to extend their access to both water and land resources. Whereas 
international migration has contributed to increasing local agricultural productivity and 
improving households' livelihoods, it has, in particular in the lower Todgha, coincided with 
an increasing agricultural disparity between those households with and without access to 
international migration resources. 
Although relatively wealthy international migrant households arc generally able to 
pump up water, falling water tables might endanger the future profitability and sustainability 
of agriculture in the lower Todgha. In villages such as Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, but also in parts of 
the Ghallil plain, many wells have become desiccated, presumably due to excessive pumping. 
The rise of motor pumping has been an "anarchic" development that has not been subject to 
any control or planning by the local authority or the local agricultural officers of the Centre de 
Mise en Valeur Agricole (CMV). From these authorities, the peasants receive neither 
assistance in choosing suitable sites to dig the wells or the right type of motor, nor financial 
aid. Formally, peasants need a permit to install a motor pump, but in practice there has been 
uncontrolled development. In all the research villages, the role of the state in agriculture has 
been minimal. Agricultural extension services are generally office-bound, suffer from a lack 
of funds, seem demoralized, and rarely play an active role in promoting agriculture in the 
valley. 
At the valley level, there has been increasing competition between peasants, who 
continue to install new pumps and dig increasingly deeper wells, without taking into 
consideration the availability and quality of water. Especially in zones that are not directly 
located on the terraces and aquifers of the Todgha, peasants often dig up to twenty meters 
deep, without finding any water or water of bad quality. The pumping has had a negative 
effect on the level of water tables (cf. El Harradji 2001), which has further contributed to the 
desiccation ofkhettaras and of the wells used for motor pumping. 
Increasing pumping competition and falling water tables might, in the absence of 
government intervention, endanger the ecological and economic sustainability of oasis 
agriculture. The anarchic, largely uncontrolled growth of agricultural motor pumping is 
putting increasing stress on these resources, and threatens to lead to the depletion of this vital 
resource. Villages located downstream accuse those villages located upstream of causing the 
desiccation of their khettaras and wells through excessive pumping. 
The legislative powers seem unable to effectively control the expansion of motor 
pumps and to settle conflicts between water users. Tadafelt and some other nearby villages, 
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for instance, have accused farmers who have created new agricultural extensions near the 
upstream village of Tiliouine of excessive pumping The result of the ensuing lawsuit was that 
the farmers did not have the right to settle on the land Moreover, it is officially not allowed to 
pump without permission However, the verdict has never been enforced, and the farmers 
continue to cultivate the land and pump water (cf Otte 2000 93) 
In the lower Todgha and Ghallil plain, most respondents have witnessed a significant 
lowering of water tables over the past decade (see also El Harradji 2001, Otte 2000) Several 
wells have become desiccated, which is currently leading to the abandonment of newly 
established farms and the waste of investments This development has exacerbated the 
growing agricultural inequality between neh and poor households, as only the relatively 
wealthy can afford to dig deeper wells and install heavier pumps if water tables fall This may 
lead to the increasing concentration of "water power" in a decreasing number of hands 
Although these hypotheses still need to be tested by hydrological research, concerns 
over the uncontrolled increase in the number of motor pumps seem to be legitimate 
Nowadays, motor pumping is by far the most important source of water in the lower Todgha 
The advent of motor pumping has contributed to the intensification of agriculture and enabled 
a significant increase in the irrigated area in the lower Todgha and the Ghallil plain However, 
serious doubts on the sustainability of this type of agriculture remain (De Haas 2001, De Haas 
and El Ghanjou 2000a, 2000b) Moreover, excessive pumping in the Todgha is probably a 
major factor in explaining the near-total decline of traditional agriculture in the Ferkla oasis 
around Tinejdad, located 50 kilometers downstream from Tinghir in the same catchment 
basin as the Todgha 
8.8. Conclusion 
In the second half of the twentieth century, there has been a general diversification in oasis 
livelihoods, which has coincided with the decreasing relative importance of agriculture This 
diversification has not only been realized through migration The regional economy of the 
Todgha itself is "de-agranzing", and more and more people are locally active in retail trade, 
commerce, cafes and hotels, crafts, and so on Households that base their livelihoods uniquely 
on agriculture have become exceptional Nevertheless, in spite of these developments, 
subsistence agriculture plays an important role in sustaining oasis livelihoods, in particular in 
the lower Todgha were holdings are larger and households generally poorer 
It is surprising that the level of agricultural production as a proportion of total income 
is not lower among international migrant households—with the exception of international 
returnees—than among nonmigrant and internal migrant households International migrant 
households exhibit a higher propensity to invest in oasis agriculture than nonmigrant and 
internal migrant households, even when controlling for income This contradicts the idea that 
international migration leads to a retreat from agriculture 
Investments in motor pumping, land purchase in and outside the Todgha, as well as 
the purchase of HYV seeds, seedlings, fertilizers, and pesticides should be primarily 
interpreted as a household strategy to increase agricultural production and, hence, further 
diversify and increase income Although most produce is destined for households' own 
consumption, an increasing number of international migrant households also produce for the 
market Others gain additional cash income by renting out their motor pumps or agricultural 
machines Despite the "leakage" of agricultural investments to the Middle Atlas and other 
regions, most of the benefits of this agriculture flow back to the Todgha, and there can be no 
doubt that international migration has contributed to agricultural development in the Todgha 
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Migrant remittances have enabled many peasants of the lower Todgha to make the transition 
to motor pumping, to intensify agnculture, and even to extend the irrigated agricultural 
surface of the Todgha 
The case of the Todgha has shown that international migration has provided 
households with the necessary revenues to invest in agriculture These results seem in line 
with the premises of the new economics of labor migration, which sees migration as a 
household livelihood strategy to overcome local (credit, insurance) constraints to production 
However, this only seems to be valid for international migration Moreover, the impact of 
migration is spatially differentiated The extent to which agricultural investments occur not 
only depends on the prevalence and duration of migration, but also on specific geographical 
factors such as the relative land and water scarcity 
As a major "capital provider", international migration plays a crucial role in current 
agricultural transformations Although migration (remittances) seems to have had a 
primordial enabling role in recent changes, it is important to observe that migration does not 
determine the nature and direction of changes as such This is a key observation After all, 
migration enables the withdrawal from, as well the intensification of agriculture Access to 
relatively high and stable international migration resources increases the economic freedom 
and the "room to maneuver" of households It increases the substantive choices they have to 
concentrate on particular livelihood activities, to withdraw from others, and it increases their 
liberty to choose the location of their social and economic activities 
The level of investments as well as the spatial and sectoral allocation of such 
investments depends on the specific local, environmental, and institutional context, which can 
form an obstacle to or, instead, give an incentive to investments in agricultural development 
For instance, we have seen that the upper Todgha is not an attractive environment for 
agricultural investment due to geomorphological and institutional constraints This has led 
peasants to invest in other places or in other economic sectors Although international 
migration potentially enables households to invest in agnculture, there are a number of 
constraints that explain why the potential of migration and remittances has certainly not been 
fully realized Major obstacles to agncultural investments are "red tape" and corruption, 
which makes it, for example, difficult to obtain title deeds on land for pioneer farmers in the 
Ghallil Besides the uncertain legal status of landed property, the near-total absence of advice 
and guidance by the agncultural extension services with regards to new agricultural practices 
also constitutes a major obstacle to agncultural development 
The theoretical inference from this is that the NELM-premise that migration is a 
strategy to overcome local constraints to production should not lead to the conclusion that 
migration thus automatically leads to more investments or more material development This 
would be a determinist and enoneous reversal of the negative vicious cycle of cumulative 
causation theorists and structuralist migration pessimists The extent to which such 
investments indeed occur, and where they are allocated, not only depends on the type and 
duration of migration, but also on the specific environmental and institutional context in 
which these livelihood activities take place Migration is one factor among many others 
determining the processes of agricultural development and a wide range of agricultural 
development responses to migration is, therefore, possible 
It seems important not to become too fixated on migration at the risk of singling out 
migration as the only or prime factor of change We should not lose sight of processes of 
change at the macro-level In fact, migration is part of the more general process of the 
political and economic integration of the Todgha into wider systems and the general 
diversification of oasis livelihoods Livelihood diversification and market integration have led 
to the increasing relevance of comparative advantages in determining cropping patterns, and 
has enabled the increasing specialization in certain crops Increasing wealth and the growing 
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importance of non-agricultural cash income has created a new situation in which the previous 
necessity of producing a large variety of products to satisfy the demands of one's own 
consumption no longer exists In other words, subsistence agriculture has lost its former 
imperative of self-sufficiency This process has enabled households to cultivate those products 
which they find either the most convenient in terms of labor input or the most productive 
As most households have liberated themselves from the obligation to be agriculturally 
self-sufficient, they now have a freer choice to specialize in certain products Moreover, 
technical innovations, in particular mechanized pumping have changed, that is, eased, the 
conditions under which oasis agriculture is possible The increased role of non-agricultural 
cash income and technical innovations have considerably enlarged the room to maneuver or 
"degrees of freedom" peasants have in opting for a particular form of agnculture, in terms of 
cropping patterns, labor inputs, as well as capital intensity In this sense, migration has played 
an important developmental role 
Although increased access to international migration resources has increased the 
substantive livelihood choices households have, this does not rule out the high relevance of 
structural constraints, which explain why the potential of international migration in 
stimulating agricultural development has not been fully realized Migration and development 
do not occur in a political and institutional void In various specific settings, various structural 
obstacles may exist to varying degrees, explaining why migration does not automatically 
bring about agricultural development in migrant sending areas, and sometimes even leads to 
the opposite 
Moreover, the analysis has shown that, even though the general impact of international 
migration on agricultural development seems to have been positive, there are also clear losers 
in the process of migration and agricultural transformation The increasing reliance on 
capital-intensive pumping in the lower Todgha has contributed to a partial or entire exclusion 
of poor households from water resources and, thus, to increasing agricultural inequality In 
contrast to international migrants, internal migrant and nonmigrant households generally do 
not have the financial resources to invest in agnculture Finally, excessive pumping and 
falling water tables might endanger the future sustainability of agnculture in general 
The impacts of migration are clearly disparate in nature Whereas migration has 
indeed enabled agricultural development in general, the benefits derived from migration are 
not equally distributed, neither across communities, households and individuals, nor across 
space 
9 
Migration, non-agricultural investments, 
and education 
9.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that migration is not only a means to spread income risks and 
improve living conditions and general well-being, but also that (international) migration can 
be a strategy to overcome local capital constraints on agricultural production. Remittances are 
a potential source of investments. Through their access to this "international migration 
capital" households have been able to invest in local agriculture. The relatively stable and 
secure nature of remittance income, moreover explains why international migration 
households exhibit a higher propensity to invest than other households, even when controlling 
for income. 
Now that we have investigated the role migration has played in agricultural 
development, the investments made by migrants in non-agricultural sectors will be at the 
center of this chapter. We have argued that migration should be seen as an integral part of a 
more general process of regional integration into wider economic and political structures and 
the concomitant diversification of livelihood strategies. Nevertheless, migration is not the 
only way through which this diversification is achieved. Almost no household relies 
exclusively on agriculture, and most households also have local, non-agricultural, and non-
migratory sources of income. This points to a process of economic diversification and partial 
de-agrarization within the Todgha itself (see chapter 5). 
To a certain extent, diversification and the improvement of oasis livelihoods has been 
enabled by structural changes in the macro-context (integration of this tribal area in the 
modem state's structures and the national and international capitalist economy, development 
of public infrastructure, and so on) that have affected oases. On the other hand, actors such as 
individuals and households are not only passive pawns reacting to the opportunities shaped by 
shifting macro-forces. Within a certain latitude set by structural constraints, households have 
the capacity to take their fate into their own hands, and attempt to reshape, diversify, and 
durably improve their livelihoods through various investments. Through this agency, they can 
also alter structures (e.g., markets and other institutions), thereby reshaping the very 
development context in which both migration and development take place. 
Based on the analysis in the previous chapter, we have concluded that remittances 
increase the propensity of international migrant households to invest in agriculture. In this 
chapter, we will analyze to what extent and in what way migration has enabled households to 
invest in the further improvement and future security of their livelihoods through investments 
in non-agricultural sectors. Furthermore, we will investigate how spatial and temporal 
differentiation in this investment behavior can be explained (research question 3). The non-
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agricultural impact of migration is primarily realized through investments in (a) housing, (b) 
private enterprises, and (c) education (human capital). 
Besides analyzing the relationship between migration and non-agricultural 
investments, we will assess the recursive impact of such investments on regional development 
in general (so, including effects on nonmigrant households) and the migration and 
immigration patterns ensuing from these developmental impacts. This chapter, therefore, will 
assess the role of migration in the more general transformation of the Todgha towards a more 
open, integrated, diversified, urbanized, and partly de-agrarized regional economy (research 
question 4). In this analysis, we will weigh the specific impact of migration compared to more 
general, contextual factors of geographical, economic, and institutional change, of which 
migration itself is a constituent part. 
9.2. Migration and investments in housing 
9.2.1. The exodus from the igherman and the housing boom 
Simultaneously with processes of out-migration and high population growth, the Todgha 
valley has witnessed the massive movement of people out of the traditional adobe igherman 
habitat to new, more spacious, and often more luxurious houses (see section 5.1). It is 
important to note that the exodus from the igherman started well before 1975. This movement 
started in the 1940s and 1950s, when the first people left the igherman of Tinghir and some 
other villages to construct large houses in the vicinity of the old village (cf. Büchner 1986). 
The exodus from the igherman further spread to all villages in the 1960s and 1970s, and was 
virtually completed in the 1990s. This led to the relocation of entire villages and the general 
demise of the traditional igherman, which have quickly fallen prey to the elements. 
The new houses have been constructed on what used to be pasture land collectively 
owned by the tribe or village1. As such collective land officially belongs to the Moroccan 
state, villages have to claim a specific lot with the state authorities before construction is 
allowed. After the local authority (i.e., the qaid or pasha) has recognized a claim, the land is 
further subdivided among all the households of the village. The past decades have been 
marked by a veritable "land reclamation fever", in which villages try to claim and privatize as 
much land as possible. Most villages have gone through two or sometimes even three 
successive cycles of land reclamation, in which they have extended their territories as much 
as possible, and whereby the last empty spots of the upper Todgha are currently being 
claimed. Conflicting claims on land regularly lead to conflicts between villages or groups of 
villages. 
The explanation for this land reclamation fever goes beyond the mere need for space 
to build new houses. It is also a quest to obtain an increasingly scarce asset, from which 
substantial profits can be drawn at a later stage. In the upper Todgha, along paved roads, and 
in the urbanizing villages around Tinghir, Taghzout, and Aït Aïssa Ou Brahim, building land 
is becoming increasingly scarce and costly. Collective land reclamation is an effective means 
by which households can acquire costly building land "for free", which subsequently becomes 
an object of speculation. 
The social and economic life of the valley gets increasingly oriented towards Tinghir 
and the outside world. Good road connections to the booming town of Tinghir and, from 
Although this is a semi-desert area, goats and camels feed on the variety of shrubs that grow in the 
surroundings of the Todgha Moreover, plants sprout during the occasional wet winters. 
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there, to more distant places, have become increasingly important. Therefore, locating houses 
along (paved) roads gives advantages in the form of easy access to semi-public transport 
(transits and taxis) and, hence, quicker, and cheaper access to administrative services, 
schools, banks, and markets. Therefore, people prefer to construct new houses along roads, 
instead of more difficult-to-access places where several igherman are located. The increasing 
importance of accessibility equally explains why households from more isolated and distant 
villages often decide to move to Tinghir. 
Between the 1960s and 1990s, virtually all building land (i.e., land located on 
relatively flat terrain between the actual oasis and the mountains) in the upper Todgha along 
the paved road between Zaouia and Tinghir was privatized (i.e., de-collectivized) to construct 
new houses outside the igherman. In this way, entire villages have been relocated, generally 
to a place adjacent to the ancient ighrem2. However, several villages that were located on the 
infrastructurally isolated left bank of the Todgha have been completely or partially relocated 
to the right bank, next to the paved road3. The building density is the highest along the paved 
road between Tinghir and Zaouia, which is now fenced off by a nearly continuous stretch of 
houses. This process is increasingly blurring the distinction between villages in spatial, 
though certainly not in socio-ethnic, terms. 
Land prices are highest around Tinghir, where several villages have virtually become 
part of Tinghir's sprawling urban structure and the remaining building space is increasingly 
being filled. In the future, new quarters will be constructed south of Tinghir. North of Tinghir, 
past the bridge over the Todgha along the main road to Errachidia, most of the building space 
has been filled up to the village of Tamasint. Here, the higher banks4 of the river are being 
occupied by houses, increasingly forming one semi-urban area, with the Todgha running like 
a broad lush artery through the different quarters on both sides of the river5. 
The section between Tamasint and Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim is the only part of the paved 
road to Errachidia where there has not yet been any construction activity. The main reason for 
this is that both A'it Todoght and Ait 'Atta villages claim ownership of the land on this ethnic 
frontier. Since this long and bitter conflict has not been settled6, the local authorities have 
proclaimed a building freeze. 
Further east, new semi-urban structures are arising around the cluster of Ait Aïssa Ou 
Brahim and Taghzout. The inhabitants of the El Hart villages have settled down in five new 
villages around the new administrative center of Taghzout. The original inhabitants of the 
three igherman (Tloult, Boutaghat, Ighrem Aqdim) of the Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim (an Ait 'Atta 
sublineage)7 have settled on both sides of the road to Errachidia, which runs through their 
former tribal territory. Houses increasingly fence off the dirt road linking the two centers. All 
2
 Interestingly, spatial segregation between different ighsan is often maintained in the spatial set-up of the new 
villages, in which each ighs lives in an ethnically homogeneous section of the village (e g Büchner 1990) 
' This is the case of many villages on the left bank of the Ait Snanefraclion of the upper Todgha, which are very 
difficult to reach by car 
4
 Houses are never built on the agricultural fields located directly along the course of the Todgha because of the 
danger of flooding. They are always located on more elevated places adjacent to the actual oasis. 
5
 The inclusion of the surrounding villages in the municipality of Tinghir in 1992 has been a de facto recognition 
of their integration into the urban structures of this town. 
6
 The focus of the conflict is that the Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim claim that the official administrative border between 
the municipalities of Taghzout and Tinghir does not coincide with the pre-colonial tribal sphere of influence. 
They claim that all land up to Tamasint used to belong to their pastureland, and that the borj (arch) indicating 
the municipal border has therefore been misplaced. The Ait Todoght villages at the western side of the ethnic 
frontier, however, claim that all the land west of that border is their rightful property. Attempts of local 
authorities to settle this conflict have failed so far. 
7
 This new semi-urban center has adopted the name of this ethnic group, that is, Ait Aïssa Ou Brahim. 
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the other Ait 'Atta villages of the lower Todgha have equally developed new habitation 
extensions, although empty space is less scarce in the most downstream part of the valley. 
Through this process of housing construction and urban spread, the river oasis has 
become increasingly hemmed in by a continuous band of housing structures, which has 
almost completely replaced the old nodal settlement patterns of dispersed, fortified igherman. 
Most of the 64 igherman—including the research villages except for Zaouia—in the Todgha 
have been completely abandoned. In the absence of regular maintenance, the igherman 
rapidly fall into ruin. The adobe structures are extremely sensitive to erosion during 
occasional rain showers. The degradation is further accelerated by the fact that many people 
have removed palmwood beams from the igherman for reuse in their new houses. 
Nowadays, only some igherman in the Todgha have sizable populations, notably 
Tinghir, Afanour, Taourirt (all three in the Tinghir municipality), and Zaouia (in the upper 
Todgha). Not coincidentally, these are also the locations where land is scarce and land prices 
high. The people inhabiting these igherman generally do not belong to their "original" 
population. Most new ighrem dwellers are poor immigrants from the Atlas and Saghro 
mountains or sedentarizing nomads, who work as agricultural day laborers, well-diggers, 
bricklayers, and in various other irregular jobs. They often settled in the relatively cheap 
ighrem habitat, which had been abandoned by the relatively "wealthy" autochthonous 
population. However, this process of the reoccupation of the ighrem only occurs in land-
scarce environments, such as Zaouia and Tinghir. Without intervention, all other igherman 
will completely disappear within one or two decades8. 
9.2.2. General causes for the exodus from the igherman 
Maintenance of the erosion-sensitive adobe habitat is labor-intensive, and, after each rain 
shower, repair is necessary. Adobe disintegrates when wet, and without continuous 
maintenance, adobe structures tend to quickly fall into ruin. Moreover, the traditional adobe 
ighrem houses tend to be small, dusty, and laborious to clean. With some exceptions, 
igherman lack hygiene facilities such as lavatories and drinking water. As ighrem houses are 
packed together, it is difficult or impossible to enlarge houses and add facilities. A major 
advantage of concrete houses is that they are easy to maintain. 
In the light of rising living standards, however, people find it increasingly difficult to 
live in the traditional ighrem houses. Resettlement in larger houses also yields a degree of 
privacy, which would have been unthinkable in the packed igherman. The spectacular 
population growth of the last century has also increased people's propensity to leave the 
igherman. Besides rising standards of living and population growth, the increasing 
nuclearization (i.e., the disintegration of extended families, see also sections 7.3.2 and 9.2.5) 
of households has also played an important role in this process. 
8
 The fine architectural heritage of south-Moroccan adobe fortresses and castles testifies to the age-old intensive 
trade and migratory links between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa Through the rapid demise of igherman, 
the Presaharan region also risks completely losing this age-old tradition of major historical, cultural, and 
touristic significance So far, except for UNbSCO's effort to restore Taounrt, the great qasbah in Ouarzazate, little 
has been done to stop this process. The demise of the igherman has social causes that are comparable to the 
"collective" crisis affecting the communal management of traditional oasis agriculture Igherman are collective 
structures with a common defense wall and watchtowers Individual houses lean against each other, and will 
collapse if surrounding houses are not maintained. Thus, if a substantial part of the population leaves the ighrem 
and does not contribute to its maintenance anymore, this will increase their labor inputs necessary to upkeep 
their houses This will decrease the incentives for remaining inhabitants to maintain the collective ighrem, and 
this will stimulate them to leave as well. 
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However, the most fundamental general factor enabling the exodus from the igherman 
has been the incorporation of the Todgha into the modem state This marked the end of the 
siba, the pre-colonial period of tribal wars and general unsafety, in which the sedentary 
population lived under the permanent threat of attacks and raids by other villages and 
invading nomads This situation of violence and lack of safety explains the fortified character 
of the igherman Before the (colonial, later Moroccan) state got a final and complete grip on 
the Todgha in the early 1930s, settlement in fortified igherman was necessary to protect the 
villagers from attacks by outsiders Since then, the political and military raison d'être of the 
igherman has fallen away Since the state has now an effective monopoly on the use of 
violence, and tribal warfare has consequently been banned, people do not have to fear attacks 
anymore, and feel safe to settle outside the igherman 
9.2.3. Migration and the propensity to invest in housing 
In order to explain the exodus from the igherman, it seems useful to distinguish between the 
general factors which have increased the propensity of people to leave the traditional habitat and 
the economic factors at the household level that have enabled people to actually make this 
move The exodus from the igherman and the concomitant housing construction boom seems to 
be a general development that can be observed throughout the entire valley The construction of 
new houses is thus not only reserved for migrant families However, if we look at the type and 
size of houses, as well as the amount of money invested and the spatial allocation of such 
investments, important inter-household differences come to light 
The migration literature gives overwhelming evidence that international labor migrants 
across the world give a high pnonty to housing investments in their region of origin 
(Papademetnou and Martin 1991, Massey et al 1998) In the same vein, apparently all studies 
on migration and development in Morocco agree that housing construction is the first 
investment pnonty (cf Fellat 1996) The Todgha valley is no exception to this rule Although 
the construction of new and relatively modem large houses outside the igherman has been a 
general development in the valley, international migrants have been at the forefront of this 
development, as they tend to build quicker and nicer constructions, and often construct more 
than one house 
Figure 9 1 indicates that 80 to 90 percent of the surveyed international migrant 
households have invested in construction since 1975, compared to about 55 percent among both 
nonmigrant and internal migrant households The figure equally demonstrates that the tendency 
to construct houses is higher in Ait Todoght compared to the Ait 'Atta villages, which is 
probably related to the poorer character of the latter villages 
International migrant households not only have a higher tendency to construct, they 
equally tend to construct more luxunous and bigger houses In chapter 7, we saw that most 
international migrants' houses are built with concrete, and generally enjoy facilities such as 
lavatones, showers, kitchens, pumps for dnnking water, and even small water towers There is a 
clear association between participation in international migration and the tendency to have such 
basic facilities Most households lacking access to international migration resources build 
relatively simple houses, generally using adobe as (cheap) construction matenal 
As could be expected, table 9 1 clearly shows that not only is the incidence of housing 
construction higher among international migrants, but also that they tend to invest larger sums 
in housing There is a high and significant association between participation in international 
migration and investments in housing These patterns resemble those for agncultural 
investments in the previous chapter, with small and insignificant differences between 
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nonmigrant and internal migrant households as well as between the three types of 
international migrant households . As was the case for household wealth, living conditions 
and agricultural investments too, the principal (socio-) economic borderline is between 
households with and without access to international migration resources. 
Figure 9.1. Incidence of house construction by household migration status, by village (1975-1998) 
• nonmigrant 
g internal 
• indirect internatbnal 
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Ξ returned international 
Zaouia Tikoutar A J B 
Mestóne 
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bfoul 
Source: Household survey 
Table 9.1. Investments in housing by household migration status 
Migration status Investments in housing in dirham 1975-1998 (%) 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current International 
Returned international 
Total 
Nu 
< 
45.6 
44.0 
18.9 
17.8 
12.3 
33.3 
within 
50,000 
51.6 
47.1 
20.0 
18.1 
21.1 
34.2 
group of investors 
50-200,000 >200,000 
36.6 
40.0 
40.0 
42.2 
47.4 
40.8 
11.8 
12.9 
40.0 
39.8 
31.6 
24.9 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
47,858 
46,592 
178,095 
187,931 
220,231 
108,003 
5%trimnied 
32,442 
34,213 
153,498 
162,965 
156,709 
76,126 
η 
//; 
125 
J' 
101 
65 
499 
Source: Household survey (η=0.358**; C=0.395**) 
The higher incomes of international migrant households seem to primarily explain their 
higher propensity to invest. However, table 9.2 highlights that, even when controlling for 
income, a significant association remains between international migration and housing 
investments within the middle and the high income categories. In line with our analysis of 
agricultural investments, it is likely that income stability and security are important factors 
explaining international migrants' higher propensity to invest in housing within income 
categories. 
Table 9.3 shows that, logically, investments in housing increase with the length of stay 
abroad. The data also reveal that the biggest differential is found between the first two 
categories, and that there is a much smaller differential between the 15-28 years and >29 
years abroad groups concerning the incidence as well as the level of investments. 
Constructing a (concrete) house is generally the first investment a migrant makes after having 
saved a certain amount of money. About half of all international migrants have constructed a 
house within 14 years of migrating. Thus, the investment response to migration for 
construction is less "lagged" than was the case for agricultural investments. 
The results of Bonferroni multiple comparison procedure of group means revealed significant differences 
between (1) nonmigrant and internal migrant household categories on the one hand, and (2) current, indirect, 
and returned international household categories on the other. Between categories within these groups, 
differences of means are insignificant. 
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Table 9.2. 
Total 
household 
income 
0-1699 
1700-3749 
>3750 
Investments in housing by international migration participation , by household income 
Investments in housing including land purchase in dirham 1975-1998 (%) 
Migration status No 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
ι Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Toul 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
50 9 
32 0 
48 4 
37 3 
127 
24 7 
35.7 
13.2 
20.3 
within group of investors 
< 50,000 50-200,000 
61.0 
52.9 
59.6 
53.2 
23.2 
35.3 
18.5 
10.1 
12.3 
31.7 
35.3 
32.3 
40.4 
50.7 
46.6 
40.7 
38 0 
38.7 
Source: Household survey (C: 0-1699=0.139'; 1700-3749=0.37? 
Table 9.3. Length of stay abroad and investments in housing 
Length of stay 
abroad 
1-14 
15-28 
>29 
Total 
No" 
33.3 
12.3 
1.9 
16.3 
Investments in housing including land 
< 50,000 : 
34.2 
20.0 
5.9 
157 
within group 
50-200,000 
55.3 
28.0 
52.9 
37 3 
of investors 
>200,000 
10.5 
52.0 
41.2 
30.7 
>200,000 
73 
11.8 
8.1 
6 4 
26.1 
18.1 
40.7 
51.9 
49.1 
Total 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
ι**;* 3750=0.271*) 
purchase in 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100 0 
Mean 
28,519 
73,760 
34,410 
48,013 
135,057 
92,666 
120,571 
249,692 
208,917 
dirham 1975-1998 (%) 
Mean 
106,421 
236,421 
260,606 
199,358 
5%trimmed 
62,008 
200,989 
233,750 
76,126 
η 
167 
25 
192 
75 
79 
154 
42 
91 
133 
η 
57 
57 
52 
166 
Source: Household survey (η=0.229*; r = 0.200**) 
More convenient and luxurious housing is a top priority for migrants and nonmigrants alike. In 
general, much more money is invested in housing (108,000 dirham on average, see table 9.1) 
than in land purchase (9,800 dirham on average) and pumping (7,500 dirham on average). 
Moreover, housing investments tend to occur early in the household migration cycle. 
It is certain that (international) migration has accelerated the exodus from and the 
demise of the igherman10. The privatization of communal land and housing construction has 
taken place in successive stages, and many households constructed an adobe house outside 
the ighrem before 1975. This partly explains why most households that have not invested in 
housing live outside the ighrem. If it is not their private property (through own construction or 
inheritance), they rent the houses or live in houses owned by close kin. International migrant 
households that have left the village altogether due to family reunification—which have not 
been included in the survey—often entrust their unused houses to close family members or 
sometimes servants or guards, who are then allowed to occupy (part of) the building. 
In the Todgha valley, housing construction tends to be a long-term process, in 
particular for poorer households. Generally, as soon as the ground floor has been completed, 
the family moves into the house. Second or third stories are only constructed when the 
household has saved enough money or are not built at all". Construction speed crucially 
depends on the amount of money available to pay for building materials and laborers, and this 
brick-by-brick mode of construction may take many years. In contrast to most nonmigrants 
and internal migrant households, international migration households are able to construct their 
houses in one go. 
10
 The high level of international migration may explain why the exodus from the igherman is almost complete 
in the Todgha valley. In oases with a lower prevalence or shorter history of international migration—such as the 
Tafilalt, the Drâa, and the Bam—many igherman are still partly inhabited. 
1
 ' The construction of multi-storey houses is mostly limited to the upper Todgha—where there is a lack of 
building space—and to the urban clusters around Tinghir and Taghzout. In the lower Todgha villages, most 
houses only consist of a ground floor, except for some houses that are mostly owned by international migrants 
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9.2.4. Spatial allocation of housing investments and the role of migration 
Households generally build their first house outside the ighrem in the village. Table 9.4 
reveals that many migrant households have constructed several houses. Over half of the 
international migrant households possess more than one house, compared to one quarter 
among nonmigrant and one third among internal migrant households. Second, third, and 
fourth houses are generally constructed outside the native village. Table 9.5 analyzes the 
spatial allocation of housing investments. It shows that one quarter of all houses constructed 
by the surveyed households are located outside the village. Since urban houses are far more 
expensive—more than double on average—to construct, however, extra-village investments 
account for 44 percent of the total amount invested in housing. Tinghir is clearly the focus of 
external real estate investments, accounting for three quarters of all houses constructed 
outside the village. 
Only about 20 percent of the houses are constructed outside the Todgha, notably in 
Rabat/Salé. There are clear differences in investment preferences among the villages. In 
Zaou'fa, Tikoutar, and Ikhba, about 90 percent of the extra-village houses are located in 
Tinghir, whereas more than half of the houses outside A'it El Meskine are constructed in the 
Rabat/Salé region—particularly in the Temara district. Real estate investments in Rabat/Salé 
are a real specialty of international migrant households from this relative wealthy village. 
Some households from the Ait 'Atta village of Tadafelt and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul have 
constructed houses in nearby Taghzout. 
Table 9.4. Number of houses outside the ighrem by household migration status 
Village Number of houses in possession (%) 
nonmigrant 
internal 
indirect international 
current international 
returned international 
1 
76.0 
68.5 
42.1 
40.2 
46.2 
2 
21.7 
29.1 
39.5 
47.1 
38.5 
3 
2.3 
0.8 
15.8 
8.8 
12.3 
>4 
00 
16 
26 
39 
3 1 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
η 
175 
127 
38 
102 
65 
Total 60.6 32.1 5.5 100.0 507 
Source: Household survey (η=0.234**; C=0.394**) 
Table 9.5. Spatial allocation of housing investments 
Location Investments in housing in dirham 1975-1998 
Within village 
Outside village 
Tinghir 
Other Todgha 
Middle Atlas 
Rabat/Salé 
Other 
Subtotal 
Incidence 
352 
116 
89 
3 
3 
14 
7 
116 
% 
75.2 
24 8 
76 7 
26 
26 
12 1 
60 
100 0 
Total investment 
29,273,250 
22,792,500 
14.736,500 
135,000 
487,000 
6.100,000 
1,334,000 
22,792,500 
% 
56.2 
43.8 
64 7 
06 
2.1 
26 8 
59 
100 0 
Per house 
83,163 
196,487 
165,579 
45,000 
162,333 
435,714 
190,571 
196,487 
% of total sum 
by intl migrant 
69 0 
79.9 
73 9 
-
-
100.0 
57.4 
79 9 
Total 468 100.0 52,065,750 100.0 111,252 74 0 
Source: Household survey 
In line with migration systems theory, these cases highlight that not only migration, but also 
the concomitant investment streams tend to follow distinct, spatially clustered patterns. 
Moreover, we can conclude that there is only limited "leakage" of real estate investments 
outside the valley: most houses are constructed within the Todgha. Whereas first houses are 
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generally built in the village, subsequent houses are overwhelmingly built in Tinghir, the 
valley's capital. International migrant households are playing a leading role in the current 
construction boom. Representing 40 percent of all households, they account for 69 and 80 
percent of investments in and outside the village, respectively. 
Table 9.6 demonstrates that international migrant households exhibit a higher 
propensity to construct houses both within and outside the village, and tend to invest larger 
sums in housing construction than nonmigrant and internal migrant households. Almost one 
third have built houses elsewhere, compared to 11 and 13 percent among nonmigrants and 
internal migrants. The costs of constructing houses outside the oasis are generally higher, as 
land has to be purchased—whereas in the villages, land is generally acquired through 
division. Moreover, urban dwellings are generally made of cement bricks and concrete 
instead of adobe, which is still used to construct houses in the lower Todgha villages. 
For relatively wealthy households, it is common to construct one new house in the 
village and a second one in Tinghir (of Taghzout) as an investment project. Other households 
construct such urban houses as a second house. This is especially common among inhabitants 
of Zaou'ia and other relatively remote villages, who often stay overnight in Tinghir if they are 
working, running their own enterprise, or going to school there. 
In most instances, however, such extra houses are not primarily destined to live in but 
as a means of acquiring extra income via short- or long-term leases12. It is also very common 
to keep one storey free for use by the family while renting out the others. There is a 
significant correlation (r=0.338) between investment in housing outside the oasis and income 
from renting houses. Ongoing immigration to the Todgha valley, population growth, and 
increasing economic activity have all increased the demand for housing and driven up rents 
and land prices over the past decades. Given these circumstances, real estate investments are a 
logical choice for migrant households. Moreover, most investors indicated in interviews that 
one important motive for investing in housing was that they consider it as a kind of "life 
insurance" for the household. In case of the death of the breadwinner, for example, family 
members are at least guaranteed shelter and will often gain rental income. Constructing 
houses, therefore, is also an investment in future income stability. 
Table 9.6. Investments in housing in and ouCside village by household migration status 
Migration status Investments in housing including land purchase in dirham 1975-1998 (%) 
Within village Outside village 
% inv Mean Within inv η % inv Mean Within inv η 
nonmigrant 
internal 
indirect international 
current international 
returned international 
50.9 
52.8 
70.3 
80.2 
84.6 
31,107 
29,980 
78,973 
103,188 
105,577 
61,141 
56,780 
112,385 
128,667 
124,773 
171 
125 
37 
101 
65 
109 
126 
31.6 
32.4 
30.8 
16,654 
16,350 
96,513 
84,966 
114,654 
153,395 
129,781 
305,625 
262,621 
372,625 
175 
127 
38 
102 
65 
Total 63.1 58,664 92,931 499 19 7 48,871 247,775 507 
Source: Household survey (η: Within village 0.415**; Outside village 0.247**) 
9.2.5. "Stone-age" mentality or rational choice? 
While virtually all studies on migration and development in Morocco agree that housing 
construction is the first investment priority of migrants, the overwhelming majority of 
researchers lament this. Researchers and policy makers have frequently "accused" 
international migrants of building large, richly ornamented houses in an urban style. In line 
12
 Sometimes, building lots in Tinghir and Taghzout are purchased for speculation 
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with the general tendency in the international migration literature (see section 2.4.3), studies 
on migration and development in Morocco have tended to strongly disapprove of this so-
called "mentalité de pierre" (Kaioua 1999:124), which they consider as "exaggerated" (Ben 
Ali 1996:354) and which for them reflects a largely unnecessary, and "irrational" (Ait Hamza 
1988) use of money which only fuels price inflation. The size and self-indulgent style of 
migrants' houses is generally frowned upon. 
Researchers have blamed the lack of entrepreneurial mentality among migrants, in 
particular among the first generation, in explaining this orientation towards what Kaioua 
(1999:124) called a "refuge sector par excellence". Such studies typically call on policies to 
"divert remittances to productive sectors of the economy" (Agoumy 1988:159) by informing 
and "guiding" migrants towards better, more "rational" investment behavior (Kaioua 
1999:124). 
However, there is reason to criticize the patronizing attitude towards migrants' 
investment behavior that is displayed by many researchers, which mostly consists of blaming 
their "irrational" mentality13 a priori rather than really trying to comprehend the motives 
behind their behavior. Taking into account the specific social, cultural, economic, and 
institutional context, the high priority among migrants (and nonmigrants) to invest in housing 
seems a "rational" and relatively secure choice. It is a relatively low risk investment (cf. Ben 
Ali 1996) with potentially high benefits. 
Although researchers might not always appreciate "pompous" houses, their 
constructors and inhabitants see the advantages of living in large, hygienic, and easy to 
maintain houses. It would be too simple to reduce the desire to construct houses as simply a 
quest to erect status symbols, although such arguments might indeed play a role too (see 
section 10.2). Several other arguments can be put forward to explain the priority for housing 
construction. 
Hajjarabi (1988) has pointed to the legitimacy of the desire for decent housing and 
basic hygienic facilities. The first logical goal for almost all migrants is to fulfill the 
households' immediate needs. Proper nutrition, health care, clothing, and housing all serve to 
give the family a decent living. The relatively large, new houses can offer more convenient 
living and privacy than was ever conceivable in the packed, dark, and dusty ighrem 
dwellings'4. 
Moreover, the luxury of migrants' houses is often exaggerated in the migration 
literature on Morocco. In fact, only a minority of the houses are built in what could be called 
a pompous style, which are, however, often taken as a representative example. Apart from the 
incidental truly pompous buildings, most migrants' houses are large and contain many rooms, 
but are relatively basic beyond the necessities mentioned above. The image that most 
migrants construct "castles" is probably due to the fact that such houses, which are often 
located along the paved road, catch the eye. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to jump to the 
conclusion that such dwellings are representative of migrants' houses on the basis of such 
superficial observations. It is exactly this tendency towards "rural tourism" or 
"impressionism" (cf. Taylor 1999) that has hampered migration and development research for 
the past decades. 
For migrants who left behind their families, the desire to offer them more convenient 
living conditions is the first argument to construct houses outside the new ighrem. This is all 
In this context, Taylor et al (1996a 411) speak of "diatribes by academics and policy makers against migrants 
for their profligate and unproductive ways" 
If badly maintained, igherman can also be dangerous to live in due to the nsk of collapse. However, the major 
disadvantage of concrete brick houses is their poor insulating qualities compared to adobe. Concrete houses tend 
to become excessively hot in summer and bitterly cold during winter nights Thick adobe walls protect houses 
better from the extremities of the Presaharan climate 
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the more logical regarding the fact that the costs of constructing a new house are only a 
fraction of what one would pay in Europe. Even migrant households that have left the village 
altogether due to family reunification, have an interest in maintaining a foothold. After all, as 
Ben Ali (1996:360) has also argued, most migrants expect or hope to return some day15. 
Indeed, houses are also important status symbols, expressing upward social mobility 
achieved through, for instance, migration (cf. Mezdour 1993:182). However, the fact that 
people (not just in Morocco) tend to be proud of their houses as a symbol of a life 
achievement does not dismiss the positive well-being and health effects of living in relatively 
large, easy to maintain and clean houses16. And for what good reason could we classify 
facilities such as lavatories, washbasins, showers, tiled kitchens, and drinking water as 
(excessive) luxury? 
Decent housing is generally recognized as a basic necessity of life. The quest for 
space, hygiene, and some degree of privacy seems to be almost universal. By implicitly 
suggesting that rural dwellers should stay in their "mud brick houses", wealthy and urban-
based social scientists apply different standards to them than they would probably do to 
themselves. Reasoning from a capabilities-based concept of development (Sen 1999), 
increased well-being and standards of living are to be considered as constituent parts of 
development. Dismissing such well-being aspects as "non-developmental" reflects a narrow 
view of development. 
There are also more specific social and cultural reasons explaining why housing 
construction takes such priority. In extended migrant households, there are usually conflicts 
between migrants' wives and their in-laws, in particular their mothers-in-law. Such conflicts 
are usually centered on control over remittances. Traditionally, the male "in-laws" receive 
and decide on the use of remittances. However, such patronizing traditions are increasingly 
contested by migrants' wives. This creates a strong push for migrants to establish their own, 
nuclear households by constructing a new house either in the village or elsewhere. The 
decision to establish independent, nuclear households is often initiated by the spouse of the 
migrant. Besides increasing the personal liberty of migrant wives, this can also be an effective 
strategy for migrants to escape from the heavy financial burden of supporting large extended 
families. The same centrifugal processes towards household nuclearization can eventually 
push towards family reunification at the destination. 
This all points again to the limitations of migration network theory. Migrants have to 
strike a balance between social expectations of them to be generous on the one hand, and 
finding gentle ways to protect their own (material and social) interest from what they 
sometimes might see as the predatory behavior of others on the other. Networks do not extend 
ad infinitum, as lineages (ighsan) tend to monopolize access to international migration 
systems (see section 6.8.3). In the same vein, there are clear tendencies to preserve the 
migration capital within the households through literally fencing off the nuclear household 
behind four walls. 
15
 As most migrants do not return eventually, it is unclear what will happen to these houses in the future 
Whereas migrants might maintain such houses as "holiday homes", it is also conceivable that many of their 
children will possibly lose interest in those houses, and will eventually sell them. Researchers have predicted 
over the past three decades that this would cause a collapse of the housing market Whether and to what extent 
this really will happen in the future crucially depends on other demand-related factors such as demographic and 
economic growth However, in the light of suslained population growth and the further nuclearization of 
households, it is not so likely that the housing market will durably collapse Moreover, this danger seems to 
apply to village rather than to urban housing 
16
 Lack of space is also a problem for schoolgoing children, as living in crowded houses hampers their ability to 
do their homework, thus leading to a potentially negative effect on their performance 
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This is another dimension of the "downside of social capital" put forward by Portes 
and Landolt (1996; see also section 6.8.3). The social capital of the petitioners consists 
precisely in their right to demand and receive assistance from fellow group members. Tight 
social networks and obligations to financially support family and community members may 
therefore eventually lead to the accelerated breakdown of extended families and a certain 
loosening of tight family ties. Avoidance of social pressure towards "shared poverty" (see 
also section 10.2) explains why some households even decide to relocate the entire household 
to Tinghir or elsewhere in Morocco. Such short-distance migration has the additional 
advantage of facilitating access to public infrastructure, banks (not unimportant for remittance 
receiving households), work, and schooling. 
Similar disaggregating processes, in which intra-household tensions lead to the break-
up of extended families and the physical "lifting out" of nuclear families and atomization of 
family life, have been described for other migrant sending areas in Morocco and Tunisia (Ait 
Hamza 1988; 1995; Bemane 1996; De Mas 1990; Michalak 1997). Hajjarabi (1988:182-3) 
argued that the wish to have one's own house is the top priority among women even more 
than among men, because women have most to gain in terms of autonomy and privacy by 
establishing an independent household. She also argued that, in their very architectural 
design, traditional houses reflect traditional, patriarchal norms and the domination of the 
mother-in-law, and, hence, obstruct private family life. 
9.2.6. Indirect effects of real estate investments 
Through the influx of relatively high, stable, and secure remittance income, international 
migrant households are better able to bear the costs and risks of real estate investments. It is 
through these investments that international migrant households simultaneously capitalize on, 
and actively contribute to, the accelerated urban growth and concentration of economic 
activities in Tinghir and, to a lesser extent, around places like Taghzout and Aït Aïssa Ou 
Brahim. 
Although we have not been able to quantify these effects17, the indirect positive effects 
of real estate investments should probably not be underestimated. Nonmigrants and local 
entrepreneurs tend to admit that they would probably not have work if migrants did not invest 
in construction and consumption to such an extent (cf. Otte 2000:124). Many nonmigrants 
and immigrants supplement their agricultural income by working in the local housing sector. 
Thus, the migration-propelled housing boom also has positive effects on the wider valley 
economy. 33 percent of the surveyed nonmigrant households gain income from local 
construction work (see section 7.4.1), and almost 22 percent of all nonmigrant working men 
above the age of 17 reported construction work as their principal activity. Therefore, the 
general housing boom—which has been partly enabled and triggered by international 
migration—has probably also created employment for nonmigrant populations. 
The construction boom has also created considerable local employment in sectors that 
are closely related to the construction business, such as Tinghir's thriving crafts industry (e.g., 
carpenters, welders), hardware stores, and retail trade in household utensils and building 
material. Furthermore, it has offered employment to various electricians and plumbers. Via 
such multiplier effects, it is likely that nonmigrants have indirectly benefited from migrants' 
investments, both in the villages and in Tinghir. Moreover, construction activities in Tinghir, 
It was not the aim of this study to make a quantitative assessment of local income mulliplicr effects of 
migrants' investments Through the survey's setup, essential data are lacking in order to calculate such effects. 
Therefore, more research is required in order to further test the tentative hypotheses presented in this section 
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Taghzout, and other places attract workers from other areas to the Todgha (see section 6.6.1). 
In the same way as the migration-triggered urban boom in the Rif (which is however much 
larger in scale) attracted migrants from the Todgha. Investments by international migrant 
households in Tinghir have, in turn, triggered reversed processes of internal migration to this 
region of international out-migration. In other words, the recursive developmental effects of 
international migration seem to have created a counterflow of internal migrants. 
It has often been argued in the migration and development literature that the housing 
boom would only be a temporary activity, and that the economic activities associated with 
real estate investments would constitute "spurious development", as opposed to the "real 
development" commonly associated with productive, industrial investments. However, it 
seems difficult to maintain this argument for two reasons. First of all, this reveals a limited 
understanding of economic processes and what actually constitutes development, as it ignores 
the ways in which consumption and so-called non-productive investments may stimulate the 
local and regional economy through income multipliers. Secondly, the argument that the 
housing boom would be only a temporary phenomenon is somewhat difficult to sustain after 
three decades of sustained urban growth in Morocco in general, and migrant sending areas in 
particular. 
Apparently, this viewpoint was based on the implicit expectation that construction 
activities would cease and the house market would collapse once all migrants had constructed 
their new, fancy houses. Obviously, this ignored the fact that migrants do not only construct 
houses for themselves, but also that they have capitalized on broader processes of economic 
development, rising standards of living, population growth, and urbanization. 
This all explains why demand for convenient urban housing has skyrocketed over the 
past decades. Thus, unexpectedly, migrants often continued to build houses Furthermore, it 
was assumed that international migration would come to an end in the mid-1970s, while, in 
fact, out-migration has continued since then (see section 6.3.2). Finally, it should not be 
ignored that, though to a lesser extent and at a lower pace, many nonmigrants and internal 
migrants equally construct houses. Indeed, the quest for more convenient, rural or urban, 
housing seems a universal one, and it is unlikely that the (urban) housing boom has come to 
end. 
There is no indication that migrants' investments have led to excessive, general price 
inflation, except for the general increase in land prices, especially in Tinghir and along paved 
roads. This increase in land prices seems indeed to decrease the ability of the poor to 
construct houses at such locations. Constructing adobe houses at less central places is 
relatively cheap. Moreover, almost all people native to the region have acquired land for free 
in their village. Almost all nonmigrant and internal migrant households now live in new 
houses, although their houses tend to be less well equipped (see section 7.5). This, however, 
cannot be the result of migration-driven price inflation, as prices for equipment and 
(imported) household utensils have actually decreased in recent years. Nevertheless, the 
living conditions of the poor immigrants, who live in the decaying ighrem habitat, are 
generally more arduous. 
9.3. Migrant entrepreneurs: Survivors and batroons 
9.3.1. Migration and the propensity to invest in private businesses 
As figure 9.2 demonstrates, the association between migration and investments in commercial 
enterprises (coffeehouses, restaurants, grocery stores, transport and so on) is weaker than for 
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agriculture and housing. Moreover, the relationship is irregular across villages. The strongest 
relationship between participation in international migration and such investments is found in 
Tikoutar. On the whole, returned international migrant households exhibit the highest 
propensity to invest. More than other types of investments, investments in private business 
enterprises seem a specialty of returned migrants. 
Figure 9.2. Investments in non-agricultural enterprises by household migration status, by village (1975-
1998) 
• nonnigrant 
D internal 
• indirect international 
D current internatbnal 
Ξ returned international 
Source: Household survey 
Table 9.7 shows the amounts invested in business enterprises per household category, and 
reveals that the association between migration and investment in enterprises is weak, though 
still significant. Less than one fifth of all the surveyed nonmigrant and internal migrant 
households have invested, compared to one quarter among indirect and current international 
migrants. Among the international returnees, one third has invested. Although measures of 
association are relatively weak, differences in investment levels between households with and 
without access to international migrant remittances are significant. 
Table 9.7. Investments in private enterprises by household migration status 
Migration status Investments in enterprises in dirham 1975-1998 (%) 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current International 
Returned international 
No 
< 
82.7 
81.7 
75.7 
74.3 
64.1 
within 
50,000 
62.1 
65.2 
55.6 
53.8 
30.4 
group of investors 
50-100,000 
17.2 
17.4 
33.3 
15.4 
47.8 
> 100,000 
20.7 
17.4 
11.1 
30.8 
21.7 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
9,799 
11,011 
12,824 
19,878 
I18,38618 
5%trimmed 
3,189 
2,728 
6,419 
9,810 
21,540 
η 
168 
126 
37 
101 
64 
Total 77.) 53.6 24.5 21.8 100.0 26,581 6,014 496 
Source: Household survey (η=0.186**; C=0.232**) 
The Bonferroni multiple comparison procedure revealed the same pattern as for pumps, land 
purchase and real estate investments (see tables 8.4, 8.12, and 9.1): there are significant 
differences between (1) nonmigrant and internal migrant household categories on the one 
hand, and (2) current, indirect, and returned international household categories on the other. 
Between household categories within these groups, differences of means are insignificant. It 
This mean has been inflated due to the existence of one extreme value, representing a rich investor in the 
tourist industry. Without this extreme value, the mean would be 63,985. Looking at the 5% trimmed mean 
values, it remains clear that returned international migrant households tend to invest far larger sums than others. 
In the following tables, this exctreme value has been excluded from the analysis. 
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is important to note that although the group of investors is relatively small compared to 
agricultural and real estate sectors, the invested amounts per investor are relatively large (see 
table 9.9). 
Table 9.8 shows that there is only a weak and insignificant association between 
migration and investments in business enterprises when controlling for income. In contrast to 
agricultural and real estate investments, there is apparently no above-income effect of 
migration on total business investments. However, because return migrants—who tend to 
concentrate on such business investments—are grouped with indirect and current migrant 
households, the important role of return migrants is concealed. The question is, however, to 
what extent these patterns are repeated across the different types of business investments that 
we have distinguished. 
Table 9.8. Investments in private enterprises by international migration participation, by household 
income 
Total 
household 
income 
0-1699 
1700-3749 
>3750 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Investments ir 
No 
88.0 
100 0 
89.5 
78.7 
70.5 
74 5 
70.0 
64.8 
66.4 
ι private enterprises 1975-
within group 
< 50,000 50-200,000 
75.0 
75.0 
68.8 
52.2 
59.0 
50.0 
40.6 
43.2 
20.0 
20 0 
12.5 
26.1 
20.5 
16.7 
37.5 
31.8 
of investors 
>200,000 
50 
50 
188 
21 7 
20 5 
33 3 
21 9 
25 0 
1998(%) 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
Mean 
4,667 
0 
4,056 
9,367 
18,548 
14,077 
30,384 
33,429 
32,499 
η 
166 
25 
191 
75 
7H 
153 
40 
91 
131 
Source: Household survey (C: 0-1699=0.132,; 1700-3749: OAJO'; 2 3150=0.124*) 
Table 9.9 gives an overview of the relative importance of different types of investments and 
their spatial allocation. Table 9.10 reveals to what extent these investment patterns differ 
across household categories. It shows that, in general, the association between international 
migration and investments is relatively weak, but differs according to investment category. 
Representing 42 percent of all new enterprises established by the surveyed households, 
investments in small grocery shops and other retail activities are most common. Although one 
fifth of the stores are located in the villages, over half of the stores are located in Tinghir. 
With an average invested amount of 43,000 dirham, these are relatively cheap investments. It 
is also a business with a fair representation of nonmigrants: A relatively low percentage of 53 
percent of the total invested amount is made by international migrant households, who 
represent 40 percent of all households. Equally, except for international returnees, there is no 
significant association between household migration status and the incidence of investments 
in the retail trade. 
Representing 23 percent of all established enterprises, investments in transport 
enterprises, such as taxis, delivery vans, and trucks are the second most important investment 
category. The most common investment is in the transits, delivery vans that are used as small 
minibuses for the transport of people and goods between the villages and Tinghir. Transits 
hold a crucial position in linking the village to the outside world, and are typically owned by 
relatively wealthy households. Others have invested in Tinghir-based grand taxis, which have 
an important function as inter-urban transport. Migrants often bring transits and taxis to 
Morocco in order to create employment for close family members, that is, "indirect" 
international migrants. Some have invested in the purchase of trucks, with which they 
transport diverse agricultural and industrial products from western Morocco to the Todgha. 
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International migrant households account for 75 percent of the total invested amount in 
transportation. 
Table 9.9. Location of investments by type of private enterprises 
Location Investments in private enterprises 1975-1998 
Village 
Tinghir 
Taghzout 
Other Todgha 
Other 
Café/restauran 
t 
105 
31.6 
105 
21.1 
26.3 
Shop 
173 
51 9 
115 
3.8 
154 
Transport 
58.6 
34.5 
00 
3.4 
3.4 
Other 
20 0 
40 0 
160 
0.0 
24 0 
Total 
26.4 
42.4 
96 
56 
160 
η 
η 
53 
12 
7 
20 
Total 100.0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 125 
η 19 52 29 25 125 
% \52 41_6 232 200 1000 
% total of investments 24 3 25.9 39 2 10.5 100 0 
% total inv by mtl migrant 87.6 52.2 74 8 39.2 68.4 
investments per enterprise 116,816 43,388 114,376 32,598 74,859 
Source: Household survey 
Table 9.10. Incidence of investments and average invested amounts by household migration category 
(1975-1998) 
Household 
category 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect intnl 
Current intnl 
Returned intnl 
Total 
Com Coeff /η 
Café/restaurant 
% 
1.1 
39 
5.3 
7.8 
6.2 
4.1 
Amount 
57 
2,201 
5,263 
9,875 
13,047 
4,617 
0.127/0149* 
Shop/retail 
% 
103 
11 0 
10.5 
10 8 
18.5 
11.6 
Amount 
4,660 
3,072 
2,892 
5,426 
10,048 
4,973 
0 082/0 145* 
Transport 
% 
4.0 
3.9 
10.5 
59 
18.5 
6.7 
0190** 
Amount 
1,882 
4,882 
3,243 
1,814 
39,172 
7,459 
W0214** 
Other 
% 
74 
3 1 
10.5 
69 
6.2 
6.3 
Amount 
2,932 
821 
1,250 
2,328 
1,719 
1,997 
0 085/0 095 
Source: Household survey 
Transportation is the only business where there is a relatively strong and significant 
association with participation in international migration. However, whereas indirect and 
returned migrant households are relatively active in the transport business, current migrants 
participate almost as little as nonmigrants and internal migrants. Apparently, "on site" 
presence is important for this type of business. 
Another typical migrants' activity is the establishment of coffeehouses, restaurants, 
and small hotels. Although the association between migration and the incidence of this type of 
investments is not as high and significant as for the transport business, international migrant 
households account for 88 percent of the total invested amount. International migrant 
households tend to invest far larger amounts in this kind of enterprise. In most cases, these 
investments are made outside the native village, notably in Tinghir and the touristy Gorges du 
Todgha . Some local migrants have invested in commercial activities outside the Todgha 
valley. Like the transportation business, it is rather expensive to establish a coffeehouse, 
restaurant, or hotel. The average invested sum per enterprise is 115,000 dirham. The 
relatively high investment costs might explain why international migrant households are 
overrepresented in these sectors. 
The excluded "extreme value" (see note 18) concerns an inlemalional return migrant who has heavily invested 
in the tourist-oriented hotel and catering industry. 
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Finally, there is a remaining category consisting of various small-scale investments— 
with a mean amount of 33,000 dirham—ranging from telephone shops (téléboutiques), all 
kinds of workshops (e.g., car and motor repair shops, smiths, carpenters) to tailors and 
laundries. There is no clear or significant association between international migration and 
investments in this category, with indirect international migrant households exhibiting the 
highest propensity to invest. Accounting for only 40 percent of all investments in this sector, 
international migration households are underrepresented in this sector on the basis of what 
one would expect from their higher incomes. 
9.3.2. Typology of migrant entrepreneurs 
It is striking that international returnees in particular tend to invest large sums in private 
enterprises. Upon departure, most migrants intend to leave only for a limited period, with the 
ambition to return in order to set up their own enterprise at home. This seems to be 
characteristic for labor migration from the southern Mediterranean. Running their own 
enterprise, that is, being an independent batroon ("boss") back home is the typical ideal of 
most migrants. Besides the social prestige associated with being a batroon and employing 
people, it enables people to be materially self-sufficient. The establishment of their own 
enterprise may allow households to diversify, stabilize, and increase their income independent 
of remittance resources. 
Drawing on a typology developed by Michalak (1997), two basic types of (migrant) 
entrepreneurs can be distinguished. The first type is the 'ayach ("survivor"), the small 
businessmen, and the typical owner of a grocery shop, coffeehouse, taxi, or delivery van. The 
generally small investments made provide a modest income. This is a heterogeneous group, 
including many retired return migrants (often the same ones practicing "sentimental" 
agriculture, see chapter 8), but also nonmigrants and internal migrants. Another representative 
of this group is the indirect international migrant who has received financial support from 
migrated family members in order to set up a small business, such as a transit service between 
the village and Tinghir20. 
Certainly, it is true that many migrants do not realize the dream of returning and 
establishing themselves as successful businessmen, and keep on extending their stay abroad, 
often resulting in family reunification. Many who do return, do only so after retirement, and 
these 'ayaches content themselves with limited investments in real estate and small-scale 
agriculture. 
Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that some international migrants do actually 
return well before retirement in order to set up their enterprises once enough money has been 
saved. This is the second type of entrepreneurs, the veritable batroon ("boss"). They represent 
about one fifth of all the surveyed return migrants and 3 percent of the total population. This 
small but influential group of successful "super migrants" invests large sums in commercial 
enterprises—often in combination with real estate investments in Tinghir. With this, they are 
also capitalizing on urban growth and the increasing importance of tourism in the Todgha. 
These successful "super migrants" tend to possess several stores, coffeehouses, hotels, and 
restaurants in Tinghir, or are active in the transportation business through the ownership of 
On the one hand, one can see such support as altruistic behavior by migrants (cf. Lucas and Stark 1985). On 
the other hand, making nonmigrant family members financially independent can also be seen as a strategy to 
avoid the financial burden of supporting (passive) recipients of remittances. Moreover, some migrants share in 
the profits made from such business. 
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trucks. Some have invested in building hotels along the touristy Route des Gorges du Todgha 
running between Tinghir and the Todgha gorge near to Zaouïa. 
The fact that these "heavy" investors tend to be international return migrants seems to 
be explained by two main factors. First, the presence of the owner in situ seems more 
important for such relatively large-scale investments. Second, their decision to return 
permanently explains their high motivation to invest in the local economy, as they want to 
secure a future income for their family. Third, the business experience and know-how 
acquired abroad possibly plays an additional role. 
Every village contains a number of such entrepreneurs who have often used their 
financial and social resources to gain political influence, for example by becoming a shikh. 
Due to their wealth and good contacts with local authorities, they are able to literally buy such 
influence, and tend to have less difficulties in obtaining licenses for establishing businesses— 
in sharp contrast to the difficulties small entrepreneurs face in their contacts with rent-seeking 
civil servants. 
9.3.3. Spatial allocation of investments and temporal dimensions 
"Super migrants" play a leading role as entrepreneurs in their home villages and have become 
key players in the economic development of Tinghir, where most investments are allocated. 
Even more than investments in real estate, investments in commercial enterprises tend to be 
allocated outside the village (see table 9.11). Only one quarter of all enterprises, representing 
18 percent of all investments, have been established in the village. Accounting for 42 percent 
of all new enterprises, Tinghir is clearly the main focus for investments among the surveyed 
village population. In terms of invested amounts, the "other locations" in the Todgha score 
surprisingly high, which is explained by the heavy investments of some entrepreneurs in the 
hotel and catering sector in the Gorges du Todgha. Only about 16 percent of all enterprises 
have been established outside the Todgha. 
Table 9.11. Spatial allocation of investments in private enterprises 
Location Investments in private enterprises in dirham 1975-1998 
thin village 
tside village 
Tinghir 
Taghzoul 
Other Todgha 
Prov Ouarzaz 
Middle Allai 
Rabat/Salé 
Other 
tal 
Incidence 
33 
53 
12 
7 
7 
7 
1 
5 
125 
% 
26 4 
42 4 
96 
5.6 
56 
56 
0.8 
40 
100 0 
Total investment 
1,650,000 
3,879,300 
174.300 
2,465.000 
572.800 
235.500 
210,000 
170.500 
9,357,400 
% 
176 
41 5 
1.9 
26 3 
61 
25 
22 
18 
100.0 
Per enterprise 
50,000 
73,194 
14,525 
352,143 
81,829 
33,643 
210,000 
34,100 
74,859 
% intl migrant 
85.7 
91.5 
99 6 
100 0 
33 3 
00 
100.0 
100 0 
88 7 
Source: Household survey 
Table 9.12 shows that there are important differences in the degree to which the households 
of the different research villages have been involved in business investments. In Zaouïa, 
Tikoutar, and Tadafelt, about one quarter of all households have invested in enterprises, 
compared to about one fifth in Ait El Meskine, Ikhba, and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul. Whereas these 
differences are not large, there are important differences concerning the amounts invested. 
Zaouïa is clearly the village with the highest investment rates, accounting for 58 percent of 
the total invested amount by all households. The limited possibilities for agricultural 
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development and its proximity to the Gorges might play a role in this preference for 
investments in non-agricultural commercial enterprises. 
Tadafelt exhibits the lowest mean investment per enterprise, which is not surprising 
considering the general poverty of its inhabitants and the relatively recent character of 
international migration from this village. Looking at the involvement of international migrant 
households, we can see that Zaouïa, Tikoutar, and A'it El Meskine score highest. It is not a 
coincidence that these are also the villages with the highest proportion of returned 
international migrants, representing 17, 18, and 20 percent of all households in the above-
mentioned villages, respectively. 
Table 9.12. Investments in commercial enterprises by village 
Village Investments in commercial enterprises in dirham 1975-1998 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul 
Total 
% household 
investing 
26.8 
24.8 
18.3 
21.0 
24.8 
179 
23.5 
Mean inv 
45,557 
14,705 
17,746 
5,927 
4,382 
16,786 
19,377 
Mean/ 
investor 
169,805 
59,386 
96,923 
28,269 
17,681 
94,000 
82,392 
Total inv 
5,558,000 
1,455,800 
1,260,000 
367,500 
499,600 
470,000 
9,610,900 
% 
57 8 
15 1 
13.1 
38 
5.2 
49 
100 0 
% by intl 
migrant 
64.8 
94 0 
82.5 
41 5 
38.8 
46 8 
68 4 
η 
122 
99 
71 
62 
114 
28 
496 
Source: Household survey 
This all adds to the idea that it is mainly in communities with a relatively long-standing, 
rather "mature" tradition of international migration, that migration pays off in terms of 
investments. This "lagged investment response" to migration seems to apply even more to 
business enterprises, as these are mainly concentrated in the hands of return migrants. 
Consequently, the indirect positive (employment and income multiplier) effects of 
international migration on households without direct access to international migration (i.e., 
indirect international migrant, nonmigrant and internal migrant households) only fully 
materialize after several decades. 
It therefore seems surprising that there is apparently no significant correlation between 
migration duration and investments (see table 9.13). This might be related to the fact that the 
relationship between length of stay and investments is not linear. Most truly entrepreneurial 
return migrants return well before retirement in order to set up their businesses. This might 
explain why it is among migrants who stayed 15-28 years abroad that we find the highest 
mean investments. However, the measures for non-linear association (η) also indicate that 
there is no significant link between length of stay and investment level. Apparently, "return 
migration" is the determining factor. 
Even stronger than was already the case for real estate investments, investments in 
private commercial enterprises tend to be allocated in Tinghir. This adds to the idea that some 
migrants capitalize on processes of urban growth, which offer increasing opportunities for 
investments. Interestingly, these investments, by themselves, contribute to this same process 
of urban economic development. Through such investments, more and more employment is 
created outside the traditional agricultural sectors. As we have seen, many nonmigrants work 
in housing construction, small-scale industry (car repair shops, all kinds of handicrafts), and 
service jobs in Tinghir. In this way, international migrants' investments create opportunities 
for the livelihood diversification of nonmigrants too. 
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Table 9.13. Investments in enterprises by length of stay abroad of international migrants 
Length of stay 
abroad 
1-14 
15-28 
>29 
Total 
No< 
75 0 
67 9 
62 3 
68 5 
: 50,000 
125 
179 
94 
133 
Amount invested in dh within group 
50-100,000 
7 1 
54 
170 
9 7 
> 100,000 
54 
89 
113 
85 
Total 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
of investors 
Mean 
51,061 
83,836 
48,717 
61,369 
5%trimmed 
7,710 
14,024 
26,562 
6,014 
η 
56 
56 
53 
165 
Source: Household survey (η=0.049Ι (0.08Γ without outlier); r length stay'investments^O.OZ:1 (-0.034' 
without outlier); €=0.211') 
This stimulating effect of international migration on the development of Tinghir—and, to a 
lesser extent, Ait Aissa Ou Brahim and Taghzout—is not only achieved through the 
employment directly created by their investments in all kinds of enterprises The higher 
standards of living and investments by international migrants have also created a higher 
demand for diverse products and services This increased consumption has created increased 
income earning possibilities for "stay-behinds" 
For example, the construction boom has coincided with a surge in demand for building 
materials, wood- and ironwork. Numerous workshops have sprouted in recent decades in 
response to this (cf Büchner 1986) Tinghir furthermore boasts one of the highest 
concentrations of car repair shops in the Presaharan region, which is undoubtedly related to 
the large number of international migrants possessing and trading cars from Europe Migrants 
also bnng loads of second-hand goods, such as car spare parts, clothes, televisions, mobile 
phones, refrigerators, water heaters, and even washing machines Several Tinghin try to gain 
a living by trading these second hand products on Tinghir's thriving weekly market, and some 
have opened second hand shops The additional advantage for nonmigrants of these informal 
imports has been a considerable drop in prices of products that are far more expensive on the 
formal market due to heavy import levies 
Tinghir has developed into one of the most thriving commercial centers in the 
Presaharan region This is certainly, though not exclusively, related to the increased 
consumption and investments of international migrant households The importance of 
international migration in Tinghir's development is also exemplified by the fact that all the 
major banks of Morocco had already established branches in Tinghir back in the 1970s and 
1980s (cf Büchner 1986) This has undoubtedly stimulated further the establishment of other 
businesses in Tinghir 
9.4. Obstacles to investments 
Notwithstanding this positive evaluation of the impact of international migration in enabling 
investments in real estate and pnvate enterprises, investors are confronted with a number of 
obstacles to investments This makes us conclude that the developmental potential of 
migration is not being optimally realized First, lengthy bureaucratic procedures and 
corruption form clear obstacles to obtaining building and business permits and title deeds on 
land and real estate In particular, small investors without direct access to political power 
(such as the "super migrants", who often occupy political functions themselves) face high 
bureaucratic obstacles, or even opposition, from local authorities 
The confrontation with rent-seeking officials not only increases investment costs, it 
more importantly also perpetuates people's low trust in the state's administrative and legal 
institutions The issue of trust is crucial to investment decisions Most inhabitants of the 
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Todgha have a profound distrust of the central state and its local representatives. The 
perceived unreliability of the state manifests itself also in a general feeling of legal insecurity 
(with regards to property) and a fear of tax collectors. Besides the general distrust vis-à-vis 
the makhzen (the state apparatus and its representatives), this seems more specifically related 
to the fact that the Todgha and its Berber inhabitants were independent of central state power 
until colonization. Todghawis who ally themselves with the makhzen, for instance by 
becoming shikh or moqaddem, are equally distrusted. 
Such circumstances seem to make potential investors hesitant. Although housing is 
generally perceived as a relatively secure investment compared to agricultural and other 
business investments, interviews revealed that house owners face specific problems with non-
paying tenants. It is very unusual to make up rental agreements in order to hide income from 
tax officials. Tenants, in their turn, have no interest in signing leases, so as to avoid any 
liability. The absence of rental agreements makes it all the more difficult for both renters and 
tenants to appeal to the public authorities or legal institutions to protect their rights. It often 
requires many years of lengthy legal procedures to recuperate rent arrears or to expel tenants, 
if they succeed at all. Moreover, many tenants claim not to have sufficient financial resources 
to make up rent arrears, or simply abscond. The informal way of renting and the distrust felt 
towards authorities and the judiciary explains why most home-owners do not even attempt to 
sue non-paying tenants21. 
Here, the informal character of the house renting market and the malfunctioning of the 
judiciary and the bureaucracy seem to constitute major impediments to the success of 
investments. From this, it can be hypothesized that home-owners are deterred by their own or 
others' bad experiences, rent-seeking behavior by officials, and defaulting tenants unwilling 
to leave their houses. The institutions supposed to protect their rights are generally seen as 
their natural adversaries. In these circumstances, homeowners in Tinghir sometimes prefer to 
leave houses empty or leave them to family members for free until a "trustworthy" tenant 
(i.e., somebody from the same village, ethnic group or family) has been found. From this, it 
can be hypothesized that the developmental potential of remittances as an investment resource 
in housing has not been fully realized. 
9.5. Migration, education, and development 
9.5.1. The neglected role of education in migration research 
In the preceding sections, we have seen that, instead of being "opposed" to each other, the 
rural and urban sectors are heavily integrated and, one level up, the same goes for the 
integration of the Todgha into national and international economic networks. Migration plays 
an important accelerating role in these processes. There is one other process, which we have 
not yet discussed, but that seems to play a crucial role in these processes of regional 
integration and generalization of migration, that is, the diffusion and increasing importance of 
education. When regarded as an investment in human capital, education is a fundamental part 
of general livelihood strategies through which households try to diversify and increase their 
income portfolio. 
21
 According to a recent study conducted by the INSEA (Institut National de Statistique et d'Economie 
Appliquée) the problem of non-paying tenants has led lo a reorientation of migrants' investments in Morocco 
The study further indicated that two thirds of all migrants (compared to four fifths in the Todgha) have already 
invested in housing and that whereas 83.7 percent of all previously realized investment projects was in real 
estate, this is only 35 6 percent for the intended investment projects (L'Economiste n01328 07/08/02) 
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In the following chapter, we will discuss how education—along with the impact of 
migration and increasing media exposure—is fundamentally changing the social and cultural 
face of oasis society and tends to raise the aspirations as well as capabilities of youngsters to 
migrate. However, besides a (1) cause of socio-cultural change (its function as "independent 
variable"), education can also be a (2) household investment strategy in human capital which 
potentially contributes to development and personal well-being. Education not only 
potentially enables women and men to access more stable and better paid employment but 
also to increase their general capabilities to stand up for their rights and shape their own lives 
(cf. Sen 1999). Furthermore, since (higher) education requires movement to another place, 
investments in education can also be a factor in (3) causing (internal) migration. 
The role of education in migration processes has been largely neglected in the 
migration and development literature. This is unfortunate, since education is now generally 
recognized as one of the constituent components of social, political, and economic 
development. Moreover, Morocco's literacy and educational participation rates remain among 
the lowest of all African countries, and a large gender gap for adult literacy persists (Spratt 
1992). In this light, it seems vital to analyze to what extent migration has had an enabling 
effect on the schooling of migrants' children in general as well in gender-specific terms. This 
analysis will be the aim of this section. 
9.5.2. The generalization of education in the Todgha valley 
In the past few decades the number of primary and secondary schools has been steadily 
increasing in the Todgha valley. In 2000, there were schools within a reasonable (i.e., 
walking) distance of virtually all villages (see chapter 5). This has coincided with a general 
increase in education levels. However, there are important intra-valley spatial differences in 
illiteracy rates and school enrollment, and there is a considerable gender gap in education. 
As can be inferred from 1994 census data (table 9.14), illiteracy rates are the lowest in 
Tinghir (40 percent) and the highest in the lower Todgha, with rates of 56 and 57 percent in 
Taghzout and Todgha Es-Soufla22. In the whole Todgha, differences between male and 
female illiteracy are high. Over one quarter (26 percent) of the men are illiterate, whereas the 
same goes for two thirds (67 percent) of all women. The younger generations, however, enjoy 
a much better education. Thanks to the presence of primary schools nearby virtually all 
villages in the valley, the official 1993-94 school enrollment rate among 7-12 year old was 85 
percent. 
Whereas the school enrollment rate of boys fluctuated around 90 percent in all parts of 
the valley, the enrollment rates of girls show more differences. Here again, Tinghir girls 
participate relatively more intensively in education than girls in the lower Todgha. However, 
with an average participation rate of 78 percent for the whole valley, the present situation 
seems much more favorable than one or two generations ago, when virtually no girls went to 
school (cf. Van Rooij 2000). Even in the more conservative villages of Taghzout n'Ait Atta, 
69 percent of the girls attend primary school. Socio-cultural obstacles hindering primary 
" In Morocco, the 1999 literacy rate among women above 15 years old was 35 1 percent, which represents 57 
percent of the male literacy rate (61 1 percent) The gender gap in education seems to be decreasing Among the 
15-24 year old age group, the female literacy rate was 57 percent, which was 75 percent of the male literacy rate 
among the same age group Nevertheless, Morocco remains educationally underdeveloped compared to other 
middle income countnes in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. In Algeria, for example, 83 3 percent of 14-
24 year-old women are literate, 91 percent of the male literacy rate In Tunisia the same percentages are 88 2 and 
91 0 percent; and in Turkey 93 6 and 95 0 percent (source: UNDP 2001) 
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school attendance by girls—in particular the idea that a girl's education was unnecessary and 
could potentially endanger their own and their family's reputation—seem to be slowly fading 
away. 
Table 9.14. Gender-specific illiteracy and school enrollment rates (Todgha, 1994) 
Municipality 
Illiteracy rate (> 10 years) 
Men 
Women 
Total 
Todgha 
El Oulya 
27.1 
67 9 
48 1 
School enrollment rate (7-12 years) 
Men 92.9 
Women 
Total 
77.8 
85.6 
Tinghir 
20.2 
58 5 
39.7 
91.6 
84.5 
88.1 
Todgha 
Es-Soufla 
31.7 
77.9 
56.7 
90.0 
68.8 
80.2 
Taghzout 
33 0 
76.4 
55 5 
89 9 
72 0 
81 0 
Total 
25 8 
67.1 
47.3 
91.0 
78.0 
84.8 
Source: Own calculations based on the 1994 national census 
The 1999 survey data presented in table 9.15 show a striking degree of similarity with the 
1994 census data concerning the spatial differentiation in educational participation. Illiteracy 
rates tend to be relatively high in the lower Todgha villages, with the notable exception of 
Ghallil n'A'it Isfoul. As with other indicators—such as wealth and migration participation— 
Tadafelt stands out as the most underdeveloped village with an illiteracy rate of 54 percent. 
Table 9.1S. Gender-specific illiteracy and school enrollment rates in the research villages 
Village Zaouïa Tikoutar 
Illiteracy rate (> 10 years) 
Men 14.8 20.3 
Women 49 3 59.8 
Total 30 3 38.1 
School enrollment rate (7-12 years) 
Men 93.8 96.6 
Women 92.8 95.7 
Total 93.3 96.2 
School enrollment rate (13-18 years) 
Men 72 9 62.5 
Women 47.6 47.1 
Total 63 4 55.0 
Ait El 
Meskine 
22.2 
46 0 
33.3 
100.0 
92 1 
95 9 
85 4 
34.2 
62 8 
Ikhba 
20.9 
64.4 
41 1 
96 2 
82 5 
90.3 
76 0 
21.6 
48 5 
Tadafelt 
40.1 
71 5 
54.2 
96.3 
76.4 
88.3 
73 4 
4.5 
38.5 
Ghalhl n'Ait 
Isfoul 
12.0 
60 0 
33 5 
100 0 
81 8 
93.1 
77 8 
58.3 
70.0 
Total 
23.2 
58 5 
39.2 
96.3 
87.7 
92 5 
73.3 
31.0 
53 8 
η 
1,592 
1,328 
2,920 
328 
260 
588 
322 
277 
599 
Source: Household survey 
Although we should be prudent because the research populations are different, it at least 
appears that illiteracy rates seem to have further dropped, and primary school enrollment 
further increased. Since 1994, school enrollment rates seem to have increased too. In 1999, 
they were over 90 percent in all research villages except for Tadafelt. Since 1994, the gender 
gap in (primary) education seems to have further closed. In Zaouïa, Tikoutar and Ait El 
Meskine, well over 90 percent of all girls attend school, compared to 83, 76, and 82 percent in 
Ikhba, Tadafelt, and Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, respectively. Apparently, girls' school enrolment is 
the lowest in the relatively "marginal" and poorer villages. This corroborates the hypothesis 
that education, wealth, and migration are strongly interrelated elements of the same general 
process of development. 
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Among the 13-18 year old age group, school enrollment is significantly lower, with an 
average rate of 54 percent for all research villages. School enrollment is highest in Ghallil 
n'Ait Isfoul, Zaou'ia, and A'it El Meskine, and lowest in Tadafelt. Compared to primary 
education, the gender gap for secondary education is very large, with 73 percent of all boys 
going to school compared to 31 percent of all girls. With the exception of Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul, 
the gender gap in secondary education increases clearly from upstream (Zaou'ia) to 
downstream (Tadafelt), with the notable exception of Ghallil n'Ait Isfoul. 
Whereas primary school attendance by both boys and girls has almost been totally 
accepted and generalized now, it was very rare for girls to attend secondary school, at least 
until the early 1990s. Going to secondary school used to be mainly a prerogative of girls from 
middle class families that had migrated from other areas to Tinghir to work as civil servants, 
engineers in the mine of Imiter, or as private entrepreneurs. Being higher educated and 
generally coming from urban areas, these immigrants generally had less reservations vis-à-vis 
female education than the autochthonous population of the Todgha. The Tinghir municipality 
was the only exception, where girls represent 28 percent of the pupils at the collège (lower 
secondary school), and 32 percent at the lycée (higher secondary school) (De Haas and El 
Ghanjou 2000a). In more distant villages, virtually no girls attended secondary school until 
recently. 
Low school attendance by girls can be explained by conservative attitudes towards 
women's role in society as well as the fact that the secondary school was considered 
relatively far away. With the establishment of four new secondary schools throughout the 
valley between 1984 and 2000, the situation has radically changed. Most villages are now 
within a short distance of a secondary school. This has had positive implications for girls' 
school enrollment, as parents often oppose the idea of their daughters walking long distances 
through the oasis23, which is seen as a potential threat to the "respectability" of the girls and 
the family's reputation. The same fear tends to deter people from sending their daughters to 
the internat (boarding school). In the upper valley, girls are gradually making up the 
difference in participation rates in secondary education, but that there is still a long way to go 
in more marginal and conservative villages of the lower Todgha valley. 
In her study on gender relations and migration in the Todgha, Van Rooij (2000:36) 
concluded that whereas older women (i.e., above 40) tend to keep their daughters at home to 
help in the household, younger women attach increasing value to the education of their 
daughters. There indeed seems to be an intergenerational upward shift in girls' education. 
9.5.3. The impact of migration on education of household members 
In section 6.8.5, we saw that migration is not selective with regard to education: migrants are 
not significantly better or worse educated than nonmigrants. In order to assess the impact of 
migration on the educational levels of migrants' children, it is interesting to analyze whether 
the children in migrant households are relatively better educated than children in nonmigrant 
households—as could be expected on the basis of their higher wealth—and whether there are 
differences between the different household categories. 
As the younger generation tends to be generally better educated, it is necessary to 
analyze the effect of migration on education levels within age groups. Table 9.16 shows the 
23
 This is particularly a problem in Tadafelt, where girls are not allowed lo attend secondary school in Taghzout, 
as this obliges them to walk through the "hostile" haratm villages of El Hart Ait 'Atta parents say that they fear 
that their daughters will be harassed by the haratm if they have to return home after sunset. 
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relationship between household migration status and education when controlling for age. It 
reveals that within the two oldest age groups (>60 and 45-59) there are no clear patterns, and 
that there is only a very weak and insignificant association between household migration 
status and education. The vast majority (i.e., 96 and 77 percent respectively) have never had 
formal education. 
Table 9.16. Educational level by household migration category, within age groups 
Age 
Migration 
status 
7-14 Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect intnl 
Current intnl 
Returned intnl 
Total 
15-29 Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect intnl 
Current intnl 
Returned intnl 
Total 
30-44 Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect intnl 
Current intnl 
Remmed intnl 
Total 
45-59 Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect intnl 
Current intnl 
Returned intnl 
Total 
</60 Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect intnl 
Current intnl 
Returned intnl 
Total 
Tolal 
None or 
Corame 
5.3 
9.2 
0.0 
3.7 
2.1 
5.0 
26.6 
26.1 
114 
129 
99 
194 
55 7 
53.1 
50 0 
59 3 
35 4 
52.8 
73.4 
77.9 
87 5 
710 
83.3 
76.5 
96.6 
95.9 
100.0 
94 7 
94.2 
95.8 
35.6 
Primary 
85.2 
80.5 
88.3 
74.6 
81.4 
81.4 
40.6 
32 2 
39 8 
35 7 
41 4 
36 9 
30 2 
30 0 
36 4 
27 9 
41 5 
31 6 
25.3 
22.1 
12.5 
29 0 
167 
23 2 
3.4 
4.1 
00 
53 
5.8 
4.2 
42.1 
Educational level (%) 
Lower 
secondary 
9.5 
10.3 
11.7 
217 
16.5 
13.6 
23.4 
20.3 
170 
29.5 
28.4 
24.4 
7.3 
6.3 
2.3 
3.6 
12.2 
6.5 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
13.4 
Higher 
sec 
-
-
-
-
-
-
84 
87 
170 
138 
99 
10 8 
36 
06 
-
50 
4 9 
31 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4.6 
Higher 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.0 
12.8 
14.8 
8.0 
105 
85 
3.1 
100 
114 
43 
6 1 
61 
1 3 
-
-
-
-
03 
-
-
-
-
-
-
43 
Tolal 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
Mean 
level24 
1 04 
102 
1 12 
1 19 
1 14 
109 
1 17 
1 50 
1 84 
168 
170 
1 52 
0 68 
0 84 
0 86 
0.67 
1.05 
0.78 
0.30 
0.22 
0.13 
0 29 
0.17 
0 24 
0.03 
0.04 
0 00 
0 05 
0 06 
0 04 
1 00 
η 
264 
185 
60 
189 
97 
795 
286 
345 
88 
325 
162 
1206 
192 
160 
44 
140 
82 
618 
79 
86 
32 
107 
54 
358 
89 
73 
23 
57 
69 
311 
3,288 
Source: Household survey 
However, these age groups comprise migrants themselves. Therefore, for our analysis it is 
more relevant to study younger age groups, as these comprise migrants' children. Among the 
30-44 years age group, there is a stronger and significant association between migration 
participation and the educational levels of younger household members. Whereas 53 percent 
of the entire age group has never attended school, this rate is clearly lower (35 percent) 
24
 The mean level of education is calculated by attributing values to different levels of education, ranging from 0 
for "no or Coranic" to 4 for higher education. 
Age category <15 15-29 30-44 45-59 >60 
Cont. Coeff. 0.204** 0.258* 0.228** 0.158 ' 0.075' 
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among members of international return migrant households This seems logical, as these 
households generally are in an advanced stage of their life cycle, and have been involved in 
migration for several decades As some of the children of these "mature" migrants may 
already be in their thirties, the effect of migration on education can indeed be first expected 
among returnees' households Other international migrants have simply migrated too recently 
to see any migration effects in this cohort 
Among the 15-29 year old age group, differences in educational levels between 
household categones become more clear-cut While the educational situation of this group is 
significantly better, the rate is again lowest (10 percent) among members of returned 
international migrant households, with only 19 percent of the population never having 
attended school It is sinking that the rates among international (13 percent) and indirect 
migrant households ( 11 percent) are now also significantly lower than among internal (26 
percent) and nonmigrant (27 percent) households On the basis of the relatively recent 
migration participation of indirect and current migrant households, this could indeed be 
expected 
Within the youngest age group of the 7-14 year old children, only 5 percent have 
never attended school Among this generation, primary education has become generalized and 
inter-household differences have therefore largely vanished Consequently, differences in the 
category "no or Corame school" become small, although international migrant and, in 
particular, indirect migrant households (0 percent'), score better than households without 
access to international migration resources 
Concerning secondary education participation in the 30-44 age category, members of 
international return migrant households again score far higher (17 percent) than other 
household categories Among the 15-29 year old age group, however, inter-household 
differences become less clear-cut, although current international migrant households score 
somewhat higher (43 percent) than others The differences are particularly high for 
participation in upper secondary school (lycée) where indirect and current international 
migrant households clearly score better Among the youngest age group, current and return 
migrant households score highest 
The conclusion is that children in international migrant households have a higher 
tendency to attend school, and exhibit higher educational levels with regards to primary and 
secondary schooling However, participation in higher education (university or higher 
vocational education) is less neatly associated with access to international migration 
resources Among the 30-44 old age group, members of international migrant households and 
internal migrant households score clearly higher than other categories, with 11 and 10 percent 
participation in higher education Among the 15-29 year old age group, again these categones 
exhibit the highest rates with 15 and 13 percent participation The lowest rate is found among 
nonmigrant households 
At first sight, it is surprising to find a relatively high percentage of people having 
followed higher education among internal migrant households The educational profile of 
these households is polarized, with relatively high scores on either end of the educational 
scale In order to understand this apparently contradictory pattern, it is important to 
acknowledge that student migration is intertwined with internal labor migration, which means 
that participation in internal labor migration increases the likelihood of participating in 
internal student migration, and vice versa 
However, it is also important to observe that participation in higher education is an 
endogenous variable to a certain extent, as it can be an independent cause of internal 
migration Therefore, the 15-29 age group is somewhat "polluted" In these cases, we are not 
correctly measuring the effect of migration on education, as the independent variable (i e , 
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household migration status) is partly defined in terms of the independent variable (i e, 
participation in higher education) 
When excluding the group of student migrants, we see that educational levels among 
the members of internal migrant households who have not migrated are relatively low Within 
the 7-14 age group, for instance, where student migration does not yet play a role, we can see 
that internal migrants score lowest on educational levels Furthermore, when grouping 
members of households with and without access to international migration, it becomes clear 
that the first group is generally better educated, in particularly in the 15-29 and, to a lesser 
extent, the 7-14 age groups, which comprise most international migrants' children The mean 
levels of education are clearly higher for those within international migration households 
It is particularly striking that indirect international migrant households score high, and 
even highest in the 15-29 age category It is thus not migration participation as such, but 
rather access to remittances-based financial resources that explain educational levels 
Moreover, the fact that indirect international migrant households have no direct access to 
international migration systems, and have to secure their future livelihood in Morocco, might 
be an additional argument to explain why they appear to prioritize the (higher secondary and 
higher) education of their children 
The empirical evidence presented here seems to corroborate the hypothesis that the 
relatively high income of international migrant households allows them to keep their children 
longer at school In poor households, children are often forced to leave school at a certain age 
in order to work Whereas international migrants were not better educated than nonmigrants 
and even less educated than internal migrants, their children clearly are better educated than 
others Migrant remittances seem to play a crucial enabling role in allowing migrants' 
children to attend school 
In order to test whether material wealth is indeed the main explanatory variable for 
higher educational levels among international migration households, table 9 17 displays the 
association between participation in international migration and educational levels within 
income groups, controlled for age In order to maintain sufficient case-loads, nonmigrant and 
internal migrant households have been grouped as "nonmigrant" Among the population 
above 25 years, there is no association between international migration and educational 
levels Although the association tends to be slightly positive in the lowest income category 
and slightly negative in the highest income category, this association is insignificant 
In the 7-25 age category—which comprises most migrants' children and is therefore 
most relevant—the differences become more clear-cut Among households without access to 
international migration resources, the percentage of children that has never gone to school is 
about twice as high as among international migrant households Looking at general 
educational levels, however, the association between international migration and education in 
the lowest and highest income categones is small and insignificant However, in the middle 
income category we find a relatively strong and significant association Interestingly, in the 
same income category we can generally find the strongest association between international 
migration and investments in housing Stated differently, the "above income effect" of 
migration manifests itself clearest in the middle income category 
It is doubtful whether the non-matenal effects of the stay abroad play a stimulating 
role in the education of children, especially because indirect international migrants, who 
never went abroad, also exhibit a high propensity to educate their children It is more likely 
that, as seemed to be the case for agricultural, housing and business investments, the 
relatively stable and secure nature of remittance income can explain why their children tend 
to be better educated than could be expected on the basis of income only Especially in the 
middle income category, income stability and security appears to be decisive in the decision 
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on whether or not to continue education. In conclusion, differing income levels seem to 
explain most of the variation in educational levels, although there is some extra-income 
migration effect, especially among middle income groups. 
Table 9.17. Education by international migration participation by household income, by age 
Age Educational level (%) 
Househ 
income 
7-25 0-1699 
1700-
3749 
>3750 
>25 0-1699 
1700-
3749 
>3750 
Migration 
category 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnlmigrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Source: Household survey26 
Noor 
Coranic 
17.9 
10.9 
17.1 
13.2 
6.7 
9.5 
12.0 
5.3 
7.3 
67 2 
58.3 
65.9 
60.7 
62.1 
61.5 
59.2 
62.2 
61.3 
Primary 
59.2 
60.9 
59.4 
60.7 
49.2 
54.1 
54.8 
59.6 
58.2 
24.8 
29.2 
25.5 
27.2 
26.7 
26.9 
21.7 
24.6 
23.7 
Lower 
sec. 
16.9 
23.4 
17.7 
17.5 
29.8 
24.6 
18.7 
22.2 
21.1 
4.3 
-
3.7 
4.9 
61 
5.6 
5 1 
4 6 
4 7 
Higher 
sec. 
3.9 
4.7 
4.0 
5.1 
9.2 
7.5 
9.6 
9.2 
9.4 
0.5 
1.4 
0.6 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
2.5 
2.3 
2.4 
Higher 
21 
-
1 8 
3.4 
5.1 
4.4 
4.8 
3.7 
4.0 
3.1 
11 1 
4 3 
54 
32 
4.2 
11.5 
6.3 
79 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
level 
1 13 
122 
1 14 
125 
1.57 
143 
1.40 
1.46 
145 
0 47 
0 78 
0 52 
0.64 
0.57 
0.60 
0.85 
0.66 
0.72 
η 
485 
64 
549 
234 
315 
549 
166 
379 
545 
415 
72 
487 
224 
277 
501 
157 
349 
506 
9.5.4. Migration and the gender gap in education 
Migration has potentially positive effects on the education of women. On the basis of a survey 
conducted in the Moroccan regions of Nador and the Tadla, Bencherifa (1996:417-9) 
concluded that international migration had had a positive effect in partially closing the gender 
gap in education. In order to similarly test whether migration has also had a positive effect on 
the educational levels of girls and young women (compared to men) in the research villages, 
table 9.18 displays the association between international migration and gender-specific 
education levels within age categories. The table shows that the vast majority (i.e., 85 to 100 
percent) of women above 30 have never been to school and that almost none have attended 
secondary school. It also shows, however, that this situation is radically better for younger 
generations, although secondary education remains the exception rather than the rule. 
Besides confirming the fact that children living in international migrant households 
(more or less coinciding with the 7-30 age group27) tend to be clearly better educated, table 
7 measures· 
Household income 
0-1699 
1700-3749 
>3750 
7-25 
0.]55' 
0.322** 
0.087' 
>25 
0 192' 
-0 033· 
-0 090' 
Among the population above 30, only weak and generally insignificant (positive and negative) associations 
exist between the level of household migration status and the educational level This is in line with the 
observation that migration itself is not or even slightly negatively selective for the variable education, but that 
migration does have a positive effect on the education of younger household members 
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9.18 shows that the association between international migration and education is stronger 
among women than among men, in particular in the 15-29 age group28. For instance, whereas 
50 percent of the 15 to 29 year old women living in nonmigrant or internal migrant 
households have never attended school, the same applies to only 26 percent of women within 
international migrant households. Whereas only 7 percent of the first group have attended 
secondary school, this is the case for 17 percent of the second group. Among men, the 
association between access to international migration resources and educational levels of 
household members are positive too, but less strong. 
Table 9.18. Educational levels by international migration participation, by sex and age 
Age Educational level (%) 
Sex 
7-14 Male 
Female 
15-29 Male 
Female 
30-44 Male 
Female 
45-59 Male 
Female 
>60 Male 
Female 
Total 
Migration 
Nonmigrant 
Intl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl. migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl. migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl. migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl. migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl. migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl. migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl. migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intl. migrant 
Total 
No or 
Corame 
4 4 
1 6 
3.2 
10.0 
3.7 
7.2 
7.2 
2.1 
4.7 
49.6 
25.6 
38 7 
23.9 
17.0 
20.8 
85.2 
88 0 
86 4 
53.5 
60.8 
57.4 
100.0 
93.8 
96.6 
92.9 
92.3 
92.6 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
35.7 
Primary 
81.9 
74 3 
78 7 
85.0 
84.0 
84.6 
30.0 
24 3 
27 2 
43.3 
57.1 
49.6 
47.2 
52.5 
49.5 
13.1 
120 
126 
45 3 
39 2 
42.1 
-
6.3 
3.4 
7.1 
7.7 
7.4 
-
-
-
42.0 
Lower 
sec 
14 1 
24 0 
183 
5.0 
12.3 
8.3 
35.2 
38.0 
36 5 
5.3 
122 
84 
12.5 
11.3 
12.0 
1.1 
-
07 
. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
134 
Higher 
sec. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
144 
193 
168 
14 
4 6 
29 
4.0 
7.8 
5.7 
06 
-
03 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4.6 
Higher 
-
-
-
-
-
-
13 3 
163 
14 8 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
12.5 
11.3 
12.0 
-
-
-
12 
-
0 5 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4 4 
Total 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
100 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 0 
Mean level 
1.10 
1.22 
1.15 
0 95 
109 
101 
197 
2.23 
2 10 
0 60 
0.97 
0 77 
1.34 
144 
1 38 
0 17 
0 12 
0 15 
0 50 
0 39 
0 44 
0 00 
0 06 
0 03 
0.07 
0 08 
0 07 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
1 00 
η 
248 
183 
431 
200 
163 
363 
347 
337 
684 
284 
238 
522 
176 
141 
317 
176 
125 
301 
86 
97 
183 
79 
96 
175 
85 
91 
176 
77 
58 
135 
3,287 
Source: Household survey' 
For the 15-29 age group, γ is 0.185 for men, against 0.444 for women. In the 7-15 age group, this differential 
drops with values of 0.340 and 0.456, respectively (see table 9.18). 
Age 7-15 15-29 30-44 45-59 >60 
Sex M F M F M F M F M F 
^ 0.340** 0.456*« 0.185*« 0445** 0.088· -0.127' -0 157' 1.000» 0.046' NA1 
No statistics are computed because level of education is a constant. 
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In order to deepen our understanding of the effect of migration on women's education, figure 
9.3 displays the link between age and the proportion of men and women who have never 
attended school specified for households with and without involvement in international 
migration. First, it clearly demonstrates the very strong relationship between age and 
education. Within the last 50 years, primary school attendance has dramatically improved 
from less than 10 percent to well above 90 percent. This exemplifies that a true "educational 
revolution" has taken place in the Todgha. 
Secondly, the figure suggests that at the times when the male "rate of ignorance"30 
dropped rapidly—from over 90 percent among those who did or did not go to primary school 
in the early 1940s (i.e., among the 65 year olds) to less than 20 percent in the early 1970s 
(i.e., among the 35 year old)—women remained excluded from schooling. The gender gap in 
education is the biggest among 35-39 year olds, with a "rate of ignorance" of around 90 
percent among women, compared to 15 percent among men. From the early 1970s on (i.e., the 
30-34 age group), women started to make up this difference in participation rates in primary 
education, a process that was largely completed in the 1990s. 
Thirdly, the general process of improving access to primary education had a disparate 
effect on members of households with and without access to international migration. Looking 
at figure 9.3, it is striking that primary school attendance has increased much faster for girls in 
international migrant households than for others. The differences between those two groups 
are particularly high in the 15-24 age group. Among the youngest age groups (5-14 years), the 
gap has been largely bridged, reflecting the generalization of primary education. 
Figure 9.3. Proportion of men and women who never attended primary school, by age and international 
migration participation 
5-9 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70-
14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 
Source: Household survey 
Based on this analysis, we can conclude that migration has played an accelerating role in 
closing the gender gap in primary education. Furthermore, the positive effect of migration on 
education seems stronger for women than for men. Now that the gendered educational 
Since the variable measured here is whether individuals ever attended at least one year of primary school, it 
should not be automatically equated with "illiteracy". Although primary school attendance can be used as a 
rough estimate of illiteracy, it does not measure the actual ability to read and to write. Actual illiteracy levels are 
higher than the figure might suggest due to the occurrence of early school "drop-out". Many young children 
learn basic writing and learning skills at Coranic school, though generally these are not sufficient to be used 
actively. Coranic school has, therefore, been excluded from this figure. 
Nonmigrant men 
Nonmigrant women 
Intnl migrant men 
Intnl migrant women 
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transition is almost complete for primary education, it is quite possible that this process will 
repeat itself in secondary education, where international migrants' daughters participate 2.5 
times more than girls in nonmigrant and internal migrant households (see table 9.18). 
These results comply with Bencherifa's (1996:417-9) earlier findings, and lead us to 
conclude that international migration has played a positive role in enabling girls to attend 
school. The relevant question here is whether this phenomenon can only be explained by the 
fact that international migrant households enjoy relatively high, stable, and secure incomes. 
After all, this cannot explain why the effect of international migration on education is not 
gender-neutral. What might offer a possible explanation for this is that, as will be further 
analyzed in section 10.4, many international migrant households are headed by women. As 
this leads to a (temporary) increase in migrants wives' influence in household decision 
making, this may also give them more power to fulfill their increasingly strong wish to keep 
their daughters at school. 
9.5.5. Education as a household investment strategy 
So far, the data have suggested that the relatively high, stable, and secure income of 
international migrant households enables them to invest in the "human capital" of their 
children. In order to further test this hypothesis, it seems useful to go beyond measuring 
general levels of education, as this variable does not relate to the exact number of years that 
people attended school. We will therefore analyze the extent to which household migration 
status is associated with the propensity among children and young adults to continue school 
or university over the course of their schooling career. Moreover, in order to assess the 
relative success of such investment strategies, it seems useful to compare unemployment 
levels among school-leavers and graduates. 
With this we should bear in mind that the costs of education pertain not only to 
expenses related to tuition fees, textbooks, educational tools, and, for higher education, travel, 
and housing. The most important costs are related to the loss of work time, and, hence, 
income. It is fairly common for young children (from the age of 7-8) to work in household 
production, such as tending sheep and goats, and helping in the household, and so on. Until 
recently, men used to start working as laborers from the age of 13-14. Each year of education 
means the loss of this work time and potential income. These costs can be considerable and 
tend to increase with age. For (nearly) adult men, in any case, these costs can amount to 1,000 
dirham per month or more31. 
Although expenses on education might appear relatively limited, they have to be 
sustained over many years before any return on investment is seen. The high opportunity 
costs of educational investments are exactly the reason why many children from poorer 
households are forced to leave school at an early age to work in order to make ends meet. As 
the direct and indirect costs of education tend to increase with age, it can be hypothesized that 
the proportion of children following education will decrease faster with age among 
households with, rather than without, access to international migration resources. 
The data presented in table 9.19 confirm this hypothesis to a certain extent. Among 
the 7-9 year old age group, differences in educational participation are very small, although 
31
 The daily payment for most unskilled day laborers is generally between 40 and 70 dirham (e g , 50 dirham for 
agricultural laborers, 60-75 dirham for experienced construction workers, and 40 dirham for inexperienced 
construction workers). It should be noted that these estimates might be too optimistic due to widespread 
unemployment, although unemployment is far higher among highly skilled than among unskilled and lowly-
skilled workers. 
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they are highest among indirect international migrant households. For the 10-14 year old age 
group, differences are small for men, while girls in international migrant households clearly 
exhibit a higher schooling rate. In the age group of 15-19, differences between households 
with and without access to international migration resources become more clear-cut, with 
higher schooling rates for the first group among men as well as women. Again, it is striking 
that indirect international migrant households score highest. 
As higher education requires remarkably more expenses than primary and secondary 
education, one would expect the differences to increase among young adults. What we see is 
that 50, 27, and 31 percent of the 20-24 year old men among indirect, current, and returned 
international migrant households, respectively, are studying, compared to 13 and 19 percent 
among nonmigrant and internal migrant households. However, among those of 25 and older, 
the proportion of men following higher education degrees is relatively high among internal 
migrant households. This unexpected result can be largely explained by the partial 
endogenous character of the education and internal migration (see section 9.5.3). 
Education can be interpreted as a household investment strategy to increase and 
stabilize future income, which is particularly prevalent among international migrant 
households. Until recently, a higher education degree was seen as a kind of job guarantee in 
the future through work as a civil servant. Working for the government has generally been 
considered ideal, as it implies not only relatively high and secure payment, but also social 
security and medical insurance. 
Table 9.19. The propensity of household members to study by age group by household migration 
categories, by sex 
Household migration 
status 
nonmigrant 
internal 
indirect international 
current international 
returned international 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
Male 
Female 
a 
7-9 
95 5 
95.6 
94.6 
85 0 
100 0 
100.0 
100 0 
88.9 
86 7 
100 0 
% currently study 
10-14 
92.6 
67.6 
91.4 
62 1 
917 
94.1 
97 5 
72.7 
100 0 
87 8 
ing within 
15-19 
59 7 
14.8 
53.4 
5.6 
77.8 
30.8 
718 
22.2 
68.0 
24.0 
age group 
20-24 
13 0 
19.0 
36 
50 0 
26 7 
31.6 
2.7 
25-29 
-
12.2 
2.9 
10.5 
6.4 
12.5 
30-34 
-
2.4 
-
-
4.5 
Source: Household survey 
This promise of a better future has stimulated many households to sacrifice everything in 
order to give their children a good education. More than agriculture or other enterprises, 
education is the first investment priority. Although relatively wealthy international migrant 
households are generally better able to educate their children, many nonmigrant and internal 
migrants aim to send at least one son to university. In relatively poor households, the oldest 
brothers and sisters often leave school early in order to work, enabling one or more younger 
brother(s) to study. These students will then often stay with migrated family members in the 
cities. 
32
 Measures of association (yes/no study dependent - not differentiated for sex): 
Age 7-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 
Com coefficient OlOS1 0 139* 0 157* 0 145* 0.154" 0 113' 
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Many international migrants who left their children in Morocco, argued they did this 
from the fear that their offspring would become "spoiled", "westernized" or "drunkards" in 
Europe. Moreover, having experienced the often problematic position of many migrants in 
Europe33, they reasoned it would be better not to expose their children to potentially 
humiliating positions. Back in the 1970s and 1980s, many migrants therefore reasoned that it 
would be better to send them to university in Morocco, which would enable them to live 
secure and comfortable lives as civil servants in Morocco. 
However, this strategy has been only partly successful, since, in the meantime, it has 
become increasingly difficult for university graduates (licensiés) to find a job due to 
government budget cuts and the surge in the number of young people holding higher 
education degrees. Other migrants' sons have left university before obtaining any degree at 
all. Table 9.20 shows that unemployment rates34 among higher educated people in 
international migrant households vary between 18 and 25 percent. This reflects the general 
Moroccan pattern of high unemployment among the young and higher educated (see section 
4.6). The two basic reasons for their inactivity are the lack of proper employment 
opportunities as well as the financially secure position of their households, a situation which 
allows them to refuse semi- or unskilled work. More generally, the mediocre quality of higher 
education, the gap between the type and level of education and labor market needs, 
government budget cuts, and relatively low economic growth have all negatively affected the 
access of young, higher educated Moroccans to the labor market. 
Table 9.20. Unemployment rates by educational level, by household migration status 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
No 
22 
I 0 
12 
2.8 
3.9 
2 1 
Unemployment 
Primary 
37 
1.7 
1.9 
3.3 
2.8 
28 
rate by educational level (> 
Lower sec. 
14 
69 
0.0 
7.3 
104 
6.0 
Higher sec 
3.2 
0.0 
6.7 
3.9 
5.3 
3.4 
I5yrs)(%) 
Higher 
00 
15.0 
27.8 
25 0 
182 
183 
Total 
26 
3.1 
44 
4.8 
54 
38 
Source: Household survey 
Most jobless graduates are forced to return to the Todgha to stay with their families. This is 
generally perceived as an extremely frustrating if not humiliating experience. They find it 
dishonorable to remain dependent on their parents and to be unable to marry. Boredom and 
bitterness characterize their existence. These unemployed young men now form Todgha's 
share of Morocco's "detached middle" (cf. Cohen 2001; see also section 10.3)36. The 
33
 Possibly, international migrants who have not reunified their households also tend to have more negative 
expenences living and working in Europe. 
34
 Note thai in the Moroccan context, "unemployment" is a concept with a limited significance. In fact, many 
people are "underemployed" in the sense that they only work from time to time, depending on the availability 
of—mostly temporary-
35 
Household 
migration 
Cont coeff 
-employment. 
nonmigrant 
0.074' 
internal 
0.647** 
indirect 
international 
0 754* 
international 
0.439** 
returned 
international 
0 359" 
36
 Mass unemployment and frustration among a new generation of relatively well-educated youngsters is a 
general problem in Middle Eastern and North African countries, and it is often suggested that this is one of the 
major explanations for the growing (religious and ethnic) radicalism in the region. In this context, Richards 
(2003,6-7) argued that "Government policies have not only reduced the rate of growth of demand for labor, but 
have also fostered inflexible labor markets. Decades of government job guarantees for graduates have induced 
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unemployed sons (and daughters) of international migrants tend to be full of resentment vis-à-
vis their fathers who did not allow them to join them in Europe. The international migrants 
themselves, confronted with the broken ambitions of their children, tend to regret their choice 
not to reunify their families in Europe. For them, their investment strategy has apparently 
failed. Notwithstanding the fact that higher education is no longer the guarantee of a 
government job, people have apparently not (yet) abandoned the idea that education is of 
paramount importance to secure a better future for their children and, hence, for themselves. 
The generalization of primary and secondary education and increasing participation in higher 
education seems to be an indication of this. After all, better education remains the only way to 
access relatively well-paid and stable jobs, either with the government or in the private sector. 
This is particularly true for households lacking the funds to start large business enterprises. 
Materially, education is the most accessible livelihood strategy for improving future 
livelihoods. Besides housing, such investments in children's "human capital" are considered 
as a "household life insurance". Furthermore, education should not only be valued because of 
its utility in gaining access to better employment. It is also functional in improving the 
capabilities of people to be informed, to stand up for their rights, to participate in local 
politics and, more in general, contribute to the public debate. In chapter 10, for instance, we 
will analyze to what extent improved education has contributed to changes in culture, local 
power relations, and gender relations. 
Indeed, this important developmental dimension of migration deserves more than the 
scant attention it has received up to now. Besides the generally acknowledged importance of 
education for social and economic development (cf. Sen 1999), female education in particular 
tends to contribute to decreasing fertility and child mortality, and to the use of more modem 
health care practices (Spratt 1992). Thus, if access to international migration resources 
enables households to improve their children's education—as this analysis has 
demonstrated—this aspect should be valued as highly "developmental". 
Nevertheless, it is clear that massive unemployment and the difficult access to 
government jobs for non-elite groups that is linked to the alleged corruption during concours 
(entrance examinations for government jobs) constitute clear obstacles for households who 
have invested in the education of their children in order to secure their future livelihoods. This 
has led to bitter frustration among the group of higher educated youngsters who have returned 
to the Todgha empty-handed. Most perceive migration, legal or "illegal", as the only 
remaining option to improve the quality of their personal life. 
9.6. Synthesis of temporal and sectoral allocation of investments 
Table 9.21 summarizes the sectoral allocation of investments by different types of households 
in terms of total amounts invested. Education has not been included due to the difficulty of 
reliably quantifying such an investment. The table reveals that households with access to 
international remittances tend to invest three to six time more on average than nonmigrant and 
internal migrant households. The table clearly shows that housing is the most common type of 
investment, followed by pumps, land purchase, and the establishment of private businesses. 
Housing represents 71 percent of all money invested. Although the incidence of agricultural 
investment in pumping and land purchase is far higher than is the case for non-agricultural 
students to seek any degree, regardless of its utility in the production, since a degree, by itself, has long been a 
guarantee of a government job. Governments cannot now provide the necessary jobs, but statist policies impede 
private sector job creation." 
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enterprises, the amounts invested per enterprise are far higher in the last category. This 
highlights that those investing in private businesses outside agriculture generally invest large 
amounts. The propensity to invest in this sector is particularly high among returned 
international households. 
Table 9.21. Sectoral preference of investments by household migration category 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Internal 
Indirect international 
Current international 
Returned international 
Total 
" 
Investments Der sector as 
Pumping Land purchase 
4.6 
5.5 
6.4 
5.7 
3.6 
4.9 
0.275** 
4.9 
4.2 
5.6 
9.0 
5.6 
6.4 
0.242** 
percentage of total investments 1975-1998 (%) 
Housing 
75.1 
73.0 
82.0 
77.1 
59.0 
71.1 
0.55«*« 
Private 
enterprises 
15.4 
17.3 
5.9 
8.2 
31.7 
17.5 
0.186** 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean total 
investment 
63.748 
63,793 
217,082 
243,605 
373,017 
151,813 
Source: Household survey 
In chapter 2 we hypothesized that sectoral investment preferences tend to change over time, 
and that the full developmental effects of migration take decades to fully materialize. The 
analysis of survey data presented in the previous and current chapter has confirmed this 
hypothesis. Figure 9.4 summarizes the temporal allocation or timing of four main types of 
investments among international migrant households. The figure indicates how many years 
after migration the first investment in each of the investment categories were made. 
Figure 9.4. Temporal allocation of first investment by international migration households, within 
investment categories 
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 >/40 
years after first departure 
Source: Household survey 
The figure confirms that housing investments tend to occur relatively quickly after migration, 
and that other investment types mostly occur at a later stage. Housing investments occur 
relatively early in the "migration cycle" and reach their peak 5-15 years after migration, 
although they also tend to occur relatively frequently in later stages. Besides housing, most 
migrant households concentrate on basic needs and education in the first decade or so after 
migration. Major agricultural investments, such as pump and, in particular, land purchase, 
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mostly occur 15-25 years after migration Investments in private businesses follow a more 
irregular pattern, but reach a peak 25-30 years after migration 
9.7. Conclusion 
Migration is not only a constituent part of the general processes of integration of the Todgha 
into the wider economic and political context and the concomitant diversification of oasis 
livelihoods It is also an independent factor contributing to the further diversification and 
partial de-agranzation of the regional economy through its enabling effect on households to 
invest in local housing, business enterprises, and education Therefore, through its recursive 
developmental effects on the Todgha, migration has the tendency to strengthen and to 
intensify the more general process of integration of the region into the wider political-
economic context and the concomitant livelihood diversification 
The first aim of this chapter was to examine the extent to which migration has affected 
the investment behavior of households in non-agncultural sectors and to explain the spatial 
and temporal differentiation in this behavior The preceding analysis has shown that, similar 
to the effects of international migration on agricultural development, access to international 
remittances has positively influenced investments in non-agncultural sectors International 
migrant households exhibit a higher propensity to invest in these sectors than internal and 
nonmigrant households This largely confirms our NELM-inspired hypothesis that 
international migration is a livelihood strategy not only to stabilize and increase income, but 
also to overcome local constraints on the economic and social "freedoms" of households and 
their individual members Access to remittances enables households to invest in housing, 
business enterprises, and to better educate the youngest generations 
It is a key observation that there is an association between access to international 
migration and investments even when controlling for income This cannot only be attributed 
to the relatively (1) high level, but also to the relative (2) stability and (3) fiature secunty of 
their incomes Possibly, the experience of staying abroad for a sustained period has enabled 
migrants to acquire (4) entrepreneurial knowledge and attitudes However, this only seems to 
play a role among a small group of wealthy "super migrant" entrepreneurs 
The fact that most international migrant households have access to stable jobs and 
European social security systems seems crucial, enabling them to bear the costs and risks of 
such investments Especially in the middle income category—where we find the highest 
"above-income migration effect", income stability and security appears to be decisive in the 
decision whether to invest or not However, as with agncultural investments, our hypothesis 
seems only valid for international migration The investment behavior of internal migrants 
hardly differs from nonmigrant households Access to international migration resources (i e , 
remittances) is the prime discriminatory factor in determining investment levels 
Differentiating between indirect, current, and returned migrants does not remove much 
vanation This further supports the idea that it is pnmanly access to international migrant 
remittances—a high, stable, and secure source of income—that matters 
Concerning the temporal differentiation in investment behavior, the analysis revealed 
a priority for housing and education at relatively early stages of the household life cycle 
Investments in various productive enterprises gain momentum only at a later stage of 
migration Both in terms of amounts invested and timing, housing is the priority investment 
The most visible effect of international migration is the construction of new houses outside 
traditional villages and the related decline of traditional ighrem habitat Instead of adobe and 
stone, migrants often now prefer to construct such houses in concrete and in "modem", urban 
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styles In the case of Tinghir, Ait Aissa Ou Brahim, and Taghzout, this general building fever 
has enabled the transformation of villages into towns, where migrants also seem to prefer to 
locate other investments Second and third houses are generally constructed in one of these 
(semi-) urban centers 
Housing occupies the highest priority on the list of capital investments However, it 
would be erroneous to explain the construction fever only in terms of people's quest for more 
status within their own community, as has often been done in the literature Decent housing is 
universally recognized as a basic necessity of life, and the importance attached to housing can 
partly be explained by a logical quest for more luxury and privacy, less conflict, and better 
physical and mental health Besides such obvious well-being and health aspects, women often 
gain significantly in personal liberty through the establishment of new houses Moreover, it is 
a strategy to protect the interests of the household from material and social claims by kin and 
community members 
Housing should also be considered as an investment strategy that serves the 
households' material interests by generating sources of income independent of external 
migrant remittances Households constructing more than one house tend to do so with the 
specific aim of making profits through later sale or letting Considering the population growth 
and high urban growth in Tinghir, this can turn out to be a rewarding investment strategy, 
which has enabled many migrant households to stabilize and further increase their income 
Moreover, the interviews revealed that the respondents consider housing investments 
as a form of "life insurance" for the family In case of the death of the breadwinner, for 
example, family members are at least guaranteed shelter and will often gain rental income 
This is particularly important in a society where no social services are available for most 
people Housing should therefore be perceived as a logical and relatively secure investment in 
a rather insecure investment environment, which generates additional household income and 
provides "life insurance" for migrant households 
The second aim of this chapter was to assess the role of migration in the more general 
economic-geographical transformations of the Todgha (research question 4) The analysis 
highlighted that, through investments in non-agricultural sectors, international migration also 
contributes to the diversification of the regional economy and, in particular, the urban 
economy of Tinghir The many international migrant households that have built more than 
one house have mostly done so in Tinghir This applies even more to the investments in 
private business enterprises, which are overwhelmingly located in the valley's capital 
Migration has played an active role in enabling the economic-geographical transformation of 
the Todgha valley, which has led an increasing demand for non-agricultural labor 
Migrants' investments not only serve to diversify, increase, and secure their own 
future income, but also create a certain level of employment for nonmigrants Moreover, there 
has been only limited "leakage" of non-agncultural investments by resident households to 
other regions Although one might argue that intra-valley rural-urban inequality has been 
reinforced by the allocation of investments to Tinghir, migration has contributed to mitigating 
the development gap between the Todgha as a whole and the more central regions of 
Morocco In comparison with surrounding areas (e g , High Atlas, Saghro, Tafilalt, Drâa) the 
Todgha valley has even become relatively prosperous This is not only visible in the 
construction boom and Tinghir's commercial development, but is also manifested in the 
occurrence of internal labor migration from other areas of Morocco to the Todgha valley (see 
section 6 7 1) The construction boom and increasing business activities have created a surge 
in the demand for laborers, particularly in housing construction, which cannot be fulfilled 
locally or even regionally This has triggered "reversal" migration from the above-mentioned, 
poorer regions to the Todgha valley 
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The way in which international migration has played an accelerating role in the rapid 
urban development within the Todgha valley seems to reflect patterns found in other migrant 
sending areas in Morocco, such as the Rif (Bemane 1997), where boomtowns in migrant 
sending areas have also become important destinations for internal migrants Notwithstanding 
the dominance of housing, there is a certain diversification, in which the importance of other 
types of investments, especially in the service sector, seems to be growing Many migrants 
create small-scale projects in trade or services, either for themselves or for close kin they have 
left behind This also reflects patterns found by (Bemane 1997) in northern Morocco 
Thus, the recursive developmental effects of international migration on a certain 
region (e g , through investments by international migrant households) can create the 
economic-geographical conditions for subsequent internal migration towards the same region 
of international out-migration 
Nevertheless, the analysis has also demonstrated that the institutional constraints such 
as alleged corruption, red tape, as well as the general lack of trust vis-a-vis the makhzen form 
clear constraints to investments in private enterprises, especially for relatively poor 
households lacking good connections and political "shortcuts" This leads us to hypothesize 
that the developmental potential of migration is certainly not being fully realized It can 
equally be hypothesized that the far-from-ideal investment environment and the concomitant 
lack of trust in institutions reinforces the tendency among many migrants to reunify their 
households at the destination—a process through which these households "disappear" from 
the oasis—or to allocate investments in the relatively secure housing sector 
Another way in which the recursive developmental effects of migration tend to 
influence people's propensity to migrate and directly create other forms of migration is 
manifested in the effects of migration on the education of younger household members 
Whereas international migration itself was not selective for education, younger members of 
households with access to international migration resources (i e , migrants' children) are 
significantly better educated Children of international migrants exhibit significantly higher 
education rates at all levels, including higher education, than children within nonmigrant and 
internal migrant households Furthermore, international migration has clearly played an 
accelerating role in closing the gender gap in primary education However, whereas internal 
migration is not positively associated with agricultural and business investments, internal 
migrant households clearly are in a better position than nonmigrant households concerning 
education The presence of labor migrants in town decreases the costs and risks associated 
with the education of a younger brother 
However, mass unemployment among higher educated youngsters may also partially 
remove people's incentive to put too much money and effort into higher education There is 
widespread frustration among a whole new generation of well-educated youngsters in the 
Todgha, who feel that they will never be able to realize even a part of their aspirations in the 
Todgha or even in Morocco The perceived exclusion and the general lack of prospects make 
them bitter This only reinforces their tendency to revert to international migration as the one 
and only way to fulfill their ambitions 
It is this role of migration in changing attitudes, values, aspirations, and social 
relations that will be at the center of the following chapter 
10 
From oasis to paradise 
10.1. The role of migration in socio-cultural change 
Within the whole complex framework of socio-economic transformations the Todgha has 
witnessed over the past decades, migration has perhaps been the most prominent 
development, not only because of its magnitude, but also because of its profound impact on 
the daily life of most oasis families and on social relations within oasis society. It is 
particularly through the experience of migration that general processes such as "integration 
into the modem state and market economy" or "globalization" are concretely manifested for 
oasis dwellers. 
It would be erroneous to depict migration only as an economic phenomenon (cf. 
Renters 1999). To a large extent, migration is also a social event in its causes and 
consequences. The social and economic dimensions of migration can hardly be separated. The 
fact alone that migrants send remittances is an expression of the intensive social bonds they 
tend to maintain with kin back home. Social and ethnic bonds also affect the selectivity of 
future migration—the likelihood of migrating is clearly higher for people with access to 
"social migration capital" in the form of already-migrated relatives. 
The impact of migration has important social and cultural dimensions, which—within 
a human capabilities perspective—have an intrinsic value as constitutive components of 
development. Moreover, in their turn, social, cultural, and institutional changes are likely to 
have their recursive impacts in the economic realm. The socio-cultural effects of migration 
may have recursive effects on people's future propensity to migrate and are also likely to 
(negatively or positively) affect perceptions of local economic opportunities and, 
consequently, the propensity of migrants to invest in and/or return to the Todgha. Through its 
effects on socio-ethnic stratification, migration may also challenge traditionally established 
power relations and the functioning of village institutions, which might, in their turn, affect 
economic production and oasis agriculture in particular. 
The social and cultural effects of migration are also likely to influence the distribution 
of social and economic "freedoms" emanating from labor migration across communities, 
households, and individuals. From a capabilities perspective on development, the 
distributional dimension of development ("equity") is equally as important as the 
accumulative dimension of development ("efficiency"). Changing value systems and social 
stratification affect the extent to which the social and economic benefits (and costs) of 
migration are distributed among ethnic groups, households, and sexes. Previous chapters have 
indicated that, in recent decades, migration has increased income and wealth in general, but 
has also created intra-community inequality between international migration "haves" and 
"have-nots"—although it should not be ignored that traditional oasis society used to be 
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inherently unequal, and denied basic human freedoms to large sections of the oasis 
population 
However, besides inequality at the inter-household level, it is important not to ignore 
inequality at the intra-household level To conclude that international migrant households 
tend to be wealthier and enjoy better living conditions does not mean to say that the benefits 
(or drawbacks) of migration equally accrue to all household members While some 
individuals within households might increase their "freedoms" through migration, some might 
potentially see their "freedoms" decrease Individuals within oasis households are typically 
not equal, in particular not along gender lines 
In order not to ignore these important and development-relevant dimensions of 
migration, this chapter explores the impact of migration on social and cultural life in the 
Todgha valley, and in particular the extent to which migration has affected social 
stratification, gender roles, culture, and institutions (research question 5)9 First, it will 
analyze to what extent migration has affected traditional patterns of socio-ethnic stratification 
and inter-household inequality (research question 5 a) Second, it will study the role of 
migration in changing local tastes, preferences, ambitions, perceptions, and to what extent 
such changes have contributed to the emergence of a "culture of migration" (research 
question 5 b) Subsequently, the analysis will focus on the way internal and international 
migration has affected intra-household gender roles and gender inequality (research question 
5 c) The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the role of migration in local processes of 
institutional change (research question 5 d) 
10.2. Migration and new patterns of socio-cultural stratification 
Migration has created a new socio-economic divide—in terms of income, general standards of 
living, and social status—between households with and without access to the European 
migration market In past decades—to be more precise, since the definite incorporation of the 
Todgha into the European-Mediterranean migration system in the late 1960s—the Todgha has 
witnessed the emergence of an "international migration elite" or a "class" consisting of 
households with direct access to high wages, social security and residence permits in Europe 
Access to international migration and remittances is the main determinant of socio-economic 
status in contemporary oasis society Although there is a small group of relatively wealthy 
nonmigrants and immigrants—mainly local businessmen, schoolteachers and other civil 
servants—international migration is now the prime avenue of upward social and economic 
mobility 
Considering the fact that no less than 41 percent of all surveyed households have 
direct (33 percent) or indirect (7 percent) access to international migration resources, we can 
hardly speak of a migration "elite" but rather of a new socio-economic divide in the Todgha 
Traditional determinants of social status and wealth (e g , religious status, ethnic background 
and land possession) have decreased, and access to monetary income has increased in relative 
importance as a determinant of social status To a significant extent, this has eroded 
traditional socio-ethnic hierarchies Inequality based on access to international migration 
resources has been largely superimposed upon traditional, largely hereditary forms of 
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inequality based on religious nobility (e.g., shurfa, igurrameri), ethnic affiliation and 
complexion (e.g., imazighen, haratin, ismakhen), and land and water possession'. 
In particular, the significance of complexion in determining socio-economic status has 
decreased. Although still considered inferior by other groups, the fact of being hartani, for 
instance, is now less a determinant of socio-economic status than it used to be. For 
traditionally subordinate ethnic groups such as the haratin, migration has created new 
opportunities for upward social mobility. We have seen that migration has not been very 
selective according to complexion: both imazighen and haratin have migrated abroad, 
although the former group somewhat more and at an earlier stage than the latter group. In 
fact, tribal affiliation (Ait Todoght participated more, A'it 'Atta less until recently), 
membership of an "international migration lineage" (either imazighen or hartani), and the 
location and relative isolation of the village are more important than complexion in 
determining migration participation. 
Investments in large, concrete houses and the purchase of land and various consumer 
goods not only improve living conditions and the general well-being of the migrant 
households, but also symbolize their newly acquired material and social success. The 
numerous gifts international migrants tend to bring, the marriage and circumcision feasts they 
organize, and the cars in which they tend to come back during the summer holiday season are 
other status symbols expressing their upward social mobility. 
International migrants also invest in symbolic-religious capital, as is manifested 
through pilgrimage, mosque building, and alms giving. Throughout the Todgha valley, 
migrants play an important role in the construction of spacious new mosques in their native 
villages. Furthermore, international migration has enabled more and more Todghawis to 
fulfill the religious duty of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Indeed, the vast majority of hajji 
(pilgrims to Mecca) in the Todgha valley are international migrants. As it is relatively 
expensive to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the hajj not only fulfills a personal, religious 
function, but also adds to the prestige of the pilgrim. The ability to make the hajj is proof of 
one's success in life. Hajji are generally esteemed and treated with respect. It is also more or 
less expected from international migrants that they invest part of their financial wealth in 
mosque building and pilgrimage2. Those who do not risk being criticized by others as selfish 
or, worse, having lost their faith while in Europe. As pilgrimage has become rather common 
among migrants, fulfilling the hajj more than once has become a means of accentuating one's 
devoutness. 
However, it would be erroneous to assume that international migrants and their 
relatives are universally regarded as highly respected members of society. The attitude of 
nonmigrants vis-à-vis international migrants is rather ambivalent. In line with observations by 
Strijp (1997) in the Rif, migrants and their household members are both praised and vilified. 
People's jealousy of migrants tends to be expressed through by strong moral-religious 
criticism. According to Tadafelt's nonmigrant population, for instance, two types of migrants 
exist (Otte 2000)3. The "good" migrant shares his earned money with poorer villagers. 
Migrants are considered as "bad" and "selfish" if they do not share their wealth with other 
1
 This process has been enabled by legal changes following the incorporation of the valley into the modem state, 
which implied the abolishmenl of slavery and the introduction of national law proclaiming the legal equality of 
people, regardless of ethnic or other hereditary background. 
1
 Following Bourdieu (1979), one can say that international migrants opt for investments in rather secure, 
traditional status symbols. As with most nouveaux riches, they tend to be culturally uncertain, and tend to follow 
rather conservative patterns of symbolic investment, such as the above-mentioned investments in religious 
capital. 
3
 The following paragraphs on nonmigrants' attitudes towards migrants heavily draw on fieldwork by Otte 
(2000) 
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villagers besides their own household and family. Nonmigrants tend to consider such 
migrants as "arrogant", who do not help the villagers and look down on their way of life. In 
this context, a "good person" means a "good Muslim", who has the obligation to take care of 
the people of the village. This means that a "good" migrant is expected to share his money 
with relatively poor "stay-behinds". After all, donating to the poor and needy is one of the 
essential religious duties of Islam. Suchzakat is obligatory for Muslims and constitutes one of 
the five "pillars" of Islam. Only when enough zakat has been paid is the rest of a Muslim's 
property considered purified and legitimate. According to the villagers, "good" people are 
mainly found among returned migrants. Most young and still-abroad migrants, who only 
return during summer holiday, showing off their material wealth, are considered "bad". In a 
way, not engaging in "shared poverty" (cf. Geertz 1963) behavior entails the risk of being 
criticized as a bad Muslim. This way of putting social pressure on migrants to share their 
wealth with family and community members is another example of the so-called "downside 
of social capital" (Portes and Landolt 1996; see also 6.8.3 and 9.2.5). 
Especially young, recent migrants tend to be accused of selfish and haughty behavior. 
As one respondent stated: 
They return each year with their nice cars because they know other people in the village are 
jealous. They all look down upon us They think they are European now, and have become as 
selfish as Europeans. Take Said. At school, he used to be a good friend of mine. But since he 
moved to Spain, he has changed completely. He is so arrogant now. He now tries to ignore 
me. And when I ask him to take me to Europe, he says he cannot help me because the borders 
are closed now. But I know that he is lying. Two years ago his brother also moved to Spain. 
He just does not want to help me. 
They seem less inclined than most of the elderly people to share their wealth by distributing 
gifts, employing others, and helping community members to migrate. There indeed seems a 
tendency for (younger) people to attempt to escape from the pressing obligations of the social 
environment through forming nuclear households (see chapter 7), constructing new houses 
(see chapter 9), or reunifying their household in towns or at the destination. In the interest of 
preserving a certain level of wealth and privacy, stricter boundaries are drawn between the 
household and the outside world. This largely reflects a general cultural change towards a 
preference for nuclear households. 
There is widespread gossiping on the bad behavior of migrants in Europe (e.g., the 
tight clothes and "loose hair" of migrants' daughters, pre-mantal sexual contacts, drinking, 
smoking, and so on), which adds to the image that many migrants, and in particular their 
children, have lost their faith and traditions. 
Basou stared at the ravishing migrants' daughters who were walking arm in arm in Tinghir's 
center. The four high-heeled girls wore stylish, tight pants and were carefully made-up; three 
of them wore tight, smart headscarves. He sighed. "If I could ever marry one of these girls, 
then I would be saved" He paused and stared at them. "The problem is that when I try to talk 
to them, they only laugh at me They are very beautiful, but you cannot trust such girls. Most 
are in fact whores". In Europe, they smoke, drink, and visit bars. They might wear 
headscarves, but look at their pants! It must be difficult to live with such a girl " 
Nonmigrants also tend to criticize migrants' children for their alleged poor knowledge of 
Tamazight Berber, Arabic, and the Muslim religion. Migrants, in their tum, tend to do their 
"Whore" is commonly used to indicate a woman who is not a virgin, or, in a larger sense, has "loose" habits 
and freely talks to men. Such women are considered "unsuitable" for monogamous marriage. 
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best to prove the contrary. Many in the villages also say that migrants who present themselves 
as pious during their holidays in the Todgha, in fact are all too happy to paint the town red 
back in Europe. International migrants in particular, who have not reunified their families, 
and have stayed alone in Europe for decades, are especially suspected of such "hypocrisy". 
Ironically, these migrants typically say that one of the main reasons why they left their wife 
and children in the village is the fear that they would become too westernized in Europe. 
On a hot summer's evening, I sat with Hamid on one of the terraces of Tinghir's center on the 
sidewalk of Boulevard Mohammed V. The center was crowded with migrants' cars riding to 
and fro. A Peugeot 405 with a French license plate parked in front of us—five women on the 
rear seat and two men on the front seat. The driver was dressed in an immaculately white 
jellaba. His passengers apparently were not family or friends, because they quickly 
disappeared after having stepped out of the car. He possibly played the usual role of taxi-
driver that is so typical of migrants. The driver proudly walked to the coffeehouse next to us, 
where the other men enthusiastically greeted him. He sat down and started to talk, the eyes of 
the other men were all directed towards him. He was obviously the center of attention. 
We looked at the "successful migrant" scene for a while. Then Hamid said: "That old 
man over there is from my village. He left the Todgha some thirty years ago. He now lives in 
Paris, and returns only once every three or four years. He never took his wife and children to 
France. He just sends enough money to allow them to survive. His children barely know him, 
and hate him because he did not allow them to come to France People say that he does not 
want them to come, because he dnnks, visits nightclubs, and has a French girlfriend. He does 
not want to have them around, because they will disturb his life. When he is on holiday, he 
tries to act as a good Muslim, to do all his prayers and visit the mosque. But he is a hypocrite. 
When you talk to him, you can smell the stench of wine" 
Strijp (1997:160-1) interpreted such moral-religious criticism by nonmigrants as an attempt at 
"symbolic domination" by them. Feeling (materially) deprived vis-à-vis international 
migrants, nonmigrants try to stigmatize them as morally inferior. Migrants themselves often 
have the feeling of being caught between several fires, as they have to maneuver between the 
many requests for financial and practical assistance, their personal interest in keeping enough 
money for themselves, and presenting themselves as "successful" migrants. This also applies 
to the household members they leave behind, who are equally considered rich. Migrants often 
do not feel understood by nonmigrants. As a migrant, who spent his summer holiday in the 
Todgha, said: 
People here don't understand us. They only think of us as a bag full of money, while they do 
not understand that we have to work hard. When I try to explain that our salaries might be 
high, but that life in Europe is very expensive, they simply don't believe me. They think that I 
am incredibly rich. They all hold out their hand, and they all expect me to bring gifts. But the 
worst are the continuous requests for visas. Everybody wants to talk to me, and they all seem 
friendly, but what they really want are visas. And if you meet a nice girl, the first thing she 
asks is whether you want to marry her. I like to come back each year, because this is my bled, 
and after a year in France, I cannot wait to go to Morocco. But after a few weeks here, I long 
to go back to France, where my home is. 
However, in their direct contacts with migrants, nonmigrants are generally friendly and eager 
to maintain relationships with them. Criticism is mostly expressed in a subtle, indirect way. 
After all, migrants can be of great help in obtaining goods, money, and work. Nonmigrants 
are partly dependent on the employment created by international migrants' investments and 
their need to have their fields and houses maintained. Contacts with migrants can also serve to 
348 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
obtain visas or to establish migrant-nonmigrant marriages5. The potential opportunity of 
gaining access to international migration is reason enough not to spoil relations even with 
"bad" migrants. 
The general image of the international migrants as rich and successful puts high 
expectations and pressure on new migrants. This explains why less successful migrants 
generally prefer not to return instead of having to admit their failure. The increasing number 
of undocumented migrants generally do not even have the possibility to return. They typically 
stay away for years, until they have managed to acquire residence permits and stable 
employment. Only a small minority never return. Migrants tend to save money during the 
entire year in order to give the impression of the wealthy migrant in the Todgha during the 
summer holidays. Through this pressure to show off one's success and the social obligation to 
distribute money and presents generously, an average summer holiday spent in Morocco tends 
to be expensive. Several respondents stated that this was one of the main reasons they did not 
return each year. As one respondent said: 
It is very expensive to go to Morocco. You have to prepare your car, buy new clothes for your 
family, buy many presents, and pay for the petrol and toll on the road. Once in Morocco you 
keep on spending money to pay the border officials, police, and to help family members and 
friends who ask for my assistance. Each time we go, it really drives me crazy It takes months 
of preparation and lots of money. Six weeks of holiday in Morocco will cost me at least 
30,000 dirham. It can therefore be more relaxing to spend the summer in the Netherlands or to 
visit family in Belgium and France. 
Although it is certainly not the only cause of social change, migration has certainly 
accelerated the breakdown of the former socio-ethnic stratification in the Todgha. It is in 
particular through migration that many individuals belonging to a traditionally inferior group 
(i.e., landless sharecroppers, haratin, and sismakhen) have acquired a higher social status. 
Such processes of partial emancipation-through-migration have been described in several 
Moroccan oases (De Haas 1998; Ilahiane 2001; Mter 1995). For these groups, migration has 
offered new opportunities to earn an external income independent of the severe social and 
economic constraints of traditional oasis agriculture, and has therefore clearly been a 
liberating experience. Migration has contributed to the emergence of new patterns of social 
stratification, which is primarily based on monetary income, and in which international 
migrant households form a new kind of nouveau riche. 
Nevertheless, descent and ethnic affiliation still play an important role in social 
interaction. For example, intermarriage between different ethnic groups has remained rather 
unusual. In particular, marriage between hartani men—regardless of their material wealth— 
and imazighen women is still largely taboo. 
"Do you know what I have heard? It is unbelievable. A man in our village was visited by a 
neh man who works in France. He asked for the hand of his daughter. But he was a Negro! 
How dared he! Who do they think they are9" Abdallah, my Ait 'Atta informant who told this 
anecdote, was visibly amused by the very thought. All the other 'Attawi men roared with 
laughter. "What did the father do", I asked. "Of course he chased him away. This was an 
insult for him. An 'Attawi could never entertain the thought that his daughter would marry a 
black man" 
In order to oblain tounsl visas or residency permits for almost all European countnes, it is necessary to have 
family or friends residing in the country of destination who are willing to stand surety 
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For many Ait 'Atta, it is painful that many of their haratin neighbors have accumulated 
considerable wealth. Nevertheless, as they often state, "all of this cannot remove the color of 
their skin", which remains, for Ait 'Atta and Ait Todoght imazighen, proof of their humble 
descent. For this reason, most Ait 'Atta—no matter how much they are in need of money— 
refuse to sell land to haratin. 
10.3. From oasis to paradise ... A culture of migration 
Please try to understand me. I have nothing to lose. This is no life here I have no job, no 
money, nothing. I cannot even marry. Here I am dead anyway. So, either I remain dead or I go 
to Europe. I do not fear the risks of taking Ά patera6. When I go, I at least have a small chance 
to survive. If you cannot find me today or tomorrow, you know that I am in Europe 
(Mohammed, 26, university graduate) 
Migration has not only affected the social and ethnic fabric of traditional oasis society; it has 
also played a significant role in processes of cultural change. For instance, migration seems to 
be influencing local tastes and styles, which is becoming particularly visible in the 
construction of urban-style houses, which strongly deviate from the traditional Presaharan 
architecture of the adobe igherman. Furthermore, as many (internal) migrants work or study 
in Arabic-speaking areas, migration has played an independent role—besides the strong 
influence of education and the media—in stimulating the use and knowledge of Arabic in this 
Berber-speaking area7. Even among migrants living in Europe, there is an increasing tendency 
to speak darija (Moroccan colloquial Arabic)8. 
However, it seems erroneous to perceive the influence of migration as a one-way 
intrusion of urban, modem, or Western influences into traditional, rural areas. On the 
contrary, the increasing confrontation with the outside world has also provoked local 
(counter-) reactions. Concerning the use of language, there is an increasing consciousness, 
pride, and affection for the mother tongue, Tamazight Berber, which seems to be very much 
due to this increasing confrontation with, use of and perceived threat of Arabic. Several well-
educated, often unemployed young Todghawis are active in Berber associations, which have 
sprouted in recent years following a political change towards more permissive cultural 
policies by the Moroccan state. 
Berber-awareness seems particularly high among the Diaspora of second generation 
Moroccans in Europe. Increasingly, such activists have transnational links, in particular 
through the internet9. Berber consciousness—in its modernist, largely de-tribalized, and 
internationalized form—is increasingly important in identity formation among the Todghawi 
youth. It gives a sense of identity and self-esteem to these young people who feel socially, 
economically, and politically excluded, and who tend to blame the "suppressing Arab elite" 
for their perceived backwardness and general lack of perspectives. As one respondent said: 
6
 Paieras are flat-bottom launches that were built for sprat fishing off the Moroccan coast, some of which are 
now used to ferry groups of 20 to 30 migrants across the Strait of Gibraltar. 
7
 Such impacts have also been described for other parts of rural Morocco (cf. Crawford 2001 ). 
8
 Migrants themselves explain this tendency by the fact that, in Europe, they meet Moroccans from other regions 
who speak either Arabic or different Berber languages, such as Tanfit or Tassusit In this context, Moroccan 
Arabic functions as a lingua franca 
9
 There are many Berber websites, on which migrant and nonmigrant youth discuss various issues and exchange 
information. There are even some special websites dedicated to the Todgha (http.//gtf asso.free.fr/gtfl php3; 
http://gtf.asso.free.fr/forum/index.php, http //www.tinghir.net; http //iquebec.ifrance.com/todra/, 
http://www.siteavie com/tinghir/, http .//www amazigh.info/). 
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It is the fault of the Arabs that we do not have work. For us it if very difficult to find a job in 
town. Without corruption or the right connections, it is impossible to get a good job. Even at 
university, Berbers are discriminated against and get lower grades. Also in the Todgha, the 
Arabs and the makhzen are stealing our riches. We have a mine. Nevertheless, all the profits 
go to the Moroccan state. If the Arabs were not here, we would not have all these problems. 
We have no empirical evidence to assess to what extent such perceptions reflect reality. What 
is relevant though, is that such feelings of structural exclusion are the dominant perception of 
reality among many young and relatively well-educated Todghawis. 
There is some empirical evidence from other countries that migration might also affect 
local (rural) religious life in Muslim society, as both internal and international migration tend 
to confront people with new, more puritan or fundamentalist religious norms. Bernal (1999) 
argued that, in a Sudanese rural community, return migrants from Saudi Arabia had 
stimulated the rise of fundamentalist Islam and the parallel decline of popular Islam. Due to 
the high social status of migrants, fundamentalist Islam was identified with progress and 
prosperity. 
In the Todgha, migrants have not played a similarly prominent role in the rise of 
fundamentalist Islam. Certainly, besides the "Berberists", a minority of unemployed ex-
students who returned to the Todgha have converted to "fundamentalist" Islam and have 
sometimes become active in fundamentalist associations such as Al Adi wa-1 Ihsane ("Justice 
and Benevolence") of the popular Cheikh Yassine. They take new pride in their "newborn" 
religious identity, and they find recognition within the local circle of fundamentalists. 
However, migrants do seem to play a more important role in the rise of orthodox, 
relatively puritan Islam, which is not fundamentalist but clearly deviates from popular 
Islam10. The rise of orthodox and fundamentalist Islam in the Todgha coincides with the 
parallel decline of popular Islam. On their return from cities and abroad, labor and student 
migrants tend to criticize (allegedly pre-Islamic) practices such as the veneration of marabuts 
(local saints) and mountains, sorcery, the tradition of ahidus (mixed dancing and music 
making during village feasts), and the traditional practice of tattooing women's faces and 
bodies. Indeed, most such practices are rapidly declining under the combined influence of 
migration, formal education, the state-controlled mosques, and the media, which are all 
channels through which "correct" Islam is propagated. It is nonetheless difficult to 
disentangle the influence of migration from other influences, which are equally or even more 
important. 
The most significant cultural impact of migration, however, seems to be its role in 
"mobilizing" the mindsets of people. In the early twentieth century, the rhythm of local life in 
the Todgha was still determined by agriculture. The high seasons used to be fall and spring, 
when most crops are harvested and fields are ploughed. Today, the yearly economic and 
cultural high season is the July-August summer holiday period, when international migrants 
return temporarily from Europe in their cars and transit minibuses, generally loaded with gifts 
and merchandise. Most marriages take place during this season, and the markets are at their 
busiest. The local youth in particular look forward to the exciting summer holiday season. In 
this way, migration has led to a reversal of traditional patterns of seasonality, reflecting the 
decreased relative importance of agriculture. 
10
 Orthodox Islam refers to the official version of Malekite Islam recognized by the Moroccan sovereign. 
Orthodox Islam is mostly associated wilh urban, elitist Morocco, and contrasts with the popular Islam of rural 
Morocco. Orthodox Islam should not be confused with fundamentalist Islam, which is a modernist religious 
movement rejecting both orthodox and popular Islam 
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The regular return of migrant role models and exposure to their relative wealth seem to 
have increased the feelings of relative deprivation and the material and social aspirations of 
the "stay-behinds"—even though their standard of living has actually increased over the past 
decades". The encounter with migrant wealth takes place not only in the summer but all-year-
round, as all the villages contain large numbers of households that receive remittances from 
one or more family members living abroad. Moreover, the Todgha is developing into a tourist 
destination, which implies that oasis dwellers are even more intensively confronted with 
"incredible" Western affluence. 
This has given rise to the emergence of a "culture of migration", in which international 
migration is strongly associated with personal, social, and material success, and in which 
migrating has become the norm rather than the exception. In addition to the exposure to the 
relatively high wealth of international migration households, improved education and 
increased media exposure seem to have further contributed to the rising aspirations of oasis 
dwellers and to a growing orientation towards the outside world. Most young women and men 
aspire to leave the valley, at least temporarily, to "make it" elsewhere before returning 
successfully. Especially for youngsters, the question is not so much whether to migrate, as 
when to leave the oasis. 
The attraction of the great urban centers of Morocco and Europe is enormous. This 
attraction should not only be seen in an economic context. Stimulated by today's omnipresent 
(satellite) television, young oasis dwellers feel attracted by a "modem" and more liberal life-
style. In their opinion, the "harsh" and "boring" oasis life cannot compete with the perceived 
advantages of living elsewhere. 
The hope of many nonmigrant youth and their parents is focused on marriage with a 
second-generation European migrant or, sometimes, a tourist. A marriage with a migrant is 
generally considered as the ultimate ideal, being the most secure way to material stability and 
success as well as upward social mobility. For them, this makes the summer holiday a 
thrilling event, when they can meet and talk to their "European" peers. The latter seem to 
enjoy their high appeal, riding around in flashy cars, strolling Tinghir's streets in fancy 
clothes, and ostentatiously speaking in French or Dutch smoothly alternated with Tamazight 
and Arabic. By displaying their wealth and "otherness", they command the covert jealousy 
and admiration of the local, nonmigrant youth. The Gorges du Todgha has become the main 
meeting place for migrant and nonmigrant youth, where they spend the hot summer days 
picnicking and courting. It is in this "hot spot" that migration networks are fostered and the 
foundations for future chain migration are laid. 
For many, migration has become a veritable obsession. Education in particular seems 
to play an important role in making people more aware of the degree to which economic, 
social, and political constraints form obstacles to fulfilling their personal aspirations. 
However, at the same time, education is no longer a guarantee of well-paid government jobs 
as used to be the case (see section 4.6). In the Todgha, unemployed youth—especially those 
from relatively wealthy families—tend to be so focused on migration that they are not even 
seriously looking for work, and are generally unwilling to do low-skilled, irregular, and 
manual jobs. They tend to be well-educated (holding secondary education or university 
degrees), but unemployed, and spend their days in frustrating lethargy. 
Most assistants who helped to carry out the household survey belonged to this group 
of jobless ex-students (see also section 3.4.2). These unemployed young men form Todgha's 
" Similar processes by which international migrants have become role models in migrant sending communities 
have been descnbed for other Moroccan migrant sending areas (Ait Hamza 1995; Heanng and Van der Erf 
2001;Kerbout 1990) 
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share of Morocco's "detached middle"12, passing their empty days on Tinghir's terraces, 
doing occasional jobs (such as being a research assistant), and, first and foremost, dreaming 
of migrating to Europe. The lack of stable employment is an increasing obstacle to marriage, 
which is still the only real way of establishing a stable, socially accepted, and legally admitted 
place in Moroccan society. Although they are neither starving, nor responsible for 
maintaining an entire family, such youth are generally frustrated in their personal ambitions, 
which seem indeed impossible to realize in the Todgha or even within Morocco' . On the one 
hand, the frustration, confusion, and disorientation lead some to cling to religious and/or 
Berber movements. On the other hand, it makes them dream of fulfilling their ambitions 
elsewhere, that is, through migrating. 
The desire to migrate should not exclusively be interpreted in material, but also in 
socio-cultural terms, especially when it concerns new generations of relatively well-educated 
women and men. Migration tends to be associated with the idea of gains in personal liberty. 
Confronted not only with economic stagnation, but also with a political and social lack of 
freedom, a new generation of relatively well-educated people aspires to live in open societies, 
which offers them better opportunities for personal development (achieved through education, 
work, social relationships, and cultural participation) in general. 
In fact, it is difficult to disentangle these material and social aspects, as both play an 
important and mutually reinforcing role in personal well-being and social recognition. In this 
context, higher earnings are a means rather than an end in themselves. This brings us back to 
Sen's capabilities approach, which argues that development is not about economic 
development or an increase in wealth per se, but about the expansion in the capability of 
human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to enhance the substantive choices 
they have. An increase in material wealth through migration can undoubtedly be an effective 
way of increasing such freedoms, but it is not an end in itself. In any case, international 
migration is generally—and rightfully—perceived as the ultimate way towards more social 
and economic freedom. 
The relevance of rising aspirations in explaining the mounting desire to emigrate can 
hardly be overestimated. This observation leads us to some important theoretical inferences. It 
has been rather common to explain the occurrence of migration in terms of a limited 
agricultural "carrying capacity" of migrant sending areas, which has, under conditions of high 
population growth, "pushed" people out of these areas. Prior research has abounded in such 
neo-Malthusian reasoning. However, besides the fact that people typically migrate from 
sparsely to densely populated areas, the problem with such explanations is that they assume 
that the needs and aspirations of people are stable. In fact, people's aspirations are volatile 
and highly sensitive to the general level of wealth at the community level. As has been argued 
12
 As a consequence of stagnating economic growth and rising unemployment, a large share of the new 
generation of high school and university graduates are forming what Cohen (2001) called the "detached middle" 
of Morocco. High unemployment, the lethargy of the educational system and state bureaucracy, and the general 
inaccessibility to stable jobs for those lacking good connections condemn many young people to frustrating 
inactivity (Davis 1989) 
13
 This situation seems typical for many parts of Morocco. Schoorl et al (2000) argued that, apart from the 
limited opportunities for finding work, the pervasive culture of migration explains why "young people prefer to 
look for opportunities to migrate as so many of their friends and relatives have done, rather than to try to build 
their future in Morocco" There seems to be a tendency towards a diversification of migration motives In 
particular "unemployment" is increasingly presented as the main motive for migration, whereas the prime 
motive used to be to "earn more money" (Fadloullah et al 2000; Hearing and Van der Erf 2001, Refass 1995) 
Direct material needs seem to play a relatively less important role than was the case at the time of "classical" 
labor migration of mostly illiterate peasants in the 1960s and 1970s, who generally had a more direct and urgent 
responsibility for the maintenance of their families (Heinemeijer et al 1977; Michalak 1997). 
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in section 8.4.5, even if the agricultural carrying capacity of the Todgha were sufficient to 
feed the entire population, it is highly likely that people would simply no longer be content 
with a basic subsistence livelihood. After all, they have become exposed to other ways of life 
and increasing wealth, both outside and inside the valley. 
Besides unequal access to social, informational, and material resources that enable 
people to migrate, differences m relative aspirations might equally explain why people from 
more "underdeveloped" areas within the Presaharan region migrate to the Todgha, while 
Todghawis migrate away from the valley. On the one hand, the Todgha and Tinghir may be 
perceived as boring and "underdeveloped" through the eyes of Todghawi. On the other hand, 
the Todgha may be a "land of opportunities" and Tinghir a relatively wealthy town through 
the eyes of an 'Attawi from a poor and isolated village in the Saghro Mountains. They do not 
only tend to have less resources to migrate, but their aspirations are relatively low compared 
to most Todghawis, who are already used to better living conditions. 
General living conditions in the valley undoubtedly improved over the second half of 
the twentieth century. The one-sided dependence on subsistence agriculture has been replaced 
by the increasing diversification of economic resources. Moreover, access to public health 
care, family planning, schooling, and other public facilities have dramatically improved. 
Regularly recurring famines and epidemics—which used to be common in oases—have been 
eradicated, and mortality and birth rates have significantly decreased (cf. Büchner 1986). 
Although large sections of the oasis population still live in poverty, all the (circumstantial) 
evidence indicates that the general standards of living have undoubtedly improved and that 
the most grinding forms of poverty have actually decreased. 
Thus, in spite of population growth there has been a certain social and economic 
development, which has even attracted immigrants from other regions of Morocco to the 
Todgha. From a "push-pull" or neo-Malthusian perspective, it then becomes impossible to 
explain the simultaneously high migration from the Todgha to cities and abroad. This 
contradicts neo-Malthusian explanations of migration, and rather seems to support transitional 
migration theory, stating that a certain minimum level of development is necessary—in 
shaping the mental (knowledge, aspiration) and material (risks and opportunity costs) 
conditions—for large-scale (international) migration to occur. 
Throughout the twentieth century, migration has been the main avenue of upward social 
and economic mobility. Exposure to the relative success of migrants seems to contribute to 
the perception among the valley's inhabitants that real success is only achievable through 
migration, which enables migrants to accumulate sufficient wealth to successfully return to 
the Todgha. Higher aspirations, better education, access to international media—indeed the 
whole process of the "opening up" of the valley to the modem world has put migration at the 
center of people's minds. 
In the migration literature, it has been suggested that migrants tend to hide their 
problems and exaggerate their wealth, thereby creating an unrealistic perception that Europe's 
streets are indeed paved with gold. As has been argued by Fadloullah et al. (2000:89), the 
perception that migration is the ultimate road towards social and material well-being is further 
encouraged by special broadcasts on national television, in which mainly successful 
Moroccans migrants are interviewed. Over the 1990s, satellite dishes have mushroomed 
throughout the valley and have further intensified the exposure of Todghawis with alternative 
cultural models and the economic affluence usually depicted on foreign (Arab or Western) 
channels. 
It might indeed be true that these distortions have created a positive bias in 
nonmigrants' perceptions on the opportunities abroad. Nevertheless, most "stay-behinds" are 
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also aware of the difficulties migrants might encounter and this is also what they tend to 
gossip about. As one respondent said: 
Migrants live in great difficulties for 11 months per year, but here they present themselves as 
rich men. They live with large families in small apartments in the banlieues, and do not have 
enough to eat. Many do not even have a car. When they go to Morocco, they buy a car, but sell 
it again at the end of their holidays in Morocco or in France. They hide their misery, but we 
know of their problems. 
Although he added 
Nevertheless, if I could seize the chance, I'd leave tomorrow. 
However, the simple fact that salaries in Europe easily exceed Moroccan salaries by five or 
ten times, as well as the potential access to public health care, schooling and social security, 
seem to justify the strong desire to migrate among those who do not have much to lose 
anyway. It is an erroneous impression that Todghawis tend to migrate "blindly". Many stories 
go around in the Todgha concerning the difficulties many migrants are experiencing. It is a 
favorite pastime to tell anecdotes about the failed and sometimes fatal attempts of Todghawis 
to leave the country illegally. 
However, the prospect of becoming an undocumented migrant does not scare all people 
off. Prospective migrants tend to be optimistic about their chances of obtaining legal status in 
European countries. The large number of "illegals" who have eventually acquired residency 
status (principally through marriage or legalization programs) seemingly justifies this 
optimism. As one respondent stated: 
Ten years ago, everybody said it was not worthwhile migrating to Europe anymore. But look at 
the people that went to Spain and Italy. They now come back in nice BMWs and Mercedes in 
summer, and all have papers now. I regret that I did not leave at the time. What can I do with 
my baccalauréat here? Nothing! 
Apparently, even an "investment" in undocumented migration is perceived to be worth the 
risk. Even undocumented or unemployed migrants tend to have incomes that exceed by 
several times what they could have earned in Morocco14. Therefore, reasoning from the lack 
of perspective in Morocco, their desire to migrate seems logical, since the high aspirations 
can only be fulfilled through migration to the European "paradise". 
The allegedly "materialistic" attitude of migrants has frequently been frowned upon in 
the literature and by policy makers. Migrants, it is often written, would be better to stay at 
home to help the development of their region "by itself'. However, this reflects a naïve view 
of development, considering the high unemployment and the lack of local resources which 
oasis dwellers need in order to fulfill their aspirations. This very lack of capabilities-
enhancing resources largely disqualifies them from self-development and it can often only be 
through (international) migration that these capabilities can be acquired. 
Or, as Sen ( 1999) emphasized, many poor are essentially deprived of the capabilities or 
freedoms to assume the responsibilities to (re)shape their own destiny. International migration 
A typical salary of a day laborer doing unskilled work in Morocco is around 5-6 US$ a day Illegal agricultural 
workers in the Spanish province of Andalusia earn about 26 US$ dollars for an eight-hour day (Migration News, 
Vol. 7, No. 6, June 2000). Salaries in western and northern European countries tend to be significantly higher 
Moreover, there is the potential prospect of access to the "unimaginable" European social security systems if 
one succeeds in obtaining residence papers. 
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can be considered as an investment, helping oasis households to overcome the above-
mentioned local constraints. This seems in line with the premises of the new economics of 
labor migration theory that states that, besides diversifying livelihoods and increasing income, 
migration can be a way to overcome local constraints to economic production. 
What seems essential in explaining how development and increased wealth over the 
twentieth century has coincided with the growing propensity of people to migrate is that 
people's aspirations have increased faster than the social and economic opportunities within 
the Todgha and Morocco. Migration is a deliberate, rational act in the sense that young, 
ambitious people are right in assessing that their personal aspirations can probably not be 
realized within Morocco in the near future. They cannot afford the luxury to just wait one, 
two, or three decades to see whether the situation in Morocco improves. Therefore, reasoning 
from their "blocked" position, it is a rational strategy to leave. 
10.4. Migration and gender relations 
Traditionally, gender relations in rural Morocco are based on strong patriarchal principles. 
This implies that men were dominant in household decision making. This coincided with a 
tendency towards spatial separation of the sexes, in which women's lives have been largely 
restricted to the domestic domain, while the public domain is largely reserved for men. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the reality of life in rural Morocco often deviated from 
this cultural-religious ideal. As in other Presaharan oases, women in the Todgha also had 
important agricultural tasks15. Moreover, social contacts between village men and women in 
the public space used to be rather common. 
According to both Aft Todoght and Aft 'Atta customary law, and in contrast with 
shari'a (Islamic law)16, women are not entitled to inherit. Both customary law and shari'a 
allow men to marry up to four women (although this has largely remained a privilege of the 
neh) and render divorce much more difficult for women than for men. Until recently, most 
girls were given in marriage at ages of between 13 and 18 years. In general, women are 
placed under the guardianship of their father, their husbands and their family-in-law, and are 
expected to obey male household members. Only when a woman has given birth to several 
children (preferably sons) and reaches a "respectable" age, can she increase her say in 
household affairs. 
15
 Typical household tasks of women are: Cleaning the house ofdusl and sand, the daily preparation of bread 
and cooking lunch and dinner, washing clothes by hand; fetching and carrying water, which is a heavy task, 
especially when there is no private well in the family's courtyard, and, last but not least, taking care of the 
children In a minonty of households that do not yet use gas stoves, women have to walk kilometers to fetch 
wood. The only household task of men is purchasing food at the weekly market. Women also have agricultural 
tasks. They harvest fruits and crops such as wheat and barley, and regularly go to the fields to cut the alfalfa for 
the livestock, to weed, and to collect wood, leaves, and twigs. The latter products are used to feed the livestock, 
heat the bread ovens, and to braid baskets. Women also take care of the family's livestock of sheep, goats, and 
cows, and process products such as milk (butter) and wool. Typical male agricultural tasks are Ploughing, 
seeding, irrigating, maintenance of irrigation infrastructure (i.e., dams, irrigation channels, kheltaras), and 
climbing date palms to pollinate, cut old leaves, and harvest dates (cf Van Rooij 2000:38-41) 
16
 The Moroccan law of inheritance, which is based on shari'a, stipulates that women are entitled to half of the 
inheritance of men. Most women, however, do not claim their legal portion, since this is considered shameful, 
and a dishonoring indication that the household head is too poor to support his family Only recently have young 
women tended to claim their inhentance rights. 
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Box 4. A day in a woman's life 
Oasis women usually work from dawn till dusk They get up extremely early and eat 
something (e g, flour soup, dates) before they walk to the fields to harvest crops, collect 
dead palm leaves—which is used to heat the bread ovens—and to cut alfalfa and weeds for 
the livestock Depending on the size of the livestock and the number of fields, women go 
between every day and once every other week After carrying the agricultural produce 
home she feeds and milks the animals She then starts to prepare breakfast (e g, bread, 
aghrum η 'gensu, olive oil, couscous, tea) for the other family members who are getting up 
by that time In families with more than one adult woman, these tasks are done in rotation 
After breakfast the house is cleaned, bread is baked and the warm lunch (e g, 
tajm) is prepared After lunch the dishes are washed In summer, when temperatures nse 
above 40oC, the whole family rests until three or four o'clock After siesta, she might do 
the laundry by hand, either at house or near an irrigation channel or khettara with other 
women If there are many crops in the fields, she will go to the fields again to cut alfalfa 
and other crops Other tasks she might be doing in the late afternoon could be churning 
milk to produce butter and buttermilk If there is time left, she might visit neighbors or 
family to drink tea Preparing dinner is the next task Dinner is usually eaten at around 
eight or nine After dinner and tea, she goes to bed (adapted from Van Rooij 2000 41) 
Then there is the heavy task of child rearing, which is predominantly a woman's 
responsibility Also in important affairs for which the father's approval is mandatory (e g , 
school, work, marriage) negotiations usually take place via the mother Breast-fed babies 
are usually earned on the back in a large cloth if the woman goes to the fields or works in 
the house Older sisters or other women in the household often take care of toddlers From 
the age of 6-7, girls usually start helping their mother in the household From the age of 
11-12, this becomes mandatory However, with the increasing school attendance of girls, 
their participation in household work is decreasing, although they are generally expected to 
help after school 
Gender inequality is further manifested by the fact that, until recently, only men were allowed 
to migrate on their own If the migrant was married, the honor of the family and, in particular, 
the chastity of his wife and daughters who were left behind, used to be guarded by the 
migrant's extended family household In a certain way, remittances, which are destined for 
the entire extended family household, can be considered as the price that the migrant pays for 
this (cf De Mas 1990 83) Thanks to this system, men have traditionally been able to 
participate in circular migration without risking the family's honor 
The question now is to what extent migration has affected traditional gender roles in 
the Todgha valley The position of migrant wives and the impact of migration on gender roles 
has received only scant attention in Moroccan migration research, focused as it is on the 
position of the—predominantly male—labor migrants and "household heads" (see for similar 
criticism Hajjarabi 1995) Moreover, most studies that do pay some attention to gender issues 
are almost exclusively focused on international migration, and largely ignore how internal 
migration might affect the position of women 
The existing evidence from Morocco seems to suggest that migration has encouraged 
the emancipation of rural women, as, in the absence of their husbands, their responsibilities, 
autonomy, and power have increased (Ait Hamza 1988, Fadloullah et al 2000 χιχ,ΠΟ) In 
the same vein, general studies on migration and development suggest that migration might 
have expanded women's power in household negotiations and in community affairs (Brydon 
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and Chant 1989; Chant 1997). The extent to which this hypothesis is sustained by empirical 
evidence from the Todgha will be the focus of this section17. 
10.4.1. General trends in gender inequality 
It is important to disentangle as much as possible general processes of change and specific 
migration impacts. Therefore, before examining the specific impact of migration on gender 
inequality, we will first briefly review general changes in the position of oasis women. In 
section 7.3.1, we saw that women tend to marry at a much younger age than men (see figure 
7.2). The average age at which the interviewed women, whose present age was 37 on average, 
had married, was 15 (Van Rooij 2000:32). However, nowadays women tend to marry at a 
later age than before. This is due to the influence of legal restrictions, education, and 
generally changing norms, which explain why most young people now reject arranged, early 
marriages. Only 2.4 percent of current 15-year old girls are married. In this context, it is 
important to note that the growing influence of modernist Islam might have reinforced this 
decline of traditional norms pertaining to early marriage. Although this remains to be 
confirmed, knowledge of official religion and scripture might be a powerful tool in the hands 
of increasingly literate young women to defend their claims. 
Moreover, there is growing awareness among parents that forced or arranged 
(premature) marriages tend to lead to divorce, which has become an increasingly common 
phenomenon18. Van Rooij (2000) revealed that almost all older women (above 35-40 years) 
say that their marriages were strictly their parents' decisions and that they hardly knew their 
husbands before marriage. Most young women claim that they chose their marriage partner, 
either independently or in negotiation with their parents. They are now generally allowed to 
meet their future husband several times before marriage. For young women, the tendency 
towards later marriages seems a clear advance, not least because this allows them to continue 
their (secondary) education. 
Moreover, for girls and their mothers, education is today a socially acceptable reason 
to postpone marriage. This was a priority for all respondents below 40. Women who keep— 
particularly their eldest—daughters at home are all above 40. In addition, the growing 
influence of modernist Islam to the detriment of popular Islam seems to have a positive rather 
than negative effect on girls' education. Education of both women and men is an important 
virtue in official Islam, whereas traditional norms strongly reject girls' education. 
Thus, both prolonged education and changing norms concerning marriage seem to 
reinforce each other. This agrees with the evidence in chapter 9 that girls increasingly attend 
primary and secondary school. Moreover, we have seen that migration has played a positive, 
accelerating role in closing the gender gap in primary education, and will possibly play a 
similar role in secondary education. Besides the fact that international migrant households 
enjoy relatively high, stable, and secure incomes, the fact that many international migrant 
households are de facto female headed seems to play an explanatory role. Since this gives 
17
 Section 10 4 mainly draws on fieldwork by Van Rooij (2000) on Ihe effects of migration on women's lives in 
the Todgha valley (see section 3.3.5). Her study consisted of semi-structured interviews (with generally open 
questions) with 20 wives of nonmigrants, 10 wives of current internal migrants, and 13 wives of current 
international migrants Migration impacts were assessed through systematic comparison of these three 
categones. 
18
 8.0 percent of women in the 20-24 age group are divorced The divorce rates are 14 9, 14.3, 11 8, and 7 3 
percent for the 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44 age groups, respectively. For men, these rates are 0 3, 0, 1 2, 6 6, 
3.1, and 4.8 percent, respectively (Household Survey). 
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women a (temporary, but factual) greater say in household decision making, this may also 
give them more power to fulfill their generally strong wish to keep their daughters at school . 
The traditionally high age differential between male and female spouses can be 
interpreted as another dimension of gender inequality. Table 10.1 indicates that the age 
differential between spouses is clearly lower for younger generations. Among households 
headed by men or women above 59 years, the male spouse is 14 years older on average than 
the female spouse. For heads younger than 45 years, this differential is only 7 years. There is 
a significant correlation (r=0.391**) between the age of the household head and the age 
differential between the head and his/her spouse. The table also indicates that international 
migration participation does not seem to play any significant role in explaining this decrease. 
Comparing households with and without access to international migration, and when 
controlling for age, no significant differences were found. Therefore, declining age 
differentials between spouses indeed seem rather part of a more general trend. 
Table 10.1. Age differential between male and female spouses by international migration participation, by 
age household head 
Age householc 
head 
<45 
45-59 
>60 
1 
Migration status 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
Nonmigrant 
Intnl migrant 
Total 
<7 
54.4 
44.8 
52.1 
31 2 
29 9 
30 5 
19.5 
17.5 
18.5 
Age differential (%) 
7-11 
32 2 
34.5 
32.8 
35.1 
45.5 
40.3 
39.0 
31 3 
35 0 
>12 
13.3 
20.7 
15.1 
33 8 
24.7 
29 2 
41.6 
51 3 
46.5 
1 
Total 
100 0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Mean 
6.7 
8.1 
70 
108 
93 
100 
12.6 
14.9 
13.7 
η 
90 
29 
119 
77 
77 
154 
77 
80 
157 
Conicoeß 
0100* 
0 117" 
0 099x 
Source: Household survey 
As we have seen in chapter 5, birth rates in the Todgha seem to be declining, reflecting the 
rapid demographic transition Morocco is currently experiencing. Considering the fact that 
fertility is an important indicator of women's social and economic position in society 
(Glewwe 1999; Sen 1999), this development should certainly be seen as positive20. 
This agrees with our empirical findings, which suggest that there is a relationship 
between age of marriage, fertility levels, and girls' schooling. In Tadafelt, it is only recently 
that primary education for girls has become acceptable, while secondary education is still 
taboo (see table 10.2). Not coincidentally, it was the research village where 39 percent of the 
15-19 year old girls are married. This agrees with valley-wide evidence that fertility rates tend 
to be higher in the lower Todgha than in the upper Todgha (see chapter 5). 
" We can also hypothesize that the immigration of professional workers, civil servants, and schoolteachers from 
western Morocco to the Todgha might have an indirect positive impact on other women's conditions. Since 
these immigrants are relatively well-educated and tend to come from the more modernized and urban areas of 
Morocco, they also import new social and cultural values Immigrants were often the first to allow their 
daughters to attend secondary school, to work, and to go out without wearing a scarf. 
20
 In explaining the rapidly declining fertility in Morocco, Courbage (1994; 1996) suggested that—after other 
main factors such as higher age of marriage, greater female labor force participation, and better education—the 
migration of Moroccan families to European countnes has also contributed to the adoption of small family 
norms, and has thus played a significant role in the demographic transition Nevertheless, Courbage does not 
give empirical evidence to support this hypothesis 
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Table 10.2. School enrollment and age of marriage, by village 
Village 
Zaouia 
Tikoutar 
Ait El Meskine 
Ikhba 
Tadafelt 
Ghallil n'Ali Isfoul 
Total 
Girls' school 
enrollment 7-12 
92.8 
95.7 
92.1 
82.5 
76.4 
81.8 
87.7 
Girls' school 
enrollment 13-18 
47.6 
47 1 
34 2 
21.6 
4.5 
58.3 
31.0 
% 15-19 
women married 
0.0 
12.8 
6.3 
108 
39.0 
12.5 
14.5 
% 20-24 
women married 
39 7 
55 0 
52.4 
64 3 
49 0 
50 0 
49.8 
Source: Household survey 
Unfortunately, we do not possess household-level data on birth rates in the research village. 
However, this general improvement in the position of women seems mainly to be the result of 
a general development rather than of migration as such. This general process seems to be 
stimulated by the following factors: ( 1 ) the spread of primary and secondary public schools 
throughout the valley; (2) pro-active family planning policies by the Moroccan government; 
(3) the general diffusion of small family norms; and (4) increased awareness of women's 
rights through education and media. There is no indication that the mentioned changes are a 
particular effect of migration. They rather seem part of a process of general social and cultural 
change. 
10.4.2. Women's workload and migration 
The position of migrant wives left behind in extended families is often difficult. While they 
tend to bear major responsibilities in child bearing and rearing, housekeeping, as well as 
assuring agricultural production during the absence of their spouses, they are also expected to 
obey their in-laws, and their mother-in-law in particular. Moreover, in extended family 
households, remittances are rarely sent directly to the migrant's wife, but generally to one of 
the men in the households, such as her father-in-law or brother-in-law. 
This situation tends to generate numerous conflicts between migrant wives and their 
family-in-law, especially on the expenditure of remittances. To avoid these conflicts, and to 
avoid supporting the whole extended family, these tensions seem to stimulate the eventual 
"lifting out" of nuclear families and atomization of family life. This happens either through 
family reunification at the migration destination, or through the construction of their own 
house in the village, or through the relocation of the entire nuclear family from the village to 
Tinghir or other towns (see also section 9.2.5)2'. 
Because of the increasing atomization of family life, more and more households are 
headed by women. 10.4 percent of all surveyed households are officially headed by a woman. 
This is 14.8 percent for nonmigrant households, 13.5 for internal migrant households, 23.1 
percent for indirect international migrant households, and 1.0 and 0 percent for current and 
returned internal migrant households. These figures partly reflect the higher occurrence of 
divorce among younger women. 
Among the relatively "old" international migration households, divorce is rare. 
However, the majority of current internal and international migrant households are de facto 
21
 Similar processes have been desenbed for other regions of out-migration in Morocco (cf Hajjarabi 1988). It is 
important to note that the atomization of family life is a general development in Morocco 
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female households. Although it is generally the oldest man (e.g., father-in-law, brother-in-
law, son) in the household who is the official remplaçant of the migrated household head, the 
migrant's wife tends to bear the actual responsibility for the household. This is certainly the 
case if the household is nuclear and the children relatively young. Female headed households 
now account for over one third of all surveyed households22. Although some "public" and 
"male" tasks (e.g., going to the market, certain agricultural tasks) may be delegated to family 
members or laborers, the migrant wives carry the actual responsibility. 
It is important to note that there is a major difference between internal and 
international migrant households. Wives of internal migrants—who generally have only 
temporary and badly paid jobs—tend to live materially insecure lives and often have to deal 
with low and irregular remittance transfers. Wives of international migrants tend to receive 
regular and relatively high remittance transfers. Moreover, they live in larger and more 
luxurious houses. 
The preponderant role of women in sustaining households' livelihoods and child 
rearing is easily underestimated, since the gendered division of labor implies that women's 
labor is less visible and not financially remunerated. Research by Van Rooij (2000) indicated 
that the workload of women did not significantly increase as a consequence of migration. 
After all, they were already used to being responsible for all domestic and many agricultural 
tasks before migration. However, for typical "male" agricultural tasks—such as ploughing, 
seeding, and irrigation—migrant households are obliged to hires wage laborers if there are no 
men around who can or want to pursue these tasks. 
Since international migration households tend to be in more advanced stages of their 
life cycle (see section 7.3.1), there are generally more adolescent or adult women around to 
share tasks within such households. Moreover, international migrant households tend to hire 
nonmigrant women for domestic tasks and they can afford to pay agricultural laborers. This 
has even led to a decrease in their workload. Wives of internal migrants, who have less 
financial resources to pay laborers, and who tend to live in small nuclear households with 
young children, generally have the most arduous workload23. Whereas remittance 
counterflows enable international migration households to (more than) compensate for the 
"lost labor effect" by hiring personnel—thereby easing the life of migrant women—internal 
migrant households are generally not, or only partially, able to do so. 
All female respondents, migrant and nonmigrant, agreed that their life is easier than 
that of their mothers. This can be partly attributed to recent technological advances, such as 
the advent of gas stoves, private water wells, and water pumps. Modem concrete houses are 
easier to clean and often contain lavatories. However, as we saw in chapter 7, it is 
predominantly households involved in international migration that enjoy such facilities. 
Wives of nonmigrants or internal migrants generally live in more arduous circumstances. 
Other factors that have eased the burden of women in their own eyes are the decrease in 
fertility (less children) and the fact that most women now buy leather, fabrics, and clothes on 
the market, instead of manufacturing them themselves as their mothers used to do. 
22
 72.2 and 58 8 percent of the internal and international migrant households are nuclear, and can therefore 
generally be considered as de facto female headed Together, they represent 29.9 percent of the surveyed 
households If we add to this the female-headed households of nonmigrant and indirect international migrant 
households, representing 6.9 percent of the total population, we can estimate that 36 8 percent of all surveyed 
households are de jure or de facto female headed 
It should be noted that there are also international migrant households that predominantly contain young 
children This is especially common among migrants who left to Spain and Italy in the 1990s, who are still in 
relatively early stages of their family life cycle (cf Otte 2000:121-2). However, in most such cases, the married 
migrants have left their wife and children in extended households Especially when these migrants live 
"illegally" in Europe, the lives of their wives are difficult and uncertain, and their husbands are also unable to 
return regularly 
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All female respondents—both migrant and nonmigrant—see education as a huge 
improvement to their daughters' lives All respondents regretted not having attended school 
themselves, and attached high pnonty that their daughters attend school This was not only 
because of the contnbution of education to possible job prospects, but also because they 
perceived that education made them less dependent on others (e g to read documents, to write 
and send letters) and, in their own words, to be "better prepared for mamage" both with 
regards to physical maturity, knowledge and assertiveness In Sen's (1999) terms, one would 
say that schooling increases the capabilities of women to gain control over their own lives 
Moreover, mothers and daughters perceive education as a good strategy and socially 
acceptable justification for preventing mamage at an early age For the girls themselves, 
going to school is a socially acceptable justification for not being involved in housekeeping 
all day long 
Concerning their daughters' future, all the respondents (obviously) wish their 
daughters a better life than they themselves have had In order to achieve this, most mothers 
wish for their daughter a life outside the Todgha, in cities or in Europe "so that they will not 
have to work in the fields" Interestingly, more migrant wives than nonmigrant wives wish 
their daughters to leave the oasis They think that this objective is most easily realized 
through mamage with a migrated and preferably rich man A minority also see a professional 
future for their daughter, such as being a schoolteacher outside the oasis In general, the 
younger and the better educated the mothers are, the higher their ambitions for their 
daughters It therefore seems particularly to be the internal migrant wives, who are 
predominantly young and sometimes attended school for a number of years, who want their 
daughters to finish their studies and obtain a good job (Van Rooij 2000) However, this seems 
a ftinction of their age rather than of their migratory background 
This corresponds with earlier observations that there is an intergenerational tendency 
towards better participation in education for girls (see section 9 5 4), which is positively 
influenced by migration Besides this influence of gradually shifting norms vis-a-vis female 
education, the increasing participation in primary and secondary education is facilitated by 
the extension of schools throughout the valley (see section 5 6 3) 
10.4.3. Women's responsibilities and their role in decision-making 
Over the generations, there seems to be a. general decrease in women's workloads and a clear 
increase in their material well-being Nevertheless, internal migrant wives tend to have 
heavier workloads than nonmigrant wives, and the wives of international migrants tend to 
have the easiest lives in terms of physical labor Another impact of migration seems to be the 
increase in responsibilities and power among migrant wives 
In her study on the position of migrant wives in the Todgha, Van Rooij (2000) 
observed that women in migrant households tend to have more control over the use of their 
husbands' earnings than nonmigrant wives, whereby migrant wives living in extended 
households have less decision making powers than those living in nuclear families Almost all 
migrant wives decide independently on most day-to-day spending and smaller investments 
Compared to nonmigrant wives, migrant wives decide relatively independently what crops to 
grow and what purchases to make They also have more influence on the schooling of their 
children, including that of their daughters, which might indeed explain why girls in 
international migrant households tend to be relatively well-educated Migrant wives are also 
responsible for hiring personnel and finding people to go to the market for them In general, 
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migrant wives only consult their absent husbands on major issues such as the renovation of a 
house or the purchase or sale of animals. 
In both internal and international migrant households, the absence of their husbands 
gives women more decision-making authority, especially when they live in nuclear 
households. However, a key observation is that this gain in authority is mainly temporary, as 
migrants take over their position as "patriarchs" as soon as they return. It is particularly 
striking that the vast majority of migrant women see this (temporary) increase in 
responsibilities and decision-making power as a burden. They say it is "not the right position" 
for a woman, often because they are afraid that they will be criticized by community members 
for their "manly" behavior. The respondents consider the prevailing role patterns as "natural", 
and most say that they are not prepared to bear the responsibility for decision making and 
play the role of household head. Migrant wives tend to complain that they have to carry all 
the weight of the responsibilities, and therefore prefer their husbands to be at home. 
A minority, however, would prefer their husbands stay away. Nonmigrant wives often 
want their men to leave. The perceived material advantages of migration typically coincide 
with a fear of being left alone. Van Rooij (2000:62) cited a migrant wife saying: 
We want our husbands to be at home because we find it difficult without them and they 
[nonmigrant wives] want their husband to migrate because there are always relational 
problems in marriages and they need the money 
Besides the perceived burden of carrying double ("male" and "female") responsibilities, many 
wives just miss the company of their husbands (Van Rooij 2000). While obviously depending 
on the quality of the personal relationship, the emotional seclusion, the long periods of sexual 
abstinence, and the material dependence on their spouses do not make life easier for migrant 
women. The position of migrant wives is also vulnerable, dependent as they are on remittance 
transfers, and because they often live in the fear of being repudiated by their absent spouses24. 
Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties, most wives of international migrants claim that, on 
the whole, they live in better circumstances. As one respondent stated: 
We have better houses and more money than other women. It is good for the men themselves 
to have a job somewhere but it is difficult for us, women, to live without our husbands. We 
have all the responsibilities. But, despite the difficulties, it is certainly better to be a migrant 
wife because of the money (Van Rooij 2000:63). 
Of all women, internal migrant wives tend to have the most arduous lives in both material and 
physical terms. They tend to live in financial insecurity and often lack grown-up children to 
support them in household tasks and decision-making due to their generally young age. Wives 
of international migrants often have grown-up children, live in better conditions concerning 
housing and sanitation and can afford to hire personnel to carry out certain domestic or 
agricultural tasks. 
Moreover, wives of international migrants often gain in power and status vis-à-vis 
nonmigrant and internal migrant women. Within a kind of patron-client relationship, the latter 
According to Steinmann (1993 122), the increasing emphasis on a capital based economy adversely affects all 
women in the Todgha Women in migrant households are more dependent on their husband's remittances, while 
women in nonmigrant households are also increasingly dependent on their husband's income, which is often 
barely sufficient to meet the household's needs. Although this seems true as such, it is probably not nghl to 
claim that women's tasks have increased in general They seem to have decreased instead Steinmann also seems 
to ignore undeniable improvements in education, fertility, age of mamage, as well as in the general living 
conditions of women. 
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two categories of women tend to perform domestic and agricultural tasks for international 
migrant wives in exchange for vegetables, meat, or some financial compensation. Such 
"payment" is generally not fixed beforehand, and depends on the benevolence of the patrons. 
Poor women have an interest in working for international migrant wives, as this gives them 
the moral right to make an appeal to their patrons in times of economic hardship, if, for 
instance they do not have enough money to buy food. Thus, working for their patrons is a 
kind of insurance against crises. Nevertheless, the relationship is not necessarily warm-
hearted. International migrant wives tend to feel superior to other women, and other women 
tend to complain about their arrogant attitude25. 
According to Van Rooij (2000), all the interviewed women say that they agree with 
their husbands' migration, but some women indicate they actually "have no choice than to 
agree". This is an interesting contradiction. In Sen's terms, one could say that women are 
basically "unfree" and bereft of the power to decide on issues such as the migration of their 
husbands, let alone their own migration. 
International migrant wives expect and wish to follow their husbands through family 
reunification. They clearly wish to do so not only to be reunited with their husbands, but also 
because they think that migrating abroad will increase their freedom both in legal and 
material terms. Internal migrant women generally do not see this as a realistic possibility 
because of the lack of stable and remunerative employment for their husbands. 
10.4.4. Migration as women's emancipation? 
We have seen that migration has not played a major and independent role in the emancipation 
of women, as has been suggested in the literature. Although the absence of men has implied a 
considerable increase in the responsibilities and decision-making power among both internal 
and international migrant women, this has mainly been just a temporary change, as most men 
assume their traditional, patriarchal roles as soon as they return. Thus, the migration of men 
does not lead to a permanent change in the position of women from the restrictions of their 
traditionally defined roles. Nevertheless, in more indirect ways and in the longer term, 
migration might contribute to women's emancipation through its positive effects on girls' 
education and the potential (but yet to be investigated) function of female (family) migrants 
and the generally well-educated and (partly) westernized "second generation" daughters as 
role models. 
An interesting question is why most migrant wives actually consider their temporarily 
more responsible and powerful position as a burden, as this runs counter to expectations that 
they would enjoy this. What probably plays an important role is the general fear of social 
criticism and scandalmongering. Such criticism might endanger their respectability and, 
hence, their social security. Too overt rule breaking may well lead to social exclusion. In this, 
gossiping seems a powerful social instrument in order to force villagers not to break too 
overtly with the prevailing cultural norms. The widespread fear of gossiping prevails in all the 
research villages and maintaining the good name of the family preoccupies the minds of 
villagers in social interaction. 
In this vein, Kandyoto (1991) argued that in order to avoid overt rule breaking while 
improving their own situation, women engage in various strategies to maximize security and 
optimize life options within the given set of concrete social, economic, and cultural 
constraints. Women may therefore actually cling to patriarchal principles, as they seem to do 
See Steinmann (1993) for similar evidence in her study on the Todgha. 
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in the Todgha, since they have no alternatives in a patriarchal society for securing their 
situation (cf Van Rooij 2000 9) 
Migration has created a quite dramatic and not intended "shock" in the responsibilities 
and tasks of women, which they do not consider rightfully theirs within the normative context 
of "traditional" society, and to which they do not always aspire Women have been pushed to 
assume the responsibility for entire families, and to intervene in domains and processes that 
used not to be their sphere of influence (cf Hajjarabi 1995 106-7) Within one generation, 
these women have been confronted with a change in social, economic, educational, and 
symbolic functions for which they were not prepared In a sociological context that is not 
favorably disposed and can be even hostile towards this change, the more or less forced 
adaptation of new roles is often painful Women defy complex emancipation processes and 
fear a new status that they have not chosen 
This explains why, the women themselves generally do not tend to view this 
temporary "emancipation" as a positive experience As this new role is generally not assumed 
out of free choice, but forced upon them by the situation, it should not automatically be 
equated with emancipation in the meaning of changing norms on gender roles It seems that 
migration itself has only limited direct influence on such norms, and that gradual 
improvements in the position of women (e g , better education, later age of mamage, more 
freedom in partner choice, lower fertility, and the beginning of participation in labor 
migration) reflect general processes of cultural change within Moroccan society rather than 
being particular effects of migration 
However, in spite of the social difficulties of deviating from their traditional role, 
women in the Todgha generally realize that they are in a disadvantaged position Television 
and education confronts them with new ideas on the role of women As Van Rooij (2000), 
demonstrated, they therefore hope that their daughters will enjoy more freedom than they 
themselves They therefore encourage their daughters' schooling—as they see this as an 
effective way to be better prepared for mamage and sometimes also to obtaining an 
independent income—and many hope that they will be able to build better futures through 
migrating elsewhere Thus, the "culture of migration" has certainly also affected women The 
typical dream of young women in the Todgha is to marry an international migrant, not only in 
order to achieve wealthier and more stable livelihoods, but also to break away from the 
constraints that traditional rural society imposes on women 
Thus, an increasing number of young women aspire to migrate independently in order 
to study or work elsewhere, and often preferably on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar 
Seeing and meeting better-educated, working, and more independent female migrants makes 
them not only more aware of other lifestyles, but also makes them realize that their 
aspirations can potentially be fulfilled, and that another, in their eyes better, life is in fact 
possible Indeed, the culture of migration has clearly pervaded women's lives too 
10.5. Migration, power, and institutional change 
The traditional village institution of the taqbilt (jema'a in Arabic) used to regulate village life, 
the distribution of water, the settlement of conflicts over water or land and organize the 
collective labor necessary for the maintenance of the irrigation system (see section 5 3 4) 
However, the political and legal integration of the Todgha into the structures of the state has 
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fundamentally eroded the power and effectiveness of this taqbilt (see section 8.2.4). 
Migration seems to have further accelerated this breakdown through its partially 
emancipating effect on formerly inferior social and ethnic groups, such as smallholders, 
ikhmmesen, haratin, and ismakhen. Although the very poorest within these groups generally 
did not manage to migrate, others seized the new opportunities migration offered to them to 
break away from the constraints of traditional oasis society. This has contributed to the 
erosion of ancient socio-ethnic hierarchies. 
New patterns of social stratification and the partial emancipation of formerly 
subordinate and low-status ethnic groups have eroded the traditional community institutions 
that regulate village life and manage the agro-hydrological infrastructure. Moreover, the 
declining dependence of oasis dwellers on agriculture, the establishment of new farms outside 
the traditional oasis, and decreasing social and economic interdependence between 
community members through the increasing importance of external revenues have further 
contributed to the breakdown of traditional village institutions. 
Under these circumstances of the decreasing legitimacy of the power of the taqbilt and 
amghar (chief), it has become increasingly difficult to enforce customary law and organize 
collective labor based on timiwult and tuiza. "Free-rider behavior" (e.g., tapping water but not 
maintaining the irrigation infrastructure) and theft have become serious problems. As we saw 
in chapter 8, this has had fundamental implications for traditional oasis agriculture, 
particularly for laborious khettara irrigation in the lower Todgha. Because of bad 
maintenance, many khettaras have now run dry, a development that further obliges peasants 
to install water pumps26. 
Power relations within the village community used to be primarily based on land and 
water ownership. For instance, a villager who does not own land is not allowed to take a seat 
in the taqbilt (Otte 2000:118-120). Nevertheless, the landless are also expected to contribute 
to the construction of the new village mosque and to pay their financial contributions the 
village's fqih. This experienced "injustice" increasingly incites traditionally subordinate and 
low-status ethnic groups to contest the legitimacy of the taqbilt. Contrary to most landowners, 
the landless people will not turn to the traditional village council if they have personal 
problems or problems with other villagers. Instead, they go to the official authorities like the 
police, the moqaddem, or the municipal council (the "modem"jema'a). 
Less and less people respect the decisions of the taqbilt and in all the research villages 
it has even become difficult to find people willing to become amghar. Land possession, 
which used to largely determine one's say in the taqbilt, has become less important, and many 
of the new migration elite now refuse to obey customary law or to work for their former 
patrons. In Tadafelt, 
many people complained about the current amghar, who was not present in the village for a 
long time because he went on pilgrimage to Mecca. In the view of the villagers, the village 
and the fields had descended into "chaos". The village needed a strong leader, but he was 
gone. Despite the dissatisfaction with this amghar, the villagers did not decide to dismiss him, 
because nobody else wanted to become the next amghar. They feared to become the next 
amghar themselves otherwise, and that was not their aim (adapted from Otte 2000:107). 
26
 The breakdown of traditional village inslitulions seems a general development in Morocco (see also Crawford 
2001; De Haas 1998; Kerbout 1990). Both internal and international migration have played an important role in 
this "landslide of social, political and economic changes" (Crawford 2001) rural Morocco is currently 
experiencing, although it is certainly not the only factor explaining these changes. 
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Being the amghar is increasingly considered as a burden, which makes them difficult to 
recruit. Tadafelt's amghar actually did not aspire to this function, and only accepted after 
repeated appeals by the villagers: 
The people wanted him for this function, so he accepted it. After fifteen days, he announced 
new sanctions and fines for breaking the rules the taqbilt had set. This announcement created 
bad blood among some young villagers, who did not intend to obey his authonty. They went 
to the fields of the amghar, where they threw stones at his water pump, cut his alfalfa, snapped 
his trees, ran through his fields and destroyed his palm trees. The water pipe of his water 
pump and the crops were severely damaged. The amghar picked up some damaged palm 
leaves and walked to the village mosque, where he showed the damaged leaves and said to his 
fellow villagers: "The amghar and the aiyans cannot cany out this job alone. You all have to 
help us. Teach your children never to do something like this again". However, the amghar was 
not compensated and the youngsters were not punished (adapted from Otte 200:109). 
Likewise, in Zaouïa it has become difficult to find an amghar. It is now only in return for 
cash payment that they are willing to bear this responsibility: 
Normally, the amghar n-tamazirt of Zaou'ia came from the neighboring village of Ait Izduig, 
since any activity which bears any relation to agricultural labor has been considered as inferior 
and not appropnate for the igurramen of Zaouïa. Usually, the amghar did his work without 
being paid. His only source of income was the fines levied on the theft of fruits and vegetables 
(50 dirham for adults and 20 dirham for children). In 1998, however, it was impossible to find 
a new amghar who wanted to do this work for free. The people from Zaou'ia and Aft Izduig 
therefore signed a contract with the quid, stipulating that the people from Zaouïa have to pay 
3,000 dirham per year in cash to the amghar n-tamazirt. 
Younger oasis dwellers and the nouveau riche (in particular international migrants) 
increasingly neglect the decisions and regulations of the taqbilt, and now can freely do so, 
since customary law is not recognized by the state27. For instance, they increasingly contest 
the traditional tagurt system—used to divide newly reclaimed land—which tends to favor 
groups within the village who traditionally possessed most land (see section 8.3.3). This has 
led to mounting conflicts within village societies and the erosion of the legitimacy of the 
taqbilt. Apparently, this process started several decades ago, as the following account from 
Tadafelt demonstrates: 
In 1960, some villagers rebelled against the amghar and aiyans. This group contained about 
35 landless and smallholding villagers. They claimed that newly reclaimed agricultural land 
outside the village should be equally divided among all male inhabitants instead of according 
One exception to this rule is the Qadi El 'Orf among the Alt 'Atta, who enjoys recognition by the Moroccan 
state This "traditional" tribal judge is elected every six years by the Ait 'Atta villages within the municipality of 
Taghzout. The Qadi El Orf is responsible for the implementation of traditional Ait 'Atta customary law 
pertaining to land and water management (Otte 2000:114) After his election, the Qadi El Orf receives a bnef 
legal training at the courthouse in Ouarzazate and he has to take an official oath in front of the governor and the 
president of the tribunal He is mainly responsible for settling conflicts that the villages' taqbilt cannot resolve, 
and with which the formal judiciary system has difficulties to effectively deal with. In practice, people appeal to 
the Qadi El Orf if they do not agree with the taqbilt''s decision People, however, increasingly tend to circumvent 
this semi-official "buffer" institution between the village's taqbilt and the State's legal system, and go directly to 
the courthouse They tend do so because they doubt the Qadi's neutrality (who mainly tends to follow the 
amghar's decisions in order not to contest his authority) or do not agree with "unequal" cuslomary law (Otte 
2000 115). 
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to the traditional laguri system The taqbilt, consisting of relatively large landowners, tned to 
suppress this plan Large landowners bribed or threatened the members of this "opposition 
party" that they would not employ them anymore as laborers Only five dissidents remained, 
who decided to start a lawsuit to claim what they saw as their rights To prevent this, the large 
landowners proposed a settlement In the village's mosque, they swore on the Koran that the 
land would be equally divided among all men The remaining dissidents wrote a letter to the 
qaid stating that they abandoned the lawsuit because the problem had been solved internally 
However, the large landowners did not hold their word At the public announcement of the 
new land division, the taqbilt proclaimed that the land would be divided according to the 
laguri system This was allegedly legitimized by the argument that the laguri was something 
developed over time, and that what was shaped by time, could not be changed In other words, 
it was God's own will that it happened this way (Otte 2000 125-6) 
Similar conflicts have occurred in all the other research villages, and have created resentment 
between the traditional landowning elite and smallholding or landless subordinate and low-
status ethnic groups Over the past decades, the dominant position of large landowners has 
been progressively put under pressure This has resulted in increasingly overt conflicts within 
village communities, which has further hampered the functioning and legitimacy of the 
taqbilt 
In this process, the former landless and smallholding have been emancipated to a 
significant extent As we saw in chapter 8, most tagurt land division systems have now been 
made egalitarian Due to the diversification of oasis livelihoods, land ownership has lost its 
dominant position in determining (largely hereditary) socio-economic status Migration has 
played an important role in this process Upon their return, migrants generally refuse to work 
as ikhmmesen or agricultural laborers for large landowners, as they used to do before 
migration Land possession used to determine one's say in local affairs Through migration 
and the generally increased importance of non-agricultural income, these days are gone now 
Formerly landless, hence powerless, people can now earn monetary wages outside agriculture 
that allow them to gain increasing influence in local affairs Although such nouveaux riches 
tend to buy land both as an economic investment and a status symbol, land is no longer the 
only determining source of wealth and power 
New elite groups increasingly circumvent traditional village institutions by creating a 
personal power basis based on their financial wealth In this context, the role of gifts, 
religious donations, almsgiving, and investments in local infrastructure can hardly be 
overestimated For instance, a rich international migrant in Ait El Meskine improved the 
access road to the village by covering it with a layer of sand Allegedly, he did so because he 
did not want to damage his nice car during summer holidays On the other hand, this also 
added to his prestige among community members 
In Tadafelt, the richest villagers—among whom there are many international 
migrants—paid for the construction of a huge, concrete mosque boasting a sky-high minaret, 
which dwarfs the ancient, adobe mosque Within six months, most of the mosque was erected, 
whereas most houses can take years to complete This was only possible because poorer 
villagers were morally obliged to contribute their labor to the collective construction of the 
mosque Returned migrants coordinated the construction of the mosque and established a 
rotation system (nuba) to ensure continuous labor input Whereas the wealthy initiators 
contributed their money, the other villagers contributed their physical labor Although some 
respondents complained about this duty, almost nobody dared to ••efuse to contribute to the 
erection of this huge mosque out of fear of being socially excluded and stigmatized as a "bad 
Muslim" 
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Gifts, donations, and the generation of local employment have given rise to new 
patron-client relationships between the migrant nouveau riche and poorer villagers Migrants 
who construct houses in the village not only prefer (because of higher trust) but also are 
morally obliged (to avoid negative rumors) to employ kin and community members (Otte 
2000) In all villages, migrants who have set up businesses in Tinghir, Taghzout or the Gorges 
du Todgha, equally preferred to employ community members Nonmigrants often work as 
guards of empty migrants' houses and take care of their agricultural fields, and, as we have 
seen, nonmigrant women tend to help international migrant women in exchange for payment 
in kind Not doing so is interpreted as an act of selfishness so typical of "arrogant" migrants, 
and potentially entails a loss of clientele for entrepreneurs In this way, the direct and indirect 
benefits of migration tend to accrue to nonmigrant kin and community members 
Through the aforementioned social and cultural changes, young people, and in 
particular returned internal migrants, increasingly question the legitimacy of the power of the 
taqbilt They also tend to criticize its decreasing capacity to organize community members 
and defend the village's interests As a partial response to increased disputes over land and 
water and the general "collective crisis" of the traditional village institutions, modem village 
associations have emerged recently In the 1990s, there was a rapid increase in the number of 
modem, officially recognized and registered village associations in the Todgha, a process that 
has been enabled by increasing civic liberties in Morocco While attempts by people to 
organize themselves tended to be regarded as politically suspect, this climate has changed 
Freedom of speech and organization drastically increased over the 1990s 
This development particularly gained momentum after 1995 In all the research 
villages, such associations already exist or there are concrete plans to establish one Most 
associations are officially recognized by the local authorities Young and well-educated 
returned internal migrants (in particular schoolteachers, but also unemployed university 
graduates) play an initiating role in this so-called mouvement associatif At the valley level, 
the local intellectual elite, schoolteachers in particular, have created the Association le Grand 
Todgha 
The main goal of village associations is to stimulate local development through 
acquiring funds or practical support from the state, foreign embassies or non-govemmental 
organizations Typical projects aim at developing agriculture (e g , "cementing" of irrigation 
channels, covering of the shafts of khettaras to prevent sand encroachment), improving local 
infrastructure (e g , drinking water, electricity, roads), and educating villagers (e g , literacy 
programs) In the lower Todgha villages of Ait El Meskine and Tadafelt, these associations 
tend to be more agriculture-oriented than in the upper Todgha (Zaouia, Tikoutar), where 
agriculture is relatively less important In general, these associations seek to re-organize 
peasants and village communities based on other, more "egalitarian" conditions (through 
formal membership by fee-paying members) than was the case under the traditional taqbilt 
system 
Such associations are typically created in response to crises or pressing needs that 
demand collective action, which traditional institutions are decreasingly able to deal with 
Several associations have obtained financial support for various projects, such as the 
establishment of a drinking water system, the repair or extension of a khettara, the 
establishment of a concrete wall along the river to protect the fields from floods, literacy 
campaigns and self-employment projects for women These associations nowadays seem 
more successful in mobilizing village populations then the old, increasingly discredited and 
criticized taqbilt It remains to be seen to what extent these new associations will play a role 
in transforming agricultural institutions, and whether they will be capable of partly overtaking 
the role of taqbilts, which younger generations frequently criticize as being "ineffective" and 
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"non-democratic" In any case, this spontaneous development demonstrates the willingness of 
oasis dwellers to improve their own conditions in and outside agriculture 
In Ait El Meskine, for instance, mounting problems associated with the anarchic boom 
in water pumping and the rising costs of pumping have created the perception among 
villagers that uncontrolled individual pumping might endanger the economic and ecological 
sustainability of agriculture Water losses are considerable, in many cases, it takes 1 to 3 
hours for the water to reach the fields from the families' compounds, where most pumps are 
located Several Meskini have now joined forces to construct a collective water pump In 
1998, they established the Association d'Irrigation Ait El Meskine, which has 46 members 
and an executive committee of 7 people One of the aims of this water association is the 
construction of a collective water pump This could reduce water losses and increase 
economies of scale Furthermore, their aim is to "cement" the principal irrigation channels, 
which would further reduce water losses 
In Zaouia and the neighboring village of Ait Oussaln, the Association Villagoiie Sidi 
Mohammed ben 'Abdellah - Tizgui was created in 1999 The association is chaired by a 
secondary school teacher native to this village, and has 140 members, among which 40 
women Its objective is to promote social, cultural, and economic development in other Ait 
Tizgui villages It has established links and active cooperation with a French NGO and foreign 
embassies in Morocco In a three year time scale, the association succeeded in creating a 
nursery school and obtaining external financial support for a drinking-water supply system as 
well as the creation of a workshop where village women can get sewing classes and produce 
clothes for the market The French NGO has furthermore provided educational tools for village 
children, computers to set up secretarial training for village women, and medicines The 
association has also organized cultural events and a collective campaign to clean the riverbed 
of refuse 
Interestingly, this process of institutional change is reinforced by donors' preference to 
deal with officially registered organizations For instance, the ORMVA (Office Regional de 
Mise en Valeur Agricole) in Ouarzazate has a budget for subsidizing small agricultural and 
irrigation projects, such as covering the wells of a khettara to prevent sand encroachment or 
"cementing" In contrast to former "top-down" approaches of agricultural development, such 
projects have nowadays to be initiated and co-financed by the villagers themselves who can 
submit proposals to the ORMVA However, non-registered organizations such as the taqbilt 
cannot apply for funding for such projects According to Otte (2000), the ORMVA introduced 
this rule after it appeared that projects initiated by modem associations were a success in 
several villages, and that the same organizations tended to obtain additional funds from other, 
governmental and nongovernmental donors both within and outside Morocco This spin-off 
has led to the creation of associations in villages that did not yet have one 
Finally, several "Todgha associations" exist among the European Diaspora of 
Todghawi In Amsterdam, there is an association uniting over 100 Todghawi families This 
association sometimes supports small "development" projects, for instance by providing the 
local hospital with medical equipment or beds In France, the Association Generations 
Tinghir-France (GTF Tinghir) aims to stimulate cultural exchange between the Tinghir and the 
Diaspora in France The developmental role of such "transnational" associations seems 
limited compared to local associations Nevertheless, their role might well increase in the 
future due to increasing literacy among migrants and "stay-behinds", the ongoing "media 
revolution", and the increasing accessibility of the internet in the Todgha 
It is important to note that most local associations are mainly initiated and supported 
by well-educated internal return migrants Education in particular—and not material wealth 
per se—provides people with the necessary capabilities to establish such associations, to 
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submit written project proposals, and to keep the books in order This diffusion and relative 
success of the mouvement associatif in the Todgha might well further discredit the taqbilt, 
which one youngster depicted as an "an old men's reserve" 
10.6. Conclusion 
Migration has deeply affected social, cultural, and institutional life in the Todgha valley It 
has had a major impact on the daily life of "stay-behinds", women in particular Migration has 
not only affected migration households, but has changed the face of the Todgha as a whole, 
not only in a material sense, but also m relation to the perceptions, preferences, and 
aspirations of its inhabitants The rise of a new "class" of relatively wealthy international 
migrant households has contributed to the erosion of traditional patterns of socio-ethnic 
stratification The influx of remittances and the transformation from an society that was 
predominantly based on subsistence agriculture and limited trade to a more open and 
diversified monetary economy, have decreased the relevance of land possession and ethnic 
background in determining socio-economic status Subsequently, a new stratification based 
on access to international migration capital over the second half of the twentieth century has 
been largely superimposed upon traditional patterns of stratification based on tnbal affiliation, 
land and water possession, and complexion Nevertheless, these do also continue to play a 
significant role in determining social status and interaction 
Selective access to international migration has drawn new socio-economic dividing 
lines within the village communities and in the Todgha as a whole However, most 
nonmigrant and internal migrant households have also been able to improve their wealth and 
living conditions over the past decades as a consequence of generally increasing opportunities 
to gain a local income outside agriculture and the establishment of public infrastructure 
(health care, education, electricity) However, the spectacular increase in relative wealth 
among international migration households has increased feelings of relative deprivation 
among nonmigrants and internal migrants alike The exposure to international migrants' 
wealth and status symbols, especially during the summer holiday return season, have 
contributed to the development of a culture of migration, in which international migration is 
perceived as the main avenue of upwards socio-economic mobility 
Thus, migration has changed the local socio-cultural context in such a way that it has 
further increased the urge of young men and women to leave the valley, at least temporarily, 
to "make it" (i e , fulfill their aspirations) elsewhere before returning Migration systems and 
migration network theories mainly explain the self-perpetuating forces and self-reinforcing 
tendencies by the emergence of migrant networks Nevertheless, they tend to ignore the 
independent impact of international migration on changing perceptions, relative deprivation, 
and rising aspirations among nonmigrants The fact that needs and aspirations influencing the 
propensity to migrate are not stable is also largely ignored by static push-pull models 
The individual propensity to migrate is influenced by capabilities (knowledge, social 
links and financial wealth) on the one hand, and by aspirations on the other hand Exposure to 
migrants' wealth and the culture of migration (i e , the strong association of migration with 
success) has increased general aspirations to improve one's livelihood through migration For 
the new generations of better educated women and men, migration is not only perceived as a 
way to achieve one's aspired material goals but also as a means to break away from the moral 
and cultural constraints imposed by local society As long as people perceive that these 
mounting aspirations cannot be fulfilled locally, this will further increase (young) people's 
urge to migrate Although this mainly pertains to international migration, internal migration 
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often precedes subsequent international migration, and can be considered as a first step to 
breaking away from local constraints to personal development 
However, it would be erroneous to attribute the above-mentioned processes of social, 
cultural, and institutional change exclusively to migration It is important to stress that 
contemporary migration itself is the outcome and constituent part of a complex set of general 
social, cultural, political, and economic transformation processes that have affected the 
Todgha and Morocco in the twentieth century, as well as a key factor in perpetuating and 
intensifying these processes at the local level Migration is both a consequence and cause of 
processes of socio-cultural change 
The term "culture of migration" can be misleading in the sense that it might suggest 
that the rising aspirations and outward-looking mentality is the exclusive consequence of the 
exposure of nonmigrants to migrants' wealth and their relative well-being Other general 
processes, such as improved education and increased media exposure, also play an important 
role in opening people's eyes to the wider world and other values and help raise aspirations 
Furthermore, many other factors besides migration also play a role in explaining 
processes of socio-cultural change at the local level Since migration is a constituent part of a 
more general process of development, its role should be seen as an accelerator and magnifier 
of these processes rather than as a single or independent cause as such The demise of 
traditional patterns of social stratification, for instance, is not only the consequence of 
migration, but, in a larger sense, the eventual consequence of processes such as the 
integration of the Todgha into the Moroccan state and the capitalist economy This has 
entailed the legal equality between different "castes" within the socio-ethnic hierarchy, and 
has engendered a general process of economic diversification away from the dependence on 
subsistence agriculture This process has, to a considerable extent, though not exclusively, 
been achieved through internal and international migration 
Although the position of women has certainly improved over the past two decades, 
this seems to be mainly a consequence of general processes such as the general improvement 
of public infrastructure and the spread of new family values (monogamy, less children) 
through education and media Moreover, except for its positive effects on girls' school 
attendance, out-migration does not seem to have directly affected women's emancipation 
Gradual changes in patnarchic values and gender roles seem rather to reflect general 
processes of cultural change within Moroccan society than the particular effect of migration 
Likewise, although processes of institutional change have been accelerated by the 
effects of migration on local socio-ethnic hierarchies, it seems the incorporation of the 
Todgha into the structures of the modem colonial and post-colonial states have swept away 
much of the legal and political basis of the taqbilt This has enabled new (migrant) elite 
groups to circumvent such institutions and largely ignore customary law 
So, migration should be seen as a constituent part of more general processes of 
development, rather than as a single cause of change itself Nevertheless, it is in particular 
through the expenence and recursive impacts of migration that more general processes of 
societal change are concretely manifested In a way, migration has become the metaphor for 
this whole complex of interrelated socio-cultural changes, and is the prime livelihood strategy 
through which individuals and households pursue improvements in their wealth and general 
well-being 
The relevant question now is how processes of social and cultural change have 
affected the economic behavior of households After all, changes in social relations, 
ambitions, attitudes, and perceptions of local possibilities for development may influence 
decisions pertaining to (return) migration and investments Cumulative causation theory and 
other pessimistic visions of migration and development assume that an increasing focus on 
migration contributes to a decrease in the belief in possibilities for economic development in 
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the regions of origin. The "culture of migration" would entail such a strong outward looking 
orientation that people cannot imagine any local improvements through their own initiative 
(Heinemeijer et al. 1976:88; Schoorl et al. 2000:xvi). 
In the case of the Todgha, however, the empirical evidence presented in chapters 7-9 
seems to refute the hypothesis that migration causes a general retreat from local economic 
activities. In contrast, international migration households show a relatively high propensity to 
invest in the Todgha, and do not exhibit the behavior of "passive remittance receivers", 
especially in the longer term. Whether new generations will show the same determination to 
go back home and invest in a similar way to the first generation of Europe-bound migrants is, 
however, difficult to predict. 
The main reason why Todghawis seem to value migration so highly is not so much 
because they dislike the Todgha but because they realize that it is elsewhere that they can 
better develop and capitalize on their capabilities through education, work, or both. They 
move away to secure the household's livelihood and enable others to stay. Following ancient 
traditions of circular migration, the typical intention of Todghawi migrants is still partir pour 
rester. 
Whether livelihood and migration strategies aimed at improving livelihoods and 
returning back home are eventually fulfilled—and to what extent they are successful—is quite 
a different matter. This eventually depends on the evolution of the development context in the 
Todgha as well as the destination. Indeed, several migrants do not succeed in their initial 
strategy and either fail in their migration project or end up by reunifying their households at 
the destination. However, it should be clear now that, in its intentions, the urge to migrate is 
not based upon an antipathy towards the Todgha as such, but rather upon the desire to 
improve one's livelihood back home. 
11 
Conclusions 
11.1. Evolution and causes of migration from the Todgha 
11.1.1. Development breeds migration 
Until French colonization of the Maghreb, the livelihoods of oasis dwellers in the Todgha 
valley used to be primarily based on subsistence agriculture. Barter with nomadic tribes, long-
distance trade, and traditional forms of seasonal and circular migration formed sources of 
additional income. The Todgha valley belonged to the so-called bled es-siba, the hinterland of 
present-day Morocco that was largely controlled by autonomous tribes and where the state 
had only a marginal influence. 
Colonization radically changed the development context of the Todgha valley. On the 
one hand, it entailed the end of tribal autonomy and the demise of traditional economic 
systems, trans-Saharan trade, and nomad-peasant trade relations. State formation and border 
demarcation further led to the disintegration of ancient trade networks and undermined 
nomadic lifestyles. On the other hand, these political-economic transformations created new 
livelihood opportunities within, but in particular outside, the valley through labor migration. 
Colonization and the concomitant incorporation of the politically largely autonomous Todgha 
valley into the context of the modem state and the capitalist economy as well as improved 
transport links and banking systems dramatically increased the scope for modem forms of 
remittance-based labor migration. This process radically reshaped the social, cultural, 
economic, and political context in which traditional migration took place, and triggered what 
we might—reminiscent of Zelinsky (1971)—call the "mobility transition" of the Todgha 
Besides a consequence of changes in the macro-context which have increasingly 
enabled people to earn an additional income elsewhere, migration has also played an 
independent role in intensifying links with the outside world and further embedding the valley 
in wider political, economic, and social structures. Whereas infrastructural development and 
increased opportunities of wage labor in other parts of the country and abroad increased the 
opportunities for labor migration, socio-cultural changes—triggered by the exposure to 
migrants' wealth, increased schooling, and media exposure—"mobilized" the mindsets of 
Todghawi, increasing their aspirations and their actual propensity to migrate. This refutes the 
popular view that poverty and underdevelopment are the root causes of labor migration. This 
seems in line with the premises of transitional migration theory, which predict that 
development, in its initial stages, tends to lead to an increase of out-migration instead of the 
reverse. 
The analysis also showed the need to extend views on migration and development 
beyond strictly material dimensions, which have been the usual focus of transitional models. 
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Increased access to education and information are constituent components of development, 
since they, besides increased wealth, also tend to increase the capabilities of people Besides 
their capabilities-enhancing role, such types of development (better education, knowledge of 
other societies) also tend to increase the aspirations of people, leading them to migrate in 
order to fulfill these aspirations This aspirations dimension should be analytically 
distinguished from the migration-enabling role of infrastructural improvements, better 
knowledge, and increased incomes The fundamental point is that processes of social and 
economic development tend to be correlated, and both seem to reinforce processes of out-
migration 
11.1.2. Evolution, clustering, and persistence of migration 
The "mobility transition" of the Todgha started at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
increasing number of Todghawis started to migrate to neighboring Algeria—a French colony 
since 1830—where they worked as wage laborers for French colons To a certain extent, this 
early form of "modem" migration associated with capitalist development and colonization 
was an extension of earlier forms of seasonal and circular migration within Morocco In the 
colonial era (1912-1956), internal migration was largely onented towards the swelling cities 
on Morocco's Atlantic coast (notably Rabat-Sale), whereas most international migrants 
continued to go to Algeria 
In the post-colonial era, opportunities for both internal and international migration 
further expanded After Algerian independence in 1963, international migration flows shifted 
to France It was in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, that the great Moroccan 
migration boom took place For the Todgha valley this was the "Golden Age" of migration 
Rapid economic growth in France—but also in other northwestern European countries such as 
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany—attracted an increasing number of "guestworkers", 
either through direct labor recruitment, or, increasingly, through spontaneous settlement This 
sudden migration boom marked the definitive incorporation of the Todgha valley into the 
Mediterranean-European migration system, and the foundations were laid for the permanent 
establishment of Todghawi communities in Europe 
The 1980s and 1990s were charactenzed by a diversification of migration strategies as 
well as destinations The recruitment freeze and increasingly restrictive immigration policies 
following the 1973 Oil Crisis and the economic downturn in Europe did not have the intended 
result of stopping migration The recruitment freeze had the "perverse" effect of stimulating 
permanent settlement of migrants in Europe and subsequent family migration Since 1973, 
family reunification and, in the 1990s, family formation have become the dominant forms of 
migration to northwestern Europe Family migration often serves as a form of labor migration 
"in disguise", through which households maintain their stakes in the international migration 
market over the generations 
This exemplifies the importance of migrant networks (a form of social capital) in 
explaining why once-started migration movements tend to gain their own momentum over 
time The expatriate networks of Todghawis clearly played a facilitating role in perpetuating 
migration from the valley between 1975 and 2000 The increasing reliance on family 
migration—either through family reunification, family formation, or relay migration—has 
been one of the strategies through which migration to Europe has continued This coincides 
with a growing awareness in the literature on "transnationalism" that links between migrants 
and "stay-behinds" may be far more persistent (over time and generations) than was assumed 
in the 1970s and 1980s 
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Another consequence of restrictive European immigration policies has been a 
significant increase in undocumented migration Another development was an increasing 
diversification of migration destinations in the period 1980-2000, in which Italy and 
particularly Spain emerged as new destination countries for both legal and undocumented 
migrants 
Rural-to-urban migration further increased in the post-colonial era to the detriment of 
the historically-rooted seasonal migration of harvest workers, for instance to the Middle 
Atlas Since then, internal migration has continued and is becoming increasingly generalized 
In the 1990s, this internal migration seems increasingly oriented towards the medium-sized 
towns instead of the large cities, whose growth seems to be slowing An increasing number of 
rural-to-urban migrants end up settling permanently in the cities, thereby breaking with 
traditional patterns of predominantly circular migration 
The fact that half of the surveyed active male population has been, or is involved in 
either internal or international migration indicates the pervasive character of this phenomenon 
in the Todgha Current international labor migrants accounted for 6 percent of the total 
population of the Todgha in 1998, a percentage that largely remained stable between 1970 
and 2000 This exemplifies the unforeseen persistence of international migration 
There has been a remarkable degree of stability in the activity patterns of migrants 
over the past decades Besides a minority of civil servants and professional private sector 
workers, a large majority of internal and international migrants are working in unskilled jobs 
in the construction and service sector Over the 1980s and 1990s, student migration became 
an increasingly important form of migration, which is closely interwoven with and 
functionally related to internal as well as international labor migration 
In line with migration systems theory, migration flows tended to be spatially clustered 
There are significant differences between the research villages in spatial orientation of 
migration Migrants originating from the same village often predominantly live in one or two 
specific cities (or even quarters) in Morocco or in Europe Within Morocco, large cities such 
as Rabat/Sale, but recently also Marrakech, Agadir, and the boomtowns in the Rif area (in 
particular Nador) have attracted many Todghawi In Europe, the urban areas around 
Montpellier, Nice, Pans (France), and, to a lesser extent, Amsterdam (the Netherlands) have 
typically attracted many Todghawi 
11.1.3. Flows, counterflows, and the weaknesses of "push-pull" 
It is a key observation of this study that internal and international migration tend to be 
positively correlated "communicating vessels" Especially in the longer term, they are 
complementary, mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive or negatively correlated 
phenomena Internal and international migration tend to occupy distinct places in the 
household life cycle Internal migration, which involves less risks and opportunity costs, 
tends to function as a precursor to international migration Internal migration tends to shape 
the mental, social, and material conditions for international migration International migration 
may lead to internal migration through its effects on family relocation, student migration, and 
urban-based investments Both internal and international migration are reciprocally related as 
constituent parts of the same general development process leading—in its social, cultural, and 
economic dimensions—to a general increase in mobility This further corroborates the 
validity of transitional migration theory 
Regarding the high population growth over the second half of the twentieth century, 
permanent out-migration (e g , through family reunification at the destination) from the valley 
376 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
has been largely counterbalanced by natural population growth, return migration, and 
immigration. People are not only leaving the valley, but the Todgha, and its urban center of 
Tinghir in particular, has also become an increasingly important destination for migrants from 
other regions in southern Morocco. Furthermore, there are distinct patterns of intra-valley 
migration explained by spatially differentiated economic and infrastructural development 
across the valley. In net terms, migration has not creamed off the valley's population, due to 
the countervailing effects of migration to the valley. Thus, out-migration has not put an 
absolute "labor drain" on the Todgha. 
In the Todgha, internal and international out-migration and immigration occur 
simultaneously, and seem to be part of the same process. Therefore, theoretical perspectives 
that divide regions and countries into (peripheral) sending and (central) destination areas do 
not necessarily reflect the complex, multi-layered spatial reality of migration systems. In fact, 
it is not possible to classify a region like the Todgha as either an "emigration" or an 
"immigration" region. It is both. Apparently, there are forces at work that simultaneously 
"push" some people to leave the valley as much as "pull" other people to move to the valley. 
The simultaneous occurrence of migration from and towards the Todgha can be explained by 
regional differences in relative access to social, human, and material resources or "capitals" 
enabling people to migrate, as well as spatial differences in aspiration levels. 
It therefore seems to make little sense to explain migration between particular areas by 
a set of static "pushes" and "pulls". This is not only because push and pull factors are 
generally mirrored in each other, but also because such explanations tend to ignore that needs 
are not constant, but determined by people's perceptions and aspirations. Push-pull models 
typically fail to explain how a region can both send and receive migrants, and why migrants 
return. 
11.1.4. Migration selectivity and the "downside" of social capital 
Transitional migration theory is linked to the notion of the selectivity of migration: a certain 
threshold of "development" is necessary for people to have the aspirations and be able to 
assume the costs and risks of migrating. The fact that the more isolated and poorer Ait 'Atta 
villages of the lower Todgha started to massively participate in processes of internal and 
international migration far later than the Ait Todoght—who were incorporated into modem 
migration systems at an earlier stage—seems to confirm this hypothesis. 
It has also been commonly hypothesized that migrants tend to be the relatively 
wealthy and better-educated members of a community. In line with these predictions, 
international Todgha migrants generally do not come from the poorest (i.e., landless) 
households. Nevertheless, the association between land possession and international 
migration participation is weak and only significant for the difference between international 
and internal migrants. Furthermore, the fact that international migrants from the Todgha are 
generally not better educated than nonmigrants of the same age refutes the second part of this 
hypothesis. Although the mean level of education among migrants has significantly increased 
in the past decades, this seems primarily the result of a general increase in education, not of a 
change in selectivity. Unexpectedly, the study revealed that internal labor migration from the 
Todgha is positively selective for education, due to its relationship with student migration and 
the fact that most job opportunities for higher educated people are found in the large towns 
and cities. 
The non-selective character of international migration with regards to education is 
probably related to the fact that international labor migrants work in unskilled jobs, have been 
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recruited directly and that, in the past, a certain level of education was even ground for 
recruiters to reject prospective migrants European employers generally preferred illiterate, 
docile, and hard workers However, this cannot explain why recent and young international 
migrants are not significantly better educated than nonmigrants What might play a role here 
is that the likelihood of international migration seems to be increasingly determined by the 
largely kinship-based access to migration networks and a certain level of material wealth, and 
that education only plays a secondary role in determining an individual's ability to migrate 
abroad 
Network theory predicts that the costs and risks of migration will fall over time due to 
the facilitating role established migrant communities play in the migration of other 
community members In this way, migration becomes less selective over time and migration 
experience is diffused throughout communities However, the hypothesis that migration tends 
to become less selective over time due to the growing importance of network effects is not 
sustained by the survey data Over the past decades, selectivity has remained largely constant 
This is related to the limited extent to which migration has spread through communities 
beyond the boundaries of families and lineages (ighsan) involved in international migration 
Due to the increasingly restrictive immigration policies of European countries, access 
to international migration resources is increasingly based on kinship Positive network effects 
therefore remain largely limited to the boundaries of the individual's own family and lineage 
This phenomenon is reinforced by the traditional preference for consanguineous marriage, 
through which "migration capital" is monopolized within the same kinship groups Therefore, 
in the Todgha, migration networks can be to the advantage of people belonging to the same 
family or ighs, but seem to be exclusionary for people not belonging to such groups, clearly 
representing a dimension of the so-called "downside of social capital" (cf Portes and Landolt 
1996) Thus, kinship-based access to migrant networks also coincides with structural 
inequality in access to such networks 
Thus, although our general hypothesis that development initially tends to boost 
migration seems to hold in general, it is, however, important to bear in mind that the 
migration-enabling impact of "development" is disparate across communities because the 
latter are internally stratified 
The analysis also revealed the inherently dynamic nature of migration systems Due to 
economic-geographical and political changes at the macro-level, there has been a partial shift 
in spatial orientation of migration from the Todgha Nor does migration automatically tend to 
lead to increased geographical clustering, as is predicted by migration systems theory For 
instance, the recent and unexpected migration of many Ait 'Atta to Spain illustrates the other, 
more volatile and unpredictable side of migration 
This all points to the limitations of the circular logic of migration systems and network 
theones, in which migration seems to go on ad infinitum Such theones do not specify what 
external, structural factors as well as internal processes counteract the alleged self-reinforcing 
tendencies leading to falling costs and risks, decreasing selectivity, increasing migration, and 
increasing spatial clustering of migration flows 
11.2. Migration as a strategy to diversify and improve livelihoods 
Chapter 7 demonstrated that internal and international migration should be seen as an integral 
part of the general process of the integration of the Todgha into the Moroccan state and the 
capitalist economy, which have enabled livelihood diversification among oasis households 
Through the expanding opportunities to earn a monetary income elsewhere, and the new 
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possibility to remit part of the money back via banking systems, many oasis households have 
been increasingly able to pursue multi-local livelihoods and diversify their income portfolio. 
Nowadays, most Todghawi households have been in some way affected by international and 
internal migration. Many households count two or three generations of migrants. More than 
40 percent of all the surveyed households are involved in international migration and 25 
percent in internal migration, and several households are involved in both types 
simultaneously. Only one third of all households have not been directly affected by some kind 
of migration. 
Increasing labor migration has coincided with the increasing multi-activity and multi-
locality of contemporary oasis livelihoods, in which we can witness a general diversification 
and partial de-agranzation of activity patterns, especially among young men. Although 
agriculture remains important as a source of cash and in-kind income, its role has changed 
from being the pillar of the oasis economy to now being just one of the many sources of 
income. Nowadays, there are only very few oasis households that base their livelihoods on 
agricultural resources only. This corroborates the general point raised by Bebbington 
(1999:2021) that we should cease to "crunch rural livelihoods into the category of agricultural 
and natural resource-based strategies". 
The increasingly restrictive European immigration policies interrupted the 
traditionally circular character of migration from the Todgha. Family reunification heralded 
this shift from circular to more or less permanent migration, turning the intended partir pour 
rester (cf. Heinemeijer et al. 1977) into partir pour quitter (cf. De Mas 1990; Kagermeier 
1997) for many migrants and their households. 
However, maintaining strong social and financial links with "home", these 
transnationally operating "permanent" migrants still play a crucial role in sustaining the 
Todgha economy and in general development in migrant sending areas. This manifests itself 
in remittance transfers to family members, the existence of "indirect" migrant households, 
and the high incidence of transnational marriages with second and third generation migrants' 
children. Therefore, family reunification does not imply that linkages with the Todgha are cut, 
as classical models of "migrant integration" predicted. On the contrary, there is an 
unexpectedly high degree of "transnational" and intergenerational commitment. 
This study has shown that international migration has greatly contributed to improving 
many people's standard of living in the Todgha valley. Largely due to the effect of 
remittances, current, indirect, and returned international migrant households tend to earn far 
higher and more stable incomes than nonmigrant and internal migrant households. They also 
tend to live in significantly better conditions in regard to housing and basic luxuries. This 
corroborates the hypothesis of the new economics of labor migration that migration is a 
household livelihood strategy to not only diversify and spread income risks, but also to 
increase income, which enables households to improve living conditions and well-being. This 
is the first way in which (international) migration has contributed to development in the 
Todgha. 
International migration has enabled many Todgha households to durably improve the 
"material" dimension of their livelihoods. This direct impact of migration on people's living 
conditions should not be dismissed as "non-developmental", as has been the case in much of 
the migration and development literature. From a capabilities perspective, consumption and 
so-called "non-productive investments" that enable people to be better housed, well fed, 
healthier, and decently clothed all endow people with a greater sense of well-being and 
increased freedom to take their fate into their own hands. They should therefore be considered 
as developmental. Although international migrant households are the prime beneficiaries of 
remittances, other households seem to have benefited in an indirect way through employment 
creation and income multiplier effects set in motion by migrants' consumption and 
Conclusions 379 
investments It is difficult to imagine what the Todgha would have been like without 
migration, but most households would probably be far worse off than they are today 
Cumulative causation theory and structuralist theoretical perspectives on migration 
and development tend to see dependency on the outside world as a negative phenomenon that 
undermines the local economy and leads migrant households to retreat from local economic 
activities Nevertheless, such an "impressionist" image of the Todgha as a region more or less 
passively relying on migrant remittances is unmistakably erroneous Firstly, although 
remittances constitute an important source of cash income, they represent "only" one third of 
total income of the surveyed households Secondly, and more importantly, international 
migrant households tend not to rely solely on remittances and subsequently withdraw from 
other, local economic activities, but instead tend to continue or even extend the number of 
economic sectors in which they are active They also tend to have higher non-migratory 
incomes than other households Thus, labor migration from the Todgha should not be 
interpreted as an "under-developing" flight from misery, but rather as an investment in a 
potentially better future 
It would also be erroneous to depict migration as the one and only cause of livelihood 
changes as such Rather than the independent cause of livelihood diversification, migration 
seems to be part of a broader strategy of oasis households to diversify and improve their 
livelihoods Migration is an integral part of a broader process of political, infrastructural, 
economic, and social integration of the Todgha valley into a changing national and 
international context, and the concomitant increasing flows of products (e g , trade), money 
(e g , remittances), people (migration), and information (e g education, the media revolution) 
between the Todgha and the outside world However, it is in particular through migration that 
these mutually reinforcing processes associated with "globalization" have materialized and 
become tangible for the average oasis dweller In many respects, migration has literally 
brought the Todghawis into the modem world and the modem world to the Todgha 
11.3. Migration and investments 
11.3.1. Migration, remittances, and the propensity to invest 
The most important conclusion of this thesis is that households with access to international 
migration resources (remittances) exhibit a significantly higher propensity to invest in the 
Todgha than other households This corroborates the central hypothesis of NELM that 
migration is a livelihood strategy not only serving to diversify the household's income 
portfolio and increase income and general well-being, but also to overcome local (economic, 
social, cultural, and institutional) constraints This enables households to invest in local 
economic activities and the education of their children, and, hence, to further improve and 
secure their livelihoods Although this is true for any investment category, international 
migrants tend to invest particularly in housing, education, and agriculture The research 
revealed that international migrant households do not generally "waste" excessive amounts of 
disposable income on "conspicuous" consumption, but are, instead, very prudent in deciding 
how to invest their money 
There is only a small difference in the investment priorities of indirect, current, and 
return migrant households Thus, the main dividing line is between households with and 
without access to international migration resources The fact that current (i e, absent) 
migrants exhibit a relatively high propensity to invest refutes common hypotheses that 
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returned migrants are the prime investors. This indicates that migration impact studies should 
not only focus on return migrants, as has generally been the case. The physical absence of the 
migrants does not have to prevent households from investing locally. This highlights the fact 
that household livelihoods have become increasingly multi-local and that migrants are 
increasingly operating (living, traveling, loving, communicating, thinking, consuming, and 
investing) on a "transnational" basis. Households do not have to concentrate their livelihood 
activities either at the origin or at the destination. It can well be both. 
The explicit intention of most migrants is to eventually return in order to build a future 
for themselves and their families in the Todgha. Although international migrants in particular 
often end up settling at their destination, this more or less permanent character of migration 
does not necessarily imply that social and economic ties with the Todgha are cut. Among the 
first generation especially, the orientation towards the community of origin tends to remain 
strong. Even if they do not return, many current international migrants tend to invest, either 
directly or indirectly, by financially assisting kin living in "indirect" international migrant 
households. 
Another key observation is that international migrant households exhibit a higher 
propensity to invest even when controlling for income. This means that the higher propensity 
of international migrant households to invest cannot exclusively be explained by their 
substantially higher incomes. Nor do the supposedly more entrepreneurial attitudes of 
international migrants form a major explanation, as indirect international migrants—who have 
never been abroad—exhibit an equal propensity to invest as current and returned migrants. 
We can therefore hypothesize that the main factor explaining this "above-income effect" of 
migration is that their incomes are not only higher, but also tend to be more stable and secure 
than is the case for laborers in Morocco. Many international migrants have access to 
European social security systems and have generally insured their future income through 
pension rights. This seems to make them more prone and less hesitant to take investment 
risks. 
Within a capabilities perspective on development, we can say that access to 
international migration resources has expanded the freedoms and capabilities of household 
members by enhancing the substantive choices they have in life. Most oasis households have 
been able to free themselves from the imperative to be agriculturally self-sufficient. 
International migration has liberated numerous Todghawis from the obligation to "slave 
away" from dawn till dusk in agriculture and household activities. This decrease in workload 
and increase in free time are valuable in themselves, as long as this does not imply frustrating, 
unintentional inactivity. Moreover, this gives people the freedom to concentrate on more 
valuable or productive work and to better educate their children. Constituting a high and 
stable and secure source of income, international remittances have greatly increased the 
"degrees of freedom" households have in shaping their own (future) livelihood through opting 
for particular activities and investments according to their own preferences. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that these direct positive developmental effects 
have remained largely limited to households with access to international migration resources. 
As the incomes of internal migrants are generally low and insecure, migration generally does 
not allow them to make significant capital investments. Their investment behavior therefore 
does not significantly deviate from nonmigrant households, with the notable exception of 
investment in education. Internal migrants' spouses, who generally become the de facto 
household heads, tend to live emotionally and physically arduous and materially insecure 
lives. Among internal migrant households, education of their children (e.g., the second oldest 
son becoming a school teacher while his older brother works in town) is the main (human 
capital) investment strategy through which they attempt to secure and stabilize future 
livelihoods. 
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Therefore, from a NELM perspective, the main rationale behind internal migration 
seems to be the diversification of the household's income portfolio Moreover, settlement in 
cities increases the chance of finding better paid jobs and obtaining financial, social, and 
informational means to eventually "leapfrog" to Europe Although some manage to find good 
jobs or migrate abroad, migration remains a "survival strategy" for most internal migrants 
Trying to keep their head above water, many are not able to durably improve their 
livelihoods, as their (informal) jobs are too insecure and their salaries too low 
11.3.2. Sectoral allocation of investments and temporal dimensions 
The analysis of the temporal allocation of investments confirmed the hypothesis that sectoral 
investment preferences tend to change over time, and that the full developmental effects of 
migration take decades to fully materialize Investments in housing construction occur 
relatively early in the "migration cycle" (reaching their peak 5-15 years after departure) as do 
those in basic luxury and education Major agricultural investments, such as land and pump 
purchase, mostly occur 15-25 years after migration Investments in private businesses follow 
a more irregular pattern, but tend to reach a peak 25-30 years after migration 
This empirical evidence largely reflects the hypothesized sequence depicted in table 
2 1 in chapter 2 In the first years after migration, migrant households tend to concentrate on 
fulfilling primary needs such as nutrition, health, debt repayment, and investments in 
education We have also argued that these initial expenditure preferences are perfectly logical 
from a capabilities point of view People's primary aim is to live in decent conditions, to be 
well fed, healthy, and to educate their children In material terms, education is the most 
accessible investment strategy for households to improve future livelihoods Besides housing, 
investments in children's "human capital" tend to be considered as a household "life 
insurance" by the respondents 
When the immediate needs are fulfilled, possible debts have been paid off, and a 
certain level of job and income security has been assured, most migrant households tend to 
invest in the construction of a new house and purchase items such as basic consumer durables 
and household appliances Investments in more risky and costly commercial enterprises 
(agriculture, large-scale housing, commerce, and so on), generally occur only in the longer 
term, after the most basic necessities have been fulfilled Only, that is, if migrants do not 
decide to depart once and for all, an event which is usually heralded by family reunification at 
the destination The extent to which investments occur, and where and in which sector they 
are allocated, however, depends on household income and the specific local development 
context 
The short-term impact of migration might in some cases indeed be a temporary retreat 
from economic activities at the origin However, in the longer term migrant households tend 
to be economically more active and invest more in local economic sectors than nonmigrants, 
even when controlling for income This corroborates other empirical evidence that over time 
there tends to be a pattern first of negative and then of positive effects of migration on non-
remittance income in migrant sending households (Taylor et al 1996 405) 
This all adds to the idea that it is mainly in communities with a relatively long-
standing, rather "mature" tradition of international migration, that migration pays off in terms 
of investments This "lagged investment response" to migration seems to apply even more to 
business enterprises, as these are mainly concentrated in the hands of return migrants 
Consequently, also the indirect positive (employment and income multiplier) effects of 
international migration on households without direct access to international migration (i e, 
382 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
indirect international migrant, nonmigrant and internal migrant households) only tends to 
fully materialize after at least three decades, when the "household migration cycle" reaches its 
end 
This implies that the developmental impact of migration can only be fully assessed 
when migration matures, that is, after several decades of sustained out-migration This 
suggests that the rather pessimistic conclusion by prior research into migrant sending areas in 
Morocco can partly be explained by the fact that most of these studies were conducted 
relatively early after the onset of large-scale migration to Europe in the late 1960s and early 
1970s Since then, attention has largely shifted to "integration" issues at the destination, 
thereby largely losing sight of the positive long-term impact of international migration on 
development in many migrant sending areas 
11.4. Migration and economic-geographical transformations 
11.4.1. The pioneering role of migrants in agricultural transformations 
The analysis has demonstrated that the growing importance of remittances and local non-
agricultural income as well as the "culture of migration" has not led to a retreat from oasis 
agriculture—as is generally assumed in the literature—but that international migration has 
instead contributed to the increasing productivity of agriculture Instead of draining the 
Todgha of its productive forces, migration has played a developmental role by enabling 
agncultural investments, such as the purchase of motorpumps, land, cattle, as well as the 
increase and intensification of production through the use of fertilizers, pesticides, HYV seeds, 
and the partial mechanization of ploughing and threshing This clearly contradicts the 
pessimistic cumulative causation theory and structuralist visions of migration and 
development 
International migration households not only tend to invest more, but have also played 
a pioneering role in the intensification of agriculture in the ancient oasis and the creation of 
new agricultural extensions in the lower Todgha This process has been primarily enabled by 
the installation of motor pumps The irony is that while the socio-cultural and emancipatory 
effects of migration have contributed to the breakdown of traditional village institutions 
regulating the maintenance of traditional, collective irrigation systems (e g, khettaras), the 
same migration process and the concomitant remittance inflows have enabled peasants to 
switch to pump-based agriculture and to create a new green frontier in the desert 
Agriculture in the lower Todgha increasingly relies on water pumps This 
development has been provoked by the decline of khettaras on the one hand, and the creation 
of recent agncultural extensions on the other, and has been facilitated by the influx of 
international remittances to a great extent Nevertheless, the increasing reliance on capital-
intensive pumping in the lower Todgha has contributed to the partial or entire exclusion of 
poor households from access to traditional khettara water resources and, thus, to increasing 
agricultural inequality The transition towards more capital-intensive, pump-based agriculture 
coincides with increasingly selective access to water, and may in the future lead to a 
concentration of "water power" in a decreasing number of hands Thus, the poorest 
households emerge as losers from this water game 
The major drawback of the boom in motor pumping is the threat it constitutes for the 
sustainability of oasis agriculture Increasing pumping competition and falling water tables 
might—in the absence of government intervention, failing law enforcement, and the general 
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legal vacuum characterizing land and water management—endanger the ecological and 
economic sustainability of oasis agnculture The anarchic, largely uncontrolled growth of 
motor pumping threatens to lead to the depletion of vital water resources 
The incidence of fallow land is highest among nonmigrant households, which seems 
to contradict the pessimistic "lost labor" hypothesis It is poverty rather than migration per se 
that forces some internal migrant and nonmigrant households to withdraw partly or entirely 
from agnculture in villages where water is nowadays only accessible through pumping The 
counterflow of remittances enables cunent international migrant households to compensate 
for the so-called "lost labor effect" by hiring paid agncultural laborers dunng agricultural 
peak seasons and for typically "male" agricultural tasks (e g , tillage, irrigation), maintenance 
work, and well-digging After family reunification and the factual disappearance of the 
household from the valley, land and other assets are normally entrusted to ikhmmesen 
(sharecroppers) or family members 
The fiindamental weakness of the "lost labor" hypothesis, as formulated by cumulative 
causation and structuralist migration theory, seems to be its static nature, as it implicitly 
assumes a fixed labor supply, and does not take into account the possibility of hiring 
"external" labor It ignores that (1) other household members may take over agricultural 
tasks, (2) land can be entrusted to ikhmmesen or family members, (3) the counterflow of 
remittances potentially enables households to hire paid laborers, and (4) agnculture can 
become more capital intensive through which similar or higher production levels can be 
achieved by using less labor 
The impact of migration on agricultural transformations exhibits a high degree of 
spatial differentiation This is mainly due to the fact that land and water resources are 
unequally distributed between the upstream and downstream parts of the valley Land is 
relatively abundant in the plains of the lower Todgha compared to the upper Todgha, where 
the narrow valley is hemmed in between steep mountains and all arable land has already been 
cultivated Yet, however, surface water is extremely abundant and perennial in the upper 
valley while relatively scarce in the lower valley These opposite gradients in relative water 
and land scarcity are crucial in explaining spatial differences in the patterns of agricultural 
change in a rather unexpected manner most agricultural development is taking place in those 
parts of the valley where water is most scarce 
Although water is relatively scarce in the lower Todgha, this constraint can now be 
overcome through the advent of the water pumping technique, provided that enough 
investment capital and groundwater is available This has enabled the intensification (in the 
traditional oasis) and spatial extension (in recent extensions) of agriculture m the lower 
Todgha, traditionally the most "marginal" part of the oasis In the upper Todgha, moreover, 
plot sizes tend to be extremely small To a great extent, this "agricultural involution" is an 
obstacle for people wishing to invest in agnculture on an individual basis Although this lush 
part of the valley looks prosperous on first sight, this impression is deceiving, as opportunities 
for agricultural development are actually very limited The absolute lack of new farmland in 
the upper Todgha has led to investment in other economic sectors or in agriculture in the 
lower Todgha or elsewhere in Morocco 
It is striking that many peasants prefer to invest in new, until recently barren, areas 
located outside the traditional oasis In the traditional oasis, plots are generally small and 
scattered, and the collective, community-level organization pertaining to water distribution is 
increasingly considered as an obstacle to individual agricultural entrepreneurship This 
explains why peasants often seem to prefer to localize investments in areas outside the 
traditional oases where constraints such as the inflexible collective regulations concerning 
water allocation, fragmented land property, and collective maintenance of the irrigation 
infrastructure do not play a role Moreover, on such new land, the possibilities for 
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intensifying agriculture are better than in the ancient oasis, since plots are larger, which 
allows for some degree of mechanization and a relatively "modem" farming system. This 
reflects evidence from other rural regions and oases in Morocco (cf. Bencherifa 1991; 1993) 
Although cropping patterns differ little across the household migration categories, 
international migrant household tend to grow a somewhat larger variety of annual crops. 
Returned migrants, in particular, tend to grow a larger variety of vegetables, and tend to cling 
to traditional forms of oasis agriculture, whereas indirect migrant households in particular 
tend to invest in relatively modem forms of agriculture. All the empirical evidence points to 
the fact that current and indirect migrant households in particular—and not returnees—play 
important roles in "innovative" agricultural development. 
11.4.2. Migration, non-agricultural investments, and de-agrarization 
Migration is not only a part of the general process of integration of the Todgha into wider 
economic and political networks and the concomitant diversification of oasis livelihoods. It is 
also a factor contributing to the further diversification and partial de-agrarization of the 
regional economy through its enabling effect on households to invest in local housing, 
business enterprises, and education. Households with access to international migration 
resources exhibit a higher propensity to invest in such non-agricultural sectors than other 
households, even when controlling for income. Through its recursive developmental effects 
on the Todgha, migration has the tendency to recursively strengthen and intensify the general 
process of livelihood diversification. 
International migration has visibly contributed to the accelerated development of real 
estate in the valley. Although the constmction of new houses is a general development, 
households involved in international migration tend to build faster and nicer houses and often 
own several. Housing is the highest priority on the list of capital investments for many, and 
the vast majority of international migrant households invest in real estate. However, it would 
be erroneous to explain the construction fever uniquely or mainly by the migrants' quest for 
more status within their own community, as has often been done in the migration and 
development literature. Decent housing is a basic necessity of life. The importance attached to 
housing should primarily be explained by a logical quest for basic luxury, space, and privacy, 
less conflicts, and better health. Besides such obvious well-being and health aspects, women 
often gain significantly in personal liberty through the establishment of new independent 
houses for their nuclear family. 
Much of the literature has tended to strongly disapprove of so-called "non-productive" 
and "unnecessary" investments in housing. However, by implicitly suggesting that oasis 
dwellers should stay in their "mud brick houses", wealthy and urban-based social scientists 
apply different standards to others than they would probably do to themselves. The quest for 
space, hygiene, and some degree of privacy seems to be almost universal. Reasoning from a 
capabilities-based concept of development, improved well-being and standards of living are 
to be considered as constituent parts of development. Dismissing such well-being aspects as 
"non-developmental" typically reflects a narrow view of development. 
Moreover, housing is also a logical and relatively secure investment in a rather 
insecure investment environment, through which households are able to generate additional 
income through various lease arrangements and provide "life insurance" for the migrants' 
households. In case of the death of the breadwinner, family members are at least guaranteed 
shelter and will often gain rental income. This is particularly important in a society where 
most households do not have access to social security systems. Considering the population 
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increase and urban growth in Tinghir, real estate investments have turned out to be a highly 
rewarding investment strategy, which has enabled many migrant households to stabilize and 
increase their income 
It is through these investments that international migrant households have 
simultaneously capitalized on, and actively contributed to, the urban growth and 
concentration of non-agncultural economic activities in Tinghir and the semi-urbanization of 
the rural space around places like "New Taghzout" and Ait Aissa Ou Brahim The 
construction boom and investments in enterprises have also created considerable local 
employment in sectors that are closely related to the construction business, such as Tinghir's 
thriving crafts industry (e g , carpenters, welders), hardware stores, retail trade in household 
utensils and building material Furthermore, it has offered employment to vanous electricians, 
plumbers, tilers, and people working in the service sector 
The many international migrant households that have built more than one house have 
mostly done so in Tinghir This applies even more to the investments in private business 
enterprises that are overwhelmingly located in the valley's capital Migration has played an 
independent, accelerating role in the economic-geographical transformation of the Todgha 
valley, which have led to an increasing demand for non-agricultural labor 
The livelihoods of oasis households are increasingly oriented towards Tinghir and, to 
a lesser extent, towards the semi-urban centers of Ait Aissa Ou Brahim and Taghzout This 
also explains why the proximity to paved roads and access to (semi-public) transport have 
become so crucial in, for example, deciding where to locate a new house Migrants' 
investments in transport play an important role in the development of transit transport 
networks within the Todgha The increasing orientation towards (semi-) urban centers is not 
only employment-related, but also related to changing consumption styles and the increasing 
importance of markets in general 
International migration has contributed to the economic development of the Todgha 
valley in the sense that migrants' investments not only function to diversify, increase, and 
secure their own future income, but also to create a certain level of employment for 
nonmigrants Moreover, there has been only limited "leakage" of non-agncultural 
investments to other regions Although intra-valley spatial inequality has been reinforced by 
the concentration of investments in Tinghir, migration has contributed to mitigating the 
development gap between the Todgha as a whole and more wealthy regions in Morocco In 
comparison with surrounding areas (e g, High Atlas, Saghro, Tafilalt, Drâa), the Todgha 
valley has become relatively prosperous This is not only visible in the construction boom and 
the expansion of Tinghir's commercial function, but also in internal labor migration from 
other areas of Morocco to the Todgha valley In other words, the recursive developmental 
effects of international migration have created a counterflow of internal migrants 
11.4.3. The reversed "cumulative causation" hypothesis 
However, the recursive developmental effect of migration has not led to a lower inclination 
among Todghawis to migrate On the contrary, migration seems to have stimulated 
subsequent out-migration This effect is not only achieved through the important facilitating 
(i e, nsk and cost lowenng) role of migrant networks The exposure to media and the 
relatively high wealth of international migrant households, general improvements in wealth 
and education—which are partially the effect of migration itself—have all increased 
aspirations, feelings of relative depnvation, and the personal capabilities of young people to 
migrate This corroborates the central assumption of transitional migration theory that 
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development initially tends to shape and enhance the matenal and mental conditions for 
migration Thus, paradoxically, through its recursive effects on regional development, 
migration may subsequently trigger more migration 
Another way in which the recursive developmental effects of migration tend to 
increase people's propensity to migrate is manifested in the effect of migration on the 
education of younger household members Whereas international migration itself was not 
selective for education, younger members of household with access to international migration 
resources are significantly better educated than children within nonmigrant and internal 
migrant households With regards to education, internal migrant households are in a better 
position than nonmigrant households, since the presence of labor migrants in town decreases 
the costs and risks associated with the education of a younger sibling. Since higher education 
implies migrating to the cities, and the higher educated tend to stay working in cities, 
educational investments tend to further reinforce the propensity to migrate among younger 
generations 
As such, the whole idea that the recursive effects of migration shape the 
developmental conditions for subsequent and even intensified migration is not new It was 
already postulated by Myrdal's cumulative causation theory (see chapter 2) However, in the 
core of its argument, our analysis—which corroborates transitional migration theory—is 
diametrically opposed to cumulative causation theory and structuralist perspectives in 
explaining how the recursive developmental feedbacks of out-migration stimulate subsequent 
out-migration The fundamental difference is that cumulative causation and structuralist 
theones see migration as the consequence of social and economic decline (or "development of 
underdevelopment"—cf Frank 1966) which are further stimulated by the negative "backwash 
effects" of migration, rather than, as we have hypothesized, the very result of development in 
the form of increased capabilities, freedoms, and aspirations of people to migrate Whereas 
cumulative causation and dependency theories argue that migration stimulates further 
migration through its negative developmental effects, we can hypothesize that migration tends 
to stimulate further migration through its potentially positive developmental effects 
11.5. Migration and socio-cultural change 
11.5.1. Migration and new forms of inequality 
The study of the spatial allocation of migrants' investments corroborates the point made by 
Taylor et al (1996) and Jones (1998) that differences in the scale of analysis may 
fundamentally affect the assessment of the impacts of migration on development When 
exclusively focusing the analysis on the village level, one might conclude that many 
investments tend to "leak away" to urban areas This seems to fit in with "pessimistic" center-
penphery models and cumulative causation theory, which state that migration leads to 
increasing dispanties in rural and urban development However, when analyzing the impact at 
the regional level (e g, the Todgha valley), the conclusion is that most investments remain 
within the valley, and that, moreover, the direct and indirect positive spin-off of these 
investments is considerable 
With regards to inequality at the inter-household level, it is difficult to give an 
unambiguous answer to the question of whether the impact of migration has been positive 
International migration has certainly given rise to a new socio-economic divide between 
households with and without access to international migration resources 
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Inequality and poverty are important features of the studied communities, and many 
nonmigrant and internal migrant households face meager and highly unstable livelihoods. 
From a capabilities perspective on development, such inequality is clearly not developmental. 
However, besides the fact that it is not possible to "scientifically" define an optimum between 
distributional ("equity") and mean ("efficiency") income objectives (Sen 1999; Stark 
1988:309), there are two reasons not to jump to any conclusion that the impacts of migration 
have "thus" been negative, or that inequality has increased over the past half century. 
Firstly, we should avoid romanticizing the past by acknowledging that traditional 
oasis society has been inherently unequal, with its caste-like socio-ethnic stratification, in 
which most oasis dwellers lived in grinding poverty and "inferior" ethnic groups were 
condemned to serfdom or slavery. Today, new forms of inequality based on access to 
monetary resources, which are to a considerable extent defined along lines of access to 
international migration resources, have been largely superimposed upon the traditional forms 
of structural, "hereditary" inequality based on ethnic affiliation, complexion, and land 
possession. 
There are no objective, scientific standards to determine, like a deus ex machina, 
which form of inequality ("pre-modem" or "capitalist") was worse. Nevertheless, traditional 
oasis society in its very essence was based on the "unfreedom" of large sections of the 
population. In the literature on migration and development in Morocco, we sometimes find a 
romantic discourse on traditional "community solidarity" or so-called "tribal democracy" in 
the form of the taqbilt. However, traditional oasis society used to deny basic human freedoms 
to large sections of the oasis population (women, slaves, serfs, landless ikhmmesen) and 
therefore seems—reasoning from the axioms of the capabilities perspective—inherently less 
developed than contemporary oasis society. 
Secondly, to a certain extent, nonmigrant and internal migrant households have 
profited indirectly from consumption and investments by international migrants. International 
migration seems to have contributed to a general, community and valley-wide improvement 
of livelihoods and the reduction of absolute poverty through the employment and income 
multiplier effects of migrant households' consumption and investments. Furthermore, 7.5 
percent of all the surveyed households do not have migrated members, but receive 
international remittances on a regular basis from family members. Although inequality 
remains an important feature of oasis society, the vast majority of (migrant and nonmigrant) 
oasis households are better off than half a century ago, and this can, to a significant extent, be 
attributed to the direct and indirect effects of international migration. 
The socio-ethnic emancipation of former subordinate smallholding and landless 
groups, such as the haratin, has contributed to the partial breakdown and malfunctioning of 
traditional village institutions for land and water management whose functioning was largely 
based on the inferior status of these people and their role as a cheap "oasis labor reserve". 
Due to the decreasing legitimacy of the power of the taqbilt and amghar (chief), it has 
become increasingly difficult to enforce customary law. In this sense, migration has 
contributed to the above-mentioned process of exclusion of the poorest from access to 
"collective" water resources and, thus, to increasing agricultural inequality. 
11.5.2. Visions of El Dorado: mirage or reality? 
Within the complex process of transformations the Todgha has undergone over the past half 
century, migration stands out prominently not only because of its magnitude, but also because 
of its profound impact on the daily life of most oasis families, on social relations within oasis 
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society, and on the perceptions, tastes, and aspirations of its inhabitants It is particularly 
through the expenence of migration that general processes—which scholars tend to indicate 
as "integration in the modem state and market economy", "modernization" or 
"globalization"—are concretely manifested for oasis dwellers 
It would be erroneous to depict migration only as an economic phenomenon To a 
large extent, migration is also a social and cultural event both in its causes and consequences 
The social and economic dimensions of migration can hardly be separated The fact alone that 
migrants send remittances back is an expression of the intensive social bonds they tend to 
maintain with kin and friends back home Social and ethnic bonds also affect the selectivity of 
future migration—we have seen that the chances of migrating are far higher for people with 
access to "social migration capital" in the form of already-migrated relatives Moreover, 
migration is not "only" an attempt to secure better livelihoods, but has also been an avenue of 
upwards social mobility for traditionally inferior groups such as the landless or smallholding 
ikhmmesen, among which can be counted many haratm 
Migration has had an important influence on life rhythm and "seasonality", as, instead 
of the harvest seasons, the July-August holiday season is now the yearly economic and 
cultural peak season, when international migrants return temporarily from Europe During the 
hot summer season, markets are at their busiest The summer holiday has also become the 
peak season for marriages between (second or third generation) Todghawis living in Europe 
and family or acquaintances in their region of origin This continues to propel chain migration 
through family formation 
The hopes of many nonmigrant youth as well as their parents are focused on marriage 
with a second or third generation European migrant A marriage with a migrant is generally 
considered as the ultimate ideal, being the most secure way to material stability and success 
as well as upward social mobility For them, this makes the summer holiday a thrilling event, 
when they can meet and talk to their "European" peers 
Together with improved education and increasing access to modem media, sustained 
out-migration has given rise to an outward looking "culture of migration", in which migration 
is associated with success and most young men and women aspire to migrate This influence 
is not only manifested through the exposure of migrants to other tastes, preferences, economic 
opportunities, and lifestyles, but also through the exposure of nonmigrants to the relative 
wealth of international migrants and their relatives This has clearly increased feelings of 
relative deprivation and, subsequently, raised the social and material aspirations of oasis 
dwellers Confronted with the wealth of migrants, oasis dwellers tend to perceive Europe as 
"paradise", an El Dorado of almost unlimited economic opportunities In the eyes of most 
young men and women—who are confronted with high unemployment, poverty, corruption, 
and a general lack of opportunity in Morocco—their high aspirations can only be fulfilled 
through migration to Europe 
The importance of rising aspirations in explaining the mounting desire to emigrate is 
paramount The fundamental weakness of common push-pull and neo-Malthusian 
explanations of migration—explaining migration in terms of high population growth and a 
limited agricultural "carrying capacity" which have "pushed" people out of their native 
areas—is that they assume that the needs and aspirations of people are stable Even if the 
agricultural carrying capacity of the Todgha were sufficient to feed the entire population— 
which is not the case (cf Büchner 1986)—most people would simply no longer be content 
with such a basic livelihood, as they have become exposed to other ways of life as well as 
increasing wealth and luxury, both outside (in cities or abroad) and inside the valley 
In the literature, it has often been stated that migrants tend to hide their problems and 
exaggerate their wealth, thereby creating an unrealistic perception that Europe's streets are 
paved with gold This might indeed be true to a certain extent However, the simple fact that 
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salaries in Europe easily exceed Moroccan salaries by five to ten times and often more, and 
the access to public health care, schooling, and social secunty all seem to justify the strong 
desire to migrate among those who do not have much to lose in their own eyes Todghawis do 
not tend to migrate "blindly" 
The allegedly materialistic attitudes and unrealistic expectations of migrants tend to 
raise womes among policy makers and some researchers Migrants, they say, would do better 
to stay in their region of origin to "help" the development of their region or should be better 
informed about the great opportunities in their country of origin and the difficult situation of 
migrants in Europe However, such views on migration and development seem somehow 
naïve if we bear in mind the high unemployment and the lack of resources available to most 
oasis dwellers This very lack of certain capabilities largely disables them from "developing 
themselves", and it is indeed particularly through (international) migration that these 
capabilities can be acquired. 
There has been a tendency in the literature to view the "culture of migration" in an 
overly negative way Even if impressions of Europe as some kind of paradise were too rosy, 
the image that there are more opportunities overseas does reflect reality Confronted with the 
many developmental constraints in Morocco, it can be a highly rational choice to migrate, 
because it is elsewhere that ambitious, young women and men are more likely develop and 
capitalize on their capabilities through education, work, or both Despite all the economic, 
social, and cultural problems migrants may face, the perception that international migration is 
the most secure way towards more social and economic freedom is more than a mirage 
However, those who leave generally have a strong desire to eventually return The 
typical ideal of migrants is still to invest the money they have earned and saved abroad in a 
commercial enterprise in the Todgha, from which their families can live The intention of 
most migrants remains "partir pour revenir" The extent to which these intentions are 
eventually fulfilled is quite a different matter What primarily matters for the migrants and 
their households is to improve their own livelihoods and well-being To most of them, the 
preferable way of doing this would be to realize their aspirations in the Todgha If 
circumstances do not allow this, they will realize them in another place, region, or country 
11.5.3. Migration and gender relations 
Although international migration has contributed to the well-being and freedoms that 
households enjoy, it is a different question of how the benefits of migration are distributed 
within the households, and in particular between men and women Whereas international 
migration seems to decrease the workload and livelihood certainty of women living in 
migrant households, the reverse seems true for internal migration Migration has clearly had a 
positive impact on the improvement in living conditions (e g , better housing and sanitation), 
general well-being (e g , through better access to health care), and decreasing workloads of 
international migrant women Poor, nonmigrant "clients" often help them in domestic work, 
while they often hire laborers for certain typically "male" agricultural tasks 
However, women in internal migrant households, while facing the same poverty and 
relatively low standards of living as nonmigrants, are not or are less able to compensate for 
the "lost male labor effect" by hiring personnel Although both internal and international 
migrant wives and their households tend to suffer from the absence of and dependency on 
their men, international migrant wives have far greater wealth, a certain degree of financial 
stability, and lighter workloads Internal migrant wives tend to live more arduous and 
uncertain lives 
390 Migration and Development in Southern Morocco 
The present study has refuted the hypothesis that international migration contributes to 
the emancipation of women through the influence of modem values transferred by migrants 
Women in migrant households tend to have more control over the use of their husbands' 
earnings than nonmigrant wives, whereby migrant wives living in extended households have 
less decision making power than those living in nuclear families They also have more 
influence on the schooling of their children, including that of their daughters. 
However, contrary to common hypotheses, migration has not led to fundamental, 
permanent changes in gender roles Notwithstanding the contribution of international 
migration to general standards of living and material well-being, the lives of migrant wives 
remain largely confined to housekeeping, childreanng, and agricultural work It is striking 
that the vast majonty of migrants' women see the increase in responsibilities and decision 
making power as an unwelcome burden Such a radical deviation from traditional gender 
roles is generally not appreciated by the women themselves, as it forces them into "male" 
roles which they are not used to playing and for which they are criticized by other villagers 
Furthermore, their gain in authority is mainly temporary, as migrants once more take over 
their position as "patriarchs" as soon as they return Gender inequality is sustained by national 
law, and migrant wives often fear repudiation or a marriage with a second wife by their 
husbands 
There has undoubtedly been an improvement in the position of oasis women over the 
past few decades For instance, they tend to marry at a later age and have better access to 
health care and family planning Young women also tend to have fewer children Women's 
workloads have decreased due to the advent of gas stoves, electricity, water pumps, and 
various household appliances However, such changes rather seem to be the effect of a 
general improvement in the position of women in Moroccan society than of a particular effect 
of international migration, which seems only limited 
The only clear exception seems education The youngest generation of women is far 
better educated than the generation before, and the huge gender gap in (pnmary) education 
started to decrease rapidly over the 1990s Although this is a general development, we have 
also seen that girls in international migrant households are generally better educated, and that 
migration has played an accelerating role in closing the gender gap in primary education We 
have hypothesized that this can be explained by the greater say in household affairs that 
women tend to have during the long absence of their husbands living abroad 
An increasing number of young women aspire to migrate, either by marrying a 
migrant, or independently in other to study or work elsewhere, and often preferably on the 
other side of the Strait of Gibraltar The exposure to better-educated, working, and more 
independent female migrants makes them not only more aware of other life styles, but also 
makes them realize that their aspirations can potentially be fulfilled, and that another, and in 
their eyes better, life is m fact possible Indeed, the culture of migration has clearly pervaded 
women's lives too 
11.6. Structural constraints to migration and development 
Although the propensity to invest is higher among international migrant households and 
migration has undoubtedly contributed to development in the Todgha, this is not to say that 
the Todgha in particular, and Morocco in general, are ideal investment environments Instead, 
this study identified several structural constraints, which lead us to conclude that the 
developmental potential of migration is certainly not being fully realized These structural 
constraints explain why many migrants do not realize their intention of returning, invest less 
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than intended, or do not invest at all. This is not only related to general factors such as macro-
economic and political circumstances', but also to more specific problems related to failing 
governmental and non-govemmental institutions, legal insecurity, the structure of "inherited" 
agricultural systems, gender inequality, structural unemployment, and the nature of migration 
policies. In many of these cases, the issue of trust is central. 
Corruption, red tape, and the general lack of trust vis-à-vis the state apparatus 
(makhzen) tend to complicate and slow down administrative procedures like, for example, 
obtaining business permits or title deeds on land and other property. This often means such 
property cannot be used as collateral for loans, reducing land, real estate, and other property 
to so-called "dead capital" (cf. De Soto 2000). These factors form clear obstacles to 
investments, especially for relatively poor households lacking good connections and political 
"shortcuts". 
The confrontation with rent seeking officials not only increases investment costs, but 
also perpetuates people's low trust in the state's administrative and legal institutions. 
Needless to say, the issue of trust is crucial to investment decisions. The perceived 
unreliability of the state manifests itself in a general feeling of legal insecurity (with regards 
to property) and a fear of rent seeking civil servants. Inhabitants of the Todgha tend to have a 
profound distrust of "the makhzen", the central state, its institutions, and its local 
representatives. This distrust is possibly reinforced by the fact that the Todgha and its Berber 
inhabitants were largely independent of central state power until colonization. Therefore, the 
makhzen and its local representatives are often seen as untrustworthy "outsiders". 
In sum, these circumstances seem to make potential investors hesitant, especially 
those whose financial resources are limited and who lack good connections and informal 
access to local rulers and the state bureaucracy. We can equally hypothesize that this 
unfavorable institutional environment and the concomitant lack of trust partly explain why so 
many migrants have decided not to return and to reunify their households and why the bulk of 
local investments are made in the relatively secure housing sector. 
In the agricultural domain, the general lack of technical assistance by the government 
and agricultural extensions offices (ORMVA, CMV) leaves the potential for agricultural 
development partially unexploited. Oriented as they are towards "modem" agriculture, 
agricultural officials seem barely interested in small-scale oasis agriculture, and also seem to 
lack both the will and means to assist or advise peasants wishing to invest in agriculture. For 
example, peasants neither have access to information on water tables, nor receive advice on 
the optimal location of wells. This lack of assistance increases the risk of failure of pumping 
investments. 
Due to excessive red tape, many peasants do not have the title deeds to their land. This 
is especially true for former collective pastureland in the lower Todgha (notably the Ghallil 
plain) that has been divided between individuals based on mutual but frequently informal 
agreements. This is an obstacle for obtaining agricultural credit, as banks require title deeds as 
collateral on loans. This legal insecurity of property rights is another dimension of the general 
lack of trust in government institutions. 
Other types of obstacles are rooted in the inherited structure of "involuted", oasis 
agriculture, the collective nature of irrigation, and structural inequalities in intra-valley water 
distribution. Extremely fragmented land tenure, the scattered location of plots, and the 
complex and collective character of regulations on water allocation hinder agricultural 
innovation, mechanization, and individual investments in the traditional oasis, particularly in 
It goes without saying lhat economic and political conditions at the macro-level, such as political stability, 
international trade relations, and economic growth, play a crucial role too. However, an analysis of such factors 
was beyond the scope of this study 
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the upper Todgha. Peasants willing to invest are therefore forced to buy land elsewhere, 
requiring considerable extra investment. Secondly, due to the historical outcome of a political 
struggle favoring the upstream and central igherman, the relatively abundant and perennial 
river water is disproportionally allocated to the upper parts of the Todgha valley—where 
water is spoiled (cf. El Harradji 2001)—depriving the lower parts of the valley of this cheap 
and renewable water resource. 
The state does not play an active role in solving the crisis in the collective 
management of the declining khettaras and other agro-hydrological infrastructure. The 
anarchic, largely uncontrolled boom in motor pumping constitutes a clear danger for the 
future ecological and economic sustainability of oasis agriculture. Increasing pumping 
competition and falling water tables are one of the causes behind the desiccation of the 
khettaras and wells. This threatens to destroy investments in pumping done by over 1,100 
peasants. Despite laws prohibiting unauthorized pumping, local authorities and the legislative 
powers do not seem willing or able to control the expansion of motor pumps through law 
enforcement or to settle conflicts between water users. This perpetuates feelings of legal 
insecurity. Furthermore, this development will exacerbate agricultural inequality between neh 
and poor households, as only the relatively wealthy can afford to dig deeper wells and install 
heavier pumps if water tables fall. 
Patriarchal value systems are a clear constraint on women's freedom in schooling, 
work, family planning, partner choice, and, last but not least, mobility. Although the position 
of women has improved over the past few decades, women who stay behind remain 
structurally disadvantaged compared to men, and also benefit less from the new livelihood 
opportunities created by international migration. However, women can expect to gain more 
from their own migration to Europe in the context of family reunification and family 
formation. For women, migration to Europe not only implies an important improvement in 
their economic situation, but also in their legal and social position. To a certain extent, this 
may explains why migrant women seem less willing to return to Morocco than men. It can 
therefore be hypothesized that (legal and social) gender inequality decreases the propensity to 
return (and invest) among migrants and increases the tendency towards family reunification. 
Many international migrants from the Todgha who decided not to reunify their 
families in the 1970s and 1980s did so because they assumed it would be a better strategy to 
invest in the education of their children (i.e., sons) in Morocco. However, this strategy has 
often failed since, in the meantime, it has become increasingly difficult for university 
graduates (licensiés) to find a job due to severe IMF-instigated budget cuts in the public 
domain, the general economic downturn, misguided educational policies, and the surge in the 
number of young people holding higher education degrees. Moreover, alleged nepotism when 
handing high-skilled jobs in the government sector might also partially remove the 
meritocratic incentives of people to put much money and effort into higher education. In 
combination with mass unemployment among higher educated youngsters, this reduces 
people's trust in Morocco as a country in which personal development goals can be realized. 
It only reinforces their tendency to revert to international migration as the prime vehicle of 
upwards socio-economic mobility. 
Besides distrust towards the Moroccan makhzen, there is a general lack of trust among 
international migrants in the institutions of the destination countries. Confronted with a 
political discourse that has become progressively hostile towards immigration and with 
increasingly restrictive immigration policies and laws, potential migrant investors fear that by 
resettling in Morocco they will give up their acquired rights in Europe. This fear of not 
having the option to return to Europe in case of failure in social (adaptation) or economic 
terms seems to decrease their propensity to invest and return. 
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Paradoxically, the rather "volatile" (i.e., unreliable) European immigration policies 
have probably also played a role in decreasing the tendency among migrants to return and 
invest. Increasingly restrictive immigration policies have not only had the "perverse" effect of 
interrupting circular migration patterns and actually decreased people's tendency to return (cf. 
Entzinger 1985). They have also added to the feeling that immigration policies will become 
even more restrictive in the future, and that today's guarantees—for example the right to 
return in case of return migration—will only have limited and temporary value. This lack of 
trust might explain why many migrants cling to their acquired European residency rights. 
From the Moroccan perspective, a European residence permit is a key asset, a "gold 
mine" giving access to the European labor market and social security systems. This asset is 
therefore fostered and preferably passed on to following generations. For female migrants, an 
additional reason not to return is that they enjoy better rights in Europe. For migrants' 
children, it gives them access to European education systems. 
In general, migrants are operating in institutional environments that they perceive as 
untrustworthy or even hostile on either side of the Mediterranean. This makes them extremely 
risk-averse and prudent about giving up their hard-won rights in Europe. 
11.7. Synthesis and discussion 
The main conclusion of this study is that international migration has substantially contributed 
to social and economic development in the Todgha valley over the second half of the 
twentieth century. The study seems to support the NELM-hypothesis that migration has not 
only been a livelihood strategy serving to diversify households' income portfolio, 
substantially increasing and securing income, as well as improving living conditions, but has 
also been a means to overcome capital constraints on investments in the economy of the 
Todgha. The relatively high, stable, and secure nature of international remittance income 
enables households to make various investments in housing, agriculture, private enterprises, 
and education, allowing them to further improve and secure their livelihoods. 
In addition, through indirect (multiplier) effects, investments and consumption by 
migrants seem to have had an indirect positive effect on the economy of the whole valley. The 
increased investments and consumption by international migrant households have 
significantly contributed to the growth, diversification, partial de-agrarization, and 
urbanization of the regional economy and the creation of employment, from which "stay-
behinds" profit in indirect ways and which attract immigrant households settling in Tinghir 
and elsewhere in the Todgha. 
Although this generally appears to be in line with the premises of the NELM, there 
seems to be room for comment. First, NELM has a one-sided focus on market constraints. The 
analysis has shown that migration has also been a livelihood strategy to overcome socio-
cultural constraints on development. Migration has been a means to break away from inferior 
socio-ethnic positions for traditionally subordinate groups such as haratin, smallholding 
peasants, and ikhmmesen, for whom migration has been the main avenue for upwards socio-
economic and cultural mobility. Nevertheless, patriarchal value systems have not been 
substantially altered by migration, and women remain in a disadvantaged position, although 
in the longer term migration has had a certain positive effect on the education of young 
women in migrant households. 
Second, it should be noted that these positive developmental effects have remained 
largely limited to international migration. Internal migrants often lead a difficult life, 
struggling to survive and leaving their households (mostly women and children) financially 
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insecure Unlike international migrants, the income of internal migrants is generally low and 
instable with the exception of a minority of civil servants and professional workers 
Therefore, migration generally does not allow them to durably improve their households' 
livelihoods by investing money in the local economy The main rationale behind internal 
migration therefore seems to be income diversification and the chance to gain access to 
international migration For internal migrant households, education is the main investment 
strategy through which they attempt to secure and stabilize their future livelihoods, although 
this latter strategy has not been particularly successful in the light of present mass-
unemployment 
Third, incorporation of the Todgha into international migration systems has given rise 
to a new socio-economic divide between households with and without access to international 
migration resources, which has largely been supenmposed upon traditional forms of 
inequality based on ethnic affiliation, land possession, and complexion Nevertheless, through 
its indirect positive effects on the regional economy, migration has almost certainly 
contributed to a decrease in absolute poverty However, feelings of relative deprivation and 
generally rising aspirations caused by better education, the influence of the media, exposure 
to migrants' wealth, and the general "culture of migration" seem to have further increased 
many people's aspirations and propensity to migrate 
This study seems to suggest that it is possible to combine the insights derived from 
transitional migration theory, the new economics of labor migration (NELM), livelihood 
approaches, and the capabilities approach towards development This allows us to integrate 
the social, cultural, and economic dimensions of migration and development interactions 
This synergy can be established on the basis of the fundamental argument that they all see (1) 
labor migration as an outgrowth of development processes, which (2) potentially endows 
people and households with the (a) capabilities as well as the (b) aspirations to migrate, as (3) 
part of a more general livelihood strategy to (a) diversify (i e, stabilize), (b) secure, and (c) 
increase income In its potential income-increasing, stabilizing, and securing capacity, 
migration again can have a positive developmental impact on migrant sending areas by (4) 
potentially enabling households to increase consumption and investments and thereby (5) 
increase their capabilities to lead lives they have reason to value 
However, the extent to which this potential is realized crucially depends on the two 
following factors (1) The level, stability and secunty of remittance income—In the Todgha, 
we have seen that there is a huge divide between internal and international migrant 
households in this respect, (2) The general development context at both the origin and the 
destination, which determines households' propensity to return as well as the level and spatial 
allocation of consumption and investments Acknowledging its fundamental role in the 
process of development is not to say that migration thus automatically leads to more 
development, as its impact is far from uniform (i e , disparate) across locales, social 
categories and over time We have also seen that particular forms of migration (i e , child 
labor in large towns) can increase "unfreedom", or have even their origins in coercion 
The many feedback mechanisms through which the impacts of migration have affected 
development in the Todgha valley have again influenced patterns of out- and in-migration 
This leads us to conclude that migration is not only a factor explaining change, but is an 
integral part of changes itself in the same degree as it may enable further change It therefore 
seems more accurate to refer to the recursive relationship between migration and 
development instead of the impact of migration on development 
The diversification and improvement of oasis livelihoods through migration has been 
enabled by structural changes in the macro-context that have impinged upon the Todgha On 
the other hand, actors such as migrants and households are not only passive pawns or victims 
reacting to circumstances shaped by shifting macro-forces Migration is not so much a flight 
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from misery, but rather a deliberate attempt to overcome local obstacles to social and 
economic development 
To a certain extent, households and individuals have the capacity to take their fate into 
their own hands, and attempt to reshape, diversify and durably improve their livelihoods, for 
instance through migration Through this agency, they also alter structures, thereby reshaping 
the local context in which migration and development occurs For instance, through 
remittance transfers, consumption and investments, migration has significantly expanded 
local markets for goods and labor, attracted banks to Tinghir and indirectly increased wealth 
among many nonmigrants Such partly migration-triggered regional development has even 
given rise to new forms of "reversed" internal migration towards the Todgha It is important 
to emphasize that this recursive impact of migration is not necessarily positive For instance, 
migration has contributed to the demise of khettara irrigation systems and increasing 
agricultural inequality 
This illustrates that, in line with structuration theory and the "new regional 
geography", agents or actors such as migrants and households have the ability to modify the 
structures of the local development context to a certain extent However, it would be overly 
optimistic to suppose such actors are able to tackle more general constraints on development 
Their scope for agency only exists within a certain latitude set by structural constraints 
Migration and development interactions do not operate in a cultural, social, political, 
and institutional void Although "pessimistic" structuralists certainly overstated their point, 
NELM and livelihood approaches have perhaps been too fixated on agency, thereby losing 
sight of structural constraints and the crucial role of institutions People might not be passive 
pawns, but their freedom is limited Structural constraints do exist and hinder the free 
movement of capital, goods, and labor Markets are far from perfect—especially in the 
developing world—and there are high intra-community inequalities in the degree to which 
people have access to various resources 
Bad or unequal access to public amenities—such as basic health care, education and 
credit facilities, corrupt or malfunctioning government and judiciary systems, 
authoritarianism, economic monopolism by influential politicians, lack of guaranteed property 
rights, and so on—all mean that large parts of the population have virtually no access to the 
social, human, economic, and political resources underlying development (De Soto 2000, Sen 
1999) 
From this perspective, the structural exclusion of large sections of the population from 
social facilities (education, health, housing) as well as credit, labor, insurance, and product 
markets are the core problems of development Structural inequalities deprive people of the 
freedoms they need to improve their own lives It restricts the space for individual agency In 
short, inequality breeds underdevelopment Migration has indeed the potential to alleviate at 
least some of these constraints, such as failing capital and insurance markets, and it can 
significantly contribute to the education, health, and well-being of family and community 
members, but it does not have the capacity to alter the more general development and 
investment conditions prevailing in a region and a country 
This explains why stimulating (international) migration alone, without having the 
accompanying measures to create a fertile ground for development in general, cannot be a 
credible development strategy for governments This explains why policies to stimulate 
migrants' investments and return migration have so often failed Therefore, public policies 
aiming to improve the functioning of social, legal, and political institutions, restoring trust in 
government, and increasing the access of populations to basic amenities is crucial not only for 
creating a fertile ground for development in general, but also for stimulating migrants to 
return and/or invest in their countries of ongin 
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Although the basic NELM-hypothesis that international migration contributes to 
development in sending areas seems to be supported by this study, it is important to 
emphasize that what is involved is a potential, rather than a more or less predetermined 
impact. In line with what Keely and Tran (1989:524) concluded earlier, the lesson from this 
analysis is not that the optimistic (neo-classical and developmentalist) viewpoint is correct 
because the pessimistic (structuralist) framework predictions were incorrect—as NELM 
scholars sometimes have the tendency to do. In fact, neither the rigor of the 
"developmentalist" nor that of the structuralist perspectives seems justified. 
In the Todgha we have seen that, notwithstanding its positive impacts, there is also 
reason to believe that the development potential of migration is not being fully realized due to 
the existence of various structural obstacles to investments. These obstacles have prevented 
many international migrants from investing and have stimulated them to settle permanently at 
the destination. 
Thus, the degree to which the development potential of migration is realized depends 
on the specific development context. Depending on this specific development context, 
migration may enable people to retreat from, just as much as to invest in, local economic 
activities. This is a key observation. Remittances, just like any other source of additional, 
external income, may give households greater freedom and the capability to concentrate their 
activities and allocate investment to those economic sectors and locales that they perceive as 
the most stable and profitable. It is this capabilities-enhancing potential of (international) 
migration that also increases the freedom of households to settle elsewhere. 
Structural factors at the micro and macro level play a key role in determining to what 
extent, and in what economic sector migrant and nonmigrant households are inclined to 
invest. These so-called contextual variables form the enabling conditions for investments. 
Jointly, they constitute the "field" on which the "seeds" of migration (e.g., remittances) are 
potentially sown. It is the general institutional and environmental context which largely 
determines this "fertility". If the field is not fertile enough in the eyes of the potential 
investors, the seeds might not be sown at all, or in another sector, place, region, or country. In 
other words, migration impacts are highly context-sensitive. Therefore, migration cannot be 
classified as either positive or negative for development. Moreover, its impact differs across 
socio-economic domains, levels of aggregation, and over time. 
Migration researchers should move beyond the negative-versus-positive debate. There 
is a clear need to shift from a determinist to a more pluralist view, recognizing that various 
development responses to migration are possible. I therefore agree with Taylor (1999) that the 
fundamental question for researchers in this discipline is not whether migration leads to 
certain types of development or not. Instead, we should examine which factors explain why 
migration has positive development outcomes in some migrant sending areas and negative 
outcomes in others. 
Analogous to what Stiglitz (2002:20) argued on the issue of "globalization", 
migration—a constituent part of that general process—is neither good nor bad for 
development. It has the potential to do enormous good and significantly contribute to 
development in migrant sending areas in the developing world. However, the extent to which 
this potential is realized crucially depends on the broader development context in such areas 
and the countries of which they are part, a context which cannot be fundamentally altered by 
individual migrants. 
There is no automatic mechanism through which migration leads to development (cf. 
Papademetriou and Martin 1991), and, as Taylor (1999) aptly stated, migration is no panacea 
for development. Bad infrastructure, corruption, a lack of trust in government institutions, 
dysfunctioning judiciary, the absence of appropriate public policies (schooling, health care, 
land reform, and so on), market failures, and bad access to international markets due to trade 
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barriers—factors which are influenced by national politics and international institutions— 
may prevent migrant households from taking the risk to invest their money in their regions 
and countnes of origin and lower their incentive to return 
Under such unfavorable conditions, migration may also give households the capability 
and freedom to effectively retreat from local and regional economies This often coincides 
with family reunification and permanent settlement at the destination In that case, they vote 
with their feet 
If favorable conditions for development and economic growth prevail, it is likely that 
migrants will send remittances home for local investment and that they themselves will 
return If structural obstacles remain, however, migrants are unlikely to invest large amounts 
of money in risky private enterprises Although (international) migration tends to generally 
have a clearly positive impact on wealth and living conditions, it alone cannot guarantee 
sustained economic development Only if migration is accompanied by improvements in the 
general development context of the sending region or a country, can its high potential be fully 
realized 
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Appendix 1. Key concepts and definitions 
Migration and migrants 
Migration can generally be defined as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence (Lee 
1966:49), but from an operational standpoint it seems useful to refer to the multiple causes or 
backgrounds of migration (Golini 1996:332-3). We have seen that family and school migration are 
often closely intertwined with labor migration. Therefore, it seems important to use a sufficiently 
broad definition as to include long-term movements for education, family reunification, but which 
should exclude, for example, holiday trips, travel for medical treatment or commuting. 
Such movements have been seen by (Colini 1996) as non-migratory mobility. Golini further 
proposed to exclude movements due to natural disasters, or political issues, which he classified as 
semi- or pseudo-migratory mobility. According to his classification, true migratory movements, both 
internal and international, are related to the "basic necessities of life", that is, school, work, family and 
home. However, it is important to realize that migration typologies or strategies are fluid and may 
change over time (Sabagh 1997). Although it is not always possible to make a clear-cut distinction 
between such categories, and while recognizing that there may be multiple causes explaining 
particular forms of mobility, it seems a useful distinction for the purpose of our study. 
Migration can then be defined as a move from the household of origin during at least six 
months per year to a place within the same country or abroad with the purpose of working, studying or 
family reunification, over a distance that forces the concerned person to settle at the destination to 
spend the nights. Labor migration, which is central to this study, is migration that is primarily 
motivated by the aim to work and gain a living elsewhere. Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that 
these are mainly legal distinctions based on the different rights of entry, and that many family and 
student migrants end up working at the destination. This makes it often difficult to distinguish labor, 
family, and labor migration in practice. Increasingly, student and family (network) migration are also a 
legal means to gain access to job markets, and therefore partially function as forms of labor migration 
"in disguise" 
A migrant is then a person who actively participates in migration as defined above. It does not 
seem useful to make a distinction between permanent and temporary migration, as such categories 
reflect intentions rather than actual outcomes. However, we can distinguish seasonal migration as a 
separate category that can be defined as yearly recurring migration over periods of less than six 
months per year. Return migration is defined as the return of a once migrated household member over 
a sustained period of more than a year. 
Household and household membership of migrants 
Defining a household is not as straightforward as it might seem, as there is no universal agreement as 
to its definition. In order to guarantee synchronized data collection, it was important to elaborate a 
clear and unequivocal definition of the household. For the purpose of migration research, it should be 
clear when a migrant is still considered as a member of a household, and when not. In practice, and 
especially in the case of migrants, there will be many borderline cases. Clear guidelines are therefore 
necessary concerning what migrants to include in the household definition. 
Generally, the household is a concept based on the idea of a 'unity' of habitat, consumption, 
and sometimes production. In this vein, a household can be defined as a 'group of individuals, whether 
relatives or not, who usually sleep under the same roof and eat together, and share income and 
expenses' (cf. Casley and Lury 1981:162). Nevertheless, such a definition would exclude all migrants, 
as they are normally too far away to eat and sleep together. In many cases, migrants maintain intensive 
social and economic relations with the household they left behind. For the purpose of migration 
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studies, we therefore have to extend the usual concept of the household to include people residing 
elsewhere "but whose principal commitments and obligations are to that household and who are 
expected to return to that household in the future" (Fawcett and Arnold 1987:1528; cf. Schoorl 
1998:12). This notion of what we might call shadow households (Caces et al. 1985) was developed for 
research into migrant networks and allows the study of links between migrants and their region 
However, this does not resolve the issue of which migrants to include and which not. 
Concepts like "principal commitments and obligations" are vague and notoriously difficult to 
operationalize and measure, and such indicators give no clear indication where to draw a line between 
household members and non-household members. This study focuses on the actual social and 
economic ties maintained between migrants and their relatives (and, in some cases, friends) in sending 
areas. Financial ties typically consist of remittances sent by household members living elsewhere. 
However, opposite capital flows are also possible, as is the case of students living in distant cities who 
are financially supported by the households of origin. The same may hold for migrants who left 
recently and have not yet found any stable employment. What these cases have in common, is that 
there exist strong financial and usually also social relations between the migrant and the household in 
which he lived before departure. 
To include both social and economic dimensions, and to come to empirically verifiable 
parameters, the main critena we have developed is whether a migrant has established his or own 
family household (usually through family reunification or family formation) at the destination. If the 
migrant lives alone, he or she is still considered part of the household. If married on departure, most 
(predominantly male) labor migrants leave their spouses and children behind. If the family stays 
behind, this mostly entails frequent visits and relatively large remittance streams. In this context, 
establishing a household elsewhere is interpreted as cutting of the most intensive social and economic 
ties with the household of ongin. 
In this vein, a household can be defined as "a group of people who are generally but not 
necessarily relatives, who live under the same roof and normally eat together, including individuals 
who live for a part of the year or the entire year elsewhere, without having established their own 
family (with spouse and/or children) in that other place". In the field, the following diagram has been 
used as a guideline aid to determine household membership of migrated individuals. 
Lives at home entire 
year? 
£ N o 
Established a family 
elsewhere? 
^ > 
£2 
W4> 
Household member 
Migrated household 
member 
No household 
member 
Unmarried migrants (mostly sons, sometimes also daughters, working or studying elsewhere), or those 
who leave behind their wife and children (mostly 'household heads' working abroad), are considered 
part of the household. We define them as migrated (household) members. The definition implies that 
family members who left the house with their spouse, or children, but who still maintain financial 
relations, are no longer considered as part of the household, as they have established their own 
independent, socio-economic unit. 
However, if such non-household members nevertheless continue to maintain financial bonds 
with kin (or sometimes friends) in the village or town of origin, this group remains relevant to our 
research. For this category, a number of specific questions on the destination, type of work and 
remittance transfers by these associated members have been included in the household survey. 
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Associated members are usually migrants who send money to their brothers, sisters, fathers, or 
mothers, although they have established their own household. The households that receive such 
"indirect" remittances from abroad are defined as indirect international migrant households in chapter 
6. 
Households that have entirely left the oasis due to family reunification have not been included 
in the regular household survey. The study only considered households actually residing in the oasis 
and their contacts with migrants. Households that left the oasis altogether as a result of family 
reunification have not been considered. Although many of these households still possess residencies in 
the oases to which they may return from time to time, their ties tend to weaken over time and, 
subsequently, they cannot be considered as being member of the oasis community anymore. 
In the collection of data on sex, age, education, activities, and migration history, only 
information on (migrated and present) household members has been collected. This implies that 
people who left the family habitation to live elsewhere together with their spouses, children or others, 
are no longer part of the household of origin. Nevertheless, such individuals (so-called 'associated' 
members) may well maintain close social and financial relations with their relatives at the origin. In 
order to overcome these difficulties, questions have been added on relations with other migrated 
relatives. It is important to note that in this definition, household is not equal to family, and may 
contain non-family members. 
Household head and nucleus 
In many cultural settings, concepts such as household heads are inherently male-biased. Also in the 
Moroccan context, the household head is often assumed to be the oldest (healthy) male We view the 
household head as the person that is considered as such by the members of the household. In general, 
this is the person who is considered the chief person responsible ("most powerful", as others would 
prefer to say) for the management of the household by other household members. However, this is not 
automatically a man. Increasingly, households are female-headed (see chapter 10). 
A family nucleus is either a mamed couple (with or without children) or a single (widowed, 
divorced) parent with at least one child. A nucleus may form one household, but a traditional 
Moroccan "extended family"-type household typically consists of several nuclei. Within such 
extended households, each brother with his wife and children normally forms a separate nucleus. Since 
we deal with a patri-local society, daughters move to the houses of their husbands' families, and only 
return in case of divorce. 
Appendix 2. Statistical notes 
Concerning the scales of measurement in the tables of this thesis, four main types can be 
distinguished. 
1. In some tables, both the independent (i.e., migration status) and independent (e.g., migration 
destination) variable is measured on a nominal scale. 
2. In other tables, both the independent and dependent variables are measured on an ordinal scale 
(e.g., yes/no migration and educational levels). 
3. In most tables, the independent variable is measured on a nominal scale (i.e., migration status), 
and the independent variable on a ratio scale (e.g., household income, investment levels). 
4. In some tables, both variables are measured on ratio level (e.g., migration duration by investment 
levels). 
For all analytical tables using survey data, measures of association have been calculated. The 
following measures have been used. Strictly speaking, calculation of significance is not mandatory, 
because the entire population of the six research villages has been surveyed. Nevertheless, for reasons 
explained in section 3.4.3, it seemed desirable to display significance. For the four above-mentioned 
types of tables, the following measures of association have been calculated: 
1. For nominal by nominal tables, contingency coefficient ("C"), both with approximate significance 
levels. 
2. For ordinal by ordinal tables: Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma ("γ") and approximate signifance 
level. 
3. For nominal by ratio tables: eta ("η"). In the tables, the dependent variable has been classified. 
Displayed means and η values have been calculated using raw, original data. Significance levels 
have been calculated using analysis of variance (ANOVA). Strictly speaking, use of η is only 
appropriate if the groups within the independent variable are approximately of equal size and 
distributions are normal. As this is often not the case (in particular for data on investments), C has 
equally been calculated as an additional measure of association. If both η and the contingency 
coefficient indicate a significant association, it is estimated that there is a significant association 
4. For ratio by ratio tables, Pearson's correlation coefficient ("r") has been calculated using raw, 
unclassified data. For reasons of comparability with other tables, r|values have equally been 
calculated. 
For all measures of associations, 2-tailed significance levels have been flagged with * (significance at 
the 0.05 level) and ** (significance at the 0.01 level). Non-significant associations have been flagged 
with \ 
In chapters 9 and 10, when controlling the association between migration, investments, and education 
for income, nonmigrant and internal migrant households have been grouped as "nonmigrant", and 
indirect, current and returned international migration households as "international migrant". This has 
been done in order to maintain sufficient case-loads. 
Appendix 3. Glossary 
(I) = Tamazight; (a) = (Moroccan colloquial) Arabic; φ = French 
•abd(pl. abidjfa) 
'abra (a) 
'adul (at) 
'ayache (a) 
•orf(a) 
agdud (t) 
aghrum η 'gensu (t) 
aghrur(t) 
ahidus (t) 
ait (t) 
akhemmes (pi. ikhmmesen) (t) 
amghar (pi. imgharn) (t) 
amghar n-tamazirt (t) 
asif(pl. isaffen) (t) 
ayian (t) 
baraka (a) 
batroon (a,t) 
bled es-siba (a) 
borj (a) 
collège (f) 
colon (f) 
commune rurale (f) 
darija (a) 
dirham (a) 
fifth (a) 
fraction (f) 
fum (a) 
see ismakh 
measure of volume 
traditional religious notary 
lit. "living one"; survivor 
custom 
pilgrimage in the honor of a saint (see salih) The center of a 
agdud is usually the tomb of the saint 
lit. "Bread from the inside", bread stuffed with vegetables, 
fat, chilli pepper, and spices. 
traditional technique of collecting water from wells with bags 
by the use of human labor or animal traction 
collective village dance party 
people, children 
lit. "one fifther"; sharecropper, receiving one fifth of the 
harvest in exchange for his labor. Arabic: khammes. 
chief, elected by the taqbilt of the ighrem village 
lit. "land chief'; village chief responsible for all agricultural 
affairs 
nver, stream 
representative from each ighs in the taqbilt who, together, 
elect the amghar 
divine blessing, miracle-working ability which gives special 
powers to igguramen (mrabtin) and shurfa 
"patron", boss 
"land of dissidence"; the part of Morocco's hinterland that 
was largely controlled by tribes and where the sultanic state 
had only marginal political influence 
watchtower (in ighrem) or arch, for instance indicating a 
municipal border 
lower secondary school 
French colonial settler 
municipality in a rural area, governed by a qaid 
Moroccan colloquial Arabic 
Moroccan currency. In 1999, 10 dirham was roughly equal to 
1 US$. 
coranic teacher, leader of prayers 
administrative subdivision (subdistrict) of a commune rurale 
or a municipalité, governed by a cheikh. A fraction generally 
comprises a group of villages or igherman 
lit. "mouth"; gorges in mountain chains, often the location of 
wells 
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guemun 
(pl.iguemunn) (t) 
gulfa (a) 
kshuma (a) 
habus (a) 
hajj (a) 
haratin (sing, hartam) (a) 
harka (a) 
ifnuzen (t) 
iger (pi. igran) (t) 
ighrem (pi. igherman) (t) 
ighs (pi. ighsan) (t) 
igurramen 
(smg. agurram)(t) 
ikhmmesen (l) 
Imazighen 
(smg. Amazigh) (t) 
ismakh (pi ismkhan) (t) 
jellaba (a) 
jema 'a (a) 
khammes (a) 
khettara (a) 
khums (a,t) 
lycée (f) 
makhzen (a) 
marabut (f) 
medersa (a) 
melk (a) 
moqaddem (pi. mqaddemin) 
(a) 
mrabtin (a) 
flood basin (subsection of iger) 
feudal system of forced labor for rulers such as qiad and 
pashas 
shame, shameful, imperative: "shame on you!" 
religious endowment. Property (i.e., land) that is traditionally 
given, leased, or conceded by devout individuals to religious 
foundations (a mosque, a zaouïa). Nowadays, this "religious 
land" is administered by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
pilgrimage to Mecca, title of returned pilgrim 
black, sedentary oasis agriculturalists. They can be either 
Tamazight or Arabic-speaking. The term haratin is 
pejorative. Other appellations: iqabhn (t), issuqw (a) 
military campaign, punitive expedition, tnbal war party 
dish of couscous with alfalfa. 
agricultural field 
traditional fortified oasis village of southern Morocco (qsar 
in Arabic) 
lit. "bone"; ethnic lineage consisting of a group of extended 
families all sharing one common ancestor. Each ighrem 
comprises several ighsan. 
ascribed descendants from a salih, or from families of 
followers close to this saint {mrabtin in Arabic) 
see akhemmes 
the "free ones". General appellation for the indigenous, non-
Arab population of the Maghreb, who prefer this term over 
the rather pejorative "Berber". In the Todgha also interpreted 
as "White Berbers" as opposed to haratin. 
slaves and their descendants (to be distinguished from 
haratin) 
loose cloak with hood 
(1) village council (see taqbilt); (2) official name of the 
"modem" elected municipal council 
see akhemmes 
ancient technique consisting of tunnels and shafts enabling 
the drainage of underground water resources for irrigation 
Tamazight: Ikhtart (pi. tikhtarin) 
lit. "fifth"; largest socio-political unit of the Ait 'Atta tribe, 
which consists of five khmas. 
higher secondary school 
lit. "warehouse"; the Moroccan state apparatus and its 
representatives (civil servants, politicians, policemen, 
soldiers, schoolteachers, etc.) 
French corruption of mrabtin "Holy man", local saint 
blessed with baraka. See salih, igourramen 
(religious) school 
private property 
head of one or a few villages; falls under the authority of the 
shikh 
see igurramen 
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mulud (a) 
municipalité φ 
mussem (a) 
nuba (a) 
pasha (a, from Turkish) 
phshtim (a) 
qadi (a) 
qaid (pi. qiad) (a) 
qaidat (a) 
qasba (pi. qasbat) (a) 
qsar (pi qsur) (a) 
ra 'ay a (a) 
rais (a) 
rhan (a) 
salih (a) 
séguia (pi. swagui) (a) 
shan 'a (a) 
shikh (pi. shiukh) (a) 
shurfa (smg. sharif) (a) 
suq (a) 
tagurt (t) 
tagurt η waman (t) 
lajin (t,a) 
Tamazight (t) 
tanast (pi. tmassen) (t) 
taqbilt (t) 
targa (pi. teregin) (t) 
timiwult (t) 
Todghawi 
transit 
celebration of the birthday of the prophet Muhammad 
municipality in an urban area, governed by ζ pasha 
see agdud 
cycle, round, or rotation. Commonly used to indicate the 
system used to distribute the water of a collective water 
source (khettara, asif) to individual owners of water rights 
state appointed chief (mayor) of a municipalité 
"indigenous" Moroccan Jews who immigrated from Palestine 
from the sixth century BC onwards 
(Religious) judge 
formerly tribal chief, since 1956 state appointed rural 
administrator ("mayor") of a commune rurale 
local government offices headed by the qaid 
fortified residence or castle of a dignitary or ruler 
see ighrem 
protection, usually between (semi) nomadic tribes such as the 
Ait 'Atta and sedentary oasis dwellers 
president of the "modem" jema 'a 
loan, pawn; traditional system of "land mortgage" 
saint, blessed with baraka; see igurramen 
see targa 
Islamic law 
head of a fraction supervised by the qaid or pasha 
ascribed descendants of the prophet Muhammad. 
market, market place 
system of division of newly reclaimed land among the Ait 
'Atta in rectangular bands; unit of irrigated land or water 
water right 
Moroccan stew 
native "Berber" language of imazighen of the Middle Atlas 
and the oases south of the Middle Atlas 
traditional system to measure the tagurt-n-waman. Tanast 
specifically refers to a small dish with a tiny hole, which was 
put in a bucket with water. The time it needed to fill with 
water and to sink, was equal to one tanast. Tanast is also the 
name of the dish itself. 
lit. "tribe" (from Arabic qabila); clan, subclan,comiminity. 
Also used to indicate the "council" (jema 'a in Arabic) of an 
ighrem. 
irrigation channel 
customary law concerning collective works (tuiza), according 
to which people who do not participate in collective works 
are fined by the amghar 
inhabitant of the Todgha valley 
From "Ford Transit"; privately operated delivery vans used 
as collective taxis that commute between Tinghir and the 
numerous villages in the Todgha valley 
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tuiza (a,t) "neighborliness", collective work, labor service: cooperative 
and rotative labor system for the maintenance of the 
irrigation infrastructure, harvesting and construction of 
houses. 
urti (pi urtan) (t) small, walled vegetable gardens in the oasis or family 
compound 
wed (a) river, stream 
zakat (a) donations for the benefit of the poor and needy prescribed in 
Islamic law 
zawiya (a) religious lodge, tomb for saint (salih), in French written as 
zaouia 
zegzaw (t) Variety of cabbage grown in oases 

Samenvatting 
Het wetenschappelijke en maatschappelijke debat over arbeidsmigratie vanuit de zuidrand 
van de Méditerranée heeft zich na een tijdelijke hausse aan migratie-impact studies in de jaren 
zeventig vooral gericht op het zogeheten 'integratievraagstuk' van migranten en hun 
nakomelingen in de Ontvangende' landen. Aan de gevolgen van migratie voor ontwikkeling 
aan de 'zendende' kant is sindsdien verrassend weinig aandacht besteed. Derhalve is er 
weinig recente, empirisch gefundeerde en theoretisch ingebedde kennis over dit thema in een 
van de belangrijkste emigratieregio's ter wereld. Ook zijn Noord-Afrikaanse en Europese 
onderzoekers hierdoor de aansluiting kwijtgeraakt met het theoretische debat over migratie en 
ontwikkeling, dat zich in met name Amerikaanse wetenschappelijke kringen heeft voortgezet. 
Deze dissertatie poogt die leemte gedeeltelijk op te vullen door middel van een 
empirisch onderzoek in een typische emigratieregio in zuid-Marokko: de oase van de Todgha-
vallei. Centraal staat hierbij de vraag welke gevolgen decennia van intensieve binnenlandse 
en internationale migratie hebben gehad voor de sociale en economische ontwikkeling van dit 
gebied. De dissertatie laat zien hoe de massale geldovermakingen en de sociaal-culturele 
effecten van migratie deze oasesamenleving volledig op haar kop hebben gezet. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt deze empirische studie binnen het kader geplaatst van het 
algemene, theoretische debat over migratie en ontwikkeling. Hierin staan functionalistische 
en neo-klassieke 'migratie-optimisten' tegenover meer structuralistisch georiënteerde 
'migratie-pessimisten'. De laatste groep, die het wegtrekken van 'jonge, talentvolle en 
ondernemende' migranten als oorzaak ziet van lethargie en economische neergang in 
herkomstgebieden, heeft het debat sinds de jaren zeventig gedomineerd. 
Recenter, genuanceerder en minder deterministisch is de new economics of labor 
migration (NELM)-benadering, die na 1980 voornamelijk binnen de Amerikaanse 
onderzoekscontext is ontwikkeld. Deze benadering bekritiseert eerder onderzoek op 
methodologische en theoretische gronden en kent een cruciale ontwikkehngsroi toe aan 
overmakingen van migranten. NELM stelt verder dat Noord-Zuid arbeidsmigratie niet op 
individueel, maar op huishoudniveau verklaard en geanalyseerd moet worden. 
Bij nader inzien blijkt NELM veel parallellen te vertonen met de in niet-cconomische 
kring opgekomen 'livelihood approach' en de 'nieuwe regionale geografie'. Op hun beurt zijn 
deze drie benaderingen onder de noemer van Giddens' (1984) structuratietheoric te scharen. 
Zij hebben gemeen dat zij structuur- en actorperspectieven met elkaar proberen te verzoenen. 
Zij hebben derhalve zowel oog voor de capaciteit en handelingsvrijheid (agency) van actoren 
(bijvoorbeeld de migrant en zijn gezinsleden) als de structuren die dit handelen beperken. 
Beide beïnvloeden elkaar en er bestaat daarom een voortdurende 'recursieve' wisselwerking 
tussen agency en structuur. Binnen een structuratieperspectief lijkt het daarom ook beter te 
spreken van een wisselwerking tussen de migratie van individuen en ontwikkelingprocessen 
(die veranderingen in de structuur impliceren) dan van een impact alleen. 
Migratie is zowel een gevolg van structurele veranderingen, als een factor die invloed 
heeft op structurele factoren. Op theoretische gronden blijkt het daarom niet goed mogelijk de 
ontwikkehngsimpact van migratie te doorgronden zonder fundamenteel begrip van de 
structurele oorzaken van migratie. In dit verband blijken dynamische migratiemodellen 
(Zehnsky 1971; Martin en Taylor 1996), in de dissertatie aangeduid als 'transitionele 
migratietheorie', die het proces van ontwikkeling koppelen aan het achtereenvolgens optreden 
en de opkomst en neergang van specifieke typen migratie, veel meer verklaringskracht te 
hebben dan de gangbare maar nogal statische 'push-pull' modellen. 
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Tenslotte wordt het cruciale, maar bepaald niet eenduidige begrip 'ontwikkeling' 
geproblematiseerd en gedefinieerd, waarbij de capao;/;//ei-benadering van Sen (1999) als 
uitgangspunt heeft gediend Deze benadering stelt dat niet inkomensgroei op zich, maar de 
mate waann mensen de capaciteit hebben en over de vrijheid beschikken om hun bestaan naar 
eigen wens vorm te geven, de maatstaf voor 'ontwikkeling' zou moeten zijn 
Uit deze synthese volgt als algemene hypothese dat arbeidsmigratie vanuit arme naar 
njke landen als een multi-lokale 'bestaansstrategie' van huishoudens moet worden opgevat 
Deze strategie heeft als doel om (1) risico's te spreiden door diversificatie van 
inkomstenbronnen, (2) inkomen te verhogen en derhalve (3) structurele sociale, institutionele 
en economische ontwikkelingsobstakels, zoals slecht functionerende kapitaalmarkten en 
ontoegankelijke publieke voorzieningen, in het herkomstgebied te overwinnen 
Het laten migreren van een of meerdere leden van het huishouden stelt de migrant en 
de achterblijvers daarom in staat hun levensomstandigheden te verbeteren Dit vergroot hun 
handelingsvrijheid en stelt hen potentieel in staat te investeren in het herkomstgebied Binnen 
het geschetste theoretische kader ligt de uiteindelijke ontwikkelingsimpact echter niet vast 
zoals in eerdere, meer deterministische visies op migratie en ontwikkeling Deze impact hangt 
af van de specifieke ontwikkelmgscontext in zowel het herkomst- als vestigingsgebied 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de onderzoeksvragen en de gehanteerde 
onderzoeksmethodologie Deze empirische studie is gebaseerd op interviews, observatie en 
een survey onder ruim 500 oasehuishoudens in 6 verschillende dorpen van de Todgha-vallei 
Het onderzoek, waarvoor de auteur tussen 1998 en 2000 twee jaar in de Todgha verbleef, 
vond plaats in het kader van het internationale iMAROM-project In de analyse van het 
empirische materiaal stond de vergelijking tussen de volgende categoneen huishoudens 
centraal ( 1 ) met-migrantenhuishoudens, (2) binnenlandse migrantenhuishoudens, alsmede (3) 
'indirecte', (4) huidige en (5) teruggekeerde internationale migrantenhuishoudens 
Hoofdstuk 4 schetst een algemeen beeld van Marokko als emigratieland bij uitstek 
Marokko ligt op wat Skeldon (1997) heeft aangeduid als de mondiale 'arbeidsfrontier' die 
categone landen die een zekere mate van sociale, economische, infrastructurele en 
demografische ontwikkeling kennen die mensen massaal in staat stelt om te migreren 
Marokko heeft zich gedurende de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw een centrale plaats 
verworven in het 'Euro-Mediterrane' migratiesysteem Op een bevolking van dertig miljoen 
leven twee miljoen aan gene zijde van de Méditerranée Met meer dan 3,5 miljard dollar aan 
jaarlijkse geldovermakingen door migranten behoort Marokko in absolute zin na India, 
Mexico en de Fillipijnen tot de vierde ontvanger van dit soort gelden ter wereld Dit is vier 
keer meer dan de ontwikkelingshulp aan Marokko, en overtreft ook de inkomsten uit de 
export van landbouwprodukten, fosfaten en toensme 
Deze instroom van harde valuta is niet alleen cruciaal voor de Marokkaanse 
betalingsbalans maar vooral ook voor talloze families die hierdoor een redelijk bestaan 
kunnen leiden Voorts wordt betoogd dat de migratie-facihterende rol van migratienetwerken, 
in combinatie met demografische en economische ontwikkelingen in Marokko en Europa, het 
uitermate waarschijnlijk maken dat de sterke emigratie uit Marokko de decennia zal blijven 
aanhouden 
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een beschrijving van de Todgha-vallei Vóór de kolonisatie waren 
de bewoners van deze nvieroase aan de zuidelijke voet van het Atlasgebergte goeddeels 
afhankelijk van zelfvoorzienende imgatielandbouw Dit werd mogelijk gemaakt door de 
permanente stroom water in de Todgha De vallei wordt uitsluitend door Berber (Tamazight)-
tahgen bevolkt Binnen het volk van de Alt Todoght ('kinderen van de Todgha'), de 
sedentaire bewoners van het waterrijke hart van de oase, bestond een sterke etnische 
diversiteit en hiërarchie Hierbij waren de 'kasten' van veelal zwarte deelpachters en 
keuterboeren (haratin), slaven (ismakheri) en joden traditioneel ondergeschikt aan de meest 
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blanke bevolkingsgroepen die van oudsher het leeuwendeel van het land en de waterbronnen 
in handen hadden Aan de top van de hiërarchie stonden de afstammelingen van lokale 
heiligen (igurrameri) en de profeet Mohammed (shurfa) 
De Alt Todoght hebben nog steeds het alleenrecht op het gebruik van de bronnen van 
de Todgha Er bestond en bestaat nog steeds een sterke antagonie tussen de sedentaire Alt 
Todoght en de semi-nomadische Alt 'Atta-stam, die zich in de loop van de eeuwen in de 
waterarme benedenloop van de vallei hebben gevestigd 
Sinds de Todgha-vallei in 1931 onder Franse controle kwam heeft deze oasevallei een 
stormachtige ontwikkeling doorgemaakt De kolonisatie betekende enerzijds incorporatie van 
deze statenloze samenleving van vrije Imazighen (Berbers) in 'Arabisch' staatsverband, het 
verlies van tribale autonomie en de teloorgang van aloude regionale en trans-Saharaanse 
handelsnetwerken Anderzijds schiep de incorporatie van deze oasevallei in modem 
staatsverband en de kapitalistische economie en de hiermee gepaard gaande revolutionaire 
ontwikkeling van infrastructuur en transportmiddelen, totaal nieuwe bestaansmogelijkheden 
door middel van loonarbeid buiten de zelfvoorzienende oaselandbouw 
Hoofdstuk 6 schetst hoe dit proces van incorporatie en 'mondialisering' zich in het 
bijzonder gemanifesteerd heeft door middel van een sterk toegenomen migratie naar zowel 
binnenlandse als buitenlandse bestemmingen Hierbij blijkt juist het proces van ontwikkeling 
migratie te hebben aangewakkerd De relatief ontsloten en relatief welvarende gedeelten van 
de vallei blijken veel eerder en veel massaler aan binnenlandse en internationale loonarbeid-
migratie te hebben deelgenomen dan de geïsoleerdere en armere (met name Alt 'Atta-) 
dorpen Dit sluit aan op de zogeheten 'transitionele' migratietheorie, die er van uit gaat dat 
ontwikkeling zeker in haar initiële stadia een sterk stimulerend effect heeft op migratie Niet 
armoede en marginalisering maar juist het ontwikkelingsproces dat tot uitdrukking komt in de 
demografische transitie, technische ontwikkeling, onderwijs, inkomensgroei en mentale 
honzonverbreding heeft een proces in werking gezet van wat Zelinsky (1971) ook wel heeft 
aangeduid als de "mobihteitstransitie" 
De mobihteitstransitie van de Todgha ving reeds ver voor de Franse bezetting van de 
vallei aan met de Franse kolonisatie van het naburige Algerije Reeds in de tweede helft van 
de negentiende eeuw trokken arbeidsmigranten vanuit de Todgha naar Algerije om te werken 
in de steden en boerderijen van Franse colons Na de instelling van het Franse protectoraat 
over Marokko ontstonden er ook steeds meer mogelijkheden voor binnenlandse migratie, die 
zich vooral richtte op kuststeden als Rabat en Casablanca Na de Algerijnse onafhankelijkheid 
in 1962 verlegde de internationale migratiestroom zich naar Frankrijk, in veel mindere mate 
naar Nederland en België Een minderheid ging werken in olielanden als Libie, Saoedi-Arabie 
en Irak 
Eind jaren zestig en begin jaren zeventig waren 'gouden tijden', waarin een groot 
aantal Todghawi naar het buitenland migreerde Na de oliecrisis in 1973 leek het 
migratietijdperk voorbij Veel 'gastarbeiders' bleken echter niet terug te keren en het tijdperk 
van de familieheremging brak aan, die in de jaren tachtig grotendeels was voltooid In de 
jaren negentig lijkt er sprake van een herleving van zowel gereglementeerde als 
ongereglementeerde arbeidsmigratie en een toenemende oriëntatie op de nieuwe 
bestemmingslanden Italie en voorral Spanje Daarnaast verklaren gezinsvormende migratie, 
'estafette-migratie' en andere vormen van 'netwerkmigratie' waarom, in plaats van de 
verwachte daling, het aandeel migranten op de totale bevolking van de vallei in de afgelopen 
drie decennia vrijwel constant is gebleven op een niveau van rond de zes procent In de 
tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw is ook binnenlandse migratie naar steden onveranderd 
sterk gebleven 
Toegang tot internationale migratie via de zeer frequente huwelijksmigratie en 
allerhande vormen van 'migratie-hulp' wordt in sterke mate bepaald door het al dan met 
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hebben van reeds in Europa gevestigde bloedverwanten Het restrictieve migratiebeleid in 
Europa heeft geleid tot een groeiende afhankelijkheid van dit 'sociale kapitaal' Uit de 
analyse blijkt dat netwerken faciliterend werken voor de migratie van leden van de eigen 
'lineage' (ighs), maar juist uitsluitend werken voor mensen die daar geen deel van uitmaken 
Dit verklaart ook waarom er geen sprake is van een in de literatuur veronderstelde afnemende 
selectiviteit of 'diffusie' van migratie door netwerkeffecten Onderwijsniveau heeft daarom 
nauwelijks een selecterende werking voor internationale migratie Binnenlandse en 
internationale migratie zijn wel enigszins selectief voor landbezit voor migratie (dat als 
indicator voor traditionele welvaart is gebruikt), maar het verband is zwak Alleen de 
allerarmste c q landloze huishoudens nemen relatief weinig deel aan migratie 
Migratie heeft met geleid tot de in de literatuur vaak veronderstelde ontvolking van de 
vallei Integendeel, de bevolkingsgroei heeft gelijke tred gehouden met de nationale trend 
Tinghir, de hoofdplaats van de vallei, heeft in de afgelopen twee decennia een snelle groei 
doorgemaakt als gevolg van immigratie vanuit de haar omringende bergen en oases in het 
pre-Saharaanse ommeland Het is daarom niet mogelijk om een regio als de Todgha aan te 
duiden als hetzij een emigratie- hetzij een immigratiegebied Het gelijktijdig optreden van 
emigratie en immigratie toont ook de sterke beperkingen van de veel gehanteerde maar 
statische 'push-pull'-theone De transitionele migratietheorie blijkt dit fenomeen wel goed te 
kunnen verklaren 
De helft van de totale mannelijke bevolking tussen de 15 en 65 jaar is migrant of (een) 
retourmigrant Binnenlandse en internationale migratie blijken een andere plaats in de 
levenscyclus van het huishouden in te nemen Hierbij fungeert binnenlandse migratie naar de 
stad vaak als voorwaarde creërende 'springplank' voor internationale migratie Ook 
internationale migratie is vaak een oorzaak van binnenlandse migratie Uit de analyse blijkt 
dat beide vormen van migratie functioneel gerelateerd zijn, en deel uitmaken van hetzelfde 
ontwikkelingsproces dat leidt tot toenemende mobiliteit in meer algemene zin 
Hoofdstuk 7 analyseert de sterke mate waann migratie een integraal onderdeel is 
geworden van de multi-lokale en multi-sectorale bestaansstrategie van oasehuishoudens 
Meer dan 40 procent van de geënquêteerde huishoudens is direct betrokken bij internationale 
migratie en 25 procent bij binnenlandse migratie Ook met-migrantenhuishoudens hebben 
vrijwel allemaal aanvullende, met-agrarische inkomsten Er is sprake van een sterke 
diversificatie en gedeeltelijke 'de-agransatie' van de regionale economie, waarbij er sprake is 
van een toenemende concentratie van economische activiteiten in Tinghir Slechts een kleine 
minderheid (4 procent) van de huishoudens leeft nog uitsluitend van de landbouw 
Voor de 'internationale migrantenhuishoudens' heeft migratie een drastische 
verbetering van hun inkomenspositie betekend Ook leven zij in aanzienlijk betere 
omstandigheden wat betreft behuizing, sanitaire voorzieningen en algehele levensstandaard 
Binnenlandse migrantenhuishoudens hebben het, afgezien van een groep relatief welvarende 
ambtenaren en zakenlieden, gemiddeld gesproken met beter dan met-migrantenhuishoudens, 
hoewel de grootste armoede sterk geconcentreerd is binnen de laatste groep In tegenstelling 
tot internationale migratie, kan binnenlandse migratie vanuit het perspectief van de new 
economics of labor migration daarom met zozeer vanuit inkomensvergroting, maar 
voornamelijk vanuit het motief van nsicospreiding worden verklaard Daarnaast vergroot 
binnenlandse migratie de kansen op internationale migratie 
Dat internationale migratie geleid heeft tot een drastische verbetering van 
levensomstandigheden op het Marokkaanse platteland is geen nieuws Verrassender is dat 
achterblijvers in internationale migrantenhuishoudens met bepaald het lethargische gedrag 
vertonen van de passieve, louter consumerende ontvangers van overmakingen uit Europa, 
hetgeen in de literatuur over migratie en ontwikkeling in de Mediterranee wel het dominante 
beeld is Migrantenhuishoudens hebben juist de neiging ook in andere economische sectoren 
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in de Todgha actief te zijn Dit is een belangrijke aanwijzing dat internationale migratie niet 
gepaard is gegaan met een terugtrekking uit lokale economische activiteiten en ondermijning 
van het productief potentieel, maar eerder het tegendeel Het hardnekkige beeld van 
emigratieregio's die passief aan het migratie-infuus liggen moet daarom voor wat betreft de 
Todgha-vallei worden bijgesteld Migratie-inkomsten, die overigens 'slechts' eenderde van 
het totale geldinkomen van de vallei vormen, gaan gepaard met eveneens hogere inkomsten 
uit lokale met-migratoire activiteiten 
Hoofdstukken 8 en 9 analyseren de mate waann de diverse categorieën 
migrantenhuishoudens geneigd zijn te investeren in agransche respectievelijk met-agransche 
sectoren De belangrijkste conclusie van deze dissertatie is dat huishoudens met internationale 
migratie-inkomsten in alle sectoren een grotere geneigdheid vertonen om te investeren dan 
andere huishoudens Dit is in tegenspraak met veel vroegere studies, die suggereerden dat 
migranten zich grotendeels zouden terugtrekken uit de regionale economie 
Bovendien zien we nog steeds een positieve samenhang tussen deelname aan 
internationale migratie en investeringen wanneer we deze analyse uitvoeren binnen gelijke 
inkomenscategorieën Het migratie-effect behelst dus meer dan alleen een inkomenseffect De 
verklaring hiervoor wordt met name gezocht in het feit dat buitenlandse migratie-inkomsten 
niet alleen veel hoger zijn, maar ook stabieler en zekerder van aard dan inkomsten uit lokale 
activiteiten en binnenlandse migratie De vermeende ondernemende en risiconemende attitude 
van migranten lijkt een minder grote rol te spelen Uit de data-analyse blijkt verder dat 
migrantenhuishoudens niet bepaald geneigd zijn het zuurverdiende geld over de balk te 
gooien Een dergelijk beeld komt vaak in de literatuur voor, maar moet verworpen worden als 
een karikatuur Spaarzaamheid en bedachtzaamheid typeren de migrant eerder dan ostentatief 
consumptief gedrag 
Hoofdstuk 8 analyseert de rol van migratie in agrarische transformatieprocessen 
Internationale migranten hebben sinds middenjaren zeventig een voortrekkersrol gespeeld bij 
de massale introductie van gemotonseerde waterpompen, die een welkome aanvulling 
vormen op de traditionele waterbronnen Deze hebben een intensivering van de landbouw in 
de oude oase mogelijk gemaakt en in de benedenloop van de vallei boeren in staat gesteld 
stukken woestijn in cultuur te brengen Hoewel de landbouw nog steeds een grotendeels 
zelfvoorzienend en traditioneel karakter heeft, houden internationale migrantenhuishoudens 
er dankzij hun financiële draagkracht gemiddeld een kapitaalsintensievere, productievere en 
meer marktgerichte landbouw op na dan andere huishoudens Dit uit zich niet alleen in het 
slaan van waterputten, maar ook in de aankoop van grond binnen en buiten de Todgha en het 
frequentere gebruik van landbouwmachines, kunstmest en pesticiden Ook bezitten zij vaker 
vee, in het bijzonder melkkoeien 
Internationale migratie lijkt in de regel met tot de eveneens in de literatuur 
veronderstelde grootschalige braakhgging ('sociaalbraak') als gevolg van de afwezigheid van 
jonge mannen te leiden Met hun relatief hoge inkomens zijn migratiehuishoudens immers in 
staat arbeiders in te huren en zo de geëmigreerde arbeidskracht te compenseren In andere 
gevallen wordt de grond in beheer gegeven aan een deelpachter of minder draagkrachtige 
familieleden 
Hoewel internationale migratie dus bijgedragen heeft aan de verhoging van de 
agransche productie, hebben de investeringen ook negatieve neveneffecten Het massale 
pompen in de benedenloop van de vallei heeft geleid tot een daling van de grondwaterspiegel 
en een verminderde watertoevoer vanuit traditionele, collectief beheerde waterbronnen Deze 
staan toch al onder druk door het verslechterde onderhoud van dammen, irrigatiekanalen, en 
ondergrondse 'imgatietunnels' (khettaras) Relatief arme huishoudens, die zich het niet 
kunnen veroorloven zelf een pomp aan te schaffen, zijn hierdoor soms gedwongen om zich 
geheel of gedeeltelijk uit de landbouw terug te trekken Er is dus sprake van een toenemende 
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agrarische ongelijkheid. Het massale en nauwelijks gereguleerde pompen kan in de toekomst 
leiden tot toenemende concentratie van 'watermacht' in de handen van enkele rijke boeren. 
Deze ontwikkeling dreigt bovendien de duurzaamheid van het gehele landbouwsysteem in de 
benedenloop te ondermijnen, en kan derhalve tot grootschalige kapitaalvernietiging leiden. 
Hoofdstuk 9 behandelt de rol van migratie in niet-agrarische investeringen. 
Huizenbouw is in het algemeen de eerste grote investering die migranten plegen. Het bouwen 
van betonnen huizen heeft geleid tot een versnelde leegloop van de igherman, de traditionele 
lemen woonburchten, het ontstaan van lintbebouwing langs wegen in de vallei en de sterke 
groei van Tinghir en enkele andere semi-urbane centra. 
In de literatuur zijn migranten in dit verband dikwijls 'beschuldigd' van irrationeel 
investeringsgedrag in overbodige statussymbolen. Zij zouden hun geld immers beter in 
productieve investeringen kunnen steken. Het blijkt echter dat investeringen in huizenbouw in 
meerdere opzichten voor de hand liggen. Goede behuizing komt tegemoet aan een 
vanzelfsprekende, primaire behoefte aan privacy, ruimte, hygiëne en een zeker comfort. 
Verder is gebleken dat met name de vrouwen groot belang hebben bij het bouwen van een 
eigen huis voor het nucleaire gezin; door het apart gaan wonen van de schoonfamilie wint zij 
immers sterk aan autonomie en heeft zij meer zeggenschap over het inkomen van haar man. 
Bovendien blijken huishoudens een investering in een eigen huis als een 
levensverzekering te zien mocht de kostwinner overlijden of er een andere crisis ontstaan. In 
dat geval heeft de familie in ieder geval een dak boven het hoofd, waaruit zij ook nog een 
inkomen kan verwerven door verhuur van een of meer etages. Zeker in een maatschappelijke 
context waar publieke sociale zekerheid grotendeels ontbreekt, is dit een belangrijke drijfveer. 
Veel migrantenhuishoudens bezitten meer dan één nieuw huis, meestal in Tinghir of andere 
steden. Voor hen is huizenbouw ook een manier om extra inkomen te verwerven, en ze 
springen hierbij handig in op de sterke urbane groei. 
Hoewel onderwijs buitengewoon ontwikkelingsrelevant lijkt, wordt onderwijs 
nauwelijks genoemd als investering in eerder onderzoek naar migratie en ontwikkeling. Naast 
huizenbouw blijkt onderwijs de voornaamste investering van internationale maar ook 
binnenlandse migrantenhuishoudens te zijn. Hoewel internationale migranten niet beter 
opgeleid zijn dan niet-migranten, blijkt uit de analyse dat hun kinderen significant beter zijn 
opgeleid, en veel vaker hoger onderwijs volgen. Onderwijs is ook een steeds belangrijkere 
oorzaak van binnenlandse migratie. Ook blijkt internationale migratie een positief effect te 
hebben op de relatieve onderwijsparticipatie van meisjes. 
Er is ook een kleinere categorie internationale migrantenhuishoudens die investeren in 
allerlei andere ondernemingen, zoals ambachtelijke werkplaatsen, naaiateliers, garages, 
koffiehuizen, hotels, taxi's en vrachtwagenvervoer. Het zijn met name relatief jonge 
retourmigranten die dergelijke investeringen plegen; in veruit de meeste gevallen doen zij dat 
in Tinghir. Naast de investeringen in de landbouw en huizenbouw, genereren dit soort 
investeringen in ondernemingen een niet onaanzienlijke werkgelegenheid en verklaren zo in 
belangrijke mate de sterke groei en immigratie naar Tinghir. 
Hoofdstuk 10 behandelt de gevolgen van migratie op sociaal-cultureel terrein. 
Migratie heeft voor mensen—maar dus niet de allerarmsten—uit lagere 'kasten' van de 
oasesamenleving een gedeeltelijke of volledige emancipatie betekend. Het bouwen van een 
betonnen huis in de geboorteregio, het op vakantie terugkeren in een auto en het volbrengen 
van de pelgrimage naar Mekka (de hajj) kunnen naast hun intrinsieke waarde ook gezien 
worden als een symbool van hun nieuwverworven status. Traditionele, grotendeels erfelijke 
determinanten van maatschappelijke status (landbezit, huidskleur, afstamming) spelen een 
kleiner wordende rol ten opzichte van het geldinkomen uit veelal niet-agrarische, dikwijls 
migratoire bron. Toch speelt afstamming en met name huidskleur nog steeds een belangrijke 
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rol in statusbepaling en sociale interactie Blanken kijken neer op zwarten en huwelijken 
tussen zwart en blank blijven grotendeels taboe 
In veel opzichten loopt de nieuwe sociaal-economische scheidslijn van de 
oasegemeenschap nu tussen de nouveau nche van huishoudens met internationale migratie-
inkomsten en huishoudens die deze revenuen moeten ontberen Migratie lijkt dus een nieuwe 
vorm van ongelijkheid met zich mee te hebben gebracht, en dit lijkt een duidelijke 
schaduwzijde Een kanttekening hierbij is echter dat de investeringen en uitgaven van 
migranten en de regionale economische ontwikkeling die hiervan mede het gevolg is geweest, 
ook werk en inkomen hebben geschapen voor veel met-migranten en immigranten in de 
lokale landbouw, huizenbouw en dienstensector 
Verder moet in acht worden genomen dat de traditionele oasemaatschappij gebaseerd 
was op geïnstitutionaliseerde ongelijkheid, waarbij de meest elementaire vnjheden aan grote 
groepen werd ontzegd Oases waren allesbehalve harmonieuze en egalitaire samenlevingen 
Voor de meeste oasebewoners heeft migratie daarom een relatieve bevrijding, vooruitgang, 
ontwikkeling, en geen achteruitgang betekend 
De achterblijvende vrouwen blijken minder dan mannen te profiteren van migratie 
Met name vrouwen van binnenlandse migranten leiden een onzeker bestaan In tegenstelling 
tot gangbare hypothesen, lijkt migratie met of nauwelijks een positief effect te hebben op hun 
maatschappelijke positie Recente verbeteringen in de sociale en economische positie van 
vrouwen lijken het gevolg van algemene maatschappelijke verandenngen, met uitzondering 
van de relatief grote onderwijsparticipatie van migrantendochters 
In de Todgha is sprake van een ware 'migratiecultuur', waarbij Europa als het paradijs 
wordt gezien Veel jongeren kunnen zich vrijwel geen toekomst meer voorstellen zonder te 
migreren De migratiedrang wordt mede aangewakkerd door de confrontatie met de relatieve 
welvaart van migranten Aan de ene kant zou men dit als een negatief effect van migratie 
kunnen zien, aan de andere kant zit er, gezien de beperkte sociaal-economische 
ontplooiingsmogelijkheden in Marokko, een belangrijke kern van waarheid in de perceptie 
dat migratie de grootste kans op persoonlijke ontwikkeling betekent 
Deze perceptie dat met-migreren een groot risico op stilstand inhoudt wordt gevoed 
door het lot van de zonen van internationale migranten die in de jaren zeventig en tachtig 
besloten hun familie niet naar Europa te halen Geconfronteerd met massawerkloosheid en 
opkomend racisme, dachten zij er goed aan te doen hun zonen in Marokko een universitaire 
opleiding te laten volgen, wat destijds nog bijna een garantie voor een redelijk comfortabel en 
zeker ambtenarenbestaan leek Inmiddels is deze situatie drastisch veranderd, en heerst er 
massawerkloosheid onder hoger opgeleide Marokkanen Veel emigrantenzonen zitten daarom 
werkloos en zwaar gefrustreerd thuis 
In concluderende zin kan gezegd worden dat migratie een positief effect gehad heeft op de 
sociale en economische ontwikkeling van de Todgha-vallei, hetgeen in grote lijnen de 
hypotheses van de new economics of labor migration lijkt te bevestigen Hierbij moet wel 
aangetekend worden dat deze positieve effecten voornamelijk, maar niet uitsluitend zijn 
voorbehouden aan internationale migrantenhuishoudens Voor de meerderheid van de 
binnenlandse migranten is migratie eerder een 'overlevingsstrategie' dan een manier om het 
eigen bestaan duurzaam te verbeteren Toch profiteren huishoudens van binnenlandse 
migranten en met-migranten indirect mee van de economische effecten van de uitgaven en 
investeringen van migranten Ondanks hun relatieve deprivatie, waren zij zonder 
internationale migratie in absolute zin zeker veel slechter af geweest 
Een andere, wellicht paradoxale conclusie is dat de culturele, sociale en economische 
effecten van migratie op korte en middellange termijn juist tot meer migratie zowel uit en 
naar de vallei lijken te hebben geleid Migratie en ontwikkeling blijken intrinsiek en in initiële 
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stadia van ontwikkeling zeer positief met elkaar samen te hangen Het is een cruciale 
constatenng dat deze economische ontwikkeling en migratie naar de vallei nu juist in niet 
onbelangrijke mate het gevolg is van de ontwikkelingsimpact van decennia van migratie 
vanuit de vallei naar het buitenland 
Evenzeer van belang is de constatenng dat onder invloed van onderwijs, media en de 
blootstelling aan de welvaart van migranten en anderen, de persoonlijke ambities van mensen 
sneller zijn toegenomen dan de bestaansmogelijkheden in Marokko hun kunnen bieden Dit 
verklaart waarom mensen onverminderd willen migreren ondanks het feit dat de 
levensomstandigheden in de Todgha in de afgelopen decennia ontegenzeggelijk zijn 
verbeterd Naast de voorname rol van toenemende ambities in het verklaren van 
migratiedrang, heeft juist een zekere mate van ontwikkeling de mensen beter in staat gesteld 
om ook daadwerkelijk te migreren 
Dit is een omkering van structuralistische visies die juist de verklaring van migratie 
zochten in toenemende misere Dit bevestigt de transitionele migratietheorie en de stelling dat 
'ontwikkeling' onontkoombaar gepaard gaat met toenemende mobiliteit In overeenstemming 
met ander onderzoek toont dit eens te meer aan dat gangbare (meestal anti-migratoire) visies 
in beleidskringen dat ontwikkeling in de herkomstgebieden het beste 'medicijn' is tegen 
migratie, zeker voor de korte en middellange termijn op verkeerde veronderstellingen berust 
Tenslotte zijn er sterke aanwijzingen dat het ontwikkelmgspotentieel van migratie in 
deze Marokkaanse vertrekregio bij lange na niet volledig benut wordt Fundamenteel 
wantrouwen tegen de 'Arabisch'-Marokkaanse maar ook Europese overheden, 
rechtsonzekerheid, corruptie, nepotisme, en de moeilijkheid om eigendomspapieren over bezit 
te verknjgen zijn factoren die verklaren waarom zoveel migranten uiteindelijk niet terugkeren 
of twijfelen hun geld in het land of regio van herkomst te investeren Vrouwen en kinderen 
van migranten hebben belang bij gezinshereniging en hebben vaak veel te verliezen bij een 
eventuele terugkeer Daarbij komt de meer algemene onzekerheid over toekomstige 
economische en politieke ontwikkelingen in Marokko Dit gebrek aan vertrouwen maakt 
migranten en hun families uiterst risicomijdend en voorzichtig om hun zwaarbevochten 
rechten in Europa op te geven Het zal voorlopig de neiging bestendigen om het heil over de 
grenzen te zoeken 
Migratie is geen panacee voor ontwikkeling Hoewel de migratie zeker een bijdrage 
heeft geleverd aan het stimuleren van regionale ontwikkeling en aan het gedeeltelijk 
transformeren van de regionale ontwikkelmgscontext, hebben individuele migranten niet de 
capaciteit om de meer algemene, voornamelijk institutionele ontwikkelingsobstakels op 
regionaal, nationaal en internationaal niveau uit de weg te ruimen 
Essentieel is dat migratie mensen nu juist de vnjheid heeft gegeven om zowel te 
investeren als zich volledig terug te trekken uit het land en regio van herkomst Juist deze 
toegenomen vrijheid wordt door migranten beschouwd als een cruciale verworvenheid, en 
behelst vanuit hun perspectief 'ontwikkeling' Of migranten en hun families geneigd zullen 
zijn sociaal en materieel te investeren in het geboorteland, hangt dus sterk af van de mate 
waarin er in mogelijkheden voor en vertrouwen in de sociale en economische ontwikkeling 
van Marokko zullen worden geboden 
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Stellingen 
Behorende bij het proefschrift 
"Migration and Development in Southern Morocco: 
The Disparate Socio-Economie Impacts of Out-Migration on the Todgha Oasis Valley" 
door Hein de Haas 
1 Waardevrije wetenschap bestaat met Zulks wel te pretenderen is een gemakzuchtige pose 
2 Ontwikkeling gaat onvermijdelijk gepaard met toenemende mobiliteit en migratie 
3 Totale migratiebeheersmg is zelfs onder totalitaire condities met mogelijk 
4 Het presenteren van ontwikkelingshulp of het afbreken van handelsbarrières als middel om 
migratie te verminderen gaat niet alleen voorbij aan het theoretische inzicht dat 'ontwikkeling' 
migratie in eerste instantie zal stimuleren, maar wekt ook de suggestie dat ontwikkeling alleen 
legitiem is als dat de njke landen zogenaamd ten goede komt 
5 Het steeds restrictievere migrauebeleid van de EU-landen heeft paradoxaal genoeg niet geleid tot 
de beoogde afname van immigratie van Marokkanen, maar tot een versterkte neiging onder 
Marokkanen zich permanent in Europa te vestigen 
6 Sociale en economische integratie van migranten in de Ontvangende' samenleving leidt tot een 
grotere capaciteit en bereidheid om te investeren in het land van herkomst 
7 Rechtszekerheid in de herkomstlanden van migranten is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor het 
scheppen van de omstandigheden waaronder zij daar een substantiële bijdrage aan ontwikkeling 
kunnen leveren 
8 Op grond van de 'transitionele' migralietheone valt te voorspellen dat Marokko zich in de 
komende decennia zal ontwikkelen tot immigratieland 
9 De kerntaak van de wetenschap is het stichten van permanente verwarring 
10 Bezuiniging op wetenschappelijk onderzoek en toenemende afhankelijkheid van 
opdrachtonderzoek hebben m Nederland geleid tot een sterk afgenomen vermogen van de alma 
mater om de samenleving op gepaste afstand kritisch te beschouwen 
11 Financiële, politieke en militaire hulp aan autocratisch geleide staten houdt zittende elites in stand 
Dit zal de ontwikkeling van hun onderdanen eerder frustreren dan stimuleren en het ressentiment 
tegen de Westerse wereld vergroten 
12 Hoewel de visie van de botsing der beschavingen* of religies een laag realiteitsgehalte heeft, 
dreigt het onder invloed van het actuele wereldpolitieke gebeuren alsnog een 'self-fulfilling 
prophecy' te worden (• Hunungton, Samuel Phillips (1996) 77» Clash cfCmlaanons and the Remaking oj World 
Order) 
13 Religie in haar messianistische gedaante heeft de mensheid meer slechts dan goeds gebracht 
14 Marokkanen spreken beter Engels dan Nederlanders Frans spreken 
15 In Marokko njden de treinen wél op tijd 


Over the second half of the 20th century, Morocco 
has evolved into one of the world's leading 
emigration countries. However, the systematic 
study of migration and development in Morocco 
and the Mediterranean has been largely neglected 
after a temporary surge of largely pessimistic 
studies in the 1970s. Empirical work from this 
region has, therefore, been largely absent from 
the lively theoretical debate on migration and 
development. 
This study aims to fill this gap on the basis of 
comprehensive fieldwork in the south-Moroccan 
Todgha oasis valley. Embedded in an elaborate 
theoretical framework and based on qualitative 
research and a survey among more than 500 
households, it explores in detail migration-
development linkages. This study demonstrates 
how migration has changed the face of traditional 
oasis society, and how international migration has 
significantly contributed to the social and economic 
development of the Todgha valley. 
This challenges the dominant pessimistic 
perspectives on migration and development. 
However, several structural obstacles at the 
regional, national, and international level prevent 
the (high) development potential of migration from 
being fully realized. In various ways, however, the 
study shows that prevalent views of migration and 
development need fundamental rethinking. 
